THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM
OF NĀGĀRJUNA
(MAHĀPRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀŚĀTRA)

ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE

VOL. III
CHAPTERS XXXI-XLII

Composed by the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna and translated by
the Tripitakadharmācārya Kumārajiva

Translated from the French
by Gelongma Migme Chodron
Gampo Abbey
CHAPTER XXXI: THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES TO ENLIGHTENMENT

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 871
I. THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM ...................................................... 871
II. THE AUTHOR AND HIS SOURCES ................................................................................. 873
   1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL MILIEU ...................................................... 874
   2. THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN BY TRAINING ........................................................................ 878
      A. Sarvāstivādin Sātrapijaka .................................................................................. 878
      C. Sarvāstivādin Kṣudrakapiṭaka ........................................................................ 880
      D. Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmapiṭaka ..................................................................... 881
      E. Postcanononical Literature .............................................................................. 884
      F. Heretical Literature ........................................................................................ 886
   3. THE MAHĀYĀNIST BY CONVICTION ...................................................................... 888
      A. The Mahāyāna ..................................................................................................... 888
      B. The Mahāyānasūtras ......................................................................................... 891
      C. The Madhyamaka ............................................................................................ 895
III. THE CHINESE TRANSLATION OF THE TRAITÉ ............................................................ 900
   1. KUMĀRAJIVA’S TRANSLATION .............................................................................. 900
   2. NĀGĀRJUNA SEEN FROM TCH’AND-NGAN .............................................................. 905
IV. SUBJECT AND SOURCES OF VOLUME III ................................................................ 909
SUPPLEMENT TO BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 914

I. LISTS OF AUXILIARIES ............................................................................................. 924
II. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE 37 AUXILIARIES ................................................. 926
   1. The 4 smṛtyupasthānas ......................................................................................... 926
   2. The 4 samyakpradhānas ...................................................................................... 927
   3. The 4 rdhipādas .................................................................................................... 927
   4. The 5 indriyas ...................................................................................................... 928
   5. The five balas ....................................................................................................... 930
   6. The 7 saṃbodhyāṅgas ....................................................................................... 930
   8. The 8 mārgaṅgas ................................................................................................ 931
III. THE AUXILIARIES IN THE ABHIDHARMA ................................................................ 933
IV THE AUXILIARIES IN THE MAHĀYĀNA ................................................................. 934
   1. The Madhyamaka viewpoint .............................................................................. 934
   2. The Vijñānavādin viewpoint ............................................................................. 937
First Part THE AUXILIARIES BELONG TO THE GREATER VEHICLE AS WELL .......... 938
Second part THE AUXILIARIES ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA (p. 1143F) .......... 942
I. NUMBER OF AUXILIARIES ........................................................................................ 942
II. THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES ..................... 944
III. THE SEVEN CLASSES OF AUXILIARIES ................................................................ 945
IV. ORDER OF THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES ..................................................... 945
V. DETAILED STUDY OF THE AUXILIARIES .............................................................. 947
   1. The Four Foundations of Mindfulness .................................................................. 947
      A. Foundations and mistakes ............................................................................. 947
      B. Foundation of mindfulness on the body ......................................................... 948
      C. Mindfulness of feeling (p. 1158F) ................................................................. 953
      D. Mindfulness of mind ..................................................................................... 956

863


| E. Mindfulness of Dhammas .................................................. | 960 |
| F. Mindfulness itself, by connection with or as object .......... | 961 |
| G. Inner, outer and mixed mindfulness ............................... | 963 |
| 2. The Four Right Efforts .................................................. | 964 |
| 3. The Four Bases of Magical Power ................................... | 965 |
| 4. The Five Faculties ....................................................... | 967 |
| 5. The Five Strengths ...................................................... | 969 |
| 6. The Seven Members of Enlightenment ............................... | 970 |
| 7. The Eight Members of the Path ....................................... | 971 |
| 8. Distribution of the Auxiliaries in the Stages ................. | 974 |
| Third Section THE AUXILIARIES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA  | 975 |
| I. THE FOUR FOUNDATIONS OF MINDFULNESS .......................... | 975 |
| 1. Mindfulness of body .................................................... | 975 |
| 2. Mindfulness of feeling ................................................ | 978 |
| 3. Mindfulness of mind ................................................... | 978 |
| 4. Mindfulness of dharmas ................................................ | 980 |
| II. – III. THE FOUR RIGHT EFFORTS AND THE FOUR BASES OF MAGICAL POWER | 981 |
| IV. THE FIVE FACULTIES ................................................... | 981 |
| V. THE FIVE POWERS ....................................................... | 986 |
| VI. THE SEVEN FACTORS OF ENLIGHTENMENT ......................... | 986 |
| VII. THE EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE PATH ................................ | 988 |

**CHAPTER XXXII: THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS AND THE FOUR TRANCES .......... 992**

| First Section THE EIGHT CLASSES OF SUPPLEMENTARY DHARMAS (p. 1209F) | 992 |
| SECOND NOTE ................................. | 992 |
| **SECOND SECTION THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS (p. 1213F) .......... 994** |
| SECOND NOTE ................................. | 994 |
| I. THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA ... 997 |
| 1. Definitions of the Three Meditative Stabilizations ................. | 997 |
| 2. Nature of the Three Concentrations ................................... | 1000 |
| 3. Aspects of the Three Concentrations ................................ | 1002 |
| 4. Distribution of the Three Concentrations in the Levels ............ | 1004 |
| II. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA ............ | 1005 |
| 1. Profound Meaning of the Three Concentrations ..................... | 1005 |
| 2. Sameness of the Three Concentrations ................................ | 1009 |
| 3. Single Object of the Three Concentrations .......................... | 1010 |
| Third section THE FOUR TRANCES (p. 1233F) .......................... | 1011 |
| I. THE FOUR TRANCES ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA .................. | 1011 |

**CHAPTER XXXIII: THE FOUR IMMEASURABLES AND THE FOUR FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS (p. 1239F) ......................... 1018**

| First Section THE FOUR IMMEASURABLES ................................ | 1018 |
| SECOND NOTE ................................. | 1018 |
| I. DEFINITION OF THE IMMEASURABLES (p. 1242F) ..................... | 1020 |
| II. ASPECTS OF THE IMMEASURABLES .................................... | 1023 |
| 1. Loving-kindness, compassion and joy ................................ | 1023 |
| 2. The three kinds of loving-kindness ................................ | 1027 |
| 3. The subjective nature of loving-kindness .......................... | 1030 |
| 4. Object and merit of equanimity ..................................... | 1031 |
5. Differences between loving-kindness and joy .................................................. 1031
6. Reasons for practicing equanimity ..................................................................... 1033
7. Limit to the salvific action of the immeasurables ............................................. 1034
8. Is the idea of salvation is purely conventional? ............................................... 1034
9. Differences between ‘happiness’ and ‘compassion’ ........................................ 1037

III. FRUITS OF THE IMMEASURABLES .................................................................. 1038

Second Section THE FOUR FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS (p. 1274F) .................. 1046
I. THE FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA .......... 1046
1. Defiled absorptions, acquired by birth, acquired by effort ......................... 1046
2. Process of access to the absorptions ............................................................... 1047
3. Transcending ideas ....................................................................................... 1048
4. Moral qualities of the absorptions ................................................................. 1049

II. THE FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA .......... 1049

CHAPTER XXXIV: LIBERATIONS, MASTERIES, TOTALITIES, SUCCESSIVE
ABSORPTIONS (p. 1281F) .................................................................................. 1051

First Section LIBERATIONS, MASTERIES AND TOTALITIES ......................... 1051
PRELIMINARY NOTE ....................................................................................... 1051
I. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE THREE LISTS ........................................ 1051
II. KAŚINA IN PĀLi SCHOLASTICISM ................................................................. 1054
III. VIMOKṢA, ABBHĪBHU AND KṛTSNA ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA .... 1056
  1. The Eight Liberations (p. 1291F) ................................................................. 1057
     A. General definition .................................................................................... 1057
     B. The first two vimokṣas .......................................................................... 1058
     C. The third vimokṣa ................................................................................ 1059
     D. Vimokṣas four to seven ........................................................................ 1063
     E. The eighth vimokṣa ............................................................................. 1063
  2. The Eight Masteries .................................................................................... 1064
     A. General definition .................................................................................. 1064
     B. The first abhibhu .................................................................................. 1065
     C. The second abhibhu ............................................................................ 1066
     D. The third and fourth abhibhus .............................................................. 1067
     E. The four last abhibhus ......................................................................... 1067
  3. The Ten Totalities ...................................................................................... 1068
  4. Objects and Distribution of the Vimokṣas, Abhibhus and Kaṭṣnas .............. 1069

Second Section THE NINE SUCCESSIVE ABSORPTIONS (p. 1308F) ........... 1070
PRELIMINARY NOTE ....................................................................................... 1070

CHAPTER XXXV: THE NINE HORRIBLE NOTIONS (p. 1311F) ....................... 1072
PRELIMINARY NOTE ....................................................................................... 1072
I. AŚUḤĀ IN THE CANONICAL TEXTS ............................................................... 1072
II. THE TEN AŚUḤASAṆṆĀ IN THE PĀLi ABHIDHAMMA ................................. 1073
III. THE NINE AŚUḤASAṀJṆĀS IN THE SANSKRĪT ABHIDHARMA ...................... 1073
First Section THE NINE NOTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA ....... 1075
I. THE POSITION OF THE NINE NOTIONS .................................................. 1075
II. HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE NINE NOTIONS ........................................ 1075
  1. Reflection on death .................................................................................. 1075
  2. Vyādmāṭakasaṃjñā ............................................................................... 1077
  3. Vidhūṭakasaṃjñā .................................................................................... 1077
III. CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NINE AND THE TEN NOTIONS ............................................... 1080
IV. RESULTS OF THE NINE NOTIONS ................................................................. 1082
  1. Rejection of the seven types of lust ................................................................. 1082
  2. Diminishing of hatred and delusion ................................................................. 1084
  3. Realization of great benefits ......................................................................... 1084
V. NATURE, OBJECT AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NINE NOTIONS .............. 1084
VI. THE PLACE OF THE NINE NOTIONS IN THE DHARMAS OF THE PATH .......... 1085

CHAPTER XXXVI: THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS (p. 1329F) ............................... 1088

PRELIMINARY NOTE ........................................................................................................ 1088
I. LISTS OF RECOLLECTIONS .............................................................................. 1088
II. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE SIX ANUSMRTI ..................................... 1089
   1. Buddhānusmṛti .................................................................................................. 1089
   2. Dharmānusmṛti .................................................................................................. 1089
   3. Samghānusmṛti .................................................................................................. 1090
   4. Silānusmṛti ........................................................................................................ 1090
   5. Tyāgānusmṛti ..................................................................................................... 1091
   6. Devatānusmṛti ................................................................................................... 1091
First Section  POSITION AND RESULTS OF THE RECOLLECTIONS (p. 1335F) .......... 1092
I. POSITION OF THE RECOLLECTIONS IN THE PRAJñĀPĀRAMITĀ ................ 1092
II. ALL THE RECOLLECTIONS DRIVE AWAY FEAR ........................................... 1094
Second Section THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA (p. 1340F) ......................................................................................... 1095
I. RECOLLECTION OF THE BUDDHA ................................................................. 1095
   1. The ten names .................................................................................................. 1095
   2. The miracles of his birth ............................................................................... 1097
   3. Physical marks and superhuman power ....................................................... 1099
   4. The five pure aggregates (anāsravaskandha) ............................................... 1103
II. RECOLLECTION OF THE DHARMA ................................................................. 1113
   1. Dharma skillfully presented ........................................................................... 1114
   2. Dharma, obtaining its retribution in the present lifetime ............................. 1114
   3. Dharma without torment of burning ............................................................ 1116
   4. The Dharma is independent of time .............................................................. 1117
   5. Dharma leading to the good place ............................................................... 1118
   6. Dharma of unhindered penetration .............................................................. 1118
   7. Other qualities of the Buddhist Dharma ..................................................... 1127
III. RECOLLECTION OF THE COMMUNITY ......................................................... 1131
   1. Community endowed with the five pure skandhas ..................................... 1132
   2. Community worthy of offerings, etc ............................................................. 1133
   3. Community, the best field of merit .............................................................. 1133
4. Community consisting of four pairs and eight classes of individuals ........................................ 1136
5. Other qualities of the Community ........................................................................................................... 1139
THE DĀNAPATI WHO EXCLUDED THE ŚRĀMANERAS FROM HIS INVITATION ........................................ 1139

IV. RECOLLECTION OF THE MORALITIES .......................................................................................... 1151
  1. The various kinds of morality............................................................................................................... 1151
  2. Qualities of the Moralities to be recollected ....................................................................................... 1152
  3. The position of morality among the Path members ........................................................................... 1153
  4. Impure morality .................................................................................................................................. 1155

V. RECOLLECTION OF ABANDONMENT .............................................................................................. 1156
  1. Material generosity ............................................................................................................................... 1156
  2. Generosity of the Dharma.................................................................................................................... 1159
  3. Abandonment of the afflicting emotions ............................................................................................ 1161

VI. RECOLLECTION OF THE DEITIES .................................................................................................... 1161
  1. Recollection of the gods–by-birth ......................................................................................................... 1161
  2. Recollection of gods of native purity ..................................................................................................... 1163

VII. RECOLLECTION OF BREATHING ..................................................................................................... 1163

VIII. RECOLLECTION OF DEATH ........................................................................................................... 1163
IX. LOGICAL ORDER OF THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS ....................................................................... 1167

Third Section THE RECOLLECTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA .............................................. 1170

CHAPTER XXXVII: THE TEN CONCEPTS .................................................................................................... 1172

PRELIMINARY NOTE (p. 1431F) ................................................................................................................. 1172
I. THE CONCEPT OF IMPERMANENCE ...................................................................................................... 1174
II. THE CONCEPT OF SUFFERING .............................................................................................................. 1178
III. THE CONCEPT OF NON-SELF ............................................................................................................... 1186

IV. LINKS BETWEEN IMPERMANENCE, SUFFERING AND NON-SELF .................................................. 1190
V. THE CONCEPT OF REVULSION TOWARD FOOD ................................................................................... 1191
VI. LOGICAL ORDER OF THE TEN CONCEPTS ......................................................................................... 1194

VII. THE CONCEPT OF DISSATISFACTION TOWARD THE ENTIRE WORLD ........................................... 1194
    1. Evils and wickedness of beings ........................................................................................................... 1195
    2. Wretchedness of lands ....................................................................................................................... 1196

VIII. THE CONCEPTS OF DEATH AND IMPURITY ..................................................................................... 1197
IX. THE CONCEPTS OF RENUNCIATION, DETACHMENT AND CESSION ............................................... 1198

CHAPTER XXXVIII: THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES, THE THREE MEDITATIVE
STABILIZATIONS AND THE THREE FACULTIES (p. 1465F) .................................................................. 1200

First Section THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES .......................................................................................... 1200

PRELIMINARY NOTE .................................................................................................................................... 1200
I. THE TEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE SŪTRAPITAKA ..................................................................................... 1200
II. THE TEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE SANSKRIT ABHIDHARMA ............................................................... 1201
III THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE MAHĀYĀNA ............................................................................ 1203
  1. Lists of Eleven Knowledges in the Pṛajñāpāramitās in Sanskrit .................................................... 1203
  2. Lists of the eleven knowledges in the Chinese Pṛajñāpāramitās ..................................................... 1204
     A. Definition of the eleven knowledges in the Pṛajñāpāramitās ...................................................... 1205
     B. The Ten Knowledges According to the Abhidharam ........................................................................ 1208
     C. The Eleven Knowledges According to the Mahāyāna .................................................................... 1215

Second section THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS ................................................................. 1218
I. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA ........................................ 1219
  1. The three kinds of concentration .......................................................................................................... 1219
PRELIMINARY NOTE

I. THE THREE FACULTIES OF UNDERSTANDING
   A. Definition
   B. Excellence of the three faculties of understanding
   C. Levels, objects, associates and causality of the three faculties

II. THE TWENTY-TWO FACULTIES (INDRIYA)
   1. The Three Faculties of Understanding According to the Abhidharma
      A. Definition
      B. Excellence of the three faculties of understanding
      C. Levels, objects, associates and causality of the three faculties

   2. The Three Faculties of Understanding According to the Mahāyāna
      A. In the Darsanamārga
      B. In the bhāvanāmārga
      C. In the Asāiṣamārga

CHAPTER XXXIX: THE TEN POWERS OF THE BUDDHA ACCORDING TO THE
ABHIDHARMA

PRELIMINARY NOTE

I. THE DAŚABALASūTRA
II. LISTS OF JNĀNABALAS

First Section GENERAL QUESTIONS
   I. ATTRIBUTES OF THE ŚRĀVAKA AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA
   II. ATTRIBUTES TO BE FULFILLED AND ATTRIBUTES TO BE COGNIZED
   III. DEFINITION OF THE TEN POWERS ACCORDING TO THE DAŚABALASūTRA
   IV. WHY TEACH THE TEN POWERS?
   V. WHY ARE THERE ONLY TEN POWERS?
   VI. WHY THE FIRST POWER INCLUDES THE OTHER NINE

Second Section THE TEN POWERS IN PARTICULAR
   I. THE POWER OF THE POSSIBLE AND THE IMPOSSIBLE
   II. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RETRIBUTION OF ACTIONS
   III. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DHYĀNAS, ETC.
   IV. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEGREE OF THE MORAL FACULTIES
   V. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF BEINGS
   VI. THE KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUIRED DISPOSITIONS
   VII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE WAY LEADING TO THE VARIOUS DESTINIES
   VIII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF FORMER ABODES
   IX. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DEATH AND REBIRTH
   X. THE POWER OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IMPURITIES

Third Section APPENDICES TO THE TEN POWERS
   I. THE BEST OF THE TEN POWERS
   II. WHY THE BUDDHA THINKS HIGHLY OF HIS TEN POWERS
   III. THERE IS NO BOASTFULNESS IN THE BUDDHA

CHAPTER XL: THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSSES AND THE FOUR UNOBSTRUCTED
KNOWLEDGES (p. 1567F)
I. THE VAIŚĀRADYASŪTRA ................................................................. 1283
II. THE VAIŚĀRADYAS IN THE ABHIDHARMA AND THE ŚĀSTRAΣ ......................................................... 1284
   1. Definition of the Four Fearlessnesses in the Vaiśāradyasūtra .......................................................... 1285
   2. Why the Buddha Mentioned His Four Fearlessnesses ...................................................................... 1286
   3. Similarities and Differences Between Powers and Fearlessnesses .................................................. 1288
   4. How Do We Know That The Buddha is Fearless? ........................................................................... 1289
   5. Why Distinguish Between the Powers and the Fearlessnesses? ....................................................... 1301
   6. Literal Commentary on the Vaiśāradyasūtra .................................................................................... 1301
      A. “I am fully and completely enlightened” .................................................................................... 1301
      B. “I have destroyed all the impurities” ......................................................................................... 1302
      C. “I have stated the dharmas that constitute an obstacle” ............................................................. 1303
      D. “The noble path indicated by me can lead to exit from the world” ......................................... 1303
      E. “I hold the place of Holy Teacher” ......................................................................................... 1304
      F. “In the assemblies I utter the lion’s roar” .................................................................................... 1305
      G. “I turn the Wheel of Brahmā” .................................................................................................. 1309
   7. Nature and Order of the Fearlessnesses ......................................................................................... 1312
Second Section THE TEN POWERS AND THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA .................................................................................................................. 1313
Preliminary Note .................................................................................................................................. 1313
I. THE EMPTINESS OF NONEXISTENCE ......................................................................................... 1317
II. THE TEN POWERS OF THE BODHISATTVA .................................................................................. 1320
III. THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES OF THE BODHISATTVA ................................................................. 1321
Third Section THE FOUR UNHINDERED KNOWLEDGES (p. 1614F) .................................................. 1322
Preliminary Note .................................................................................................................................. 1322
I. THE PRATISĀMVIDS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA ................................................................ 1323
   1. Arthapratisasīvīd .......................................................................................................................... 1323
   2. Dharmapratisasīvīd ....................................................................................................................... 1324
   3. Niruktipratisasīvīd ........................................................................................................................ 1325
   4. Pratibhānapratisasīvīd .................................................................................................................. 1325
   5. Levels, knowledges and types of pratisasīvīd .................................................................................. 1326
II. THE PRATISĀMVIDS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA ................................................................ 1327
   1. Arthapratisasīvīd .......................................................................................................................... 1327
   2. Dharmapratisasīvīd ....................................................................................................................... 1328
   3. Niruktipratisasīvīd ........................................................................................................................ 1328
   4. Pratibhānapratisasīvīd .................................................................................................................. 1329
CHAPTER XLI: THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA ........................................................................... 1331
Preliminary Note .................................................................................................................................. 1331
I. THE EIGHTEEN ĀVENIKADHARMAS OF THE BUDDHAS ........................................................................ 1331
II. THE EIGHTEEN ĀVENIKADHARMAS OF THE BODHISATTVAS .......................................................... 1334
First Section MAHĀYĀNIST LIST OF THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA ............................................................................................................................... 1335
I. TEXT OF THE LIST ACCORDING TO THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ ................................................................ 1335
II. DETAILED COMMENTARY ON THE LIST ......................................................................................... 1337
   1-2. The Buddha has no bodily or vocal defect .................................................................................. 1337
   3. The Buddha has no lapse of mindfulness ....................................................................................... 1338
   4. The Buddha has no notion of variety ............................................................................................. 1339
   5. The Buddha has no non-concentrated mind .................................................................................. 1341
6. The Buddha has no unconsidered equanimity ................................................................. 1344
7. The Buddha has no loss of zeal .......................................................................................... 1348
8. The Buddha has no loss of exertion ...................................................................................... 1351
9. The Buddha has no loss of mindfulness ............................................................................ 1354
10. The Buddha has no loss of wisdom ................................................................................... 1355
11. The Buddha has no loss of deliverance .............................................................................. 1356
12. The Buddha has no loss of the wisdom and the vision of deliverance ............................... 1356
13-15. Every physical, vocal or mental action of the Buddha accompanies knowledge ........ 1358

Digression on a case brought against the Buddha ............................................................... 1361
1. The Accusation .................................................................................................................... 1362
2. The Defense .......................................................................................................................... 1362
   A. Meeting With The Heretics ............................................................................................. 1363
   B. Display of His Breast ....................................................................................................... 1365
   C. Display of His Tongue and His Cryptorchidia ............................................................... 1366
   D. Insults to the Disciples .................................................................................................... 1366
   E. Insults to Devadatta ......................................................................................................... 1368
   F. Use of a Stone Bowl ......................................................................................................... 1371
   G. Silence on the Fourteen Difficult Questions .................................................................. 1377
   H. Simultaneous Teaching of the Self and the Non-self ...................................................... 1379
   I. Simultaneous Teaching of Existence and Non-existence ................................................ 1380
16-18. The Buddha penetrates the past, the future and the present ....................................... 1383
   A. Sarvāstivādin-Saṇṭāna Debate on Time ......................................................................... 1384
   B. The Non-existence of Time According to the Mahāyāna .............................................. 1387

Second Section REFUTATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDAIN THEORIES ON THE SPECIAL
ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA .............................................................................................. 1389
I. REFUTATION OF THE FIRST SARVĀSTIVĀDAIN LIST ....................................................... 1389
II. REFUTATION OF THE SECOND SARVĀSTIVĀDAIN LIST .............................................. 1390

Third Section CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL
ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA RECORDED IN THE MAHĀYĀNI LIST ............................ 1392

CHAPTER XLII THE GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND THE GREAT COMPASSION OF THE
BUDDHAS .................................................................................................................................. 1394

PRELIMINARY NOTE ............................................................................................................. 1394
I. GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND GREAT COMPASSION ACCORDING TO THE
ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA ...................................................................................................................... 1394
II. GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND GREAT COMPASSION ACCORDING TO THE
MAHĀYĀNA ................................................................................................................................ 1396
   1. Great loving-kindness and great compassion ................................................................. 1398
   2. Degrees of loving-kindness and compassion ................................................................. 1398
   3. Epithet ‘great’ reserved for loving-kindness and compassion ....................................... 1400
   4. Epithet ‘great’ refused for the wisdom of the Buddhas ................................................ 1401
   5. Loving-kindness and compassion are pure among the Buddhas .................................. 1402
INTRODUCTION

Volume II of the *Treatise on the Great Virtue of Wisdom* appeared in 1949 and more than twenty years separate it from Volume III which I [Lamotte] have the honor of presenting today. During this time Buddhist studies have made considerable progress in many directions and have brought new light to the *Traité*. An entire book would be needed to describe them in detail, which would delay further the publishing of the present volume. These introductory pages will be limited to providing some detailed information on the *Traité* itself, its author, the sources from which it draws its inspiration, the Chinese translation of which it is the object and, finally, the contents of Volume III. The Supplement to the Bibliography that will follow it will inform the reader more fully.

I. THE TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUE OF WISDOM

The *Traité* is a voluminous commentary on a lengthy version of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*. The short version that first appeared consisted of 8000 ślokas or units of 32 syllables and was entitled *Āṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. The original Sanskrit text was published by R. Mitra in 1888 and by U. Wogihara in 1932-35; it was translated into Chinese six times (T 220, nos. 4-5, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228) and once into Tibetan (Tib. Trip 734).

The long versions entitled *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* were three or possibly four in number:

1. The *Āṣṭādaśāsāhasrikā* in 18,000 ślokas partially edited by E. Conze in 1962, translated once into Chinese (T 220, no. 3) and once into Tibetan (Tib. Trip. 732).

2. The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* in 25,000 ślokas; the history of which is more complicated:
   
   a. T 222: *Koung-tsang-king*, by Dharmarakṣa in 286 A.D.
   
   
   
   

A modified version serving as commentary to the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* of Maitreya also exists in Sanskrit and Tibetan.


---

1 In this introduction, except for indicated exceptions, the numbers in parentheses in the text refer to the pages of the French translation when they are in simple numbers, to the pages and columns of the Chinese edition of T 1509 when the numbers are followed by the letters a, b or c.

3. The Śatasāhasrikā in 100,000 ślokas was partially edited in 1902 by P. C. Ghosa, translated once into Chinese (T 220, no. 1) and once into Tibetan (Tib. Trip. 730). This list far from exhausts the enormous production of Prajñāpāramitās: there are still many other shorter texts of which the author of the Traité was unaware. E. Conze has recorded them for us in his work The Prajñāpāramitā Literature, 1960.

The Traité was a commentary in Sanskrit on the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, in the present case the original version of the Pañcamśatisāhasrikā, a copy of which was in Kumārajīva's possession and which he translated at the same time as the Traité in 403-404: this is the Taishō 223. The translator had no knowledge of the modified version, the only one that has come down to us.

On the other hand, the Indo-Tibetan tradition is silent about the Traité, the only evidence of which is the abridged Chinese translation made by Kumārajīva under the name Ta-tche-tou louen (T 1509).

The East as well as the West has become accustomed to restoring this title in Sanskrit as Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, "Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom".

But, as P. Demiéville has commented, various titles are found both in the editions as well as in the fragments of manuscript found at Touen-houang and especially Mo-ho-po-lo-mi-to-king-che-louen: "The latter (also denoted in the K'ai-yuan-lou, T 2145, K. 4, p. 513a4) is the one that appears at the head of the preface by Seng-jouei (at the beginning of T 1509), with an abridged variant also given by the Tch'ou-san-tsang-ki-tsi (T 2145, k. 10, p. 74c11). This title is probably the older one and could correspond to the Sanskrit Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-upadeśa-[śāstra]: the word upadeśa is, furthermore, given in transcription in the Chinese biographies of Nāgārjuna which must emanate from Kumārajīva: in one of these biographies we read that 'Nāgārjuna made an upadeśa in ten thousand gāthās to explain the Mahāyāna in a developed manner' (Long-chou-p'ou-sa-tchouan, T 2047, p. 184c18; Fou-fa-tsang-yin-yuan-tchouan, T 2058, k. 5, p. 318b16)."

But the characters che-louen do not necessarily render the Sanskrit upadeśa and do not appear among the Chinese expressions most often used to translate upadeśa, namely, louen-yi, fa-yī, chouo-yi, fa-chouo, yi-couo, ta-kiao.

Be that as it may, Demiéville was right and, in the title in question, che-louen is the equivalent of upadeśa. Actually, upadeśa is also the name of the twelfth and last member of the 'twelve-membered' word of the Buddha (dvādaśaṅga-buddhayacana) which is frequently mentioned in the Sanskrit texts of the two

---

2 Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna, JA, 1950, p. 375, n. 1
3 Read: 'ten myriads of gāthās.'
5 The Chinese characters are given rather than the numbers as in previous vols. I and II.

872
Vehicles; Kumārajīva uses only two ways of rendering this member: he either transcribes it as yeou-po-t’i-chö, or else he translates it as louen-yi.

And yet at kiuan 20, p. 208b16, which the reader will find below at p. 1237F, the Traité designates itself under the title of Pan-jo-po-lo-mi-louen-yi: pan-jo-lo-mi is the transcription of prajñā-pāramitā, and louen-yi is the translation of upadeśa.

Therefore the original Indian title was Prajñāpāramitopadeśa ‘Detailed Analysis of the Perfection of Wisdom’, or also Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra-upadeśa, ‘Detailed Analysis of the Great Sūtra on the Perfection of Wisdom’, in the present case, the Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrikā.

The works of scholastic Buddhism often have the title of Upadeśa: thus Vasubandhu composed upadeśas on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (T 1519, 1520), the Sukhāvatīvyūha (T 1524), the Ratnacūḍa (T 1526), the Dharmacakrapravartana (T 1533), etc.

At kiuan 33, p. 308a, the Traité will explain what it means by upadeśa: “Louen-yi (upadeśa) means to reply to questions (prāśnavyākaraṇa), to explain why and then to explain broadly the meanings (artha). When the Buddha preached the four truths (satya), he was asked what they are, and the reply was that they are the four noble truths (āryasatya). He was asked what are these truths, and the reply was that they are the four noble truths on suffering (duḥkha), its origin (sāmadaya), its cessation (nirodha) and the path (pratipad): that is what the louen-yi (upadeśa) is. He was asked what is the noble truth of suffering (duḥkhāryasyatya), and the reply was that it is the eight kinds of suffering, suffering of birth (jātiduḥkha), etc. He was asked what is the suffering of birth, and the reply was that beings, in every place of birth (jātisthāna), undergo suffering. Giving such answers to questions and broadly explaining the meanings is what is called yeou-po-t’i-chö (upadeśa).

II. THE AUTHOR AND HIS SOURCES

An almost twenty century-old legend has been woven around the author of the Traité and even to skim through it, it is evident that there will be further enrichment of it. Without pretending to ‘render unto Caesar’, for the time being, we are not prevented from disregarding it momentarily so as to study the author on the basis of his work alone. Indian writers in general and Buddhist scholars in particular are not in the habit of pushing themselves forward and, if a literary genre has been neglected in India, it is indeed that of autobiography. We cannot blame the philosophers who profess the anātman for concealing their own individuality in their works. Such reservation is easy when the work is not greater than five hundred stanzas, as was the case for the Madhyamakaśāstra, the Dvādaśamukhaśāstra, the Catuhṣatakashāstra or the Śatakashastra. When, like the Traité, it reaches more than three million words in a thousand scrolls, it is more difficult for the author to maintain his incognito.
1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL MILIEU

According to the indications furnished by the author, he seems to have been active at the beginning of the 4th century of our era in north-western India. This region, which for a long time was the only gate half-way open to the exterior, already had had a long history. After having undergone the Achemenid yoke for two and a half centuries (559-326 B.C.) and the Macedonian occupation for twenty years (326-306 B.C.), it had rejoined the mother country on terms of the convention concluded between Seleucos the First Nicator and Candragupta. Having moved within the circles of the Mauryan Indian empire from about 306 to 189, it was conquered by the Greco-Macedonians of Bactria who founded two kingdoms in it: the western Greek kingdom consisting of Bactria, Sogdia, Arie, Sýistan and Arachosia; the eastern Greek empire extending over Kapiša, Gandhāra and the Punjab. Devoured by internal quarrels, the Greeks eliminated themselves, and their last representative disappeared from the scene of history about 30 A.D. Previously, peoples of Iranian language had already infiltrated into India and, for a century and a half (ca. 90 B.C. – 50 A.D.) the north-west suffered invasions by Scytho-Parthians, the Šakas of Mauēs (90-53 B.C.) and the Pahlavas of Gondopharesia (19-45 A.D.). Finally, about 50 A.D., Indo-Scythia passed into the hands of nomadic populations of poorly defined origin, called Ta Yue-tche, Yue-tche and Tou-houo-lo by the Chinese, Tokharoi and Thagouroi by the Greeks, Tochari and Togarī by the Romans, Tukhāra, Tusāra and Turuška by the Indians, Tho-Kar and Thod-Kar by the Tibetans, Tokhrī by the Ouigours, Ttauγara or Ttauḍūgara by the Khotanese. Starting out from Kan-sou in 174 B.C., they had seized hold of Bactria about 130 B.C., and had divided it up into five dynasties. One of their descendants, Kujula Kadphises, an officer of the Kouei-chouang region, dominated his fellows and laid the foundations of an immense empire which, at the time of its greatest extent, included Chinese Turkestan with Kashgar, Yarkhand and Khotan, eastern Iran with Sogdia, Bactria and Séistan, all of north-western India with Kashmir, the Indus basin and the middle Ganges area, possibly as far as Benares.

For two and a half centuries, the Kušāna empire played the role of crossroads of Asia, all the lines of communication of which it controlled.

The first dynasty represented by Kujula Kadphises and Vima Kadphises (ca. 50-80 A. D.) was succeeded by a second dynasty represented by the illustrious names of Kaniška, Vāşiška, Kaniška II, Huviška and Vāsuđevas. The date of Kaniška’s accession is still debated: 78, 128 or 144 A.D.6 On his inscriptions, he inaugurated a new era lasting at least 98 years. The Kušāna empire became decadent with the accession to the Persian throne of the Sassanides (227-651): about 226, its founder, Ardahīr-i-Bābegān invaded Kapiša, Gandhāra and the eastern Punjab.

Reigning over populations of very different race, language and religion, the Kušānas were wise enough to respect them all. Their coins bore inscriptions in Indian, Iranian and even Greek; on the reverse side, they

showed Iranian deities, Sun, Moon, Wind, Fire, Mithra, Anaītis; some Indian, Śiva, Mahāsena, Skandha, Budha (sic!) and also Serapis, Horus, Heracles, Selene, Helios and even Roma.

Kaniṣka favored Buddhism by building near Puruṣapura, his capital, a stūpa 700 feet high at the village of Kharjurikā, which, for many centuries, was admired by the Chinese pilgrims. Excavations at this site by D. B. Spooner and H. Hargreaves have unearthed an inscribed reliquary surmounted by three figures representing the Buddha between Brahmā and Indra; the body of the reliquary is engraved with various figures of orantes, particularly Kaniṣka flanked by two deities, the Sun and the Moon, the Miiro and Mao of the coins. It appears from many inscriptions in Kharoṣṭhī and Brāhmī that the great emperor promoted the building of stūpas and vihāras. His successors followed his example, and the founding and endowment of a magnificent monastery at Jamālpur Mound near Mathurā is attributed to Huviṣka.7

A legend, which seems to be a replica of that of Aśoka, formed around Kaniṣka. It connects him with the minister Māṭhara, the physician Caraka and important religious individuals such as Sāṃgharaṇa, Aśvaghoṣa, Jeyata, Pārśva, Vasumitra and Pūrṇa. The legend has it that he convened a great council at Kāśmir to revise the Buddhist scriptures and to compose explanatory treatises on the Three Baskets.

The author of the Traité definitely lived at the time of the Great Kuśāṇas since he makes frequent allusions to the Greater and Lesser Yue-tche or Tukhāras (p. 547F, 555F, 672F, 1584F). But curiously enough, he never mentions their personal names and limits himself to referring to them by the official title of devaputra, frequent on the inscriptions and coins (p. 475F, 1421F, 396c, 321a, etc.). Such reticence is perhaps a mark of respect, but more likely answers to the fundamental antipathy the Indians always experienced in regard to sovereigns of foreign origin. It explains the total silence maintained by the indigenous chronicles on Alexander’s incursion into India, major event though it was. Despite their generous donations, the great Kuśāṇas remained outsiders to the native population. The author of the Traité does not conceal his scorn for the borderlands (pratyantajanapada) which he considers to be places of lowly birth, and he adds to them not only the foreign kingdoms such as Tukhāra, Sogdia, Persia and the eastern Mediterranean, but also some regions of India occupied by primitive peoples such as the Śavaras, people of Dravidian languages such as the Andhras and even some slightly aryанизed capitals such as Ujjayinī (p.174F, 1584-1586). In his eyes, the Buddhist Madhyadesa was limited to the lands of Aryan tongue and, whatever their religious sympathies, he is not far from rejecting as barbaric foreigners all those who spoke Chinese, Scythian, Greek, Dravidian, Tibetan, Kāśgarian, Tokharian or Bactrian (p. 1586).

At the end of the Kuśāṇa epoch, the religious situation was very complex. The inscriptions, the coins and the literary texts attest to the active presence, in the north-west, of Brahmanism and Hinduism, of Jainism and Buddhism, as well as the persistence of the primitive cult of the Nāgas. The holy Dharma particularly flourished and, starting from the reign of Aśoka (272-236), the region became, after Magadha, the second Holy Land of Buddhism. The great emperor flooded it with his edicts on the Dharma, published in Indian Prākrit, in Aramaic and in Greek.8 After this psychological preparation, the missionary Madhyāntika, sent

7 H. Lüders, Mathurā Inscriptions, 1961, p. 57 seq.
8 Inscriptions at Shāhlbāzgarhī (Peshāwār district) and at Māneshā (Hazāra district) in chancellery Prākrit and Kharoṣṭhī script; Aramaic inscription at Pūl-i-Darunteh in Lampaka; bilingual Greco-Aramaic at Qandahār (JA,
by Moggaliputtatissa, settled down there with five hundred arhats; he introduced the cultivation of saffron and substituted the reign of the holy Dharma for the cult of the nāgas. The district was soon covered with monasteries (vihāra, saṃghārāma) to shelter the monastics and with commemorative monuments (stūpa) to perpetuate the memory of Śākyamuni. The stūpas of the old style – described by Hiuan-tsang as ‘Aśoka’s stūpa’ – were especially numerous. Consisting of a raised hemispherical dome on a terrace surrounded by a balustrade, they marked the places where Śākyamuni, during his previous existences as Bodhisattva, had distinguished himself by his generosity, morality, patience and exertion. Thus, although the last lifetime of the Buddha had taken place in the region of the middle Ganges, the north-western India was the main theatre of his jātakas.

Later, at the time, more precisely, of the Kuṣaṇas, the stupa evolved in form: placed on a raised drum, it became more slender and gained in height. What is more, it was covered with sculptures representing the human form of the Buddha in various episodes of his last existence, a major innovation probably inspired by Hellenistic sculptors who may have developed unhindered in the large sculpture schools of Gandhāra and Mathurā.

At the same time, the legend of the Buddha, breaking with historical plausibility, devised a long journey of Śākyamuni across the north-west of India where he may have left traces of his passage. Accompanied sometimes byĀnanda, sometimes by the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi, the Teacher, starting from Mathurā, made this tour in twenty-five stages, taming the nāgas, converting the kings, predicting important events and leaving his shadow in the village of Pālitakūṭa, near Tchahār-Bāgh (p. 547-554F)

In the meantime, the Buddhist community had passed through many vicissitudes: “When the Buddha was in this world, the Dharma met with no opposition. After the Buddha died, when the Dharma was recited for the first time, it was still as it was when the Buddha was alive. One hundred years later, king Aśoka called together a great quinquennial (pañcavaraṣa) assembly and the great Dharma teachers debated. As a result of their differences, there were distinct sects (nikāya) each having a name and each developing subsequently” (p. 106-108F). Following a schism provoked by Mahādeva, the Saṃgha split into two big parts, that of the Sthaviras “Old Ones”, partisans of a more strict orthodoxy, and that of the Mahāsāṃghikas “Majorities”, of laxer and democratic tendencies. These two sections in turn became subdivided into various sects which tradition has fixed as eighteen in number. They expanded over all of India and geographical separation further increased their differences.

In the Kuṣaṇa epoch, two sects, the Mahāsāṃghika and the Sarvāstivādin, contended with one another over the north-west. The former, represented at Mathurā and Kapiša, used a hybrid language, a mixture of the Prakrit jargon and correct Sanskrit. The latter, derived from the Sthavira branch, resolutely opted for the

use of Sanskrit as the religious language, They were by far the more powerful, and inscriptions in Karoṣṭhī and Brāhmī indicate their presence at Mathurā, Kalwan, Shāh-jī-Ḍheri, Zeda, Kurram (either in Afghanistan, Punjab and Sindh) with off-shoots as far away as Śrāvastī and Sārnāth.

The two sects, which were opposed especially in matters of buddhology, evolved somewhat over time, but the second in particular still represented the old Buddhism as Śākyamuni had taught it to his śrāvakas. Nevertheless, around the beginning of our era, they were infiltrated by adepts of a new form of Buddhism animated by a more daring ideal, inspired by more radical philosophical ideas and professing theories, hitherto unknown, on the nature of Buddha and future Buddhas. This movement, suggestive rather than revolutionary, took the name of Mahāyāna ‘Greater Vehicle (of salvation)’ and qualified as Hinayāna, ‘Lesser Vehicle’, the old doctrines and practices. It did not constitute a new sect and its name never appears in the inscriptions, but it developed within the very bosom of the monastic communities.

Some monks, regarding the teachings transmitted for five hundred years as the holy Dharma (saddharma), refused to come to terms with the Mahāyāna, rejected its scriptures as false and charged the new movement with being the Counterfeit Dharma (pratirūpakādhārma): disciples they were, disciples they meant to remain. But beside these reactionary śrāvakas, there were progressive monks who took the Mahāyāna sūtras into consideration, held them or pretended to take them as the Word of the Buddha and adopted their ideas. Nevertheless, they did not leave their monastery and continued to co-habit with the ‘Old Ones’ who did not share their views. Thus, in the 7th century, Hiuan-tsang distinguished three types of monasteries: the monasteries within the jurisdiction of the Hinayāna sects (Sthavira, Mahāsāṃghika, Sarvāstivādin, Saṃmatiya), the Mahāyāna monasteries, and finally the monasteries where practitioners of both Vehicles lived together.

In regard to his epoch and the sources that he uses, it seems that the author of the Traité was a Sarvāstivādin, perhaps belatedly converted to the Mahāyāna. His high esteem for the monastic life (p. 839-846F), his disdainful silence toward the Mahāsāṃghikas whom he mentions only once in his work suggests that he wore the yellow robe of the bhikṣu in some Sarvāstivādin monastery of north-western India, one of these monasteries built on the plains or on the hills, the ruins of which still exist at Shāh-jī-Ḍheri, Śhāh-Ḍheri, Shahr-i-Bahlol, Sanghao, Takht-i-Bahai, Hamal-Garhī, Karkai, etc. Fa-hien, who visited them at the beginning of the 5th century, tells us that they were occupied almost exclusively by Sarvāstivādins.

Under the direction of learned teachers, the author devoted himself to the study of the sacred texts, memorized the Tripiṭaka and specialized in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. He manifests such a deep understanding of it that we may think he in turn taught it. Later, the reading of the Mahāyānasūtras must have made an impression on him, and study of the early Mādhyamikans (Nāgarjuna, Āryadeva, Rāhulabhadra) convinced him of the cogency of the new ideas. He went over to the Mahāyāna without, however, giving up his scholastic habits. In the form of a commentary on the Pañcaviṃśatisātisāhasrikā, he composed a voluminous exegetical treatise which is like a Mahāyāna reply to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. The author appears both as a Sarvāstivādin by training and a Mahāyānist by conviction, and it is under these two aspects that he should be studied.
2. THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN BY TRAINING

The study program imposed on the north-western bhikṣus involved a formidable body of canonical and paracanonical texts. In contrast with most of the sects which had only three Baskets, the Sarvāstivādin Tripiṭaka, contrary to its name, had four: 1. the *Vinayapiṭaka*, the basket of discipline, 2. the *Sūtrapiṭaka*, the basket of dogmatic texts incorporating four “traditions” (*āgama*), 3. the *Abhidharmapiṭaka*, the scholastic basket, 4. the *Kṣudrapiṭaka*, the basket of minor texts. This is mentioned on p. 692-693F of the *Traité* and p. 412a of the Chinese translation.

A. Sarvāstivādin Sūtrapiṭaka.

It comprised four *āgamas* listed in the following order: 1) *Ekottarāgama* or *Ekottarika*, 2) *Madhyāgama*, 3) *Dīrghāgama*, 4) *Saṃyuktāgama*. The text of the *āgamas* was translated into Chinese at the beginning of the 5th century (T 125, 26, 1, 99) and the sands of central Asia have yielded important fragments of their original Sanskrit: on the basis of these fragments, the patient work of E. Waldschmidt and his school have resulted in the reconstruction of numerous sūtras.

The *Traité* sometimes refers to these *āgamas* and occasionally cites the *Ekottara* (p. 103F, 1268F), the *Madhya* (p. 4F, 103F, 307b, 456b), the *Dīrgha* (p. 103F, 300F, 544F) and the *Saṃyukta* (p. 103F, 447F, 542F, 614F, 288a, 295b, 298a, 307a, 444a). As general rule, however, it prefers to refer to the sūtras incorporated in these *āgamas*. These sūtras being familiar to all learned Buddhists, very often it omits mentioning their titles.

Comparative study of the texts shows that the author of the *Traité* used the *Madhyāgama* and the *Saṃyuktāgama* of which Taisho 26 and 99 are the translations. In regard to the *Ekottarāgama* and the *Dīrghāgama*, he used originals slightly different from Taisho 125 and 1.

According to the immutable laws of religious exegesis, the author presents no event that is not based on a dogmatic source. On each page he refers explicitly or implicitly to a sūtra or a topic mentioned by several sūtras at the same time. This will become evident in the notes annexed to the French translation.

The sūtras being the very words of the Buddha, the author never rejects them. If they apparently contradict themselves, he makes efforts to assure their authenticity, then to interpret them according to the nature of things (*dharmatā*) by establishing a clear distinction between the scriptures of provisional meaning and those of definitive meaning (p.536-539F, 1621F n.). He shows himself thus to be a specialist trained in the school of rigorous intellectual discipline and respectful of the traditional game of exegesis.

---

9 The Vijñānavādins inherited this canon: cf. HBI, p. 167.
10 The same order was adopted by other schools; cf. HBI, p. 170.
11 In *Essays Offered to G. H. Luce*, 1966, p. 49-58, A. Bareau has decisively established the Dharmaguptaka origin of the *Dīrghāgama* translated into Chinese by Buddhayaśas and Tchou Fo-nien (T 1).
The never-ending recourse to old canonical sūtras has the psychological effect of immersing the author in the past and making him relive in spirit the memorable events that occurred in Kosala, Magadha and the middle Ganges region at the time of the Buddha and his great disciples. He manifests an extensive and precise knowledge of the geography of the ancient epoch (p. 163-197F).

B. Sarvāstivādin Vinayapiṭaka

The Traité is rather confused on the history of the Vinaya (p. 104F, 756c) but may be complemented thanks to information given by the Kaśmirian tradition and collected in the 5th and 6th centuries by Kumārajīva, Seng-yeou and Houei-kiao.12

At the council of Rājagrha presided over by Kāśyapa at the death of the Buddha, Upāli recited the Vinayapiṭaka. As there were 80 repetitions of reciting this Vinaya, this last one will be called the ‘Vinaya of 80 recitations’. The first five patriarchs, Kāśyapa, Ānanda, Madhyāntika, Śāṇavāsa and Upagupta, conserved it carefully. As Upagupta, a contemporary of and advisor to Aśoka, had established residency at Mathurā, the old Vinaya which he retained was designated under the name ‘Vinaya of the land of Mathurā in 80 sections’. The text contained Avadānas and Jātakas.

But at that time, people, being of weak faculties, were unable to memorize so voluminous a code. The different Buddhist schools therefore published an abridgment of it and this is how the five Vinayas saw the light of day: Pāli Vin., Mahāsāṃkha Vin. (T 1431), Mahāsāṃgika Vin. (T 1425), Dharmaguptaka Vin. (T 1428) and Sarvāstivādin Vin. (T 1435).

The Sarvāstivādin Vin. was compiled by Upagupta who reduced it to 10 sections by eliminating the stories of the Avadānas and Jātakas. It was entitled: ‘Vinaya in ten recitations’ (Daśadhāya): sections 1 to 3 commented on the 250 rules of the bhikṣu; sections 4 to 6 dealt with the seven and the eight dharmas, in other words, the Skandhakas; section 7 explained the rules of the bhikṣuṇīs; sections 8 to 10 were reserved for appendices: Ekottara, Upāliparipṛcchā, Kṣudrakavarga and Kuśaladharma. Some original fragments have come down to us and have been published by J. Filliozat and H. Kung13 and by V. Rosen.14

Introduced into Kaśmir, this Vinaya was also designated by the name ‘Vinaya of Kaśmir’. Kumārajīva translated it at Tch’ang-ngan in 404-405 under the name Che-song-liu (T 1435) and subsequently, after 409, Vimalākṣa completed it and enriched it with a preface.

Later, according to the Traité (p. 756c), there was a vibhāṣā in 80 chapters that commented on it. This vibhāṣā should not be confused with the primitive Vinaya which itself also consisted of 80 sections. Although the sources lack precision in this regard, this vibhāṣā, also composed in Kaśmir, is undoubtedly identical with the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya,15 definitely subsequent to the advent of the great Kuśāṇas

12 HBI, p. 191-192.
13 Fragments du Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin, JA, 1938, p. 21-64.
14 Der Vinayavibhāṅga zum Bhikṣuprātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins, 1959.
15 HBI, p. 187-188.
since it contains a prophecy relating to Kaniṣka.\textsuperscript{16} The Indian original has come down to us almost complete: various Sanskrit texts, such as the \textit{Divyāvadāna} and the \textit{Avadānaśataka} reproduce long passages of it; an apparently complete copy, written on birch-bark, was discovered at Gilgit in Kaśmir in 1931 and published by N. Dutt.\textsuperscript{17} Between the discovery and the editing, several sheets were misplaced, notably the major part of the \textit{Samghabheda-vastu} containing a detailed biography of Buddha Śākyamuni. G. Tucci recovered it in Afghanistan and it has appeared in the \textit{Serie Orientale Roma}. The Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya also exists in Tibetan translation (Tib. Trip. 1030-1037) and in Chinese translation (T 1442-1451), but the latter, made by Yi-tsing between 700 and 712, is not quite complete.

The \textit{Traité} has drawn up the table of contents of the \textit{Sarvāstivādin Vinaya} (p. 104F) and borrows from it some important definitions, such as that of the Buddhadharmā (p. 81F), as well as various stories telling the circumstances that led the Teacher to formulate certain disciplinary regulations along with the exceptions they involve: the interdiction of eating impure food (p. 118-121F), of using bowls other than iron or baked clay \textit{pātra} (p. 1674F), the authorization of accepting and wearing rich robes offered by lay people (p. 1678F), etc. But it is inspired much more frequently by the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya from which it borrows most of the Avadānas and Jātakas with which it ornaments its explanation. After the fashion of this \textit{vinaya}, it explains most of the events in the life of the Buddha and his great disciples during their last lifetime. It would be impossible to list here the borrowings taken more or less directly from the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya: merely as example, the most characteristic are listed here: conversion of the old Subhadra (p. 205-209F, 1650F), Sudhodana reassured by a god about the health of his son (p. 228-230F), the legend of Dharmaruci (p. 410-414F), Buddha’s journey to Śāla (p. 457-463), slander about the gardener Gaṇḍaka (p. 497-499), the nine or ten torments inflicted on the Buddha in the course of his last lifetime (p.507-511), the miracle of the multiplication of five buddhas (p. 531-535F, 1352-1353F), journeys of the Buddha in southern India, in north-western India and in Kaśmir (p. 546-548F), the story of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana (p. 621-633F), the fable of the snake, the frog and the rat (p. 753F), the crimes of Devadatta (p. 868-878F, 1671-1674F), the story of Yaśodharā and the explanation of her prolonged pregnancy (p. 1001-1112), the relationship between king Bimbasāra and the courtesan Âmrāpāli (p. 990-992F), etc.

The author has an interesting comment on the value of the Vinaya (p. 648b): like the sūtras, the code of monastic discipline is the word of the Buddha but concerns only the things of this world for the welfare of the Saṅgha; it imposes precepts (śīla) but does not explain the nature of things (dharmatā).

C. Sarvāstivādin Kṣudrakapiṭaka.

The \textit{Kṣudrakapiṭaka}, also called \textit{Kṣudrakāgama} or simply \textit{Kṣudraka} by the \textit{Traité} (p. 341F), formed a separate basket for the Sarvāstivādins, corresponding roughly to the Pāli \textit{Khuddakanukāya}. It consists of

\textsuperscript{16} Mūlasarv.Vin, in \textit{Gilgit Manuscripts}, III, part 1, p. 2; T 1448, k. 9, p. 41b28.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Gilgit Manuscripts}, III, 1942-50.
old minor texts, usually versified, put into the mouth of the Buddha or one of his great disciples. Their number is not fixed, but the more or less complete lists that have come down to us mention the following texts, all of which the *Traité* has used:

1) *Dharmapada* (p. 29F, 1423F, 1513F, 278b, 316a, 464a).

2) *Udāna* (p. 325F, 1220F, 1513F).


4) *Satyadrṣṭa*.

5) *Śailagāthā*.


The more recent editions of these minor texts are mentioned in the Supplement to the Bibliography annexed to the present Introduction.

D. Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmapiṭaka.

This basket is the masterpiece of the Sarvāstivādin school; it shows but vague similarities with the Ceylonese Theravādin *Abhidhammapiṭaka*. It includes seven original works which tradition attributes, not to the Buddha himself, but to a series of disciples extending from the first to the sixth century after the Parinirvāṇa. The Chinese and Tibetan sources do not fully agree on the names of the supposed authors.

1) The *Samgītiparīyāya*, composed by Śāriputra (T 1536) or by Maudgalyāyana, is a commentary on a sūtra of the Dīrghāgama, the Samgītiparīyāya, of which important fragments have been published.

2) The *Dharmaskandha* by Mahāmaudgalyāyana (T 1537) or by Śāriputra is a collection of sūtras preached at Jetavana in Śrāvastī and briefly commented by canonical quotations.

3) The *Prajñaptiśāstra* by Mahāmaudgalyāyana (T 1538; Tib. Trip. 5587) shows some resemblance to the cosmological sūtra of the Dīrghāgama (T 1, no. 30) and the *Li-che-a-p‘i-t’an-louen* (T 1644) which itself also shows all the characteristics of a sūtra.

4) The *Vijñānakāya* by Devakṣema (T 1539) or by Devaśarman was composed at Viśoka near Śrāvastī in the century following the Parinirvāṇa.

---

18 HBI, p. 177-178.
19 HBI, p. 203.
5) The Dhātukāya is attributed to Vasumitra by the Chinese (T1540), to Pūrṇa by the Tibetans: both authors are considered to be contemporaries of Kāṇiṣka.

6) The Prakaraṇapāda (T 1541, 1542) is given by the Traité (p. 111-112F) as a collective work: the first four chapters are said to be the work of Vasumitra and the last four, among them the chapter on the Thousand Aporias, the work of the Kaśmirian arhats.

7) The Jñānaprasthāna

Its author was Kātyāyanīputra, or simply Kātyāyana, who lived in the 3rd century after the parinirvāṇa according to Seng-tchao and Hiuan-tsang, in the 3rd or 5th according to Paramārtha. The Mahāvibhāṣā has it that he composed his work ‘in the East’, but Hiuan-tsang locates him at Tāmasavāna near Činabhukti in Kaśmir on the right bank of the Bias. According to Paramārtha, he went to Kaśmir with five hundred arhats and five hundred bodhisattvas to compile the Abhidharma of his school, and the result of this compilation was the Aṣṭaskandha, also called Jñānaprasthāna. As the work represents the Sarvāstivāda in its pure state, it is not likely that bodhisattvas, as adepts of the Mahāyāna, collaborated in it. Moreover, it may be noted that the traditions about the council of Kāṇiṣka do not have Kātyāyana appearing in them.

The Jñānaprasthāna was in Sanskrit: Vasubandhu’s Koṣabhāṣya and Yaśomitra’s Kośavyākhyā cite lengthy extracts from it, and fragments of it have been found at Kapiša and central Asia: those from Bāmiyān have been published by S. Lévi, and those from Koutcha by B. Pauly: these last were identified by P. Demiéville.

The work has been the object of two Chinese translations: 1. the Abhidharmāṣṭaskandhastra (T 1543) translated in 383 at Tch’ang-ngan by Saṅghadeva and Tchou Fo-nien with a preface by Tao-ngan; 2. the Abhidharmajñānaprasthānastra (T 1544) translated by Hiuan-tsang at Tch’ang-ngan in 657 to 660.

In the course of time, many commentaries have been made on the Jñānaprasthāna. According to Tao-ngan, three arhats, Che-t'o p'an-ni, Ta-si and Pi-lo-ni, each dedicated a vibhāṣā to it; only the first is known to us. Later, five hundred great arhats in turn commented on it. Actually we have three vibhāṣās on the Jñānaprasthāna:


21 HBI, p. 203-207.
25 Tch’ou-san-tsang-k'i-tsi, T 2145, k. 10, p. 73b.
1) *Vibhāṣāśāstra* by Che-t’o-p’an-ni (T1547) or by Kātyāyanaputra himself (?), translated at Tch’ang-ngan in 383 by Samghabhadra, Dharmanandin and Buddharaḵsa, and perhaps revised at Lo-yang by Samghadeva.26

2) *Abhidharmavibhāṣāsāstra*, by five hundred arhats (T 1546), translated at Leang-cheou from 437 to 439 by Buddhavarman on the basis of an Indian manuscipt found by Tao-t’ai west of the Mountain of Onions (Pamir). It consisted of a hundred *kiuan*, but in 439, as a result of the invasion of the region by the barbarian T’o-pa T’ao, about forty of them were lost and only sixty remain.27

3) *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* by five hundred arhats (T 1545) translated by Hiuan-tsang at Tch’ang-ngan in 656-659.

But these facts tell us nothing about the date of the original Sanskrit texts. We know only that the Mahāvibhāṣā is later than Kaniṣka since it tells the well-known story of the eunuch and the bulls (T 1545, k. 114, p. 593a), placing it as ‘once in Gandhāra, under Kaniṣka’.

Although the *Traité* contends with the *Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma*, its author reveals himself as an outstanding specialist in this Abhidharma and I [Lamotte] personally think that before his conversion to the Mahāyāna, he professed the Vibhāṣā in some monastery in Kaśmir-Gandhāra. As may be observed in reading the present volume, the explanation of the abhidharmic doctrines take up ten times as much space as their refutation, and the author is careful to say that his explanation is only a summary that could be further extended (p. 1186F, 1225F, 1232F, 1236F, 1273F, 1279F, 1309F, 1362F, 1483F, 1486F, 1492F).

Among the texts and authors that he mentions, the following may be noted:

1) The *Satpādābhidharma* (p. 106F, 111F, 536a, 752b), the *Abhidharmasūtra* (p. 576c, 586b), the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* (p. 105F, 693F), the *Abhidharmavibhanga* (P. 1236F, 1702F, 1703F).

2) The *Prakaranapāda* (p. 11F) and its chapter on the Thousand Aporias (p. 1101F, 1171F, 1181F).

3) Kātyāyaniputra or simply Kātyāyana (p. 109F, 614F, 1383F, 1697F), his disciples (p. 245F, 285F, 330a), his work called *Jñānapratīṣṭhānāśaskandha* (p. 109F), Kātyāyana- or Kātyānāṇīputrābhiddharma (p. 424F, 786F, 787F).

4) The *Vibhāṣā* (p. 110F, 377F), the *Abhidharmavibhāṣā* (p. 292F, 343a, 579c), the Kātyānāṇīputrābhiddharmavibhāṣā (p. 273a) and the Vibhāṣā scholars called Abhidharmavibhāṣapadeśācārya (p. 341c). According to some citations (p. 272F, 377F, 728F, 993F), it seems that the author of the *Traité* made use of a complete version of the *Great Vibhāṣā* by five hundred Kaśmirian arhats. For the same reason, he was probably aware of the Abhidharmāṃrūtarasa by Ghoṣaka (T 1553) and the Abhidharmasāra by Dharmaśīri (T 1550, by Upāśanta (T 1551) and perhaps also by Dharmatrāta (T 1552).28 At times he was inspired by some *Dhyānasūtras* such as the *Tch’än-yao-king* (T6090, etc. (p. 1025F, 1322-1323F, 1396F). 26

---


27 Idem, *ibid.*, p. 120.

1422F, 1547F, 264c, 705b), but the question of borrowings is obscure and would require an in-depth inquiry.

The Traité does not mention the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas often evoked in the Mahāvibhāṣā, but it was certainly familiar with the controversy on time which set them in opposition to the Sarvāstivādins (p. 1691-1694F) and takes its position, understood provisionally, on the side of the opinion of the latter.

In brief, the information that it provides is so vast that it can hardly be situated before the beginning of the 4th century A.D.

E. Postcanonical Literature.

The author would have been neither Indian nor a scholar if he had not been impassioned by the folklore of his region, the prose and verse biographies of the Buddha Śākyamuni, the tales of previous existences and the innumerable legends current in his time, legends that the Chinese Tripitaka grouped into the Section of previous facts (pen-yuan) from which É. Chavannes judiciously chose for his fine work Contes et apologues du Tripitaka chinois. In contrast to Vasubandhu, Saṃgharakṣa, Asaṅga, boring because of their technicality, the author excels in mingling the playful and the serious, without retreating at times in the face of the more spicy stories.

It goes without saying that these legends are without a country of origin. But it is quite natural that the author would have leaned preferentially on the folklore of his own region.

Among the Jātakas that he preferred are the tales where the future Buddha “sacrificed his body, his flesh, his head, his eyes, his marrow and his skull to his enemy” (p. 143F, 691F, 716F, 750F, 945F, 983F, 1654F, 1712F, 502c, 606b, 624c). These stories concern events situated by the ‘Golden Legend’ in north-west India and commemorated by the building of great stūpas which the Chinese pilgrims such as Fa-hien in about 630 did not fail to visit.

At Nagarahāra (Jelāl-ābād), Śākyamuni received the prediction of the Buddha Dīpaṃkara after having offered him seven blue lotuses and having spread his hair under his feet (p. 248F, 284F, 983F). – At Puṣkarāvatī (Shāh-Dheti), Śibi made the gift of his eyes to a beggar. – At Varṣapura (Shāhbāzgarhī), Sudinna or Viśvantara gave to an insatiable brahmin his white elephant, his kingdom, his chariot, his wife and his children (p. 713-714F, 304c). – At Mingora-Butkara), the bhikṣu Kṣhantivādin gave himself up without complaint to the blows of king Kali (p. 264F, 889-990F, 1670F). – At Mahāvana (Sounigrām), the dethroned king Sarvada, wishing to give alms although he had no money, gave himself up to a beggar who then delivered him to the usurper and so obtained a great reward (p. 714-715F). – At Masūrasamghārāma (Goumbatai, near Tousak in the Bouner), the brahmaçārin Dharmarakta or Dhammatrata, in order to obtain a Buddhist verse, agreed to write it down using his skin as paper, one of his bones as pen and his blood as ink (p. 975-976F). – At Girārai, on the boundary between Peshāwār and Bouner, king Śibi, at the cost of pounds of his own flesh, rescued a pigeon chased by a falcon (p. 255-260F, 1713F, 304c, 314c). – In the Upper Indus, the Bodhisattva gave his body to a starving tigress about to devour her cubs (p. 143F, 723F,
At Kāpiśī (Bāmiyān), the Bodhisattva let himself be flayed by hunters and devoured by insects in order to remain faithful to his vows (p. 853-855F).

The least that can be said is that the geography of the north-west plays a large part in the Traité. It places among the populated and wealthy cities of its time the city of Puṣkarāvatī (Prāṅg, Chārsadda and Rājar), the former Peukelaotis of the Greeks identified by them with Artemis, the tutelary goddess of the city, but which, at the time, belonged to the Ta Yue-tche (p. 172F, 672F). It mentions the miraculous healing of a leper by the bodhisattva Samantabhadra at Haḍḍa (near Jelāl-ābād) at the monastery of Buddhōṣṭa. It was familiar with the large Himalayan lakes of Anavatapta (p. 206F, 450F, 466F, 290b, 481a) and Mandākinī (p. 466F), and for it, the great rivers of India are not only the Ganges, the Yamunā, the Sasa bhū, the Aciravatī and the Mahī listed in the canonical sources (p. 266a), but also, and in particular, the northern rivers - the Ganges, Sindhu (Indus), Vakṣu (Oxus) and Sītā (Tarim) which flow out of Lake Anavatapta by the Mouths of the elephant, ox, horse and lion respectively (p. 385F, 450F, 290b, 348b, 611c).

As will be seen from the notes (incomplete, alas) appended to the French translation, the author of the Traité has taken the stories and apoloughtes with which his explanation is sprinkled from an enormous mass of documents. Among the postcanonical sources that he preferred, the following texts may be mentioned: the Aśokastūra and the Aśokavadāna from which he borrowed theavadāna of the gift of earth (p. 723F, 277a, 301b), the story of Vītaśoka (p.1263-1264F) and probably also the macabre adventure of the man whose limbs were replaced by those of a corpse and who ended up doubting whether he still belonged to the world of the living (p. 738-740F); the Avadānasataka from which was taken the deed of the future Śākyamuni who praised the Buddha Puṣya with a single stanza for seven days and seven nights (p. 253-255F, 297F), the incident of the blind bhikṣu for whom the Buddha threaded a needle (p. 5690570F), 1645-1646) and the jātaka of the deer that sacrificed itself (p. 1651-1652).

Some texts used by the Traité are of an era in which the Buddhist legend about Kaniṣka was already stereotyped and were translated into Chinese at a late date. This was the case particularly for the Tsa-pao-tsang-king (T203), which dedicated four stories to Kaniṣka and was translated only in 472 under the Pei Wei by Ki-kia-ye and T’an-yao. From it the Traité borrows the story of the Kašmirian arhat K‘i-ye-to (Jeyata?) who lived 700 years after the Buddha and who, invited by Kaniṣka, categorically refused to get dressed (p. 879F).

The Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā by Kumāralāṭa, considered by the Chinese to be the teacher of Harivarman, also dedicates two stories to emperor Kaniṣka. It was translated, or rather adapted, only in the 5th century by Kumāraśīva who named it Sūtrālaṃkāraśāstra and attributed it to Aśvaghoṣa (T 201). The Traité, without ever designating it by name, borrows from it a good dozen stories as though they were autonomous avadānas: the artist from Puṣkarāvatī (p. 672-674F); the outcaste Nītha converted by the Buddha (p. 1634F, 310a); the monastic quarrels at Kauśambī (p. 896-898F); king Aśoka and the monk who exhaled a sweet perfume (p. 695-698F); the Buddha disowns Śāriputra (p. 1526F); the Buddha and the cowherds (p. 146-153F); the Śibijātaka (p. 255-260F); Jyotiska and Śrīgupta (p. 184F, 1634F); Gautamī’s nirvāṇa (p. 587F); the white six-tusked elephant (p. 716-718F); the bodhisattva deer-king (p. 972-975); the bodhisattva king
who gave himself up to his enemy (p. 714F); the Dharma teacher who condemned the brahmanical institutions (p. 489-492F).29

By their number and their precision often pushed to the point of being literal, these borrowings prove irrefutably that the author of the Traité is post-Kaniṣka and, consequently, he cannot be dated in the first or second centuries of our era as has been generally done.

F. Heretical Literature.

The Traité – and this is new proof of its Indian origin – is familiar with the religions and the philosophical systems which at that time swarmed all over the north-west of India. For its author, whoever is not a ‘son of the Śākyas’ is a heretic (tīrthika) and, in its general meaning, he includes all wandering monks (parivrājaka) of poorly defined jurisdiction, Jains (Nirgrantha and Śvetāmbara), brahmins and Hindus, all given to practices condemned by the Buddha (p. 43F, 1409F, 1571F). He is familiar with their ‘ninety-six systems’ (p. 432F, 1426F, 261a, 325c, 349b, 412b, 581b) and their ‘eighteen sacred books’ (p. 48F, 92F, 637F, 639F, 1589F). He has read the Vedic literature with its four Vedas and its six Vedaṅgas without, however, neglecting the profane sciences (p. 1623-1624F). He enters into debate at times with those who profess the six brahmanic dārśanas, those of the Sāṃkhya (p. 546c) and the Vaiśeṣika (p. 728F, 923F, 1449F). He knows the Hindu iconography and mythology with its great gods like Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, Maheśvara-Śiva, Kumāra, Mahābrahmā the creator, etc., but recognizing in all of them a certain power, he denies any omniscience to them (p. 137-142F, 466F, 562F, 863F). However, he goes so far as to use a Śivaite cosmogony as an argument (p. 835-837F).

It is hard to see how a Chinese or even a Serindian would have been able to be so well-informed about Indian things.

3. THE MAHĀYĀΝIST BY CONVICTION

Monk and Abhidharma specialist, the author of the Traité ended up by being converted to the Mahāyāna movement that had already been introduced into the north-west at least three centuries previously.

A. The Mahāyāna.

29 Since this is a borrowing by the Traité from the Kalpanāmaṇḍikā, the hypothesis suggested on p. 490F, n. 1, is completely unfounded.
In contrast to the Vehicle of the śrāvakas in its religious ideal, its philosophical positions and its buddhology, the Mahāyāna constitutes, in fact, a new Path of liberation.

The Bodhisattva Ideal. – The śrāvaka aspired to the state of arhat, personal salvation involving the suppression, the eradication of the passions and some form of awakening (bodhi) or wisdom (prajñā) concerned with the three general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of things: impermanence, suffering and selflessness. The saint’s death is followed by nirvāṇa, the cessation of painful transmigration, the passing from the domain of contingency to that of the unconditioned (asamskṛta) Absolute. In order to attain this ultimate goal, the śrāvaka in the yellow robe of the monastic must travel the path to nirvāṇa, the three essential elements of which are morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā).

This ideal of sainthood clearly defined by the Buddha and his disciples could be pursued, in a strict sense and despite its demands, by monks retreating into solitude or within the confines of monasteries; it was beyond the reach of the lay person living in the world and prey to all the cares of the times. Accustomed to supporting their fellows and, moreover, to furnishing the Community with food, clothing and shelter, the lay people practiced the active virtues resulting from their estate rather than the passive virtues of which the monastics were an example. In literature as in art, there arose the infatuation of the upāsikās and the upāsikās for the Jātakas or stories of previous existences in the course of which the future Buddha Śākyamuni multiplied his actions of generosity, morality, patience, exertion and wisdom, thus giving the measure of his altruistic virtues. It was, therefore, him rather than the stiff and solitary monk that the lay people took as model with the secret hope that by following his example they too would arrive at the state of Buddhahood.

The Mahāyāna came to consecrate these profound aspirations by inviting not only the monastic but also the ‘sons and daughters of noble family’ to engage in the career of the bodhisattvas, i.e., the future Buddhas.

But the prerogative of the Buddhas is not just sainthood (arhattva) but also the possession of supreme perfect awakening (anuttarāsarvajñānsambodhi), omniscience (sarvajñāna), the awareness of things in all their aspects (sarvākārajñatā) put to the service of all beings.

For the adept who takes up the career of the bodhisattva, there are two crucial moments: i) the production of the mind of bodhi (bodhicittotpāda) by which the bodhisattva promises by solemn vows (praṇidhāna) to conquer supreme awakening in order to devote himself to the welfare and happiness of all beings; ii) the attainment of the said awakening (sambodhipratilābha) which transforms him into a Buddha.

A long interval stretches out between these two moments, for the bodhisattva delays his entry into complete nirvāṇa indefinitely in order to practice his salvific activity as long as possible. He actually knows that, once entered into nirvāṇa, he will no longer be able to do anything for anyone. And so, in three, seven or thirty-three incalculable periods (asaṃkheyakalpa), he traverses the ten stages (bhūmi) of his career, accumulating the meritorious actions and practicing the six or ten perfections (pāramitā), namely, generosity (dāna), morality (śīla), patience (kṣānti), exertion (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna), wisdom (prajñā), skillful means (upāyakauśalya), vows (praṇidhāna) for sambodhi and the welfare of beings, power (bala) and knowledge (jñāna).
Infinite Multiplication of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. – While recognizing in the Buddha a series of prerogatives and powers, the śrāvakas kept him on the human plane for a long time. They held him to be the possessor of the sciences and practices, the teacher of gods and humans; they were not aware that once he entered into nirvāṇa, he was invisible to gods and men, leaving them his Dharma as sole inheritance. According to them, the appearance of a Buddha was an exceptional event, as rare as the blossoming of the fig tree, and humanity remains without guide and without counsellor for long periods.

A god ‘dead since nirvāṇa’, as H. Kern defined it, could be enough for the monastics in the strict sense, but could not satisfy the aspirations of people who urgently required a supreme being, a pantheon of saints, a mythology and a cult. The popularization of the holy Dharma and its penetration into the masses had the result of transforming the wise preceptor of gods and men into a ‘God higher than the gods’ (devātideva) and to surround him with a crowd of dii minores et maiores as powerful disciples.

The Hiṇḍu sects had already upheld this process of sublimation, the Sarvāstivādins by filling the legend of Śākyamuni with marvels, the Mahāsāṃgikas by setting aside his historical career into the domain of fiction. And as the need for efficacious protectors became more urgent, the śrāvakas imagined a compassionate messiah at the side of the transcendent Buddha, the future Buddha Maitreya, and some arhats, immortalized by the needs of the cause, ever ready to fly to the aid of the faithful.

These are but exceptions, and the Mahāyāna did not hesitate in multiplying the Buddhas and bodhisattvas infinitely. Breaking the narrow limits of the ancient cosmology, they imagined an infinite number of universes in the bosom of the cosmos, each ruled over by a Buddha assisted by one or more great bodhisattvas. The Buddha is already in possession of supreme awakening, whereas the great bodhisattvas, those of the tenth bhūmi, are merely ‘close to awakening’. Apart from this difference, both Buddha and bodhisattva, inspired by the same loving-kindness, convert beings in the universes belonging to them and often appear simultaneously in multiple forms in different universes.

Śākyamuni, whose historical existence cannot be brought into doubt, will henceforth be seen to have aligned with him and comparable to him peers and emulators in number as many as the sands of the Ganges. He will remain the best known but not the only one. Other Buddhas will be seen to arise, such as Amitabha or Amītāyus reigning in the west over Sukhāvati, Akṣobhya in the east governing his universe Abhirati, Bhaisajyaguru, also in the east, exercising his activity as healer. The most famous bodhisattvas were Maitreya waiting in Tuṣita heaven for the time to succeed Śākyamuni; Avalokiteśvara residing on Mount Potalaka before manifesting in China as the female deity Kouan-yin; Manjuśrī, the bodhisattva of knowledge who, in various forms, appeared in India, Khotan, Nepal, finally to reside at Wou-t’ai-chan.

Most of these Buddhas and bodhisattvas have no ties with history and are only names; some, however, arise from anonymity to become personages of choice for the Mahāyānists, and the interest devoted to them was so lively that they leap out of legend quivering with life.

In the scholarly mind, they are, above all, symbols of universal wisdom and compassion. The Buddhas are identical in their essential body (dharmakāya), identified with the truth discovered and preached by them. They are enthroned in the paradises, surrounded by gods and saints whom they delight with their enjoyment bodies (sambhogakāya). They send down below representatives of themselves, emanated bodies.
(nirmāṇakāya) preaching the Dharma and converting beings. This salvific work is that of the truth that leads to the end of suffering, to detachment, to peace.

The twofold non-existence of beings and things. – Faithful to the teachings of Śākyamuni, the śrāvakas had proclaimed the non-existence of the individual (pudgalanairāmya); the Mahāyānists, by a later step, further professed the non-existence of things (dharmanairāmya).

Belief in the self (satkāyadrṣṭi) is the most pernicious of errors because it plants as a root in the mind all kinds of desire, the cessation of which is the condition sine qua non of liberation. Śrāvaka and Mahāyānist agree in condemning the belief in a self (ātmagrāha) and the belief in mine (ātmīyagrāha): whatever the names they use to designate them, the soul, the living being, the person, the individual, the agent, does not exist; men, saints, bodhisattvas and Buddhas are only names corresponding to nothing substantial.

But if the śrāvakas were the first to deny the self, they did recognize some sort of reality in things. The great schools of the Sarvāstvādins and the Sautrāntikas prepared long or short lists of conditioned things (saṃskṛta-dharma), i.e., resulting from causes (pratiṣṭhavasamutpanna) – material entities, minds and mental events, formations dissociated from mind and matter – having only momentary or infinitesimal duration, but nevertheless possessing a self-nature (svabhāva) and specific characteristics (lakṣaṇa): short-lived and transitory, but nevertheless realities.

For the Mahāyānists, on the other hand, dharmas, as arising from causes, do not exist in themselves; they are empty of self nature (svabhāvaśūnya) and empty of specific characteristics (lakṣaṇaśūnya).

Three corollaries follow from this emptiness:

i) Dharmas are unborn and are not destroyed, for empty things arising from empty things are unborn, Being unborn, they are never destroyed.

ii) Dharmas, being without production or destruction, are peaceful or ‘nirvānic’ from the beginning, nirvāna being none other than peace.

iii) Dharmas, being without exception peaceful and nirvānic, are all equal and involve no duality.

This is why the Mahāyāna adept, the bodhisattva, does not grasp them and, as the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says (p. 146F), if he does not grasp them, it is due to their absolute purity, namely, non-production, non-manifestation, non-activity, non-existence (anupalambha).

It follows that the four truths preached at Benares by Śākyamuni need a new interpretation. The Buddha said: “All phenomena of existence are suffering”, but these phenomena do not exist. He said: “The origin of suffering is desire”, but suffering is unborn. He said: “There is a cessation of suffering, nirvāna”, but as suffering in unborn, nirvāna is acquired by rights, and saṃsāra, painful transmigration, coincides with it. Finally he said: “The eightfold Path leads to the cessation of suffering”, but as suffering is not to be destroyed, the path to its cessation has already been traversed.30

30 These ideas will be masterfully set forth, p. 1381-1382F.
Face with the emptiness of beings and things, the attitude of the sage is to do nothing, to say nothing, to think nothing: that is the secret of peace.

**Emptiness.** – Some western interpreters have wanted to see in emptiness (śūnyatā) an absolute negation, but when the Mahāyānists say that beings and things are empty, they attribute no nature to them. They refuse to hypostatize an emptiness that is nothing other than what is (akīmicā), a ‘simple non-existence’ (abhāvamātra). It is not by virtue of an emptiness that beings and things are empty; they are empty because they are not. The very notion of emptiness is only a provisional expedient: it is a raft that one abandons after having crossed over the river, a medicine that one rejects after being cured. This is why the Mahāyānists are not nihilists: nihilists deny what they see; Mahāyānists, not seeing anything, affirm nothing and deny nothing.31

**Truth of appearance and absolute truth.** – An objection naturally arises in the mind: on the one hand, the Mahāyāna nourishes the high ideal of goodness and multiplies the Buddhas and bodhisattvas who are its protagonists; on the other hand, it affirms the non-existence of beings and the emptiness of dharmas. Of the two things, either the Buddhas and bodhisattvas convert beings or else nobody converts anybody.

The Mahāyānists themselves posed this objection and found an answer to it in the theory of the twofold truth: the conventional or provisional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) and the absolute truth (paramārthasatya). Without living a daily life according to the customary norms, one does not grasp the true nature of things (dharma-tā); but this is what must be understood in order to reach the goal. It is indispensable at the start to bow to conventions because they are the means of reaching nirvāṇa in the same way that someone who wants to empty out water first needs to get a vessel.

At the beginning of his career, the still partially awakened bodhisattva who sees beings and perceives things, must practice normally the virtues of his level: practicing generosity, observing discipline, maintaining patience, concentrating the mind, and awakening wisdom. That is the mundane and provisional way of practicing the virtues.

But when his mind has opened to the absolute truth, when he has penetrated the twofold emptiness of beings and things, he raises the same virtues to the rank of perfections (pāramitā). Conforming to the nature of things, he gives by making no further distinction between donor, recipient and the thing given; he observes discipline by identifying sin with merit; he is patient in considering suffering as non-existent; he is energetic by making no physical effort; he concentrates his mind by identifying concentration with distraction; he is wise by abstaining from opposing error and truth. In a word, the goal of the bodhisattva’s career is the stopping of all speech and all practice (sarvavādacaryoccheda) and, as this non-activity corresponds to reality, it assures the welfare of beings more effectively than a feverish activity inspired by false prejudice.

By accepting from the point of view of the truth of appearance that which he rejects from the point of view of the absolute truth and vice versa, the Mahāyānist stays equidistant between affirmation and negation.

---

31 See above, p. 925F, 1078-1095F; also below, p. 1225-1229F.
between the view of existence and that of non-existence: he is established in the Middle Way (madhyamā pratipad), sheltered from all criticism.

B. The Mahāyānasūtras.

The new ideas found their expression in the Mahāyānasūtras, also called Vaipulyasūtras, ‘Texts of Lengthy Development’, which spread in India about the time of our era, five centuries after the Parinirvāṇa. The Traité gives some second-hand information on the genesis of this literature:

1. Having appeared in the east, immediately after his awakening the Buddha Śākyamuni preached publicly to the śrāvakas the famous Sermon at Benares dealing with the four Noble Truths. A little later, at Rājagṛha on Grdhraṇaṭparvata, he taught the Prajñāpamārita, soon followed by other Mahāyānasūtras, to a chosen assembly of bodhisattvas and eminent śrāvakas such as Ānanda, Śāriputra and Subhūti. This last revelation remained unknown to the ordinary public and the śrāvakas had no knowledge of it, but the gods who heard it from the heavens uttered cries of joy and affirmed having been present at the second turning of the Wheel of Dharma (dvitīya dharmacakrapravartanam) (p. 517a).

2. After the Buddha’s death, Mahākasyapa gathered a great council at Rājagṛha, and a thousand arhats compiled the texts of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka (p. 90-106F). Also, but in another place, on Mount Vimalasvabhāva as it will be told later, the great bodhisattvas Mañjuśrī and Maitreya, taking Ānanda with them, compiled the Mahāyāna. But Ānanda, knowing deeply the aspirations and behavior of beings, did not preach the Mahāyāna to the śrāvakas who were incapable of understanding (p. 938-941F; 756b).

3. Conforming to a prediction, after the Buddha’s Parinirvāṇa, the Prajñāpāramitā, the first in the list of Mahāyānasūtras, came from the east to the south, from the south to the west, without, it would seem, meeting much success (p. 25F, 541b).

4. Finally, in the five hundred years after the Parinirvāṇa, it reached the north (uttarapatha) where there were many believers (p. 25F):

“This Prajñāpāramitā, in the north, will do the Buddha’s work. Here is the reason: when the Buddha was in this world, he was able to cut the doubts of the Saṃgha: the Buddhadharma prospered and there was no fear that it might disappear. But five hundred years after the Buddha’s Parinirvāṇa, the holy Dharma gradually , and from then on the work of the Buddha has been menaced. Then beings of keen faculties (tiṣṇendriya) will study and meditate [the Prajñāpāramitā]; they will make offerings of flowers and perfumes to it. Beings of weak faculties (mrđvindriya) will transcribe it and also offer flowers and perfumes. These two types of beings finally will find salvation... This profound Prajñāpāramitā will spread afar in the northern region. Indeed, among all the regions of Jambudvīpa, the north is the vastest. Furthermore, the Snow Mountains (Himālaya) are there and since it is cold, its plants can destroy the passions [of desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and ignorance (moha)]. As a result of
the grains that are eaten, these three poisons have no great virulence. For this reason, people are gentle, their faith is steady and their faculties are powerful. Because of all that, in the north those who practice the Prajñāpāramitā are numerous.” (p. 26F, 531b)

And the Traité is kind enough to comment on a passage in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras that tells the circumstances in which the bodhisattva Sadāprudita found a manuscript of the Prajñā written on gold leaf with molten beryl and sealed with seven seals at Gandhāra in the city of Gandhavatī (in Chinese Tchong-hiang-ti or Miao-hiang-ti) (p. 744a).

By adopting these legends among so many others, by considering these predictions as long realized, the author reveals once more his connections with the north-west and his relatively late date. It goes without saying that his Sarvāstivādin colleagues rejected all these Mahāyānasūtras as apocryphal and refused to consider them. Hence certain comments of the author, not free of bitterness: “You do not believe in the Mahāyāna, you reject the proof and you claim that only the śrāvakasystem has value” (p. 1698F); “This is a big mistake, for the Mahāyānasūtras are the true Buddhaharmon, uttered from the very mouth of the Buddha. You must not reject them. Besides, you take your origin from the Mahāyāna” (p. 293F); or also: “It is true that your Kātyāyaniputra expresses himself in that way and that is indeed why he is called the son of Kātyāyanī; if he were really a Śākyaputriya, he would not say that” (p. 1697F).

In commenting on the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, the Traité does not draw its explanations solely from the Prajñā literature, but calls upon all the Mahāyānasūtras known at that time, the production of which extended over almost three centuries. It cites them abundantly but most often does not mention their titles. For this reason, I [Lamotte] have not been able to make a complete list of them. Since the Indian originals were never dated, I [Lamotte] have adopted a chronological order here based, for want of anything better, on the dates of the first Chinese translations of them.


11. Tathāgataaghyasūtra or Tathāgatacuṇyataghyāyanirdeśa, T 312, transl. Dharmarakṣa in 280 (cf. T 310, no. 3; Tib. 760, no. 3). Cited Mi-tsi-kin-king = Ghyakasūtra, p. 19F, 1638F, 284a, 466b, 684a; Mi-tsi-kin-kang-king = Ghyakavajrapāṇisūtra, p. 560F. Mentioned without title, p. 1587F.


13. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, T 263, tr. Dharmarakṣa in 286 (cf. T 262; 264; Tib. 781). Cited Fa-houa or Fa houa-king, p. 417-418F, 555F, 578F, 280a, 299b, 300b, 303b, 339a, 394b, 420b, 466b, 619b, 648c, 713b, 714a, 754b, 756b; mentioned without title, p. 294F-295F.


---

32 There is an older translation by Tche Tch’an (T 626), but judging from the title it adopts, the Traité is referring to the anonymous translation (T 629).


27. Vikurvaṃśāparipṛcchā, T 420, transl. Kumārajīva between 402 and 409 or 413 (cf. T 421; Tib. 834). Mentioned without title, p. 1611F.


---


From this list, incomplete as it is, it may be seen that the author of the Traité used the Mahāyānasūtras originally appearing in India over three centuries which had been translated into Chinese between 179 and 503A.D. At that time, these sūtras seem to have been independent publications and were not yet incorporated into vast collections like those of the Prajñā, the Avataṃsaka, the Ratnakūṭa or the Mahāsāṃnipāta.

C. The Madhyamaka.

Presenting themselves as the word of the Buddha, the Mahāyānasūtras do not have to justify their teachings: they proceed with categorical statements (more negative than affirmative) and only by way of exception do they sketch out any proof. From the philosophical point of view, they insist on the twofold emptiness of beings and of things and try to inculcate in their readers the ‘conviction that dharmas do not arise’ (anuttatikadharmakṣānti) with all its consequences. From the religious point of view, they turn the spotlight on certain Buddhas, certain bodhisattvas: Akṣobhya is the preference of the Prajñāpāramitās, Samantabhadra of the Pratyutpannasamādhis, Amitabha of the Sukhāvatīvyūhas, Vajrapāni of the Tathāgatataguhyas, etc.

At one time the need was felt to condense the teachings of the Mahāyānasūtras. This was the work of the first Mādhyamika ‘philosophers of the Middle’ and partisans of emptiness (śūnyavāda), Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rāhulabhadra. In technical perfect Sanskrit in the manner of Aśvaghoṣa, they wrote opuscules as memorial verses (kārikā).

The goal of Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva is to reduce to the absurd (prasaṅga) the realist and pluralist views of the philosophical systems current at their time, notably Sarvāstivādin Buddhism, brahmanical Sāṃkhya and Vaiṣeṣika. They show that the facts or basic categories of the old Buddhism escape any preaching: existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence, and that affirmation or negation of any proposition whatsoever necessarily involves the negation or affirmation of its opposite. Avoiding the extreme views, refusing to make any categorical statement on a defined subject, following a “Middle Path”, these authors escape from all criticism. More a mystic than
philosopher, Rāhulabhadra dedicated to Prajñāpāramitā a hymn that was greatly appreciated by the Indians. All the information that could be desired on the life of Nāgārjuna, his works, his supposed relationship with Kaniṣka and the Śatavāhanas may be found in Venkata Ramanan’s work, Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy as presented in the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra, 1966. Here I [Lamotte] will limit myself to documenting a passage from the Si-yu-tche ‘Description of the Western Lands’ by Tao-che Tao-ngan (312-385) reproduced in the Fa-yuan-tchou-lin by Tao-che (T 2122, k. 38, p. 589a).34 To my knowledge [Lamotte], it is the oldest mention of Nāgārjuna; it has him living five hundred year after the Parinirvāṇa, but contrary to most later sources, it places him, not in Dakṣiṇakosala or Vidarba, but in northern Kosala (capital Śrāvasti) and in the kingdom of Kāśi (Benares) which, at the time of the Buddha, was governed by king Prasenajit:

The Si-yu-tche says: “There is a large stūpa on the sea-shore five hundred li east of king Prasenajit’s capital. Within this big stūpa there is a small stūpa twelve feet high, adorned with precious ornaments; each night there is a flash of light like great fire. It is said that five hundred years after the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna went into the ocean to convert an āgarāja. The nāgarāja offered this precious stūpa to Nāgārjuna who then made a gift of it to this kingdom. The king then built a large stūpa to enclose the small one. For ages, people in search of a favor come there to prostrate themselves, burn incense and offer flowery parasols. These flowery parasols rise by themselves into the air, spin about and gradually ascend. After each night, they disappear without anyone knowing their whereabouts.

The Si-yu-tche says: “In the kingdom of Vāraṇaśī (Benares), the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna built seven hundred stūpas and following that, the stūpas built by worldly people and the saints were innumerable. Just on the banks of the river Tcha-lien (for Ni-lien-tchan-na = Nairañjana), more than a thousand stūpas were built; every five hundred years (pañcavarṣa), a great free assembly is convened.”

It was Kumārajīva who who made known the works of the first Madhyamikas in China. Among other texts, he translated, during the 6th hong-che year (404), the second part of the Śatakaśāstra by Āryadeva with commentary by Vasu (T 1659) and, during the 11th hong-che year (409), the Madhyamakaśāstra by Nāgārjuna with commentary by Pingala (T1564),35 two works known to and cited by the author of the Traité.

1. He took his inspiration mainly from Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakaśāstra from which he reproduces many extracts sometimes by mentioning the title (p. 69F, 1142F, 1609-1620F, 338c), sometimes without naming

34 Other citations of the Che Tao-ngan Si-yu-tche, thought to be identical with the Che-che Si-yu-ki, have been collected by L. Petech in an article entitled “Description des Pays d’Occident” de Che Tao-ngan (Mélanges de Sinologie offerts à P. Demiéville, I, 1966, p. 167-190.  
35 Cf. the preface by T’an-ying, T 2145, k. 11, p. 77b8-9; K’ai-yuan, T 2154, k. 4, p. 513a6.
it (p. 36F, 45-46F, 72F, 396-397F, 922F, 1204-1207F, 1436F, etc.). He refers twice (p. 36F, 1638F) to the well-known dedicatory kārikā where Nāgārjuna summarizes his doctrine in a series of eight ‘No’s’: Anirdham anutpādam, etc.

2. He knows the ‘Centuries’ by Āryadeva and refers to it at least once (p. 1370F) by simply mentioning the title of one of its chapters, the Ātmapratīṣṭhaprakaraṇa (see below, p. 1370-1375F as note).

3. He cites almost in its entirety the Prajñāpāramitāstotra by Rāhulabhadra whom the Chinese tradition unanimously gives as disciple of Āryadeva, himself the disciple of Nāgārjuna.37

From these investigations we may conclude that the author is later than the first Madyhamikas and should not be identified with Nāgārjuna the author of the Madhyamaka śāstra. If, as Kumārajīva has it, the real Nāgārjuna was born 880 years after the Buddha’s Parinirvāṇa which he fixes at the 15th year of king Siang, cyclic kia-chen order (637 B.C.), that is, in 243 A.D., the author of the Traité who knew the disciples and the grand-disciples of Nāgārjuna could hardly have been active before the beginning of the 4th century of our era.

Here, in its main features, is the picture that emerges from his work. A native of the north-west and steeped in his Indian nationality, he became a monastic in some monastery of Kaśmir-Gandhāra of Sarvāstvādin persuasion. He devoted himself passionately to the study of the Tripiṭaka and specialized in the Śatpādībhidharma and its various Vibhāṣās. He acquired such mastery of them that he was probably in charge of teaching them. Devoured by curiosity, he showed a pronounced taste for reading and soon the golden legend of Buddhism which was flourishing in the north-west no longer held any secrets for him. He did not, however, dissociate himself from the heretics with whom he was in close contact on their alms-rounds: he had a sufficient rather than schematic acquaintance with Vedic literature, of the Brahmanic systems, especially the Śāmkhya and Viśeṣika, as well as the Hindu doctrines (Śivaism and Viṣṇuism). He took part in internal debates between the Sarvāstvādin-Vaibhāṣikas and the Dārśāntika-Sautrāntikas of Kumāralāṭa and did not hide his preference for the former.

But already, almost three centuries ago, the Mahāyānist movement had taken root in the north-west where it found favor with sons and daughters of good family. Accustomed to the routine of community life and intellectually tired, most of the Sarvāstvādin monks had but little interest in the new ideas that troubled their mental security and modified their customs. Our author was of a different nature. Becoming progressively more familiar with the Mahāyānasūtras that were published, becoming familiar with the

36 In his introduction to the Suvikrāntavikrāmin, p. LXX, R. Hikata notes several Nāgārjunian stanzas in T 1509 that have escaped me [Lamotte]: p. 616b11-12 = XVIII, 7; p. 64c9-10 = XVII, 20; p. 96c13-14 = XVIII, 7; p. 97b = I, 1 (anirdham anutpāda); p. 107a13-14 = XV, ii.

37 For Rāhulabhadra, see below, p. 1373-1375. Contrary to the Chinese tradition of the 6th century, Candrakīrti and the Tibetan historians make him the teacher of Nāgārjuna, probably under the influence of the chronicles of Nālandā which, in their lists of siddhas, give the following sequence: Rāhulabhadra (or Rāhula), Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva: cf. Dpag-bsam ljon-bsam (tr. S. Pathak, Life of Nāgārjuna, IHQ, XXX, 1954, p. 93); Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, tr. E. Obermiller, II, p. 123: J. Naudou, Les bouddhistes kaśmiriens au Moyen Age, p. 82.
mode of reasoning of a Nāgārjuna or a Deva, he thought he had discovered the ‘true nature of things’ and resolutely became a Mahāyānist. Such a turnabout did not provoke any moral or intellectual crisis in him. Convinced of the advantages of the monastic life, not for a moment did he think of leaving (hīnāyāvarte) it to return to lay life. His Buddhist faith was in no way shaken since he remained faithful to the Word of the Buddha ‘such as it was in the Sūtra and appeared in the Vinaya’ and, although he adhered preferentially to the sūtras of profound meaning, supramundane and associated with emptiness, he was aware of ‘not straying from the true nature of things’, but on the contrary, of staying even closer to it.

When he compared the fantasy and exaggerations of the texts of lengthy development with the tidy and methodical texts of the Tripitaka, his sense of moderation was not offended, but the uneasiness that he felt did not prevent him from discovering in the new literature a fire and heat lacking in the old literature. When this Abhidharma teacher examined the sibylline kārikās of a Nāgārjuna or a Deva closely, not only could he admire their precision and their terseness but he had to notice, on his own part that, compared with the enormous production of Kātyāyanīputra and the Kaśmir arhats, these opuscules, which did not even reach five hundred verses, were rather lightweight.

This is why he undertook to compose, in the form of a commentary on the Mahāyāna-prajñāpāramitāsūtra, an exegetical treatise that would be the Mahāyānist replica of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma.

According to a well-ordered plan which, however, never appears in the divisions adopted by successive editions, he transposes the Prajñā into early times by citing old canonical sūtras on every page and by evoking numerous individuals borrowed from Śākyamuni’s following. In this way, mixing the old and the new, he reveals, according to the fortunate phrase of Hiuan-tsang, a Sthavira-Mahāyāna. On the questions discussed, he begins by explaining, with complete objectivity, the opinions of the Sarvāstivādin masters; then he moves on to criticize them, frequently but not always, by taking his inspiration from two or three skilfully introduced and clearly explained Nāgārjunian kārikās.

In his work, the explanation of the Abhidharmic theories occupies ten times more space than their refutation for, to his eyes, the Abhidharma in which he had specialized is in no way without pertinence: actually, it comes under conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) which makes its presence felt by everyone in daily life and serves as a stepping-stone to reach the truth. But it fades and vanishes in the light of the absolute truth (paramārthasatya), before the ‘true nature of dharmas’, an expression rendered in Chinese by the four characters Tchou-fa-che-siang. For the sake of being literal, I [Lamotte] have usually restored it as sarvadharmānāṃ bhūatalakṣaṇam, but in Kumārajīva’s translations, it may have, as its Indian correspondent, dharma-lakṣaṇa, tattva, bhūtānaya and, most frequently, dharma-tā. The expression is not very frequent in the Chinese version of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (T 223, p. 231b, 244a, 257b, 392a, 416c) and appears only once in the Chinese kārikās of the Madhyamakastra (T 1564, p. 24a). In turn, the true nature of things is the pivotal axis of the entire philosophy of the Traité. Evoked as early as the opening stanzas, it is trotted out obsessively throughout the entire work (p. 3, 15, 18, 45, 49, 51, 53 68, 131, 150, 156, 159, 213, 239, 298, 322, 327, 338, 340, 355, 399, 400, 439, 481, 500, 593, 677, 700, 708, 710, 769, 839, 902, 915, 916, 918, 924, 925, 926, 928, 929, 950, 954, 969, 1019, 1045, 1047, 1054, 1059, 1060, 1083, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1110, 1112, 1142, 1165, 1190, 1204, 1229, 1231, 1232, 1245, 1253, 1261, 1278,
This true nature, if one may say so, is indefinable by definition, for, being nothing whatsoever, it transcends any category of mind. It suffices to reproduce here the paraphrase that will be given below on p. 1501F: “The true nature of dharma is unborn and unceasing, neither defiled nor purified, neither existent nor non-existent, ever peaceful, perfectly pure, like space indefinable, inexpressible; it is the cessation of all the paths of discourse; it surpasses the domain of all minds and mental events; it is like nirvāṇa: this is the Dharma of the Buddhas.”

We must be careful not to apostatize it as a negative Absolute, for emptiness is valid only as method of argument and has nothing to do with a metaphysical principle: “The person who produces the view of emptiness I declare to be incurable. I am not surprised that a person is attached to a view of the self as great as Mount Sumeru and I do not blame him. But if a fool is attached to a view of emptiness, be it as small as the sixteenth part of a hair, that I cannot allow.”

By means of his constant recourse to bhūtalakṣaṇa as criterion of the truth, the author of the Traité carves out for himself a place in the philosophy of the Middle.

The Taisho Index no. 13, p. 342-344, has prepared a list of the bodhisattvas mentioned in the Traité which contains more than 60 names, of which 22 are directly borrowed from the nidāna of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (p. 428F). The author has a high opinion of the bodhisattvas and dedicates no less than six chapters to them (VIII to XIII) where he dwells at length on their qualities and their prerogatives. But his admiration bears upon the bodhisattva in abstracto rather than on any one bodhisattva in particular. He reveals himself to be a philosopher rather than a devotee.

Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaakaśāstra aroused lively interest and was commented upon at least eight times: by Nāgārjuna himself (which is doubtful), Buddhapālita, Bhavya, Candrakīrti, Devaśāman, Gunāśrī, Gunamati and Sthiramati. On the other hand, the Traité went unnoticed in India. Candrakīrti himself, the best commentator on the Madhyamakaśāstra in the 7th century, does not seem to have had any suspicion of its existence or, if he was aware of it, he did not rank it among the main works of Nāgārjuna. In a Madhyamakaśāstrastuti the original Sanskrit of which was found by G. Tucci,38 he notes in stanza 10 only eight Nāgārjunian works:

1) Sūtrasamuccaya (T 635; Tib. 5330).39
2) Parikathā Ratnāvalī = Rāja-parikathā-ratnāvalī (Tib. 5658).
4) Śastragaditāḥ kārikāḥ = Madhyamakaśāstra.
5) Yuktyākhyā śaṣṭikā = Yuktiṣaṣṭikā (Tib. 5225).

38 In Oriens Extremus, IX, 1962, p. 47-56
39 On the authenticity of this work, see J. Fililiozat, Śikṣāsamuccaya et Sūtrasamuccaya, JA, 1964, p. 473-478.
6) $\text{Vidalā} = \text{Vaidulyasūtra}$ (Tib. 5226) and $\text{Vaidulyaparakaraṇa}$ (Tib. 5230).

7) $\text{Śūnyatāsaptati}$ (Tib. 5227).

8) $\text{Vigrahamasya... vyāvartanī} = \text{Vigrahavyāvartanī}$ (Tib. 5228).

The Tibetan historians Bu-ston (I, p. 51F) and Taranātha (p. 302F) will be inspired by this list in their accounts of Nāgārjuna.

On the other hand, rather quickly and, in any case, as early as the 7th century, India retained no memory of the Traité and the fact that it was saved from oblivion is due to Kumārajīva.

III. THE CHINESE TRANSLATION OF THE TRAITÉ

Kumārajīva (344-409 or 413), assisted by his disciples Seng-jouei (352-436) and Seng-tchao (384-414) as well as a group of Chinese scholars, translated at Tch’ang-ngan four works of Madhyamaka inspiration that he wrongly or rightly attributed to the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna:

1) $\text{Ta-tche-tou-louen} = \text{Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa}$ (T 1509) between the summer of 402 and the 1st of February 406, with preface by Seng-jouei.

2) $\text{Che-eul-men-louen} = \text{Dvadaśanikāvyāśāstra or Dvādaśamukhaśāstra}$ (T 1568) in 408-409, with preface by Seng-jouei.

3) $\text{Tchong-louen} = \text{Madhyamakaśāstra}$ (T 1564) in 409-410, with preface by Seng-jouei.

4) $\text{Che-tchou-p’i-cha-louen} = \text{Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra}$ (T1521), at an undetermined date.

In the prefaces and colophons attached to these translations, there are some indications about the very circumstances of the translation, the date and the life of Nāgārjuna as they were imagined at Tch’ang-ngan at the beginning of the 5th century.

1. KUMĀRAJĪVA’S TRANSLATION

---

40 Hiuan-tsang certainly knew the existence of it, but beyond his stay in India between 629 and 645, he collected no information on this subject.


42 The attribution of this text to Nāgārjuna is discussed among Japanese scholars: cf. A. Hirakawa, L’auteur du Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra, Jour. Indian and Buddhist Studies, V, 1957, p. 176-180; R. Hikata, Introduction to Suvikṛṣṭavikrāmin, p. 52, 55, 73, 74.
The translation of the *Traité* went hand in hand with that of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (T 332) of which the *Traité* is a commentary. The documentation of these two texts has been gathered and critiqued by P. Demiéville with his customary skill, and I largely take my inspiration from his work.

Information taken from the colophon of the *Ta-tchen-tou-louen* (T 1409,k. 100, p. 756c, or T 2145, k. 10, p. 75b):

The dharmācārya Kumārajīva came to Tch’ang-ngan in the year 3 of the *hong-che* period of the Ts’in, *sin-tch’eou* cyclic order, the 20th day of the 12th moon (February 8, 402). During the summer of the 4th year (402), at Si-men-t’ang ‘Pavilion of the Western Gate’ of the Siao-yao-yuan ‘Pleasure Park’, he published this *Che-louen* (*Upadeśa*, T 509) for the emperor [Yao] Hing. The translation was finished on the 27th day of the 12th moon of the 7th year (February 1, 406).

During this period he also published:

1. the *King-pen ‘Sūtra Text’*,
2. the *Tch’an-king ‘Dhyāna Sūtra’*,
3. the *Kiai-liu ‘Vinaya’*,
4. the *Po-louen ‘Treatise in a century’*,
5. the *Tch’an-fa-yao-kiai ‘Summary explanation of the method of Dhyāna’*, consisting of almost 500,000 yen ‘words or syllables’.

---

44 Compare the *Tch’ou* (T 2145, k. 2, p. 11a16): The *Ta-tche-louen* in 100 *kiuan* was translated at Suan-yao-yuan; it is sometimes divided into 70 kiuan. – *Li-tai* (T 2034, k. 8, p. 78c18: The *Ta-tche-tou-louen* in 100 kiuan is the work of the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. It was translated during the 5th moon of the 6th year of the *hong-che* period (May 23 or June 23, 404) at Siao-yao-yuan. Seng-jouei did the brush-calligraphy and added the preface. See the *Eul-ts’in-lou* [catalog compiled between 309 and 415 by Seng-jouei and lost a long time ago]. Kumārajīva says that an integral translation [of the *Upadeśa*] should have consisted of 1000 scrolls, but he abridged it because of the weakness of mind of the Ts’ins. – The *K’ai-yuan* (T 2154, k. 4, p. 513a4) adopts the date proposed by the colophon.
45 This is the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (T 223) of which the *Upadeśa* (T 1509) is the exegesis. But in his doctoral thesis, M. Saigura does not see things in this light: “Das *Ching piṅ* ist ein erfundenes Werk, für dessen Existenz wir keinerlei Belege haben, und das aus folgendem Grund nie existiert haben kann.” Upon which he launches into mathematical calculations!
47 T 1435: *Che-song-liu* or *Sarvāstivādavinaya*, partially translated in 404.
48 T 1569: *Po-louen* or *Satakasāstra* by Āryadeva, with commentary by Vasu, translated in 404-405.
With the Che-louen (Upadeśa), this makes up 1,500,000 yen.

The first p’ in ‘chapter’ of the [Che]-louen (Upadeśa) takes up 34 kiuan ‘scrolls’ [in the Chinese translation] and comments on only a single chapter [of the Sūtra, T 223] entirely.

Also, beginning with the second p’ in ‘chapter’, the dharmācārya [Kumārajīva] abridged the integral text of the [Che]-louen, giving only what is essential, just what is necessary to explain the meaning of the text [of the Sūtra] from then on giving up the completion of the commentary in its full development. Thus he ended up with 100 kiuan ‘scrolls’ [of translation]. A complete translation would have been ten times as long.  

Information taken from the preface by Seng-jouei to the Ta-tche-tou-louen (T 1509, p. 57, or T 2145, k. 10, p. 74c-75b).

Ma-ming (Aśvaghoṣa) was born at the end of the Authentic Dharma (saddharma), and Long-chou (Nāgārjuna) at the end of the Counterfeit Dharma (pratirūpakadharma)....  

At the end of the Authentic Dharma it was easy to propagate [the doctrine]; thus Aśvaghoṣa worked directly with the inheritance that had been passed down to him and had only to dust it off. But the end of the Counterfeit Dharma was beset with many troubles; thus Nāgārjuna associated with lay people and taught them to understand things by the gradual path. Moreover, he went to the palace of the Nāgas to borrow the clarity to illuminate wisdom in the quest for the mystery. He dedicated himself to the study of the profound secret in order to exhaust the wonders of the subtle words. Then, taking the text of the Prajñā[pāramitāsūtra] as a basis, he composed this Upadesa...

He explains the true nature (dharmatā) so that people misled by wrong views are no longer led astray and are corrected. In this Upadeśa, he begins by explaining the views [of the Ābhidharmikas?] and mentions the differences in order to exhaust their beauty, but finally he recommends detachment (anabhinivēśa) from all these views as the proper solution. Where the explanation is incomplete, he engages in a discussion to illuminate it; if the discussion does not succeed, he opts for the Middle [Path] (madhyamā pratipad) as the definitive solution...

There is the dharmācārya Kumārajīva who, from an early age, acquired a reputation for insight and wisdom and who now, at a ripe age, enjoys extraordinary renown... He always depended on this Upadeśa.

On the 20th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of the hon-che period (February 8, 402), he came from Kou-tsang to Tch’ang-ngan. The Ts’in emperor [Yao Hing] for a long time humbly nourished the hope...
of seeing him and was overjoyed to meet him. In the course of their conversations, they lingered until the end of the day and, by trying to pierce the mystery, they forgot the year’s fatigue...

The emperor gathered the śramaṇas in the capital who were specialists in doctrinal works and ordered scholars learned in criticism of the texts, noblemen, and ministers to assemble in the Siao-yao-yuan pavilion on the shore of the Wei... He personally examined the mysterious document and adjusted the [Chinese] words to the Sanskrit text... When the text of the [Prajñāpamāritā]sūtra (T 223) was established, he went on to the translation of this Upadeśa (T 1509).52

The abridged version of the Upadeśa (in its original Sanskrit text) had 100,000 gāthās each of 32 characters (i.e., 100,000 units of 32 syllables), or a total of 3,200,000 ‘words’ (Sanskrit syllables; for the Chinese, the notions of words and syllables overlap). Taking into account the contrast between Sanskrit and Chinese, the one being complicated and the other concise, he condensed it by two-thirds and thus obtained these 100 kiuán of the Chinese translation. In the 300,000 words of the Ta-tche-[you-louen] (condensed thus into about 300,000 Sanskrit syllables), the sublime meaning of the mysterious paragraphs appeared in full clarity. The complete Sanskrit text is as detailed as that of the first chapter (parivarta); the master of the Dharma abridged it by cutting it because the Chinese love conciseness. If he had translated the entire text, that would have come to at least 1000 kiuán.53

From this somewhat confused information, some conclusions may be drawn:

1) The translation of the Upadeśa began at Tch’an-ngan between May 25 and June 23 of the year 404 and was completed February 1, 406.

2) It went along with the translation of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (T 223) of which it is the commentary. But here the evidence differs somewhat.

a. According to the preface by Seng-jouei in T 223, published in the Tch’ou (T 2145, k. 8, p. 53b), the translation of the Sūtra began on the 23rd day of the 4th moon of the 5th hong-che year (May 29, 403) and finished on the 5th day of the 12th moon of the same year (January 13, 404); after which, the Chinese texts was again revised up to the 23rd day of the 4th moon of the following year (May 18, 404).

b. According to the Tch’ou (T 2145, k. 2, p. 10c16) and the K’ai-yuan (T 2154, k. 4, p. 512b4), the translation of the Sūtra began on the 23rd day of the 4th moon of the 5th hong-che year (May 29, 403) and finished on the 23rd day of the 4th moon of the 6th year (May 18, 404).

52 However, in his preface to the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (Tch’ou, T 2145, k. 8, p. 53b13), Seng-jouei states that the text of the sūtra had not been (definitely) fixed until the (translation) of the Upadeśa was finished (cf. P. Demiéville, l. c., p. 383, n. 3).

53 The translation of this paragraph is borrowed from P. Demiéville, l. c., p. 387-388.
3. The Ta-tche-tou-louen (T 1509) is just an incomplete translation of the Indian Upadeśa. The latter, which was divided into chapters (parivarta, p‘in), consisted of 100,000 gāthās or 3,200,000 Sanskrit syllables. A complete translation would have involved 1000 scrolls (kiuan) and 3,200,000 words (yen).

However, Kumārajīva actually translated only nine-tenths and his translation has only 100 scrolls and about 320,000 Chinese characters. This is how he did it:

a. He completely translated the first parivarta of the Indian Upadeśa.

b. He abridged two-thirds of the text of the other parivartas.

The subdivisions of the Ta-tche-tou-louen into chapters (p‘in) as well as into scrolls (kiuan) varied considerably in the course of successive editions. In some of the Touen-houang manuscripts they are completely missing.

In the actual Taisho edition, the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (T 223) consists of 90 chapters in 27 scrolls; the Ta-tche-tou-louen (T 1509) also has 90 chapters, but is divided into 100 scrolls. We may also note that in these two texts the titles of the chapters do not always coincide.

Scrolls 1 to 34 of the Ta-tche-tou-louen (p. 57c-314b) are the complete translation of the first chapter of the Indian Upadeśa; scrolls 36 to 100 of the same Ta-tche-tou-louen (p. 314b-756c) are the abridged translation of the rest of the Upadeśa.

4. Commissioned and supervised by Yao Hing, executed by the Serindian Kumārajīva, critiqued by more than 500 scholars, written down by brush and prefaced by Seng-jouei, the Chinese translation of the Upadeśa was so completely Sinicized that it succeeds in pulling the wool over one’s eyes and makes one doubt its Indian origins. What we have said about its author shows that it is an illusion. The Upadeśa is the work of an Indian, but its translators gave it a Chinese flavor and that was the reason for its success.

Many comments and arguments exchanged orally during the course of a work prolonged over two years have passed into the translation either in the form of notes (written at the time in a single column in very tiny characters) or as pure and simple interpolations.

Quite rightly, R. Hikata has distinguished in the Ta-tche-tou-louen passages that are clearly or probably by Kumārajīva and those that should be or conveniently are attributed to ‘Nāgārjuna’.

Everyone agrees in attributing to Kumārajīva or to his collaborators explanations of Sanskrit terms with phonetic transcriptions and translations into ‘the language of the Ts’in’, such as samyaksambuddha (p. 128F0, sugata (p. 131F), lokavid (p. 132), puruṣadamyasārathi (p. 133), śāstā devamanusyānām (p. 135F), buddha (p. 137F), samgha (p. 202F), dhāraṇī (p. 317F), Bhadrapāla and Ratnākara (p. 428), Gaṇḍaka (p. 497), Vipaśyin, Śikhin and Visvabhū (p. 535F), Kauṭṭikā (p. 637F), pāramitā (p. 701F), Sudinna (p. 713-714), Asoka (p. 723F), śīla (p. 770F), ksānti (p. 865F), vīrya (p. 927F), Arbuda and Norarbuda (p. 963F).

54 Unfortunately their number is not given precisely.
55 Cf. P. Demiéville, l. c., p. 391.
56 P. Pelliot, BEFEO, VIII, p. 509-510.
57 R. Hikata, Introduction to the edition of the Suvikrāntavikrāmin, p. LIII seq.
mahāprajñāpāramitā (p. 1066F), vimokṣa (P. 1291F), samādhi (p. 1487F), ārṣa sthāna (p. 1593F), samskāra (p. 696b), etc.

Also seeming to be interpolations, some comments on the customs and usages of the T’ien-tchou, capable of being of interest to the Chinese but completely useless to an Indian reader: In India there are two words to designate time, kāla and samaya (p. 76F); it is a custom in India to call anything that is fine, heavenly (divya) (p. 523F); in India it is usually said that some one who has done what had to be done ‘has crossed over to the other shore’ (p. 702F); in India it is the custom to grasp someone’s feet as a sign of respect (p. 847F); the Buddha inhabited the Indian Kingdoms, and in these kingdoms there are always many brāhmīns (p. 1267F); Iśana and Varuṇa are at Indra’s left and right respectively (p. 1338F); according to the rule of the Indian language, the combining of several syllables forms a word and the combining of several words forms a phrase (p. 380b-c); the Greater Vehicle in the Indian language is called Mahāyāna (p. 394c); the Buddha manifested only 32 lakṣāṇas and 80 anuvyañjanas in order to conform to Indian taste (p. 684b).

e tc.

But it would be dangerous to see interpolations everywhere: several passages of the Ta-tche-tou-louen may not correspond to the picture that one has, on the basis of late documents,58 of a Nāgārjuna ‘who was a Brāhmin from the south of India, contemporary with Kaniṣka and a friend of a Šatavāhana’, but which may be passages quite natural coming from an author who lived and worked at the beginning of the 4th century in north-western India.

2. NĀGĀRJUNA SEEN FROM TCH’AND-NGAN

If, as I [Lamotte] think, the author of the Upadeśa is different from the author of the Madhyamakaśāstra, the problem of the date of Nāgārjuna loses some of its interest. However, we cannot pass over the information provided by the Tch’ang-ngan school of the 5th century in silence.

As we have seen above, Kumārajīva considered Nāgārjuna to be the author of the Upadeśa, of the Dvādaśanikāya, the Madhyamakaśāstra and the Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā of which he provided the translation.

58 For a long time, the West has had at its disposal, as information about Nāgārjuna, only incomplete and late documents: a short summary of the Long-chou-p’ou-sa-tchouan (T 2047) in V. Vassilief, Le bouddhisme, ses dogmes, son histoire et sa littérature, 1865, p. 212-213, Tāranātha’s Gesichte des Buddhismus translated by A. Schiefner, 1869, and the Si-yu-ki (T 2087) by S. Beal (1884) and Th. Watters (1904-05). The paucity of documentation explains the tendency of the moderns to exaggerate the importance of some old comments without any geographical and chronological significance. Thus, concerning Kumāralabdha (= Kumāralātā), the founder of the Sautrāntika school, we read in the Si-yu-ki (T 2087, k. 12, p. 942a16-18): “At that time, there was Aśvaghoṣa in the east, Deva in the south, Nāgārjuna in the west and Kumāralabdha in the north; they are called the four suns illuminating the world.” And since legend attaches Aśvaghoṣa to Kaniṣka, it has been deduced that the four ‘suns’ appeared simultaneously in the 1st or the 2nd centuries of our era according to the date that is assigned to Kaniṣka. This is to give too much importance to a comment that is only a stylistic symbol.
But we know that Kumārajīva, who ‘forgot small details’\(^{59}\), did not look very carefully: perhaps he carelessly attributed Kumāralata’s *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* to Aśvaghoṣa.

According to customary usage, he dated Nāgārjuna in post-Nirvāṇa years. In China until the beginning of the 6\(^{th}\) century, the birth of Śākyamuni was placed at the 8\(^{th}\) day of the 4\(^{th}\) moon of the 10\(^{th}\) year of King Tchouang (687 B.C.).\(^{60}\) But Kumārajīva brought a correction to this computation.

In a note dated 568 A.D. in the *Eul-kiao-louen* by Tao-ngan\(^{61}\) cited by Tao-siuan (596-667) in his *Kouang-hong-ming-tei* (T 2103, k. 8, p. 142a18-20), we read:

>According to the chronology of the dharmācārya Che (Kumārajīva) and the *Che-tchou-ming* (inscribed pillar in the Wou-hin region) in agreement with the *Springs and Autumns* (Chronicles of the Lou principality), the Tathāgata was born on the 5\(^{th}\) (correction: the 4\(^{th}\)) year of king Houan of the Tcheu, *yi-ich'eu* cyclic order (716 B.C.). He went forth in the 23\(^{rd}\) (correction: 22\(^{nd}\)) year of king Houan, *kouei-wei* cyclic order (698 B.C.). He attained enlightenment in the 10\(^{th}\) year of king Tchouang, *kin-wou* cyclic order (687 B.C.). He entered into nirvāṇa in the 15\(^{th}\) year of king Siang, *kia-chen* cyclic order (637 B.C.): this was 1295 years ago (586 B.C.).

The dating of the Parinirvāṇa in 637 B.C. allows the use of the information provided by Ki-tsang (549-623) on Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Harivarman in his commentary on the *Śatakaśāstra* (T 1827), the *Madhyamakaśāstra* (T 1824) and the *Three Treatises* (T 1852):

T 1827, k. 1, p. 233a8-14: The teacher [Seng]-jouei, in the preface to the Satyasiddhiśāstra [by Harivarman] which he wrote after the death of his teacher Che [Kumārajīva], cites some words of the latter: “After the Buddha’s death in the year 350, Ma-ming (Aśvaghoṣa) was born; in 530 Long-chou (Nāgārjuna) was born.” He also said: “Aśvaghoṣa illustrated the end of the Authentic Law (saddharma); Nāgārjuna appeared at the beginning of the Counterfeit Law (pratirūpakadharma)”... [Seng]-tchao and [Seng]-jouei say that T’i-p’o (Āryadeva) was born in the 800\(^{th}\) year or later.\(^{62}\)

T 1824, k. 1, p. 18b23-25: At what time in the Counterfeit Law (pratirūpakadharma) was Nāgārjuna born? The master [Seng]-jouei, in his preface to the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, cites some words of his teacher Lo-che (Kumārajīva) who says: “Aśvaghoṣa was born in the year 350, and Nāgārjuna was born in the year 530.”


\(^{61}\) This is not the well-known Tao-nga of the 4\(^{th}\) century.

\(^{62}\) Information confirmed by Seng-tchao’s preface to the *Śatakaśāstra* by Āryadeva (T 1569, p. 167c12; *Tch’ou*, T 2145, k. 11, p. 77b12).
Once the dharmācārya Lo-che [Kumāramjīva], after having translated the Satyasiddhiśāstra, asked Seng-jouei to comment on it. After the death of master Kumārajīva, Seng-jouei wrote down his last teachings and composed the preface to the śāstra; he said: “The Satyasiddhiśāstra was composed by Harivarman, the most famous of Kumāralata’s disciples, a scholar of the Hīnayāna from the land of Ki-pin (Kaśmir) in the 800th year after the Buddha’s Parinirvāṇa.”

As the preface to the Satyasiddhiśāstra has disappeared, it is difficult to verify the sayings of Ki-tsang. But it is wrong that Seng-jouei placed Aśvaghoṣa at the end of the Authentic Law and Nāgārjuna at the beginning of the Counterfeit Law. In his preface to the Ta-tche-tou-louen (T 1509, p. 57a12-13), he says, to the contrary, that Aśvaghoṣa was born at the end of the Authentic Law and Nāgārjuna at the end of the Counterfeit Law, and several lines lower down, (p. 57b13) he refers to the authority of an Indian Chronicle in terms of which Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna appeared at the end of the Authentic Law and at the end of the Counterfeit Law respectively. The two periods each cover 500 years, so it would follow that the two individuals were separated by about 500 years.

That being so, there is only one way to interpret Kumārajīva’s phrase which puts Aśvaghoṣa at 350 years and Nāgārjuna at 530 years after the Parinirvāṇa. We must understand that Aśvaghoṣa was born at 350 post-nirvāṇa (which gives 637-350 = 287 B.C.) and Nāgārjuna 530 years after Aśvaghoṣa (which gives 637- (350+530) = 243 A.D.).

If we accept these numbers, the Tch’ang-ngan school of the 5th century placed the great masters at the following dates:

- 637 B.C.: Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha
- 287 B.C.: Birth of Aśvaghoṣa
- 243 A.D.: Birth of Nāgārjuna who was followed by Āryadeva
- 253 A.D.: Publication of the Satyasiddhiśāstra by Harivarman, the disciple of Kumāralata.

This information probably came from Kaśmir where Kumārajīva had been educated and with which he remained in contact. It may be compared with a passage from the Rājatasāṅgīṇī (I, v. 168 and 173) by the Kaśmirian historian Kalhaṇa (12th century) in whose words a bodhisattva of the first bhūmi, the glorious Nāgārjuna, lived at Śaḍarhadvana (Hārvan) in the reigns of the last great Kuśāṇas, Huṣka (Huviska?) and his successors.

Nevertheless, no historian will accept that an interval of almost 500 years separated Aśvaghoṣa from Nāgārjuna. In a note incorporated by Seng-tchao in his Commentary on the Vimalakīrti (T 1775, k. 8, p. 399b), Kumārajīva himself places Pārśva and Aśvaghoṣa in the 600 years post-nirvāṇa.

63 According to the Li-tai (T 2034, k. 8, p. 78c22), Kumārajīva translated the Satyasiddhiśāstra in the 8th year of the hong-che period (406-407); according to the K’ai-yuan (T 2145, k. 4, p. 513a18), the translation began on the 8th day of the 9th moon of the 13th hong-che year (October 11, 411) and was finished on the 15th day of the 9th moon of the 14th year (November 4, 412).
One cannot escape the impression that all these dates are derived from theoretical views on the successive stages of the holy Dharma and that, as an absolute chronology, their value is rather weak.

It is doubtful that at the beginning of the 5th century, the Tch’ang-ngan school would have known Nāgārjuna’s Suhrllekhā “Friendly Letter”, of which three Chinese and one Tibetan translation exist:


2) T 1673: K’uan-fa tchou-wang yao-kie “Summary in verse to encourage kings”, translated in 434 at Nankin by Samghavarman, disciple and successor to Gunavarman.

3) T 1674: Long-chou-p’ou-sa k’uan-kai-wang sang “Stanzas of encouragement to the king by the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna”, translated in 691 by Yi-tsing during his trip to India. In his Account sent from the southern seas (T 2125, k. 4, p. 227c13-15) Yi-tsing specifies that this letter was dedicated by Nāgārjuna to his former dānapati called Che-yin-tō-kia (Jantaka), king of southern India, called So-to-p’o-han-na (Śatavāhana).

4) Tib. 5409 and 5682: Bśes-pahi phriṅ-yig “Friendly Letter “, addressed this time to king Bde-byed (Udayana), a contemporary of the Buddha!

The first translation, which makes the king, Jantaka, the recipient of the letter, is suspect in several regards. It is first mentioned in the Nei-tien-lou catalogue T 2149, k. 8, p. 312b25) compiled only in 664, and it is hard to see why Samghavarman would have retranslated a text published by his teacher three years previously.

The second translation, which does not specify the name of the recipient, gives more guarantee of authenticity: it is mentioned in the Tch’ou-san-tsang-ki-Tsi (T 2145, k. 2, p. 12b23; k. 14, p. 104c25) already published in 515 and mentioned by Houei-kiao in his Kao-seng-tchouan (T 2059, k. 3, p. 342c3), which was not the case for the first.

Later, a biography of the bodhisattva Nāgārjuna entitled Long-chou-p’ou-sa-tchouan (T 2047) and published under Kumārajīva’s name was circulated. It has been translated into English by M. Walleser. It probably collected some information previously furnished by Kumāramjīva, but he was not the author.

Firstly, the first catalogue to mention it was the Li-tai-san-pao-ki (T 2034, k. 8, p. 79a7) compiled at Tch’ang-ngan in 597 by Fei Tchang-fang and, contrary to his custom, this editor was unable to refer to any earlier catalogue.

64 For detail, see S. Lévi, Kaniṣṭha et Śālavāhana, JA, 1936, p. 107-110.


66 A note by Kumārajīva incorporated by Seng-tchao in his Commentary on Vimalakīrti (T 1775, k. 2, p. 339a) tells of an episode between Nāgārjuna and a heretic. Nāgārjuna had said to the latter that the devas and asuras were at war. The heretic asked for proof. Immediately broken spears and swords, bodies and heads of asuras fell from the sky. The heretic was convinced and gave in. The episode in question is taken from the Long-chou-p’ou-sa-tchouen (T 2047, p. 185a, 186a) and from there passed into the Fou-fa-tsang-yin-yuan-tchouan (T 2058, k. 5, p. 318a-b).
Secondly, this biography, which correctly mentioned the *Upadeśa* in 100,000 *gāthās* (T 1509) and the *Madhyamakaśāstra* in 599 *gāthās*, also attributes to Nāgārjuna three works unknown as yet and which will not be considered further: a śāstra on the marvelous Bodhi of the Buddhas in 5,000 *gāthās*, a śāstra on the skillful means of great compassion in 5,000 *gāthās* and a śāstra on the absence of fear of which the Madhyamakaśāstra would be an extract.67

Finally and above all, this biography presents its hero as a high-flying adventurer and complacently describes his stormy youth, his exciting voyages, his daring attempts at reform, his sensational discoveries in the Nāga palace, his quarrels with the prince, his magic contests with the Brāhmīns and finally, his mysterious death. The picture thus sketched gives a good idea of what the upper middle ages thought of a siddha, but corresponds poorly to the image that we ourselves have of this penetrating and rigorous logician who was the author of the *Madhyamakaśāstra*, this wise encyclopedist who was the author of the *Upadeśa*.68

**IV. SUBJECT AND SOURCES OF VOLUME III**

Volume II of the present work, which appeared in 1949 treated the six virtues – generosity, morality, patience, exertion, meditation and wisdom – which the bodhisattva must practice in order to reach supreme complete enlightenment and, at the same time, to assure the welfare and happiness of all beings.

The canonical and postcanonical texts of early Buddhism had already mentioned these virtues and, for a long time, the deeds of future Buddhas appeared in the bas-reliefs. But in the view of the Prajñāpāramitā, these virtues are raised to the level of perfections (*pāramitā*) insofar as the bodhisattva ‘keeps them and does not keep them’ (*asthānayogena tiṣṭhati*) in the sense that he practices them with the deep conviction (*kṣāti*) that beings do not exist and that things are unborn. From the perspective of their true nature (*bhūtalaksana, dharmaṭā*), all contingent phenomena are reduced to being identical (*samatā*) in a fundamental non-existence. The result is that the bodhisattva will be completely generous if he eliminates the notions of donor, recipient and gift given, perfectly moral if he mixes merit and wrong-doing, perfectly wise if, rejecting both true and false, he professes no system whatsoever.

In the present Volume III, the author dedicates no less than twelve chapters (XXXI – XLII) to commenting on a few pages of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra (*Pañcaviṃśatisīhasikā*, p. 19-21); *Śatasīhasikā*, p. 56-66). This part, the most technical and without a doubt the most interesting part of the *Traité*, has as its subject the practices forming the Path of Nirvāṇa and the attributes of the Buddhas.

67 Cf. T 2047, p. 184c18-21; 186b9-12. The same list appears in T 2058, k. 5, p. 318b16-19. – This “Śāstra on the absence of fear” has been compared with the *Mālamadhyamakavṛtti-akutobhayā* attributed to Nāgārjuna and appearing in the Tib, Trip, no. 5229, but the comparison is forced

68 One could ask if the *Upadeśa*, like the *Mahāvibhāṣā* which it opposes, was not another collective work. This is a question to which I [Lamotte] am unable to respond.
Such a subject is somewhat unexpected. The bodhisattva delays his entry into nirvāṇa indefinitely and remains in saṃsāra with the sole purpose of dedicating himself as long as possible to the welfare and happiness of beings. Why then should he be interested in practices that are aimed precisely at hastening nirvāṇa? The answer is simple. The bodhisattva must know these practices so as to teach them eventually to beings destined to be converted by the old Vehicle – that of the śrāvakas, a fact that does not prevent them, at the appropriate time, from being redirected towards the Greater Vehicle. This is why the bodhisattva ‘completely fulfills’ (paripūrayati) the practices of the path in order to be able to teach them or review them with awareness of their cause, but he does not realize (na sākśīkaroti) them personally, for he would, by that very fact, betray his ideal of future Buddha and he would rejoin the ranks of the arhats who are more preoccupied with their sainthood than with the salvation of others.

As for the attributes of the Buddha, they are still beyond the reach of the bodhisattva. But although he has not ‘fulfilled them completely’, he is ‘anxious to understand them’ (parijñmatukāma). This is why it is necessary to speak of them. The division into chapters as presented in the Taisho edition leaves much to be desired and so it is useful to present a summary of Volume III here.

FIRST PART: *The dharmas of the Path arranged in order of importance:*

I. The thirty-seven bodhipākṣikadharmas divided into seven classes (chap. XXXI):

1. Four smṛtyupasthānas.
2. Four sanyakpradhānas.
3. Four rddhipādas.
4. Five indriyas.
5. Five balas.
6. Seven saṃbodhyaṅgas.
7. Eight mārgaṅgas.

II. The eight complementary classes of dharmas of the Path (chap. XXXII-XXXIV):

1. Three samādhis.
2. Four dhyānas.
3. Four apramāṇas.
4. Four ārūpyasamāpattis.
5. Eight vimokṣas.
6. Eight abhibhāyatanas.
7. Ten kṛtsnāyatanas.
III. Six other classes of dharmas of the Path (chap. XXXV- XXXVIII):

1. Nine aṣubhasamŷñas.
2. Eight anusmṛtis.
3. Ten samŷnas.
4. Eleven jñānas.
5. Three samādhis.
6. Three indriyas.

SECOND PART: The attributes of the Buddhas (chap. XXXIX-XLII):

1. The eight balas according to the Abhidharma (chap. XXXIX).
2. The four vaišāradyas according to the Abhidharma (chap. XL).
3. The ten balas and the four vaišāradyas according to the Mahāyāna (chap. XL).
4. The four pratisamvids according to the Abhidharma and according to the Māhayāna (chap. XL).
5. The eighteen āvenikadharmas according to the Mahāyān list (chap. XLI).
6. The eighteen āvenikadharmas according to the Sarvāstivādin lists (chap. XLI)

7. Mahāmaitrī and mahākarunā (chap. XLI).

For each of these subjects, the Traité first explains the theories of early Buddhism according to the interpretation of the Abhidharma and the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika-Vibhāṣa; then it presents the contrasting view of the Prajñāpāramitāśūtra and the other Mahāyānasūtras, taking its inspiration most frequently from refutation of arguments condensed in the Madhyamakaśāstra.

A clear distinction is made in the account between the Abhidharmic theories and the Mahāyānist criticism. The subtitles, added here to the French translation, carefully mark the separation. It often happens, as a matter of fact, that the contemporary exegesis quoting one or another passage taken from the Traité, without placing it in context, attributes theories to the author which he presents only to oppose them.

By means of these frequent allusions to the early Tripitaka, the author plunges us into the elating atmosphere of the 6th century B. C. In the course of Volume III, we will see ‘humans and non-human beings’ whom Śākyamuni met at random in his preaching tours march past helter-skelter: Ājñātakaumṇḍinya (p. 1426F, 1576F), Ambaṭṭha (p. 1576F), Ānanda (p. 1352F, 1547F, 1589F, 1631F, 1649F, 1676F), Anavataptaṇāgarāja (p. 1343F), Āṅgulimāla (p. 1542F, 1579F), Aniruddha (p. 1405F, 1558F, 1630F), Apalā (p. 1578F), Asita (p. 1344F), Āṭavaka (p. 1578F), Bakkula (p. 1386F, 1530F), Bhradvāja (p. 1401F), Bimbisāra (p. 1577F), Brahmadatta (p. 1577F), Brahmā devarāja (p. 1343F, 1583F), Brahmāyus (p. 1577F), Caṇḍa Pradyota (p. 1577F), Cāturmahārājakāyikadeva (p. 1679F), Čuḍapanthaka (p. 1543F), Devadatta (p. 1545F, 1662F, 1671F seq.), Dīrgha the yakṣa (p. 1405F), Dīrghanakha (p. 1576F, 1688F),
Elapatra (p. 1579F), Gavāmpati (p. 1659F), Iśāna (p. 1338F), Jambuka (p. 1363F), the Jātilas (p. 1576F), Jivaka (p. 1677F), Kīmbila (P. 1405F), Kṣānti (p. 1670F), Kūṭasanta (p. 1577F), Laṅkabhadrika (p. 1439F), Madhuvāsiśtha (p. 1659F), Mahāgatemi (p. 1403F), Mahākāśyapa (p. 1355F, 1399F, 1547F, 1577F), Mahākātyāyana (p. 1531F), Mahādeva (p. 1583F), Māndhātṝ (p. 1583F), Māra (p. 1582F), Maudgalāyana (p. 1355F, 1426F, 1530F, 1543F, 1575F, 1576F, 1631F, 1632F), Meghika (p. 1675F), Nāgasamāla (p. 1675F), Nandika (p. 1405F), Nandopananda (p. 1359F), Nītha (p. 1634F), Pilindavatsa (p. 1439F), Pilotika (p. 1576F), Piṇḍola Bhāravadāja (p. 1631F), Prasenajit (p. 1577F), Pukkusāti (p. 1531F, 1577F), Pūrṇa (p. 1631F), Puṣkarasārin (p. 1577F), Rādha (p. 1675F), Rāhula (p. 1546F), Revata Khadiravaniya (p. 1547F), Sāgara nāgarāja (p. 1343F), Sāgara the king (p. 1583F), Śaivala (p. 1546F), Śakra devendra (p. 1343F, 1583F), the 100,000 Śākyas (p. 1577F), Śāriputra (p. 1355F, 1426F, 1439F, 1543F, 1547F, 1575F, 1576F, 1631F, 1632F, 1694F, 1713F), Satyaka Nirgranthiputra (p. 1355F, 1576F, 1662F, 1665F), Saundarananda (p. 1545F, 1641F), Śibi (p. 1713F), Śrenīkavatsagotra (p. 1356F), Śrīgupta (p. 1634F), Śrīvṛddhi (p. 1526F), Śroṇa Koṭiśvaśa (p. 1387F), Subaddha (p. 1650F, 1652F), Sūdrasana (p. 1583F), Śuddhodana (p. 1344F), Sumana (p. 1426F), Sunakṣatra (p. 1545F, 1675F), Sundarī (p. 1572F), Udayana (p. 1577F), Upāli (p. 1547F), Urubilva the nāga (p. 1359F), Uruvilvākāśyapa (p. 1355F, 1576F), Vakkali (p. 1546F), Varuṇa (p. 1338F), Vemacitrin (p. 1583F), Virūdhaka (p. 1529), Viśvakarman (p. 1578F), Yaśas (p. 1545F).—The only bodhisattvas mentioned in the present volume are Sadāprarudita (p. 1353F, Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī and Maitreya (p. 1694F).

More than the two previous volumes, Volume III is loaded with canonical quotations of which here is a provisional list:

1. Hīnayāna sūtras cited with their titles. — Bahudhātuka (p. 1524F, 1525F), Devatāpariprccchā (p. 1633F), Dhyāṇa (p. 1268F, 1547F), Dīrghanakahabrahmācīrī (p. 1688F), Ekottara (p. 1268F), Karmavibhaṅga (p. 1534F), Kātyāyanāvavāda erroneously cited as Kāśyapapariprccchā (p. 1684F), Romaharsanīya (p. 1554F), Sarvārava (p. 1590F), Sundarī-sūtra (p. 1572F).

3. Mahāyānasūtras cited with their titles:69 - Akṣayamatinirdeśa cited Akṣayamati bibhisattvaparipṛcchā (p. 1245F), Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā (p. 1272F) or Akṣayamatisūtra (p. 1716F), Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (p. 1646F), Saṃvṛtiparamārthaśatamirdeśa cited Praśantasūtra (p. 1562F), Sarvadhamāpravṛtti nirdeśa (p. 1535F), Śūraṃgamasamādhi cited Mahāyāna-Śūraṃgamasūtra (1647F), Tathāgatācintyasyaḥyanirdeśa cited Guhyakasūtra (p. 1538F) or Guhyayakavajrapāṇisūtra (p. 1681F), Vimalakīrtinirdeśa cited Advayapravesadhammadaparyāya (p. 1645-1636F, n. 1). Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā cited Jālinībodhisattvasūtra (p. 1268F, 1417F0 or Viśeṣacintisūtra (p. 1714F).

4. Mahāyānasūtras mentioned without titles. – Akṣayamatinirdeśa (p. 1250, n. 1), Amitayuruddhānusmṛti (p. 1361, n. 2), Pratyutpannabuddhaśaṃkāvasthī-śamādhi (p. 1361, n. 2), Ratnamegha (p. 1513F, n. 1), Śūraṃgamasamādhi (p. 1611, n. 2), Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa (p. 1587F, n. 1), Vikurvaṇarājaparipṛcchā (p. 1613, n. 1).

The references to the Madhyamakāśāstra by Nāgārjuna and to the Catuḥāataka by Āryadeva have been noted above, p. XXXIXF-XLF.

*** *** ***

I [Lamotte] am pleased to be able to express my gratitude to my colleagues and friends who have shown interest in this work. With the kindness of a bodhisattva, P. Demiéville has given me tireless assistance. W. Simon and J. Brough have furnished precious information. My young colleague, R. Shiḥ, has proposed judicious corrections. H. Durt, J. Kato and M. Van Velthem have shared in correcting the proofs.

At the intervention of J. Willems, the very distinguished President of the University Foundation and the National Council for Scientific Research, the Franqui Foundation has granted a generous subsidy for this publication and thus relieved the burden of the Oriental Insitute of Louvain and its President, Count J. Ryckmans.

To these worthy individuals, to all these kalyāṇamitras, I express my highest thanks.

I would also like to thank particularly E. Peeters, director of the Orientalist Press, who has tried hard to meet my wishes and speed the publication of this Volume.

Étienne Lamotte
Louvain, May 17, 1970

---

69 As they are too numerous, the explicit and implicit references to the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtras are not given here.
SUPPLEMENT TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ed. = edition; rec. -= reconstruction of Sanskrit; tr. == translation.


Abhidharmamrta : rec. Sh. Bh. SASTRI (Visvabharati Studies, 17), Santiniketan, 1953.


Ajitasenavyakarana : ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.

Aksarasataka : tr. V. GOKHALE (Mat. z. Kunde des Buddh., 14), Heidelberg, 1930.


Arthapadasutra : ed. and tr. P. V. BAPAT (Visvabharati Studies, 13), Santiniketan, 1931.


BANERJEE A. C., Sarvastivada Literature, Calcutta, 1957.


Bha saijayaguru Sutra : ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.


Ceylon Encyclopaedia - Encyclopaedia of Buddhism ed. by G. P. MALALASEKERA, 7 fasc. parus, Colombo, 1961 and following.


Chao Lun : tr. W. LIEBENTHAL, 2nd ed. Hong Kong, 1968.

Cittavisuddhiprakarana : ed. P. Bh. PATEL (Visvabharati Studies, 8), Santiniketan 1949.


Dasottarasutra : ed. KUSUM MITTAL (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, 4), Berlin 1957.


DEMIEVILLE, P., *La penetration du bouddhisme dans la tradition philosophique chinoise*, Cahiers


Ekadasamukha : ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.


FACENNA D., *Reports on the Campaigns 1956-58 in Swat* (Pakistan); *Sculptures from the Sacred Area of Butkara 1* (Publ. of the Centre Studi e Scavi archeologici in Asia, IsMeo, I; II, 2; II, 3). Boma, 1962-64.


FILLIOZAT J., *The Graeco- Aramaic Inscription of Asoka near Kandahar*, Epigraphia Indica, XXXIV,


Guhyasamaja Tantra : ed. B. BHATTACHARYYA (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 53), Baroda, 1931.


INGHOLT H. and LYONS J., *Gandharan Art in Pakistan* (Pantheon Books), New York, 1957


Karikasaptati = Trisatikayah Prajiaparamitayah Karikasaptatih, ed. G. Tuoci,


Kathinavastu ! ed. et tr. KUN CHANG (Indo-Iranian Monographs, I), La Haye, 1957.


MARSHALL J. and FOUCHER A., È, 3 vol., Calcutta, 1939.

MAY J., Candrakirti : see above under. Madh. karika.


MAY J., La philosophie bouddhique de la vacuité, Studia Philosophica, XVIII, 1958, p. 123-137.


Melanges d'Indianisme a la memoire de L. Renou (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 28), Paris, 1968.

Melanges de Sinologie offerts a M. Paul Demieville (Bibl. de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, XX), Paris, 1966.


NAGAO G. M., Index to the Mahayana Sutralamkara, 2 parts, Tokyo, 1961.


Nyayabindu : ed. Th. STCHERBATSKY (Bibl. Buddhica, 7), Petrograd, 1918.


OKC = *A comparative analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division of the Tibetan Tripitaka*, Kyoto, 1930-32.


PETECH L., *Northern India according to the Shui-Ching-Chu* (Serie Orientale Koma, II), Rome, 1950.


Pratityasamutpadasastra : ed. V. GOKHALE, Bonn, 1930.


RAMANAN- K. V., *Nagarjuna's Philosophy as presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sastra*, Tokyo,
1966.


Samadhiraja Sutra : ed. N. DUTT, 3 parts (Gilgit Man., II), Srinagar, 1941-54.


Sangitisutra and Sangitiparyaya ; ed. and tr. KUSUM MITTAL et V. STACHE-ROSEN, Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im alten Buddhismus, 2 vol. (Deutsche Akademie für Orientforschung, 65, 1-2), Berlin, 1968.


Sarvatathagatadhisthana ! ed. N. DUTT (Gilgit Man., I), Srinagar, 1939.


Satasastra : tr. G. TUCCI, *Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts* (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 49), Baroda, 1929.


Vin. des Mulasarv. = Mulasarvastivada-Vinayavastu, ed. N. DUTT, 4 parts (Gilgit Man., Ill), Srinagar,
1942-50.


WALDSCHMIDT E., Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden, 2 Teile (Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, B. X, 1 et 2), Wiesbaden, 1965-68.

WAYMAN A., Contributions to the Madhyamika School of Buddhism, JAOS, Vol. 89, 1969, p. 141-152.


CHAPTER XXXI: THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES TO ENLIGHTENMENT

PRELIMINARY NOTE (p. 1119F)

I. LISTS OF AUXILIARIES

The title of the fourth noble truth preached by the Buddha in his sermon at Benares is the path of cessation of suffering (duḥkhiṇirṇyata pratiṣṭhā). It deals with the noble eight-membered Path (ārya aṣṭāṅgārtha), the culmination of a method of liberation involving an infinite number of more or less efficacious spiritual practices. The most important – among which are included the eight Path members – are designated by the name ‘Auxiliaries to Enlightenment’, bodhipakkhiya, bodhipakṣa, bodhipakṣa, bodhipakṣya or bodhipakṣa dharma in Sanskrit.

Definition of the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 96, p. 496b18-21): “Why are they called bodhipakṣa? The two knowledges of the saint, the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (āśrayaśrayajñāna) and the knowledge that they will not arise again (anuttāpaśrayajñāna) are given the name of Bodhi because they consist of the complete understanding of the four Truths. If a dharma is favorable to this complete understanding, it is given the name of bodhipakṣa.”

Definition of the Kośa, (VI, p. 282-284): “Kṣayajñāna and anuttāpaśrayajñāna are Bodhi which, due to the difference of the saints who attain it, is threefold: śrāvakabodhi, pratyekabodhi, anuttarā samyaksambojñā. Indeed, ignorance is completely abandoned (aśesāvidyāpahānā) by these two jñānas: by means of the first, one knows truly that the task has been accomplished; by means of the second, one knows that the task will no longer have to be accomplished. Inasmuch as they are favorable to this Bodhi, thirty-seven dharmas are its auxiliaries (tadanulomāṣad bodhipakṣikādharmaḥ)... All these auxiliaries to Bodhi are also a group of pure (anāsrava) or impure (sāsrava) qualities of hearing (śrūta), reflecting (cintā) and meditating (bhāvanā), arising from practice (prāyogika).”

But the classical list of the thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment (saptatrimśad bodhipakṣikādharmaḥ) was slow in being formulated:

1. In the Nikāyas and the Āgamas the term bodhipakṣika dharma is rather rare and still poorly defined. The Aṅguttara, III, p. 70, 300 (cf. Vibhaṅga, p. 244) includes among them: the guarding of the senses (indriyeṣu guttadvāratā, sobriety (bhojane mattaññatā) and heedfulness (jāgariy’ānuyoga). For the Saṁyutta, V, p. 227, 239, the bodhipakṣika are the five spiritual faculties (indriya); for the Vibhaṅga, p. 249, they are the seven members of enlightenment (sambojñāṅga).

2. In the Canon there is frequently a list of 37 dharmas divided into seven classes: 1) the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), 2) the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna), 3) the four bases of magical powers (rddhipāda), 4) the five spiritual faculties (indriya), 5) the five strengths (bala), 6) the seven members of enlightenment (saṁbodhyaṅga or bodhyaṅga), 7) the seven members of the path (mārgaṅga).
Except for the Ekottarāgama, the Nikāyas and the Āgamas do not enumerate these dharmas which are 37 in total, and do not describe them as bodhipākṣika.

See, for example, Dīgha, II, p. 120 (cf. Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāna, ed. Waldschmidt, p. 196, 224); Dīgha III, p. 102, 127; Majjhima, II, p. 238-239; III, p. 296; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 125, 203; Udāna, p. 56. It is the same for the Pāli Vinaya, II, p. 240; III, p. 93; IV, p. 26, etc. – Madhyamāgama, T 26, k. 8, p. 476c20-21; k. 9, p. 479a18-19; k. 52, p. 753c6-7; Saṃyuktāgama, T 99k. 2, p. 14a7-8; k. 3, p. 19c5-6; k. 13, p. 87c3-4; k. 24, p. 176c14-15; k. 26, p. 188b26-27.

The Ekottarika, a late text crammed with Mahāyānist interpolations, is the only Āgama to enumerate these dharmas and describe them as bodhipākṣika: cf. T 125, k. 3, p. 561b20-22; k. 7, p. 579c26; k. 13, p. 612a19-20; k. 18, p. 635b25-26; k. 26, p. 696c9; k. 40, p. 765c15.

3. Sometimes the seven classes are incorporated into a list of more than 37 dharmas, e.g., Majjhima, II, p. 11-12; Anguttara, I, p. 39-49; and also for the Greater Vehicle, Pañcaviṃśati, p. 203-308; Sūtrasṭhasrikā, p. 1427-1439.

4. Paracanonical or postcanonical texts, whether Pāli or Sanskrit, the sūtras and śāstras of the Greater Vehicle list the seven classes in question, number their components and give them a name, ‘the 37 bodhipākṣa dharmas’, that will remain classical.

For the Pāli sources, see Nettippakaraṇa, p. 197, 261; Milinda, p. 30; Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 582-583; commentaries by Buddhaghosa on the Saṃyutta, I, p. 104; II, p. 139; III, p. 136; and on the Aṅguttara, I, p. 85; II, p. 11; III, p. 56; IV, p. 111; Compendium of Philosophy, p. 179.

For the Sanskrit-Chinese sources, see an infinity of texts on the two Vehicles: Divyāvadāna, p. 350, 616; Avadānaśataka, I, p. 340; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 96, p. 495c27-28; Kośa, VI, p. 281; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 57 seq.; Lalitavistara, p. 9; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 18, p. 350b9; Kāśyapaparivarta, p. 75; Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 458; Vimalakīrti, p. 117, 139, 144, 201-202, 216, 378; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 140-146; Madhyantavibhāga, p. 89-94; Yogācārabhūmi, T 1579, k. 28, p. 439c-440a (for the śrāvakas): Bodh. bhūmi, p. 259 (for the bodhisattvas); Dharmasaṅgrahe, ch. 43; Arthaviniścaya, p. 569-575; Mahāvyut., no. 952-1004.

5. As well as the classical list of 37 bodhipākṣikas which is by far the most widespread, there are also aberrant lists:

a. The Nettippakaraṇa, which notes (p. 31, 261) the list of 37, mentions (p. 112, 237) a list of 43 bodhipakkhiyas beginning with six saññā: aniccā, dukkha, anatta, pahāna, virūga and nirodhasaññā.

b. In his commentary on the Anguttara (I, p. 85) Buddhaghosa mentions as heretical (adhamma) a list of 38 bodhipakkhiyas, consisting of 3 sati, 3 padhāna, 3 iddipāda, 6 indriya, 6 bala, 8 bojjhāṅga and 9 maggaṅga.

c. According to the Vibhāṣā (T 545, k. 86, p. 499a14-15), the Vibhajyāvādins have a list of 41 bodhipākṣikas, by adding the four āryavamsas ‘Ārya stock’ - being content with clothing, food and seat, and taking delight in cessation and the Path - to the 37 traditional ones.
According to Bhavya (M. Walleser, *Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus*, 1927, p. 90; A. Bareau, *Trois Traités*, JA 1956, p. 186) place the four *apramāṇas*, also called *brahmavihāras*, loving-kindness, etc., among the *bodhyāṅgas*.

[In Kośa, VI, p. 281, note, de La Vallée Poussin comments that the Anguttara, I, p. 53, recognizes only six *bodhyāṅgas*, memory being omitted. This is wrong, for memory (*satisāṃbajjāṅga*) is mentioned in the first line on p. 53.]

**II. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE 37 AUXILIARIES**

1. The 4 *smṛtyupasthānas*

Pāli formula in Dīgha, II, p. 290; Majjhima, I, p. 55-56; Saṃyutta, V, p. 141, 167, 185; Vibhaṅga, p. 193. *Ekāyano ayāṃ bhikkhave maggo ...vuneyya loke abhijjhādomanassam...* – Sanskrit formula in Pañcaviṃśati, p. 204; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1427; Daśabhūmika, p. 38. *Sa ... kāye kāyāṇupaśyī (var. kāyānudarśī) ... vinīyā loke ‘bhidhyādaurmanasye.*

Transl. – O monks, there is only one way for the purification of beings, for going beyond sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of suffering and sadness, for the conquest of the right Path, for the realization of nirvāṇa: this is the four foundations of mindfulness. What are these four?

1. The monk dwells considering the body in the body, energetic, aware, mindful of controlling greed and sorrow in the world.
2. He dwells considering feeling in the feelings, energetic, aware, mindful of controlling greed and sorrow in the world.
3. He dwells considering the mind in the mind, energetic, aware, mindful of controlling greed and sorrow in the world.
4. He dwells considering dharmas in the dharmas, energetic, aware, mindful of controlling greed and sorrow in the world.


Transl. – 1. Thus he dwells considering the body in the body internally (i.e., in his own body), considering the body externally (i.e., in the body of another) or considering the body (both) internally and externally.
2. He dwells considering feelings in the feelings internally, considering feeling in the feelings externally or considering feelings internally and externally.

3. He dwells considering the mind in the mind internally, considering the mind in the mind externally or considering the mind in the mind internally and externally.

4. He dwells considering dharmas in the dharmas internally, considering dharmas in the dharmas externally or considering dharmas in the dharmas internally and externally.

2. The 4 samyakpradhānas

In the Pāli sources, sammappadhāna ‘right efforts’; in the Sanskrit sources, samyakprahāna ‘right cessations’, translated into Tibetan as yan dag par spoṅ ba, but glossed as samyakpradhāna in the Kośavyākhya, p. 601, l. 29. The Chinese translations give a choice between tcheng cheng or tcheng k’in on the one hand, and tcheng touan on the other hand.


Transl. – The four right efforts:

1. Here the monk gives rise to zeal, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that evil bad dharmas not yet arisen do not arise.

2. He gives rise to zeal, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that evil bad dharmas already arisen are destroyed.

3. He gives rise to zeal, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that good dharmas not yet arisen arise.

4. He gives rise to zeal, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that good dharmas already arisen are maintained, preserved, developed increased, cultivated and completed.

3. The 4 āṭṭhipādas.

Pāli formula: Dīgha, II, p. 213; III, p. 77, 221; Majjhima, I, p. 103; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 365; V, p. 254, 263-264; 278; Anguttara, I, p. 30, 297; II, p. 256; III, p. 82; IV, p. 464; Vibhaṅga, p. 216; Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 111, 113; II, p. 205. Cattāro āṭṭhipādā: 1. Idha bhikkhu ... āṭṭhipādaṃ bhāvati. – Sanskrit formula:
Transl. – The four bases of magical power:

1. Here the monk cultivates with active effort the basis of magical power that is provided with zealous concentration, a basis that rests on separation, that rests on detachment, that rests on cessation and results in rejection.

2. He cultivates with active effort the basis of magical power that is provided with energetic concentration, a basis that rests, etc.

3. He cultivates with active effort the basis of magical power that is provided with the concentration of mind, a basis that rests, etc.

4. He cultivates with active effort the magical power that rests on concentration of examination, a basis that rests, etc.

[The formula *vivekaniśritam*, etc., that does not appear here in the Pāli wording, however, does occur.]


Transl. – Concentration, the application of the mind to a single object which the monk acquires by resting on (while giving predominance) to zeal, to energy, to the mind, or to examination, concentration of the mind or concentration of examination.

4. The 5 indriyas

The five spiritual faculties, not to be confused with the five organs also called *indriyas*, are frequently mentioned in the canonical texts but rarely defined *in extenso*, and the definitions given are rarely identical. There is no classical definition as there is for the other auxiliaries.

*Vibhaṅgasutta* of the Saṃyutta, V, p. 196-197, to be compared to the Tsa a han, T 99, no, 647, k. 26, p. 182b-c:

*Pañcimāni bhikkhave indriyāni. katamāni ... idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave paññindriyaṃ.*

Transl. – Now, O monks, the five faculties. What are these five? The faculty of faith, the faculty of exertion, the faculty of attention, the faculty of concentration, and the faculty of wisdom.

1. What is the faculty of faith? Here the noble disciple has faith; he believes in the enlightenment of the Tathāgata and says: The Blessed One is holy, completely and fully enlightened, endowed with the
sciences and methods, well-come, knower of the world, peerless, leader of men to be tamed, teacher of
gods and men, the Buddha and Blessed One. This is called the faculty of faith.

2. What is the faculty of exertion? Here the noble disciple dwells actively energetic in destroying the
bad dharmas and producing the good dharmas; he is firm, of proven courage, and does not reject the
burden of the good dharmas. This is called the faculty of exertion.

3. What is the faculty of attention? Here the noble disciple is attentive, endowed with vigilance and
supreme discrimination, unceasingly recalling and remembering what was done and what was said a
long time ago. This is called the faculty of attention.

4. What is the faculty of concentration? Here the noble disciple, making renunciation the object of his
mind, acquires concentration, acquires the application of mind to a single object. This is called
concentration.

5. What is the faculty of wisdom? Here the noble disciple is provided with wisdom: He is endowed
with wisdom to determine the rising and falling of things, wisdom that is noble, penetrating, leading to
complete cessation of suffering.

Daṭṭhabbāṃ sutta of the Saṃyutta, V, p. 196 (cited in Nettipakaraṇa, p. 19), corresponding to Tsa a han, T
99, no, 646, k. 26, p. 182b:

1. Kattha ca bhikkhave saddhindriyaṃ ... ettha paññindriyaṃ daṭṭhabbāṃ.

Transl. – 1. Where, O monks, is the faculty of faith to be found? In the four members of entry into the
stream. That is where the faculty of faith is found.

2. Where is the faculty of exertion to be found? In the four right efforts. That is where ...

3. Where is the faculty of attention to be found? In the four foundations of mindfulness. That is where ...

4. Where is the faculty of concentration to be found? In the four trances. That is where ...

5. Where is the faculty of wisdom to be found? In the four noble truths. That is where ...

This outline is developed in the Vibhaṅgasutta, no, 2, of the Saṃyutta, V, p. 197-198, where the
viriyindirya is defined in exactly the same terms as the four sammāpadhāna.

I [Lamotte] have searched in vain in the Sanskrit sources for a text corresponding to the Pāli sources cited
here. The Mahāvyutpatti, no. 977-981, mentions the five indriyas but does not give a definition; the
Arthavinisācaya, p. 571-572, gives a definition borrowed, it seems, from the Akṣayamatisūtra cited in the
Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 316-317, but its wording has nothing in common with the old canonical sources.
5. The five balas

Pāli formula: Āṅguttara, III, p. 10; Majjhima, II, p. 12; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 366. Pañc’ imāni bhikkhave ... samādhibalam paññābalam. - Sanskrit formula: Pañcaviṃśati, p. 208; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1437; Daśabhūmika, p. 39. Sa śraddhābalam ... samādhibalam, etc., prajñābalam, etc.

Except for the samādhibala, the Āṅguttara, III, p. 10-11, uses exactly the same terms to define the five balas as the Saṃyutta, V, p. 196-197, cited above, uses to define the five īndriyas. The same formulas appear also in the definition of the seven balas presented by the Āṅguttara, IV, p. 3-4.

Actually, it has always been recognized that there is just a difference in intensity between bala and īndriya. Cf. Saṃyutta, V, p. 220: Evaṃ eva kho bhikkhave yaṃ saddhinriyāṃ taṃ saddhābalam, yaṃ sādhibālam taṃ sādhindriyāṃ. pe. yaṃ paññindriyāṃ taṃ paññābalam, yaṃ paññābalam taṃ paññindriyāṃ: “Similarly, O monks, the faculty of faith is the power of faith, and the power of faith is the faculty of faith. And so on up to: the faulty of wisdom is the power of wisdom, and the power of wisdom is the faculty of wisdom.”

This identity is confirmed by the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 141, p. 726b13-20; Kośa, VI, p. 286.

6. The 7 saṁbodhyaṅgas

Pāli wording: Majjhima, I, p. 11; II, p. 12; III, p. 275, etc. 1. Idha bhikkhu satīsambojjhaṅgaṃ ... bhāveti, etc.– Sanskrit wording in Pañcaviṃśati, p. 208; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1438; Daśabhūmika, p. 39; Mahāvyut. no. 989-995. 1. Sa smṛtyaṁ sāmbojhaṅgaṃ ... Upeksāsāṁbodhyaṅgaṃ bhāvayati, etc.

Transl.– Here the monk cultivates the members of enlightenment called:

1. attention, 2. discernment of dharmas, 3. exertion, 4. joy, 5. relaxation., 6. concentration, 7. equanimity:

members that rest on detachment, that rest on cessation and result in rejection.

In the Pāli sources, a stock phrase defines these seven saṁbodhyaṅgas: cf. Majjhima, III, p. 86-87; Saṃyutta, V, p. 67-69, 331-332, 337-339; Vibhaṅga, p. 227:

1. Yasmiṁ samaye, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno ... bhāvanāparipāriṁ gacchati.

Transl.– 1. O monks, when an unfailing attention has arisen in the monk, then the member-of-enlightenment called attention has begun in the monk, then the monk develops the member-of-enlightenment called attention, then the member-of-enlightenment called attention reaches its full development in the monk.

2. When the monk thus dwelling attentively examines, inquires and investigates this thing by means of wisdom, then the member-of-enlightenment called discernment of dharmas is launched in him.
3. When exertion without laziness arises in this monk who is examining, inquiring and investigating this thing by means of wisdom, then the member-of-enlightenment called exertion is launched in him.

4. When spiritual joy is produced in this energetic monk, then the member-of-enlightenment called joy is launched in him.

5. When the body and also the mind relaxes in this monk with joyful spirit, then the member-of-enlightenment called relaxation is launched in him.

6. When the mind is concentrated in this monk of relaxed and happy body, then the member-of-enlightenment called concentration is launched in him.

7. When this monk considers his mind thus concentrated with equanimity, then the member-of-enlightenment called equanimity is launched in him, then the monk develops the member-of-enlightenment called equanimity, then the member-of-enlightenment called equanimity reaches its full development in the monk.

8. The 8 mārgaṅgas


Transl. – The noble eightfold Path, namely, right view, right concept, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.


Transl. – Here the monk cultivates right view, right concept, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration, which rest on separation, which rest on detachment, which rest on cessation and lead to rejection.

A stock phrase defines the eight mārgaṅgas; it occurs frequently in the Pāli Nikāyas, e.g., Dīgha, II, p. 311-313; Majjhima, III, p. 252-252; Saṃyutta, V, p. 8-10; Vibhaṅga, p. 235-236. The Sanskrit Āgamas do not reproduce it exactly: cf. Tchong a han, T 26, k. 7, p. 469a15-b 29:

Ayun eva ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo, ... catutthajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati …

Transl. – Here is the eightfold noble Path: 1. right view; 2. right resolve; 3. right speech; 4. right action; 5. right livelihood; 7. right mindfulness; 8. right concentration.
1. What is right view? It is the knowledge of suffering, the knowledge of the origin of suffering, the knowledge of the cessation of suffering, the knowledge of the path leading to the cessation of suffering.

2. What is right concept? The concept of renunciation, the concept of non-maliciousness, the concept of non-violence.

3. What is right speech? Abstaining from falsehood, abstaining from gossip, abstaining from abusive speech, abstaining from unnecessary speech.

4. What is right action? Abstaining from killing, abstaining from theft, abstaining from illicit sexual activity.

5. What is right livelihood? Here the noble disciple, excluding the evil way of life, earns his livelihood by way of right living.

6. What is right effort? Here the monk gives rise to a wish, exerts himself, activates his energy, stimulates his mind and strives so that the evil bad dharmas not yet arisen do not arise. He gives rise to a wish... and strives so that the evil bad dharmas already arisen are destroyed. He gives rise to a wish... and strives so that the good dharmas not yet arisen arise. He gives rise to a wish... and strives so that the good dharmas already arisen are maintained, preserved, developed, increased, cultivated and completed.

7. What is right mindfulness? Here the monk dwells considering the body in the body, energetic, aware and mindful of controlling greed and sadness in the world. Similarly he dwells considering feeling in the feelings, mind in the mind and dharmas in the dharmas...

8. What is right concentration? Here the monk, having eliminated desires, having eliminated bad dharmas, enters into the first trance, provided with examination, provided with judgment, resulting from detachment, which is joy and happiness. – By the suppression of examination and judgment, he enters into the second trance, inner peace, one-pointedness of mind, without examination and judgment, arisen from concentration, which is joy and bliss. – By renouncing joy, he dwells equanimous, reflective, aware; he experiences bliss in his body; he enters into the third trance where the saints say that he is ‘equanimous, reflective, dwelling in bliss’. – By cessation of bliss and by cessation of suffering, by the previous suppression of joy and sadness, he enters into the fourth trance, free of suffering and bliss, purified in renunciation and reflection.

We may note that the definitions of samyagvyāyāma (no. 6) and samyaksrmīti (no. 7) given here are the same, respectively, as the definitions given above of the four samyakpradhānas and the four smṛtyupasthānas.

For an original definition of the eight mārgāngas, see Arthaviniścaya, p. 573-575.
III. THE AUXILIARIES IN THE ABHIDHARMA

Of the eighteen treatises contained in the Pāli Vihaṅga, the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh are dedicated to the five classes of bodhipākṣikas respectively: the smṛtyupasthānas (p. 193-207), the samyakpradhānas (p. 208-215), the ṛddhipādas (p. 216-226), the sambodhyaṅgas (p. 227-234) and the mārgāṅgas (p. 235-243). Each treatise is made up of three parts: 1) the suktabhājanīya or literal explanations of the canonical sources; 2) the abhidhammabhājanīya or scholastic explanations of the same sources; 3) the pañḥāpucchaka or summary by means of questions and answers.

The bodhipākṣikas are often discussed in the Visuddhimagga as well by Buddhaghosa who summarizes his views at the beginning of chapter XXII (ed. Warren, p. 582-585, tr. ṅānamoli, p. 792-796).

But in the second part of the present chapter, the Traité takes its inspiration solely from the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāsika sources and enunciates theories already described in the Śatpādābhiddhārma (T 1533-1554), the Vibhāṣā (T 1545), the Amṛtasāra (T 1550-1552), the Abhidharmāmṛtarasa (T 1553), all texts dealing copiously with the bodhipākṣikas. It seems that the Traité preferably consulted the Prakaraṇapāda of Vasumitra (T 1541-42) which it cites twice under the heading of chapter VII, namely ‘the Thousand Difficulties’.

The Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma shows considerable progress in elaborating the doctrine of the auxiliaries in regard to the number of elements (dravya) entering into the constitution of the bodhipākṣikas, their successive appearance in the course of practice of the Path and their distribution in the levels (bhūmi) of birth or absorption.

1. Elements making up the bodhipākṣikas. – The Abhidhātra authors rightly noted that although the canonical lists enumerate 37 bodhipākṣikas, many of them are fundamentally the same. Thus, when the lists speak of samyakprahāna, vīryendriya, vīryabala, vīryasambodhyaṅga and samyagvyāyāma, basically it is a matter of one and the same thing, exertion. This is why these authors were led to reducing the 37 bodhipākṣikas to a certain number of constitutive elements, i.e., faith, exertion, mindfulness, etc. The Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 96, p. 496a-b) hesitates between ten, eleven or twelve constitutive elements; the Abhidharmāmṛtarasa (T 1553, k. 2, p. 977c11-12; Reconstruction by Bhikṣu Sastri, p. 116) settles for ten; the Kośa (VI, p. 283-284) has ten and the Abhidharmādīpa (p. 358) has eleven. Here the Traité also has ten.

2. Successive appearance of the bodhipākṣikas. – But if several auxiliaries are intrinsically the same, should we not accuse the canonical lists of having introduced fictional distinctions? No, for a given practice may have been practiced more or less efficaciously at different stages. This is why exertion, as it progresses, successively takes the name of samyakprahāna, vīryendriya, vīryabala, vīryasambodhyaṅga and finally samyagvyāyāma.

Since then, the authors of the Abhidharma were brought to determining the successive appearance of the seven classes of bodhipākṣikas in the course of the various stages of the path:
1) The first class, that of the śṛtyupasthānas, appears at the beginning stage (adikāramika).

2) – 5) The four following classes appear during the preparatory Path (prayogamārga) or the practice of the four roots of good (kusalamūla) ‘leading to penetration’ (nirvedhabhāgīya): 1) The four samyakpraghānas, in the Heat (uṣmagata); 2) the four rddhipādas in the Summits (mūrdhan); 3) the five indriyas in the Patiences (ksānti); 4) the five balas in the Supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma).

6) The sixth class, that of the seven sāṃbodhyaṅgas, develops in the Path of meditation (bhāvanamārga).

7) The seventh and last class, that of the eight mārgāṅgas, appears in the Path of seeing (darshanamārga).

Here, the Traité will not mention this classification although it appears in the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 96, p. 496c22-497a2), the Kośa (VI, p. 287-288), the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 362), etc.

3. Distribution of the bodhipākṣikas in the levels. – On the other hand, the Traité borrows textually from the Vibhāṣā the paragraph on the distribution of the bodhipākṣikas in the levels (bhūmi). This distribution is also accepted by the Abhidharmāṃtra (T 1553, k. 2, p. 977c21-26; Reconstruction of Sastri, p. 117), the Kośa, VI, p. 291-292, and the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 365.

In this entire section, the Traité shows its complete understanding of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma.

IV THE AUXILIAIRIES IN THE MAHĀYĀNA

1. The Madhyamaka viewpoint

Preliminary question. – From the beginning of this chapter, the Traité is confronted with an objection of principle. The auxiliaries of Bodhi that lead directly to nirvāṇa are of interest primarily to the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas whose aspirations concern nirvāṇa. But can we say that they also concern bodhisattvas who delay their nirvāṇa indefinitely in order to dedicate themselves to the welfare and happiness of beings?

The answer of the Traité is categorical: the bodhisaptākṣikas concern the bodhisattvas as well as the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and consequently are relevant to the three Vehicles.

Some arguments drawn from scripture and reasoning support this thesis:

1. In the Great Prajñā (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 194-223; Śatasūrasirikā, p. 1405-1473), there is a long chapter dedicated to the constitutive elements of the Mahāyāna. These are the six pāramitās, the twenty śānyatās, the one hundred and twelve samādhis, the twenty-one practices, the forty-three dhāraṇīmukhas and the ten bhūmis. The seven classes of bodhipākṣikas are placed at the head of the twenty-one practices.
(Pañcaviṃśati, p. 203-308; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1427-1439). This is proof that the bodhipākṣikas are an essential part of the Greater Vehicle and must be practiced in some way by the bodhisattvas.

Other Mahāyānasūtras may be called upon as witness. Thus the Avataṃsaka (T 278, k. 38, p. 640a27-28; T 279, k. 54, p. 286c24-25) makes the seventh of the ten gardens frequented by the bodhisattvas to be the six pāramitās, the three saṃgrahavastus and the thirty-seven bodhipākṣikas. In its section on the Daśabhūmika (p. 38-39, 42, 57), the same Avataṃsaka comments that the bodhisattva practices (bhāvayati) the bodhipākṣikas as early as the fourth bhūmi, purifies them by the view of sameness (samatā) in the fifth and fulfills them completely (paripūrayati) in the seventh.

Similarly, the Bodh. bhūmi (p.342) section of the Yogācārabhūmi, describes the Arcimati, the fourth bodhisattva level, as the level ‘associated with the auxiliaries’ (bodhipākṣhyapratisamyuktā).

2. We also know from reasoning that the bodhipākṣikas are a part of the bodhisattva path, the intent of which is to save beings and lead them to nirvāṇa. But there is no nirvāṇa without bodhi, and bodhi can be attained only by practice of the Path (mārgabhāvana) with all the auxiliaries of bodhi (bodhipākṣika dharma). It is thus necessary that the bodhisattva fulfill them completely (paripūr) himself in order that he can teach them to others. But although he fully completes them (paripūrayati), he does not realize (na sākṣātkaroti) them immediately for, if he did that, he would enter into nirvāṇa immediately. He means, however, in his great compassion imitating the Buddhas, to stay in saṃsāra for a long time in order to ripen (paripācana) the greatest possible number of beings. Established in the perfection of wisdom (praṭihāramitā), he knows that saṃsāra is identical with nirvāṇa, but that does not prevent him in any way from perfecting beings by the practice of the Path. This is why ‘his wisdom is accompanied by skillful means, and his skillful means is accompanied by wisdom’ (upāyasahitā praṇī, praṇīsahita upāyah).

The Traité will develop considerations of this type in the first section of this chapter. But although the bodhisattva shares the thirty-seven auxiliaries with the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha, he practices them in quite a different spirit. This is what the Traité will set out to show in the third section of the chapter.

View and aim of the bodhisattva in the practice of the auxiliaries. – Two passages of the Great Prajñās are involved here:

1. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 146-147; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 841-842. - The bodhisattva clings (nopalabhate) to no dharma in general nor to any class of bodhipākṣika in particular because of their absolute purity (atyantavistuddhitām upādāya). This purity is a non-arising (anuttapāda), a non-manifestation (aprādurbhāva), an absence of clinging (anupalambha), a non-activity (anabhisamskāra). Things do not exist (na saṃvidyante) as worldly fools would like to believe (yathā bālaprthigjanan abhinivistāḥ); things exist by not existing (yathā na saṃvidyante tathā saṃvidyante). Consequently, because they exist only out of ignorance, they are called (the result) of ignorance (evam asaṃvidyamānāḥ tenocate ‘vidyetī).

2. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 56-57. – Dharmas in general and the seven categories of bodhipākṣikas in particular must be completely fulfilled (paripūrayitavya) by the bodhisattva who abides in the perfection of wisdom
by a method of non-abiding (bodhisattva praṇāpāramitāyām sthītvāsthānayogena) basing himself on the impossibility of their being apprehended (anupalabdhitām upādāya).

The Traité has defined the method of non-abiding (aṣṭānayoga) above (p. 656F): it consists of not grasping any characteristic (nimitta) in things. The translation of anupalabdhi and anupalabdhitā, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-apprehension, impossibility of apprehending, that cannot be got at, etc., and he cannot be blamed for sticking to the purely literal meaning. However, I [Lamotte] think that the understanding of the term is much vaster than may be given to it by understanding the etymology. A dharma is anupalabha, non-apprehended, not only because it is not grasped by any faculty whatsoever, but also as a result of its basic non-existence which puts it beyond the range of any clinging. For my part, the ultimate meaning of anupalabdi and anupalambha, rendered in Tibetan by mi dmigs pa and in Chinese by wou so tö, is very tricky. In his Materials for a Dictionary, p. 35, Prof. E. Conze proposes different translations such as no(n)-appr
By this twofold attitude of theoretical refusal and practical acceptance, the bodhisattva remains faithful to his plan, namely, *prajñā* accompanied by *upāya* and vice versa.

2. The Vijñānavādin viewpoint

In contrast to the Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka of which the *Traité* is here the spokesman, the Vijñānavādin school is of the opinion that the True nature of dharmas is not pure and simple non-existence but a True manner of being (*bhūtatathatā*) and that the practice of the *bodhipāksikas* allows its attainment.

To illustrate this point of view, a passage from the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 259, is cited:

*Bodhisattva upāyaparīghtena jñānena ... iyam asyapāramārthikī kāyāmupāsyānā.*

Transl. – By means of wisdom incorporating skillful means, the bodhisattva understands fully the thirty-seven auxiliaries but does not realize them; and he understands them fully from the point of view of both Vehicles, namely, the point of view of the śrāvaka Vehicle and the point of view of the Greater Vehicle.

From the point of view of the śrāvaka Vehicle, he understands precisely those that have been explained completely in (the chapter) on the śrāvaka level to which reference will be made (T 1579, k. 21-34, p. 395c-477c; cf. A. Wayman, *A report on the Śrāvaka-Bhūmi and its Author Asaṅga*, J. Bihar research Soc., XLII, 2-4, Parts 3-4, 1956, p. 1-14).

But how does the bodhisattva understand exactly the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment from the point of view of the Greater Vehicle? Here the bodhisattva abides considering the body in the body, but he does not conceive the body as being body [which is the viewpoint of the śrāvakas], nor as not existing in any way whatsoever [which is the viewpoint of the Mādhyamikas]; but he understands exactly the manner of existence of the inexpressible nature of the body [which is the viewpoint of the Vijñānavādins]. That is the bodhisattva’s consideration of the body in the absolute sense.

*** *** ***

[k. 19, p. 197b] (p. 1137F)

*Sūtra* (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 19, l. 12-15; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 56, l. 9-57, l. 10). –The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who abides in the perfection of wisdom by the method of non-abiding should, without producing them, complete perfect [the following] (Prajñāpāramitāyam sthitvā bodhisattvena mahāsattvenāsthdhānayogenānupādanatah paripūrayatyāh):

1. the four foundations of mindfulness (*catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni*),
2. the four right efforts (*catvāri samyakpradhānāni*),
3. the four bases of magical power (*catvāra ṛddhipādāh*),
4. the five faculties (*pañcendriyāṇi*),

937
5. the five strengths (pañca balānī),
6. the seven members of enlightenment (sapta bodhyānānī),
7. the eight members of the Path (aṣṭāṅgamārga).

Śāstra. –

**First Part THE AUXILIARIES BELONG TO THE GREATER VEHICLE AS WELL**

Question. – The thirty-seven auxiliaries (pākṣika) are the path (mārga) of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha; the six perfections (pāramitā) are the path of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva. Then why speak of things concerning only the śrāvaka when dealing with the bodhisattva?

Answer. - 1. The bodhisattva-mahāsattva must practice the paths of all the good dharmas. Thus the Buddha said to Subhūti: “The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who practices the Prajñāpāramitā should practice the paths of all the good dharmas, from the level of sharp wisdom (śuṣka- or śuklavipāśyanābhūmi) up to the level of the Buddhas (buddhabhūmi). He must practice (śikṣitavyam) the first nine levels but not realize them (saksākartavyam); as for the level of the Buddhas, he must practice and realize it.”

Free quotation of the Prajñāpāramita in the Daśabhūmiparivarta (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 225; Śata., p. 1473: Yad bodhisattvo mahāsattva upāyakausalyena sarvāsu pāramitāsu caran saptatrimśad bodhipākṣeṣu dharmesu śikṣito ’pramāṇadhyaṇārūpyasamāpattisu caran daśatathāgata balapratīṣṭhitvā astādaśāvaiśeṣu buddhadharmesu caran śuklapāśyanābhūmiṃ gotrabhūmiṃ darśanabhūmiṃ tanubhūmiṃ viṭṭarāgabhūmiṃ kṛtvibhūmiṃ śrāvakabhūmiṃ pratyekabuddhabhūmiṃ bodhisattvabhūmiṃ bodhisattvād bhūmiḥ bodhisattvo mahāsattvo ‘tikrmya etā navabhūmiṃ atikrmya buddhabhūmau pratiṣṭhate, iyaṃ bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya dasāṃ bhūmiḥ.

Transl. – “When the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, with his skillful means, practices all the perfections, practices the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment, practices the [four] limitless ones, the trances and the formless absorptions, practices the ten strengths of the Tathāgata, the [four] unhindered knowledges and the eighteen special attributes of the Buddhas, when he goes beyond nine levels, namely, the level of clear seeing, the level of the spiritual lineage, the level of the eighth saint, the level of seeing, the refined (?) level, the level of renunciation, the level of the one who has finished his career, the level of the śrāvaka, the level of the pratyekabuddha and the level of the bodhisattva, when he is established in the level of the Buddha, that is the level of the bodhisattva-mahāsattva.”

The ten levels cited here are the levels common (sādhāraṇabhūmi) to both vehicles. On this subject, see Śūraṁgamasaṃādhi, p. 248-251, note. The Sarvāstivādin treatises are not unaware of them, as Prof. A. Hirakawa has shown in The Rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Memoirs of the Research Dept. of the Tokyo Bunko, No. 22, 1963, p. 67-68.
2. Moreover, where is it said that the thirty-seven auxiliaries are the qualities of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas alone and do not constitute the path of the bodhisattva? In this Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, in the chapter entitled Mahāyāna, the Buddha says that [the thirty-seven auxiliaries], from the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) up to the eight members of the noble path (āryaśāṃsāmārga) are contained in the Three Baskets (tripitaka) of the Greater Vehicle; but he does not say that the thirty-seven auxiliaries are things exclusively concerning the Lesser Vehicle.

In his great loving-kindness (mahāmaitri), the Buddha preached the thirty-seven auxiliaries that are the path to nirvāṇa. In accordance with the vows (prāṇidhāna) of beings, in accordance with karmic causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), each finds his own path. The person who seeks (paryṣate) to be a śrāvaka finds the śrāvaka path; the person who has planted the roots of good (kuṣalamūla) of the pratyekabuddha finds the pratyekabuddha path; the person who seeks the bodhi of the Buddhas finds the Buddha path.

According to his previous vows (pūrvapraṇidhāna) and the sharpness (tīkṣṇa) or dullness (mṛdu) of his faculties (indriya), the person has great compassion (mahākārūṇā) or does not have great compassion. Similarly, when the nāga king (rāja) makes rain (vrṣṭi) to fall, it rains on the earth everywhere indiscriminately (nirviśeṣam); the big trees (mahāvrksa) and the large plants (mahātrīṇa) receive a lot of rain because of their big roots (mūla); the small trees (alpavrksa) and the small plants (alpatrīṇa) receive but little because of their small roots.

Question. - So be it. Nowhere is it said that the thirty-seven auxiliaries are exclusively the path of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and are not the path of the bodhisattvas, but it can be known by rational induction. The bodhisattva who remains in saṃsāra and the five destinies (pañcagati) for a long time does not get nirvāṇa quickly. And yet the thirty-seven auxiliaries are presented only as adjuvants to nirvāṇa, whereas the perfections (pāramitā) and the great compassion (mahākārūṇa) of the bodhisattvas are not. This is why we know that [the thirty-seven auxiliaries] are not the bodhisattva path.

Answer. – 1. Although the bodhisattva remains in saṃsāra for a long time, he must know the True Path (bhūtamārga) and the false paths (abhūtamārga), the world (saṃsāra) and nirvāṇa. Knowing that, he makes his great vow (mahāpraṇidhāna): “Beings are worthy of compassion; I must save them and bring them to unconditioned (asaṃskṛtapada) safety.” The bodhisattva who practices the perfections (pāramitā) is able, by means of this true dharma (bhūtadharma), to reach the Bodhi of the Buddhas. But although he practices and understands this dharma, he has not yet fulfilled the six perfections and this is why he does not immediately realize (na sāksākaroti) this true dharma.

Thus the Buddha said: “It is like [an archer] who, raising his head, shoots his arrows into the air (ūrdhvaṃ kāṇḍoṃ kṣipati): the arrows support each other so that they do not fall to earth. In the same way, the bodhisattva, taking the arrow of the Prajñāpāramitā, shoots it into the air at the three gates of deliverance

---

71 Actually the Prajñāpāramitā, in the chapter on the Mahāyāna, mentions the thirty-seven bodhipāksikas, from the four smṛtyupasthānas to the āṣṭāṅgamārgas, among the Mahāyāna practices (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 203-208; Śata. P. 1427-1439).
(vimokṣamukha); then, taking the arrow of skillful means (upāya), he shoots it at the arrow of Prajñā so that it does not fall on the ground of nirvāṇa.”

tadanyaiḥ kāṇḍaṁ tat kāṇḍaṁ bhūmaṁ patat pratiniṇvāreyd vārayet, tasya paurvakasya kāṇḍasya kāṇḍaparśarāpyā bhūmaṁ pataṇaṁ na dudāyāt. tāvat tat kāṇḍaṁ bhūmaṁ na patet yāvan nākāṁśed aho badedaṁ kāṇḍaṁ bhūmaṁ pated iti. evam eva Subhūte bodisattva mahāsattvāḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṁ
caram upāyavakauṣalyaparīphitaṁ tāvat tāṁ paramāṁ bhūtaśāktoṁ na sākṣāktaroti yāvan na tānī kuśalamūlāṁy anuttarāyāṁ samyaksambodhau paripakvāṁ suparipakvāṁ. yadā tānī kuśalamūlāṁy
anuttarāyāṁ samyaksambodhau paripakvāṁ bhavanti suparipakvāṁ, tadā tāṁ paramāṁ bhūtaśāktoṁ sākṣāktaroti.

Transl. – “It is, O Subhūti, as if a powerful master archer, well practiced and well versed in the practice of shooting the bow, shot an arrow into the air and, having shot one arrow into the air prevented, by means of other arrows, this arrow from falling to the ground, by means of a series of arrows, prevented the first arrow from falling to the ground: this first arrow would not fall to the ground as long as the master archer did not consent to its falling to the ground. In the same way, O Subhūti, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, progressing in the perfection of wisdom and endowed with skillful means, does not realize the supreme summit of the real (i.e., nirvāṇa) as long as these roots of good are not ripe, are not indeed ripened by supreme complete enlightenment. But when these roots of good are ripe, are indeed ripened for supreme complete enlightenment, then he realizes this supreme summit of the real.”

The example of the master-archer appears in every version of the Prajñā: Aṣṭasāhasrikā T 224, k. 7, p. 458c16; T 225, k. 4.p. 497c10; T 226, k. 5, p. 531c11; T 227, k. 7, p. 560a16; T 228, k. 18, p. 649c8; Pañcaviṃśati, T 221, k. 14, p. 94c21; T 223, k. 18, p. 350c3; T 220, t. VII, k. 452, p. 281a9; Aṣṭādaśa, T 220, t. VII, k. 517, p. 646c19.

The same example is summed up in the Ratnagūṇasaṃcayā, XX, 9-10, p. 74, as follows:

_Iṣvastraśita yathā puruṣordhā kāṇḍaṁ_
_kṣepitva anya puna kāṇḍaparāmparaṁ/_
_patanāya tasya purimasya na deya bhūmit_
_ākāṁśaṁśa puruṣasya pataye kāṇḍaṁ/_

_Evam eva prajñāvarapāramitāṁ caranto_
_prajñā-upāyabalarddhīvicāramāno/_
_tāvan na tāṁ paramaśūnyata prāpṇoṁtī_
_yāvan na te kuśalamūla bhavanti pūrṇaḥ/_

Transl. – “It is as if a man practiced in shooting the bow shot an arrow into the air and then, by means of a series of other arrows, did not allow the first arrow to fall: but if the man so wished, the arrow could fall. In the same way, the person who practices wisdom, the best perfection, and who practices wisdom and skillful means, the strengths and magic, would not take this supreme emptiness as long as these roots of good are not fulfilled.”
2. Furthermore, if, as you have said, the bodhisattva abides for a long time in saṃsāra, he must undergo all the physical and mental sufferings (nānavidha kāyikacaitasikaduhkh). If he has not attained true knowledge (bhūtajñāna), how could he endure these things? This is why the bodhisattva-mahāsattva seeks the auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipāṣikā) and true knowledge. From then on he can transform (pariṇāmitum) the world (saṃsāra) into the fruits of the path (mārgaphala) and into nirvāṇa by the power of Prajñāpāramitā. Why? The threefold world (traidhātuka) is the result of a complex of causes and conditions (sāmagrīja). That which is born from this complex has no intrinsic nature (svabhāva); having no intrinsic nature, it is empty (śunya). Empty, it is ungraspable (aghṛhya). The ungraspable is nirvāṇa. This is why [the Prajñāpāramitā] says here: “The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who abides in the perfection of wisdom by the method of non-abiding must, without producing them, fulfill the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna).”

3. Furthermore, in the śrāvaka and prakābuddha system, it is not said [198a] that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are the same. Why? Because their wisdom (prajñā) does not penetrate dharmas deeply. In the bodhisattva system, it is said that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are identical because their wisdom deeply penetrates dharmas. Thus the Buddha said to Subhūti: “Form is emptiness and emptiness is form (rūpaṃ eva śnyataḥ śnyataiva rūpaṃ); feelings (vedanā), ideas (saṃjñā), formations (saṃskāra) and consciousnesses (vijñāna) are emptiness, and emptiness is feelings, ideas, formations and consciousnesses. Emptiness is nirvāṇa and nirvāṇa is emptiness (śnyataiva nirvāṇam, nirvāṇam eva śnyata).”

The Madhyamakaśāstra also says:

Nirvāṇa is no different from saṃsāra,

Saṃsāra is no different from nirvāṇa.

The limit of nirvāṇa and the limit of saṃsāra

Are the same limit, for there is no difference.75

Having found this True nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa), the bodhisattva-mahāsattva is not disgusted with saṃsāra and not pleased with nirvāṇa. The thirty-seven auxiliaries are the ground of true knowledge (bhūtajñānabhūmi).

---

73 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 1137.

74 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 38: Rūpaṃ eva śnyataḥ, vedanaiva śnyataḥ, saṃjñāiva śnyataḥ, saṃskārā eva śnyataḥ, vijñāṇam eva śnyataḥ; Śnyataiva rūpaṃ, Śnyataiva vedanā, Śnyataiva saṃjñā, Śnyataiva saṃskārāḥ, Śnyataiva vijñānam.

This is a stock phrase endlessly repeated in the Prajñās: Pañcaviṃśati, T 222, k. 1, p. 221c1, p. 223a14; k. 3, p. 235a11. Other references above, p. 1112F, n. 2.

75 Madh. kārikā, XXV, 19-20; Madh. vrāti, p. 535; T 1564, k. 4, p. 36a4-11:

Na saṃsmaṛavya nirvāṇāti kiṃcid asti viśeṣam/
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāti kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam/
irvāṇasya ca yā koṭih saṃsaraṇasya ca/
na tayor anstaram kiṃcid susūkṣmam api vidyate//
Second part THE AUXILIARIES ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA (p. 1143F)

I. NUMBER OF AUXILIARIES

Question. – Since the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) suffice to obtain the path (mārga), why talk about thirty-seven auxiliaries? Would it be for the sake of abridgment (saṃkṣiptena deśanā) that you speak of the four foundations of mindfulness and for the sake of expansion (vistareṇa deśana) that you speak of the thirty-seven auxiliaries? Then that is not correct (ayukta) because, if one wants to expand, there would be innumerable (apramāṇapakṣa) auxiliaries.

Answer. – 1. Although the four foundations of mindfulness are sufficient to obtain the path, the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna) and the other auxiliary dharmas must also be preached. Why? Among beings, minds (citta) are multiple (nānāvidha) and varied (viṣama); their fetters (samyojana) and the things that they love and those to which they are unattached also are multiple.

76 The fourth noble Truth concerning the path to the cessation of suffering is so complex that it consists not only of the eightfold path (aṣṭāṅgamārga) preached by the Buddha but also the thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipāksīka) and a whole infinity of dharmas.

The person who raises the objection is here contesting the need to speak of the thirty-seven auxiliaries in detail, as some of them are enough to lead to nirvāṇa. This is mainly the case of the four foundations of mindfulness since the Buddha stated in the Majjhima I, p. 63:

Ehāyano ayaṃ bhikkhave sattānaṃ visuddhiyā sokaparividdavāṃ satikkaṃāya dukkhadomanassānaṃ atthagāmāya nāyassa adhigāmaṇa nibbānassa sacchikirīyāya, yaddiṣṭaṃ cattāro satipaṭṭhānā ti. – “There is one single way, O monks, leading to the purification of beings, to the transcending of sorrow and lamentation, to the disappearance of suffering and sadness, to the attainment of knowledge and realization of nirvāṇa; this is the four foundations of mindfulness.”

But the objection does not hold, for although the smṛtyupasthānas and the other auxiliaries to enlightenment constitute paths that are sufficient to the attainment of enlightenment, they are not suitable for all adepts indiscriminately: each must choose the one best suited to his own capacities and aptitude. Hence the need to propose a complete listing of auxiliaries to adepts without, however, excluding an infinity of other practices which will make up the object of chapters XXXII to XXXVIII.

77 The Dharma may be preached in an abbreviated form (saṃkṣiptena) or in a long form (vistareṇa): cf. Anguttara, I, p. 53; II, p. 189.
Although it is a single truth (ekārtha) and is of a single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), the Buddhadharmā is expressed in distinct explanations (samābhinnadeśana): twelve classes of texts (dvādasāṅgadharma-pravacana) and eighty-four thousand dharmanas (catuṣṭisahāsradharmaskandha).78 If it were otherwise, after having preached the four noble Truths (āryasatyā) in the course of their first sermon, the Buddhas should stop and should preach nothing more. Because there are beings who detest suffering (duḥkha) and love happiness (sukha), the Buddhas preach the four truths: 1) physical and mental dharmas, etc. (kāyikacaitisakādīdharmā) are all suffering and have no happiness (sukha); 2) the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) of this suffering are craving (trṣnā) and the other passions (kleśa); 3) the cessation of this suffering (duḥkhanirodha) is called nirvāṇa; 4) the way to reach nirvāṇa is the Path (mārga).

There are beings who, as a result of worries (bahucintā), distractions (vikśiptacitta) and misunderstanding (viparyāśa), cling (abhinivīśante) to the body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), the mind (citta) and things and lead a bad life (mihiyācāra). For these people the Buddhas preach the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna). It is the same for the other [auxiliary] dharmanas of the Path: each of them is preached to a certain type of being. It is like a master physician (bhaisajyaguru) who cannot cure all sickness with a single drug (bhāṣajya): sicknesses (vyādhi) are dissimilar and the remedy to be applied is not single. In the same way, the Buddha adapts himself to the various types of mental illnesses (cittavyādhi) from which beings suffer and cures them with different remedies.

Sometimes the Buddha saves beings by preaching only one thing. Thus the Buddha said to a bhikṣu: “This is not yours, do not grasp it (na tāvakāṁ, tan mā grhāṇa).” – The bhikṣu said: “I know it already, O Bhagavat.” – The Bhagavat replied: “What do you know?” – The bhikṣu answered: “Dharmanas are not ‘mine’ (ātmīya); they should not be grasped.”79

Sometimes the Buddha saves beings by means of two things, concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā). Sometimes, by three things, morality (śīla), concentration and wisdom. Sometimes by four things, the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna).

[198b] Thus, although the four foundations of mindfulness are enough to attain the Path, there are other dharmanas that differ in practice (ācāra), concepts (vikālpa), quantity and point of view. This is why the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna) and the other [auxiliary] dharmanas must also be preached.

2. Furthermore, the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas have a power of faith (śraddhābala) so great that they save all beings, and so the Buddha preaches the thirty-seven auxiliaries to them simultaneously. And although he

78 Two different classifications of the Buddhist scriptures already mentioned above (p. 27F, 560F). For details see F. Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 157-163.
preaches other dharmas favorable to the Path, such as the ten concepts (daśasamjñā)\textsuperscript{80}, etc., all are included (samgrhiṭa) in the thirty-seven auxiliaries. These thirty-seven are a collection of all the remedies (sarvabhaṣajyasasaṃsarga) that can cure all the illnesses (vyādhi) of beings. This is why it is not necessary to multiply the auxiliaries to the Path infinitely. Similarly, although the Buddha possesses innumerable powers (bala), we speak only of ten powers, for they are enough to save beings.

II. THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES

These thirty-seven auxiliaries have ten things (dravya)\textsuperscript{81} as roots (mūla). What are these ten? 1) Faith (śraddhā), 2) morality (śīla), 3) thought (samkalpa), 4) exertion (vīrya), 5) mindfulness (smṛti), 6) concentration (samādhi), 7) wisdom (prajñā), 8) relaxation (praśrabdhi)\textsuperscript{82}, 9) joy, (prīti), 10) equanimity (upekṣā).

1) Faith (śraddhā) constitutes: a. the faculty of faith (śraddhendriya); b. the power of faith (śraddhābala).

2) Morality (śīla) constitutes: a. right speech (samyagvac); b. right action (samyakkarman); c. right livelihood (samyagājīva).

3) Thought (samkalpa) constitutes: right thinking (samyaksaṃkalpa).

4) Exertion (vīrya) constitutes: a. the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna); b. the faculty of exertion (vīryendriya); c. the power of exertion (vīryabala); d. the factor-of-enlightenment called exertion (vīyasambodhyaṅga); e. the [factor-of-the path] called right effort (samyagvyāyāma).

5) Mindfulness (smṛti) constitutes: a. the faculty of mindfulness (smṛtiendriya); b. the power of mindfulness (smṛtibala); c. the factor-of-enlightenment called mindfulness (smṛtisasambodhyaṅga); d. the [factor-of-the-path] called right mindfulness (samyaksmrṭī).

6) Concentration (samādhi) constitutes: a. the four foundations of magical power (ṛddhipāda); b. the faculty of concentration (samādhindriya); c. the power of concentration (samādhibala); d. the factor-of-enlightenment called concentration (samādhīsambodhyaṅga); e. the [factor-of-the-path] called right concentration (samyaksamādhi).

\textsuperscript{80} See below, chap. XXXVII.
\textsuperscript{81} According to the Vibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 96, p. 496a-9), the thirty-seven auxiliaries consist of ten, eleven or twelve constitutive elements: according to the Abhidharmāṃtra (1553, k. 2, p. 977c11-12) and Koṣa (VI, p. 283-284), ten; according to the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 358), eleven.
\textsuperscript{82} This is cittapraśrabdhi, ‘the dharma by means of which the mind is skillful, light, capable’: cf. Koṣa. II, p. 157. Kumārajīva renders praśrabdhi here by tch’ou “to get rid of?”; the translation k’ing-ngan ‘lightness-peace’ adopted by Hiuan-tsang in his version of the Koṣa (T 1558, k. 2, p. 7c7; k. 4, p. 19b6; k. 12, p. 67a1-2; k. 25, p. 132b11; k. 28, p. 147a13) seems preferable.
7) Wisdom (prajñā) constitutes: a. the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna); b. the faculty of wisdom (prajñendra); c. the power of wisdom (prajñābala); d. the factor-of-enlightenment called discernment of dharmas (dharmapravicayasaṃbodhyāṅga); e. the [factor-of-the-path] called right view (samyagdṛṣṭi).

8) Relaxation (praśrābdhi) constitutes the factor-of-enlightenment called relaxation (praśrābdhisamāṃbodhyāṅga).

9) Joy (prīti) constitutes the factor-of-enlightenment called joy (prītisamāṃbodhyāṅga).

10) Equanimity (upekṣā) constitutes the factor-of-enlightenment called equanimity (upekṣāsāṃbodhyāṅga).

III. THE SEVEN CLASSES OF AUXILIARIES

1. The dharmas where mindfulness (smṛti) is focused (upatiṣṭhati) on the objects of knowledge (prajñālambana) are called ‘foundations of mindfulness’ (smṛtyupasthāna).

2. Those that destroy bad dharmas and move in the right path (samyagmārga) are called ‘right effort’ (samyakpradhāna).

3. When the concentrated mind (pragrīhīcitta) stops worrying (āśvasiti) about things (ālambana), there is ‘foundations of magical power’ (ṛddhipāda).

4. When a mind of dull knowledge (mṛdujñānacitta) is acquired, there is ‘faculties’ (indriya).

5. When a mind of sharp knowledge (tīkṣṇajñānacitta) is acquired, there is ‘powers’ (bala).

6. By the practice of the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārgavyāpāra), there is ‘[factors] of enlightenment’ (sāṃbodhyāṅga).

7. By the practice of the path of seeing (darśanamārgavyāpāra), there is ‘[factors] of the path’ (mārgāṅga).

IV. ORDER OF THE THIRTY-SEVEN AUXILIARIES

Question. – First we must speak about the [factors] of the path (mārgāṅga). Why? Because only after having traveled the path are the good dharmas acquired. Thus, a person first travels over a road and later arrives at his destination. Here, by what mistake (viparyāsa) do you first speak of the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) and only at the end, of the eight factors of the path (mārgāṅga)?

---

83 The text in square brackets is taken from Kośa, VI, p. 284, so as to complete the list.
84 The punctuation in Taisho is defective, the period should be placed between ken and li.
85 Śraddhā, vīrya, smṛti and prajñā are called faculties (indriya) when they are weak, called powers or strengths (bala) when they are strong; cf. Kośa, VI, p. 286.
86 For the logical and chronological order of the seven classes of auxiliaries, cf. Kośa, VI, p. 288-290.
Answer. – It is not a mistake (viparyāsa). The thirty-seven auxiliaries are involved as soon as one wants to enter onto the Path.

1. Thus, when the yogi goes to the teacher (ācārya) and hears the teaching on the Path (mārgadharma) from him, first he uses his mindfulness (smṛti) to retain (dhāraṇa) this teaching: that moment is called ‘foundation of mindfulness’ (smṛtyupasthāna).

2. When he has retained and followed this teaching, the yogin who is looking for the fruit (phalaparyēṣin) practices with exertion (vīrya prayuñjate): this is called ‘right effort’ (samyakpradhāna).

3. As a result of this expenditure of energy (bahūvīrya), his mind is distracted (vikṣipta). He concentrates his mind (cittaṃ pragṛḥṇati) and controls it (damayati): this is called ‘foundation of magical power’ (ṛddhipāda).

4. His mind being tamed (dānta), he produces the ‘five faculties’ (pañeṇdriya).

   a. The True nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas is very profound (atigambhīra) and difficult to probe (durvigāya), but by means of the faculty of faith (śraddhendriya), he believes in it: this is called the ‘faculty of faith’ (śraddhendriya).

   b. He does not spare his own life (kāyajīvita) and seeks enlightenment (bodhim paryēṣate) wholeheartedly (ekacittena): this is called ‘faculty of exertion’ (vīryendriya).

   c. He constantly thinks about the Bodhi of the Buddhas and does not think about anything else: this is called the ‘faculty of mindfulness’ (smṛtīndriya).

   d. He always concentrates his mind on Bodhi: this is called the ‘faculty of concentration’ (samādhiṇḍriya).

   e. He considers (samanupāsyati) the four truths and the True nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa): this is called the ‘faculty of wisdom’ (prajñendriya).

5. When the five faculties (pañeṇdriya) have been developed (vṛddha), [198c] they are able to intercept the afflictions (kleśa): this is like the power of a big tree (mahāvṛkṣa) that is able to block off water. These five faculties, when they have been developed, are able to gradually penetrate the profound Dharma (gambhīradharma).87 this is called ‘power’ (bala).

6. Having obtained the powers (bala), the yogin distinguishes the dharmas [of the path of meditation (bhāvanamārga)]:

There are three factors (āṅga): 1) the [second] factor-of-enlightenment called discernment of dharmas (dharmapravicayasaṃbodhyaṅga); 2) the [third] factor-of-enlightenment called exertion (vīyasambodhyaṅga); 3) the fourth factor-of-enlightenment called joy (prītisambodhyaṅga). If the mind sinks when one is practicing the Path, these three factors (āṅga) raise it up again (samutthāpayanti).

[There are three other factors]: 1) the [fifth] factor-of-enlightenment called relaxation (praśrābdhisambodhyaṅga); 2) the [sixth] factor of enlightenment called concentration

87 Defined above, p. 337-338F.
(samādhisaṃbodhyaṅga); 3) the [seventh] factor-of-enlightenment called equanimity (upekṣasamābodhyaṅga). If the mind is distracted (vikṣipyate) when one is practicing the Path, these three factors settle it (pragṛhṇanti) so that it is concentrated.

As for the remaining factor, namely: the [first] factor-of-enlightenment called mindfulness (smṛtyasamābodhyaṅga), it operates in both cases [when the mind sinks and when it is distracted]. It can unite the good dharmas and stop the bad ones; it is like a gate-keeper (dauvārika) who allows what is useful (arthavat) to enter and sends away what is useless (anarthaka).88

If the mind sinks, mindfulness (smṛti) and the three factors [nos. 2-4] raise it up. If the mind is distracted, mindfulness and the three factors [nos. 5-7] settle it.

Because these seven things work (gāmitvā), they are called ‘factors’ (aṅga).

7. When the yogin has obtained these things and his tranquility (kṣema) is complete (saṃpanna), he wishes to enter into the unconditioned city of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasamskṛtanagara).89 This is why he practices the dharmas [of mārgaṅga]: that moment is called ‘Path’ (mārga).

V. DETAILED STUDY OF THE AUXILIARIES

1. The Four Foundations of Mindfulness

A. Foundations and mistakes

Question. – What are the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna)?90

Answer. – The foundation of mindfulness on the body (kāyasṛtyupasthāna) and the foundations of mindfulness on feeling (vedanā), mind (citta) and dharmas are the four foundations of mindfulness. The yogin considers (ampasyati) these four things in four ways: 1) he considers the impurities of the body (kāvyāśuci); 2) he considers the painfulness of feelings (vedanāduḥkha); 3) he considers the impermanence of the mind (cittānityatā); 4) he considers the non-self of dharmas (dharmanairātmya).

Although each of the four things has these four characteristics, in the body it is especially the impurities that must be considered; in feelings, the suffering; in the mind, impermanence; and in dharmas, non-self.

88  Canonical comparison: Dīgha, II, p. 83; III, p. 101; Samyutta, IV, p. 194; Anguttara, IV, p. 107, 110; V, p. 104: Seyyattā pi rañño paccantimaṃ nagaraṃ daśuddāpaṃ daśhapākāratoraṇaṃ ekadvāraṃ, tatr’ asa dovāriko pandaṭo viyatto medhāvī aṇhātānaṃ ātānaṃ pavesetā. – See also the Nāgasenasūtra in BEFEO, XXIV, 1924, p. 113.

89  The ‘City of nirvāṇa’ is a canonical expression: cf. Tch’ang a han, T 1, k. 4, p. 30a19 seq.; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 16, p. 626a1; k. 23, p. 669b27; k. 25, p. 687b19-20; k. 39, p. 760c24. We will see (p. 1231F) that the three gates of the City of nirvāṇa are the three vimokṣamukha.

90  See references above, p. 1121F.
Why? The worldly person (prthagjana), who has not yet entered into the Path, is deluded about these four things and produces four mistakes (viparyāsa): 1) the mistake that consists of taking what is impure to be pure (aśuccau śucir iti viparyāsa); 2) the mistake that consists of taking what is suffering to be happy (duḥkhe sukham iti viparyāsa); 3) the mistake that consists of taking what is impermanent to be permanent (anitye nityam iti viparyāso); 4) the mistake that consists of taking what is not a “self” to be a “self” (anātmany āmeti viparyāsa). 91

In order to destroy these four mistakes, the Buddha preached the four foundations of mindfulness: 1) to destroy the mistake about purity (śuciviparyāsa), he preaches the foundation of mindfulness on the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna); 2) to destroy the mistake on happiness (sukhaviparyāsa), he preaches the foundation of mindfulness on feelings (vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna); 3) to destroy the mistake on permanence (nityaviparyāsa), he preaches mindfulness on the mind (cittasmṛtyupasthāna); 4) to destroy the mistake on the self (ātmaviparyāsa), he preaches the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas (dharmasmṛtyupasthāna). It is for this reason that he preached four, no more and no less. 92

B. Foundation of mindfulness on the body

Question. – How does one obtain these four foundations of mindfulness?

Answer. – The yogin who is established in pure morality (viśuddhaśīla) and is practicing exertion (vīrya) wholeheartedly (ekacittena) considers (anupasya) the fivefold impurity of the body (kāyāsucī). What are these five impurities? 1) The impurity of birthplace (jātisthānaśucī); 2) the impurity of seed (bījaśucī); 3) the impurity of intrinsic nature (svabhāvaśucī); 4) the impurity of intrinsic characteristics (svalakṣanāśucī); 5) the impurity of the final outcome (paryavastāśucī).

1. What is the impurity of the place of birth (jātisthānaśucī)? Head (śiras), feet (pāda), belly (udara), back (prśtha), thighs (pārśva), that which is called a woman’s body (strīkāya) is a collection of impure things (aśuddhavastusamgrī).

Inwardly (adhyātman), it contains a stomach (āmāśaya), a belly (pakvāśaya), excrement (viṣ), urine (mūtra)93 and [other] impurities (aśuci). Outwardly (bahīrdhā), there is a wind (vāta) conditioned by the afflictions (kleśa) and actions (karman), a wind that blows on the seed-consciousness (vijñānabīja)94 and

91 On these mistakes (viparyāsa), see Anguttara, II, p. 52; Vibhaṅga, p. 376; Kośa, V, p. 21; Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 198; Traité, p. 925F.
92 The contrast between viparyāsa and smṛtyupasthāna has already been noted above, p. 1076F.
93 See also Mahāvyut., nos. 4026, 4027, 4065, 5063.
94 The vijñāna-bīja “seed-consciousness), the consciousness which is seed, is obviously the third member of the causal chain, the member conditioned by actions and itself conditioning name and form (nāmarūpa). This is what descends into the mother’s womb and is the first seed of the new being. This
vijñāna was the subject of a conversation between the Buddha and Ānanda (Dīgha, II, p. 63: Kośavyākhya, p. 669; Madh. vr̥itti, p. 552).

Transl. – If the vijñāna, O Ānanda, did not descend into the mother’s womb, would the nāmarūpa (i.e., the entire living individual) coagulate as an embryo? – No, Lord.

If the vijñāna went away after having descended into the mother’s womb, would the nāmarūpa come into existence? – No, Lord.

If the vijñāna were to be cut off in the child, boy or girl, would the nāmarūpa grow and develop? – No, Lord.

The technical term vijñānabīja used here by the Traité does not appear, it seems, in the canonical scriptures, but occurs in some Mahāyānasūtras, especially in the Śalistamba, ed. Sastri, p. 13-14 (cited with a few variants in Madh. vr̥tti, p. 566, and Pañjikā, p. 480:

Transl. – “Although this twelve-membered co-dependent production set in action for all of eternity continues to function uninterruptedly like the current of a river, however, four members of this twelve-membered co-dependent production function as cause to ensure its substance. What are these four? They are ignorance, craving, action and consciousness. Here consciousness is cause as seed: action is cause as field; ignorance and craving are causes as defilements. Action and the defilements give rise to the seed-consciousness; action plays the part of field for the seed-consciousness; craving waters the seed-consciousness, ignorance plants the seed-consciousness. If these four conditions do not exist, there is no arising for the seed-consciousness.”

But it seems that the Śalistamba may have been directly inspired by the Bhava-sutta of Anguttara, I, p. 23-224, where the Buddha explains to Ānanda: “If the action destined to be retributed in kāma-, rūpa- or ārāpyadhātu did not exist, existence (bhava) in one of these three realms would not manifest.” The Sūtra continues by saying:

Iti kho Ānanda kammaṃ khettam, viññānam bijam, taṅkhā sineho avijñāvaratanaṃ satthanaṃ taṅkhāsanyojananaṃ hūnyā... majjhimaṇaṃ... paññatāya dhārayā viññānam patijjhitam. “Indeed, O Ānanda, action is the field, consciousness is the seed, and craving is the moisture (of the soil). In beings chained by ignorance, fettered by craving, consciousness manifests in the lower, middle or higher realm.”

The Bhava-sutta exits in a Chinese version in the Ts’i tch’ou san kouan king (T 150a, no. 42, p. 881c), an anthology of 47 sūtras translated by Ngan Che-kao, the first year of the yuan-kia period (151A.D.). Tan-ngan claims that these sūtras are extracts from the Samyuktāgama (cf. Li-tsi, T 2034, k. 4, p. 50b1), but actually, only two sūtras – the Sattaṭṭhāna (no, 1) and the Puggala (no, 30) – come from the Samyukta, and all the others are borrowed from the Ekottara. The anthology is entitled Ts’i tch’ou ‘The Seven Subjects’, after the title of the first sūtra Sattaṭṭhāna (cf. K’ai-yuan, T 2154, k. 1, p. 479e16).

It is quite characteristic that the Bhava-sutta, dealing with the vijñāna-bīja, should have been one of the first to be translated into Chinese. The seed-consciousness was called upon to play a large role in the Abhidharma (see Kośa, III, p. 25, 26, 124, 26); it is the basis of the Vijñānavādin psychology
introduces it within the two viscera. During eight or nine months, the seed-consciousness dwells in a pit of excrement and urine (vimmūtragārta). Thus it is said:

This body is foul and revolting:
It is not from a flower that it is born,

[199a] Neither does it come from Campaka,
And it does not come from a jewel mountain.

This is what is called the impurity of the place of birth.

2. The impurity of the seed (bījaśuci). – By means of the wind (vāta) of deceptive concepts (mrśāvikalpa) and wrong thoughts (mithyāmanasikāra), the father and mother (mātāpi) blow upon the fire (agni) of sexual desire (rāga); blood (rudhīra), marrow (majjan) and fat (vasā) escape, get hot and are changed into sperm. The seed-consciousness (vijñānabīja) conditioned by previous actions (pārvakarman) settles in the blood (sōnita) and whitish sperm (śukra). That is what is called the seed of the body (kāyabīja). Thus it is said:

The seed of the body is impure,
It is not a precious substance,
It has not come from pure innocence,
It has come only from the urinary pathways.

That is what is called the impurity of the seed.

3. The impurity of intrinsic nature (svabhāvāśuci). – From head to toe and on all four sides, the body is a lowly rag. Everything in it is full of impurities. Decorate it with garments, bathe it with perfumed water, nourish it with the best dishes and food of many flavors, at the end of one night all of it will be impure. Even if that you clothe it in celestial garments (divyavastra) and feed it with celestial food (divyāhāra), because of the body itself, all of it will become impure. Then what can be said if you give it only human garments and human clothes? Thus it is said:

which made the ālayavijñāna, the consciousness-receptacle ‘provided with all the seeds’ (sarvabījaka) the support of the knowable (jñeyāśraya); cf. Mahāyānasamgraha, p. 12 seq.

95 Reminder of a canonical topic: Dīgha, I, p. 76, 173, 209; Majjhima, I, p. 144, 500; II, p. 17; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 83, 194, 202; V, p. 370; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 386: Ayam kāyo rūpī cātummahābhūtiko mātāpetikasambhavo odanakumāsamupacayo anico’
ucchādanaparimaddanabhedanaviddhamasananadhammo: “The material body, composed of the four great elements, coming from the mother and father, fattened with boiled rice and gruel, that always must be oiled and massaged, nevertheless breaks up and is destroyed.”

Formed from earth, water, fire and wind,
It transforms everything into impurities.
Empty the sea to bathe the body,
Still you will be unable to clean it.

That is what is called the impurity of intrinsic nature.

4. The impurity of intrinsic characteristics (svalakṣaṇāśucī). – This body with its nine gates (nanañāra) is always secreting impurity: the eyes (akṣi) spill out rheum (aksigūhaka) and tears (aśru); the ears (karaṇa) produce wax (kānagūhaka); the nose (nāsā) contains snot (sīṃghāṇaka); the mouth (mukha) has saliva (lālā) and vomit (vāṃṭkṛta); the anus (guda) and the urethra (mūtramārga) constantly empty out excrement (viṣ) and urine (mūtra); and the hair-pores (romakūpa) sweaty impurity.

All kinds of impure things
Fill the interior of the body.
It flows ceaselessly
Like a filter-sack containing dirt.

That is what is called the impurity of intrinsic characteristics.

96 Cf. the Vijayasutta of the Suttaniṣṭa, p. 34, verse 197-198:

\[
\text{Aṭṭhaṃ asaṃ sthehi asucī sabbadā} / \\
\text{akkhīmha akkhīgūhako, kaṇṇagūhuko} / \\
\text{sīṃghāṇikā ca nāsāto, mukhe na va nat' ekadā} / \\
\text{pittam semhā ca va mati, kāyambha sedajalikā} / \\
\]

“Impurity flows from him ever in nine streams: from the eye, rheum; from the ear, wax; from the nose, snot; from the mouth sometimes bile and sometimes phlegm vomit; and from the entire body there flows sweat and filth.”

A sermon of the Buddha, cited in Milinda, p. 74, and Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 161, is expressed thus:

\[
\text{Allacammapatićchasnno navadvāro mahāvaso} / \\
\text{samantato paggharati asucī pāṭiganiyo} / \\
\]

“Covered with damp skin, [the body] with its nine gates, a great suffering, pours out stinking secretions from very part.”

The nine gates (dvāra), holes (chidra) or wounds (vraṇa) of the body are the two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, mouth, anus and urinary canal. They are often mentioned in Buddhist texts: Fo pan ni yuan king, T 5, k. 2, p. 171a16; Tsa pan nie pan king, T 7, k. 1, p. 194c13; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 5, p. 453c5; Anguttara, IV, p. 386; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 30, p. 713a28; Ts’i tch’ou san kouan king, T 150, p. 880b5; Siceou hing pen k’i king, T 184, k. 2, p. 466c16; Ta tchouang yen louen king, T 201, k. 12, p. 324b28 (tr. E. Huber, Sīrālāmkāra, p. 346); Fa kiu king, T 210, k. 2, p. 573c27; Śīkṣasamuccaya, p. 82, l. 1 (navavraṇamukha).
5. The impurity of the final outcome (paryavāsanāśuci). – Thrown on the fire (agnī), the body becomes ash (bhasman); devoured by insects (kurmi) it becomes dung (purīṣa); placed in the earth, it decays, decomposes, and becomes earth; put into the water, it swells up and decays or it is eaten by water-insects. Of all corpses (kuṇapa), that of man is the most impure: his impurities (aśucidharma) will be explained at length in reference to the nine concepts (navasamjñā). Thus it is said:

Examine the body minutely:
It ends up necessarily in death.
Difficult to control,
It gives nothing in return,
Ungrateful like a lowly individual.

That is what is called the impurity of the final outcome.

Moreover, from birth (jāti) until death, everything that moves close to the body, everywhere that it rests, all is defiled. Just as perfumed clear waters that flow in a hundred rivers are changed into bitter salt as soon as they reach the great sea (mahāsamudra), so whatever the body eats, the most delicate dishes of various flavors, beautiful colors and fine smells, as soon as they penetrate into the sea of the belly (udarasamudra), are changed into filth. Thus the body, from birth to death, always contains disgusting impurities.

The yogin wonders if this body, impure as it is, does not have some permanence. Wrong! It is a great suffering (mahāduḥkha). This body is the place of arising (upapattisthāna) of all the suffering. Just as water (ap) arises from the earth (prthivī), wind (vāyu) from the ether (ākāśa) and fire from wood (dāru), so all the inner (ādhyātmika) and outer (bāhya) suffering comes from the body. The inner sufferings are old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (marana); the outer sufferings are the knife (asi), the stick (danda), cold and heat (śītosya), hunger and thirst (kṣutpīpāsā), etc. It is because there is a body that these sufferings exist.

Question. – The body is not suffering alone basically (duḥkhasvabhāva); happiness (sukha) also comes from it. If there were no body, who would experience the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa) as they like?

Answer. – The suffering which the four noble truths [mention] the saint cognizes truly as suffering, but worldly people (prthagjana) call it happiness. It is necessary to rely on the noble truth (āryatattva) and reject error (moha) and doubt (kāṅkṣā). This body is really suffering because it rests on the ‘Great Suffering’ (mahāduḥkha) [of saṃsāra], and it is only a lesser suffering (parīttaduḥkha) that constitutes happiness. Thus, when a man condemned to death undergoes punishment (danda) instead of being

97  The nine concepts, objects of meditation on the horrible (aśubhabhāvanā), will be studied below in Chap. XXXV.
98  Like a stubborn horse.
executed, he feels great joy. This punishment is really suffering, but as he escapes from death, the condemned man calls it happiness.

Furthermore, recent suffering (nava-duḥkha) is ‘happiness’ (sukha) [in contrast] to the old suffering (pūrva-duḥkha) which is ‘suffering’. Thus, when one sits down (sūlā) one feels happiness, but when this position persists, it gives rise to suffering. At the beginning, walking (caṅkrama), standing (sthāna) and lying down (sāyā) are happiness, but in the end they too are suffering. Whether one is bending (saiṅjite) or one is stretching (prasārite), whether one is bowing the head or raising it, whether one looks straight ahead (ālokite) or to the side (vilokite), whether one is breathing out (praśvasite) or breathing in (āśvasite), suffering always follows the body. From conception (garbhāvakrānti) and birth (jāti) to death (marāṇa), there is not a single moment of happiness.

You enjoyed pleasures (rāga) as if they were happiness; when the sickness of lust (abrahmacaryavyādhī) increases, you seek women outside, but the more you find, the more your torment increases. It is like when one suffers from scabies (kacchū), one goes near the fire, one scratches one’s hands and roasts them. At that time, one feels a little joy, but in the long run (read kieou) the sickness increases in intensity. This little joy, it too becomes the cause of the sickness: it was not a true happiness or the elimination of the sickness. Those who see people with scabies act thus, feeling pity (karuṇā) for them. The person who has renounced desire (vītarāga) has the same feelings towards the lustful: he has compassion for these angry madmen, burned by the fire of desire (kāmadagdha) who suffer more than they enjoy. For many reasons of this kind, we know that the body has the nature of suffering (duḥkhalakṣaṇa) and is the cause of suffering (duḥkhahetu).

The yogin knows that the body is merely impure (aśuci), impermanent (anitya) and suffering (duḥkha) but he cannot do otherwise than nourish it. It is like parents who have given birth to a son: however vicious the child, he is born from themselves (ātmaja) and this is why they must feed him and raise him.

The body is, in truth, not the self (ātman). Why? Because it is not independent (svatantra). It is like a man sick with an illness of wind (vāyuvyādhī), unable to raise or lower his head, unable to come or go; or like a man suffering from an obstruction in his throat, unable to speak. This is why we know that the body is not independent. If a man has something, he uses it as required. This is not the case for the body; as it escapes from all influence, we know that it is not ours.

It is in this way that the yogin meditates on the body, the impure (aśuci), impermanent (anitya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya), selfless (anātman) body possessing innumerable defects of the same type. The various considerations on the body are called mindfulness of the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna).

C. Mindfulness of feeling (p. 1158F)

In possession of this consideration called kāyamsṛtyupasthāna, the yogin pursues his reflections and asks himself why beings are attached (abhinniśante) to this body. It is because of pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā). How? From the meeting between the six internal organs (ādhyātmikendriya) and the six outer objects (bāhyaviṣaya) the six kinds of consciousnesses (vijñāna) arise. From these six consciousnesses arise the three kinds of feelings (vedanā), unpleasant feeling (duḥkhavedanā), pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā), neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling (aduḥkhāsukhavedanā). Pleasant feelings are loved by all beings; unpleasant feelings are hated by all beings; as for the neither unpleasant nor pleasant feelings, people neither reject them nor cling to them. Thus it is said:

Evil-doers and monks (pravrajita).

Gods, humans and small worms:

Amongst these beings divided among the five destinies (gati) in the ten directions,

There is not one that does not love happiness and hate suffering.  

Out of error (moha), mistake (viparyāsa) and ignorance (ajñāna),  

They do not know nirvāṇa, the abode of eternal bliss.

Considering pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā), the yogin truly knows that it contains no happiness but only suffering. Why? Happiness (sukha), i.e., ‘true happiness’ (bhūtasukha) is free of errors (viparyāsa). And yet all the pleasant feelings of the world come from mistakes and contain no reality.

Furthermore, while greedily seeking the happiness of pleasant feeling, one will encounter great suffering. Thus it is said:

Those who go to sea encounter heavy winds

The waves rise up as high as the Kālaparvata.

Those who go into the army to fight

---


101 See the Rahogata-suttanta of the Saṁyutta, IV, p. 216 (Tsa a han, T 99, no. 476, k. 17, p. 121c) cited in Kośa, VI, p. 131, and Kośavyākhya, p. 519:

Transl. – “I have spoken, O monks, of three feelings: pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling and neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling. But I have also said that every feeling is suffering (acc. to the comm., dukkhasmiṃ = dukkha-samissitaṃ): it is by viewing the impermanence of [all] the formations, the perishable, transitory, unpleasant, destructible and changing nature of [all] the formations that I have declared that all feeling is suffering.”

In other words, all the phenomena of existence, by reason of their transitory nature, are suffering and, if sometimes they seem to us to be pleasant, sometimes unpleasant and sometimes indifferent, that is purely a mistake.
Cross very dangerous paths and perilous gorges.

Noble śreṣṭhins must bow down when approaching vile people in order to satisfy their sexual desires.

These many great sufferings

All come from attachment to happiness and to cupidity (rāgacitta).

This is why we know that pleasant feeling can give rise to all sorts of suffering.

Furthermore, although the Buddha spoke of the three kinds of suffering, one of them, that of pleasant feeling, merits the name of suffering because in it happiness is rare. It is like a bushel of honey (madhu) which, when thrown into a big river, loses its smell and its taste (rasa).

Question. – Happiness [such as it is conceived in the world (laukikasukha)], having error (viparyāśa) as cause and condition (hetupratyaya), is suffering (duḥkha). But the concentrations (samādhi) practiced by the saints (āryapudgala) give rise to a pure happiness (anāsravasukha) which itself is real happiness. Why? Because this happiness is not derived from delusion (moha) or mistake (viparyāśa). How then could it be suffering?

Answer. – It is not suffering. Although the Buddha said: “All that is impermanent is suffering” (yat anityam tad duḥkham), it was only in regard to impure dharmas (sāsravadhrma) that he was speaking of suffering. Why? Worldly people (prthagjana) are mentally attached to impure dharmas, and as these impure dharmas are impermanent (anitiya) and perishable (vyaya), they give rise to suffering. But the mind does not become attached (nābhivīśate) to pure dharmas and, although they are impermanent (anitiya), they do not produce sadness (daurmanasya), lamentation (parideva), suffering (duḥkha), torment (viheṭhana), etc. That is why they are not called suffering. And besides, the bad contaminants (anuśaya) do not take shelter there.

Furthermore, if pure happiness were suffering, the Buddha would not have treated it separately in the truth of the Path (mārgasatya), since, [as suffering], it would have been included (samgrhīta) in the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya).

Question. – “There are two kinds of happiness (sukha): impure (sāsrava) happiness and pure (anāsrava) happiness.” Impure happiness is lowly, vile, perverse and bad; pure happiness is excellent. Why does one become attached to the lowly vile happiness and not attached to the excellent happiness? One should

102 Anguttara, V, p. 187-188.

103 Of the 98 anuśayas, bad tendencies that cause actions to accumulate, 92 have an impure object; 6 have a pure object, namely, the third and fourth truth, cessation and the Path: cf. Kośa, V, p. 34.

104 The Buddha spoke of samādhi, the second element of the Path of nirvāṇa, when he was dealing with the fourth noble truth. This proves that samādhi, which gives rise to the pure happiness of nirvāṇa, is truly happiness and not suffering. If it were suffering, the Buddha would have spoken of it in connection with the first truth which deals precisely with universal suffering.

become attached preferentially to the excellent happiness in the same way that one would prefer to be attached to precious objects of gold (heman) or silver (rajata) rather than to straw (trṣṇa) or to wood (kāṣṭha).

Answer.- Pure happiness being excellent, wisdom (prajñā) abounds there and, as wisdom is abundant there, it can eliminate attachment (abhiniveśa). In the impure happiness, it is the fetters (samyojana), thirst (trṣṇā), etc., that abound, and thirst is the root of attachment (abhiniveśamūla). The true wisdom (bhūtaprajñā) [inherent in pure happiness] is able to eliminate attachment. That is why it is not attached to [the pure happiness].

Furthermore, pure wisdom (anāsravaprajñā) always considers (anupāsyati) universal impermanence (suvānityatā) and because it considers impermanence it does not produce the fetters (samyojana), thirst (trṣṇā), etc. It is like a sheep (edaka) that is kept near a tiger (vyāghra): even if it has good grass and good water, it does not get fat.106 In the same way, even though they experience pure happiness (anāsravasukha), the saints nevertheless contemplate impermanence (anityatā) and emptiness (śūnya) and that is why they do not produce the ‘fat’ of desire (rāgameda).

Furthermore, pure happiness (anāsravasukha) is inseparable from the sixteen noble aspects (ṣodasākāra) of the three concentrations (samādhi)107 and is always without the mark of a self (sattvanimitta). If it were endowed with the mark of a self, it would produce minds of attachment (abhiniveśacitta). Thus pure happiness, although excellent, does not give rise to attachment.

For many reasons of this kind, the yogin considers pleasant worldly feeling (laukikā sukhaveṇā) as suffering.

He considers unpleasant feeling (duḥkhaveṇā) as an arrow (śalya); as for the neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling (adhuḥkāsukhaveṇā), he considers its impermanent and perishable nature (anityavyayānīmitta).

Thus he does not experience desire (rāga) for pleasant feeling; he does not experience hatred (dveṣa) for unpleasant feeling and he does not experience delusion (moha) for neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling.

That is what is called mindfulness of feeling (vedānāsmṛtyupasthāna).

D. Mindfulness of mind

The yogin also says to himself: “It is because of happiness that one becomes attached to the body; but who is experiencing (vedayati) this happiness?” Having reflected, he knows that feeling (vedānā) comes from the mind (citta). It is following mental elation (cittākṣepa) and a misunderstanding (viparyāsa) that beings experience a given happiness. The yogin must take into account that the mind which is transitory (anitya)

106 See the apologue of the big but not fat sheep, above (p. 908-909F)
107 The sixteen aspects of the four noble truths perceived in the course of the three samādhis of śūnyatā, ānīmitta and apraṇihita: see above, p. 641F and later, k. 23, p. 233b6; k. 54, p. 444a15; k. 63, p. 505a17.
has the nature of being born and perishing (utpādabhāṅgalakṣaṇa) and lasts for only a moment, is unable to experience happiness. It is by mistake that a person claims to feel happiness. Why? At the very moment when one wishes to experience happiness, the mind has already changed; at the moment when the happiness arises, the mind is another (anya) mind. There is no connection between happiness and the mind. How could it be said that the mind experiences happiness?

The past mind (atītacitta), being already destroyed (bhagna), does not experience the happiness; the future mind (anāgatacitta), being not yet born (utpanna), does not experience the happiness; the present mind (pratyutpannacitta), being momentary (ekakṣaṇika) and fleeting (kṣipra), does not have the awareness to experience the happiness.

Question. – We accept that the past mind and the future mind cannot experience happiness. But the present mind, which endures for a moment, must experience happiness. How can you say that it does not?

Answer. – I have just said that, being fleeting, it does not have the awareness to experience happiness.

Besides, being impermanent in nature (anityalakṣaṇa), all dharmas have no span of duration (sthitikāla). If mind lasted for a moment, it would also last during the second moment. It would then be eternal in duration and without the nature of disappearing (vyayalakṣaṇa). And yet, among the three characteristics of conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma-lakṣaṇa), the Buddha also mentioned the characteristic of disappearance (vyayalakṣaṇa). If the mind did not have disappearance, it would not show the characteristics of the conditioned.

---

108 The sūtras of the Āgamas and the Nikāyas set out the three characteristics of conditioned dharmas: production or origin, disappearance, and duration-change.

Sanskrit version (cf. Nidānasamyukta, p. 139, cited in Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 39, p. 199c22-23; Kośa, II, p. 223; Kośavyākhyā, p. 171; Madh. vṛtti, p. 145): Trīṇimāni bhikṣavah saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni. Katamāni trīni. Saṃskṛtasya bhikṣava utpādo ‘pi prajñāyate, vyayo ‘pi prjñāyate, sthityanyathātvam apīt: “There are, O monks, three characteristics of the conditioned that are themselves conditioned. What are these three? Of the conditioned, the production is object of consciousness; the disappearance is also object of consciousness; likewise the duration-change.”


The Pāli reading thitassa (or thitānaṁ) aṇañathattam ‘change while it (they) endure(s)’ is in contrast with the Sanskrit reading sthityanyathātvam attested by the preceding sources and by a fragment from Central Asia published by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Documents sanscrits de la seconde collection A. Stein, JRAS, 1913, p. 573.

c. The Chinese versions of the Āgamas render the originals only imperfectly: the Tsa a han, T 99, k. 2, p. 12a29 (corresponding to the Samyutta, III, p. 37) mentions only utpāda and vyaya; the Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 12, p. 607c15 (corresponding to Anguttara, I, p. 152) has utpāda, anyathāva and
Furthermore, if dharmas suffered a destruction \textit{a posteriori} (\textit{uttareṇa}), we would know that they possessed it already \textit{a priori} (\textit{pūrveṇa}). Thus, when a person clothes himself in a new garment (\textit{navavastra}), if on the same day that he puts it in, the garment is not yet old, it would not be old on the second day either, and so on for ten years: the garment would always be new and never old. In truth, the garment was already old, and we should know that [this ageing] coexisted with its newness. But since this ageing was subtle, we were not aware of it. It is only in the presence of old things that we notice it. This is why we know that dharmas do not have a time of duration (\textit{sthitikāla}). How then could the mind last long enough to be able to experience happiness? Since it has no duration, it is impossible that it experiences happiness.

This is why we know that there is nothing that can truly experience happiness. [A mind ‘experiencing happiness’] is a purely conventional entity (\textit{prajñāptimātra dharma}); we speak of a single entity experiencing happiness as a result of the succession of minds (\textit{cittaprabandha}).

Question. – How do you know that all conditioned dharmas (\textit{sanskrta dharma}) are impermanent (\textit{anitya})?

Answer. – Here I must repeat what I have already said above (p. 37F). These conditioned dharmas, which all depend on causes and conditions (\textit{hetupratyayāpekaśa}), are impermanent. Because not existing earlier, they exist now and because existing now, they will not exist later, they are impermanent.

Furthermore, the nature of impermanence (\textit{anityatālaksana})\textsuperscript{109} always follows (\textit{anusarati}) conditioned dharmas. Conditioned dharmas have neither increase (\textit{upacaya}) nor decrease (\textit{apacaya}), and finally, all conditioned dharmas are mutually destroyed (\textit{parasparavihethaka}): therefore they are impermanent.

Furthermore, a twofold old age (\textit{dvividhajarā}) always follows (\textit{anusarati}) conditioned dharmas: \textit{i)} primary old age (\textit{mūlajarā}); \textit{ii)} the old age of old age (\textit{jarājarā}).\textsuperscript{110} A twofold death (\textit{dvidhamarāṇa}) always

\textit{vyaya}; the Tṣa a han, T 99, k. 12, p. 83c16 (corresponding to Nidānasamnyukta, p. 139) subdivides the \textit{sthityanyathātva} of the original and thus has four characteristics: \textit{uppāda}, \textit{sthiti}, \textit{anityathāva} and \textit{vyaya}.

\textit{d.} The Pāli Abhidhamma accepts only three characteristics: \textit{uppāda}, \textit{vaya} and \textit{ḥṭitānām aṅnathatattam} (Kathāvatthu, p. 61; \textit{Compendium}, p. 25, 125).

\textit{e.} The Sanskrit Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins, while referring to the canonical sources that accept three characteristics, nevertheless puts forth four: birth (\textit{jāti}), old age (\textit{jarā}) duration (\textit{sthiti}) and impermanence (\textit{anitya}) according to the Vibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 39, p. 200c10-12) and Koṣa, II, p. 222; \textit{jāti}, \textit{jarā}, \textit{nāśa} according to the Abhidharmadīpā, p. 104.

\textit{f.} For the Sautrāntikas and for Vasubandhu, the four characteristics of the conditioned, being the viprayuktasamskāras, are not real entities (cf. Koṣa, II, p.226-234).

\textit{109} Fourth \textit{sanskrta laksana} according to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma (see preceding note).

follows them: i) death by oneself (ātmanā maraṇam); ii) being put to death by another (pareṇa maraṇa).

Among the conditioned dharmas, the impermanence of the mind (cittānityatā) is very easy to detect. Thus the Buddha said: “Sometimes worldly people (prthigjana) recognize the impermanence of the body (kāvānityatā) but do not recognize the impermanence of the mind (cittānityatā). Some worldly people say that the body is eternal, but the mistake that holds the mind to be eternal is even more fatal. Why? It may be that the body will last for ten years or twenty years, whereas the mind, night and day, disappears each moment (ekakṣaṇalavamuhūrte), arising as one thing, perishing as another, without stopping for a single moment. On the point of arising, it is born one thing; on the point of perishing, it dies another thing. The true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of such a magical thing (māyāvastu) is ungraspable (anupalabdha).

cet te na saṃskṛtāḥ //: “If production, duration and destruction have a secondary characteristic, there is infinite regression; if they do not have a secondary conditioned characteristic, they are not conditioned.”

111 Dīgha, III, p. 231; Anguttara, II, p. 159: Atth’ āvuso attabhāvapaṭilābhō yasmin attabhāvapaṭilābhe attasaṃcetetā yeva kamati no parasaṃcetetā. Atth’ āvuso attabhāvapaṭilābhō yasmin attabhāvapaṭilābhe yeva kamati no attasaṃcetetā: “There is an occasion in life life [note, p. 1165F] in the course of which it is one’s own volition that acts, not the volition of another. There is an occasion in life during the course of which it is the volition of another that acts and not one’s own volition.”

According to the explanations of Anguttara (l. c.) summarized in Kośavyākhyā, p. 170, in the first case, death is due to one’s personal will (ātmanā maraṇam), in the second case, to the will of another (pareṇa maraṇam). Kośa, II, p. 218, cites several examples of these two kinds of death.

112 Beginning of the Markataskūtra of the Samyutta (Nidānasamyukta, p. 115-120; Tsa han, T 99, no. 289, k. 12, p. 81c), entitled Assutavato in the Samyutta, II, p. 94-95.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – 1. A foolish and unlearned worldly person, O monks, can indeed become disgusted with it, detached from it, and liberated from the body formed of the four great elements.

2. Why? We notice, O monks, that this body formed by the four great elements gets bigger, gets smaller, is taken and rejected. [This is why one can become disgusted with it.]

3. But in regard to the ‘mind’, or the ‘consciousness’, the foolish and unlearned worldly person is incapable of becoming disgusted with it and liberated from it.

4. Why? During the long night [of saṃsāra], this [mind] has been cared for, guarded, assimilated, espoused, adopted by the foolish unlearned worldly person, who says to himself: “It belongs to me, it is me, it is my self.”

This is why the foolish unlearned worldly person is incapable of becoming disgusted with it, detached from it, liberated from it.

5. And moreover, O monks, it would be preferable that the foolish unlearned worldly person considers as his self the body formed by the four great elements rather than the consciousness.

6. Why? We notice that the body formed by the four great elements, when it is maintained [in health], lasts for ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years, or even a little longer.
For innumerable reasons of this kind, we know that the mind is impermanent. That is what is called mindfulness of mind (cittasmṛtyupasthāna).

E. Mindfulness of Dharmas

The yogin asks himself on whom does the mind depend (apekṣate) and who controls the mind. Having considered well, he does not see that the mind has a master. The dharmas resulting from the complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī) are not independent (svatantra); not being independent, they have no intrinsic nature (svabhāva); not having any intrinsic nature, they have no self (ātman). If there is no self, then who controls the mind?

Question. – 1) There must be an ātman. Why? If the mind (citta) controls the body (kāya), there also must be an ātman to control the mind. In the same way that the master of a kingdom (rāṣṭreśvara) controls the general (senāpati) and the general controls the soldiers (pattī), there must be an ātman to control the mind, and there must be a mind to control the body so that it may enjoy the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa).

2) Moreover, as each person possesses his own mind (ātmacitta), we know that there really is an ātman. If it were only due to a mistake (viparyāsa) about the body and the mind that we assume an ātman, why would we not produce the idea of an ātman in regard to another?113 Thanks to this sign, we know that each one possesses his own ātman.

Answer. – 1) If, the mind controlling the body, there were an ātman to control the mind, there still must be someone to control the ātman. If there were still someone to control the ātman, there would be an infinite regress (anavasthā); as there would be still someone to control the ātman, there would be two ātmans.

If there is no ātman to control the mind, there can only be the mind to control the body. You consider the mind to be dependent on a soul (pudgalāpekṣa), but in the absence of the mind, the soul has no object of consciousness (jñeya) and, having no object of consciousness, how would it control the mind? If the soul had the characteristics of a knowledge (jñānalakṣaṇa), why resort again to the mind? This is why we know that only the mind presents the characteristics of a consciousness (vijñānalakṣaṇa). Therefore it is able to control the body and does not depend on a soul (pudgalam nāpekṣate). It is like fire (agni) which, by its nature, burns things without the intervention of a person (puruṣa).

7. On the contrary, what is called ‘mind’, ‘consciousness’, over the days and nights, in the course of instants, moments and hours, appears in many different aspects: when it arises, it is [already] another mind that is born, when it disappears, it is another mind that is destroyed.

8. It is like a monkey who grasps a branch of a tree and, having let go of it, grasps another. In the same way, what is called ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’, over the course of nights and days, etc., as before up to ‘when it is disappears, it is another that is destroyed.’

113 This objection has already been formulated above, p. 736F.
Objection. – Although fire has the power to burn, it is not useful without a person; although the mind has the characteristic of a consciousness (vijñānalakṣaṇa), it is not controlled without the soul (pudgala).

Answer. – Dharmas exist insofar as they have their own characteristics (lakṣaṇa). Not having any characteristics, the soul does not exist. You consider the inbreath and the outbreath (ānāpāna), suffering and happiness (duḥkhasukha), etc., as characteristics of the soul; but that is not right (ayukta). Why? Because the inbreath and the outbreath, etc., are characteristics of the body, and the fact of feeling suffering, happiness, etc., is characteristic of the mind. Why make the body and the mind into characteristics of the soul?

Moreover, fire (agni) burns things by itself without depending on a person (pudgala). We say that a man burns something only metaphorically. You have fallen into an untenable position (nigrahasthāna). Why? Because the soul (puruṣa) is the person (pudgala) and you cannot compare the person with the person.

2) Moreover, you said: “Each one possessing his own mind (ātmacitta), we know that there really is an ātman. If it were only due to a mistake (viparīta) about the body and the mind that an ātman is assumed, why not produce the idea of an ātman in regard to another?” Without knowing if the ātman exists or does not exist, you are asking why one does not produce the idea of the ātman in regard to another.114 [The distinctions] between one’s own body (ātmakāya) and another’s body (parakāya) exist as a function of the ātman. But the ātman is non-existent (nopalabhyate). [The characteristics attributed to it]: having form (rūpin) or formless (arūpin), permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya), finite (antavat) or infinite (ananta), moveable (gantr) or motionless (agantr), cognizant (jñātṛ) or ignorant (ajñātṛ), active (kāraka) or inactive (akāraka), autonomous (svatantra) or non-autonomous (asvatantra); all these characteristics of the ātman do not exist (nopalabhyante), as we have said above in the chapter on the ātman.

For many reasons of this kind, the yogin considers that dharmas come from complexes of causes and conditions, that there are no real dharmas endowed with ātman. That is what is called mindfulness of dharmas (dharmaṃśṛtyupasthāna).

F. Mindfulness itself, by connection with or as object.

The four foundations of mindfulness (śṛtyupasthāna) are of three kinds: i) mindfulness in itself (svabhāvasṛtyupasthāna); ii) mindfulness by connection (saṃsargaśṛtyupasthāna); iii) mindfulness as object (ālabanasṛtyupasthāna).115 [201a]

114 Compare the refutation developed above, p. 737-747.
115 See Kośa, VI, p. 159-161; Kośavyākhya, p. 529-531:

Śṛtyupasthāna itself (svabhāva) is fixing of the attention (śṛty upasthānam): it is a wisdom (prajñā) by which the attention is fixed (śṛtyir anayopatīṣṭhate) on the body, the feelings, the mind, dharmas. The person who possesses this prajñā becomes an amupaśyin: hence the phrase: kāye kāyānupaśyī śṛtya upashtītasṛtyī.
i) What is mindfulness in itself (svabhāva)? The wisdom (prajñā) that considers the body (kāyam amupaśyaṇa) is mindfulness of the body. – The wisdom that considers the feelings (vedanā) is mindfulness of feelings. – The wisdom that considers the mind (citta) is mindfulness of mind. – The wisdom that considers dharmas is mindfulness of dharmas. This is mindfulness in itself.

ii) What is mindfulness by connection (samsarga)? When they consider the body at the head of the list, the dharmas of the Path [other than prajñā], coming from causes and conditions (hetu prataya), impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), are mindfulness of the body. – When they consider feelings, the mind or dharmas as head of the list, the dharmas of the Path [other than prajñā], coming from causes and conditions, impure or pure, are mindfulness of feelings, mind or dharmas [respectively]. This is mindfulness by connection.

iii) What is mindfulness as object (ālambana)?116 All dharmas with form (rupadharma), namely, the ten bases of consciousness (daśāyatana) and a small part of the dharmāyatana117 are mindfulness of body. – The six kinds of feelings, namely, feeling arising from contact with the eye (cakṣus amśaparṣajā vedanā) and the feelings arising from contact with the ear (śrotra), nose (ghrāṇa), tongue (jihvā), body (kāya) and mind (manas) respectively118 - The six kinds of consciousnesses, namely, consciousness of the eye (caksurviṣṇa) and consciousnesses of the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind119 are mindfulness of mind. – The notion aggregate (samjñāskandha), the volition aggregate (samkāraskandha) and the three unconditioned (asamskrta)120 are mindfulness of dharmas. That is mindfulness as object.

Mindfulness in itself (svabhāva), having wisdom (prajñā) as nature, is formless (arūpin), invisible (anidarśana), non-resistant (apratiṣṭha), sometimes impure (sāsrava) and sometimes pure (anāsrava)...121

These things are fully explained in the Ts’ien-nan ‘The Thousand Aporias.’122
**G. Inner, outer and mixed mindfulness**

[1. In regard to kāyasmṛtyupasthāna.] – What is the inner body (adhyātmakāya); what is the outer body (bahirdhākāya) and, since everything is already included (samgrhita) in the inner and outer body, why does the sūtra speak again about the consideration of both the inner and outer body (adhyātambahirdhākāyāmupāsyanā)?

**Answer.** – One’s own body (svakāya) is inner; another’s body (parakāya) is outer.

One’s own body is of two kinds: i) the impurities (aśuci) inside the body; ii) the skin (tvac), the hairs (roman), the nails (nakha), the hairs of the head (keśa), etc., outside.

---

122 Prakaraṇapāda, T 1541, k. 8-9, p. 667c-672a; T 1542, k. 11-12, p. 739b-743c.

The Traité cites the Ts’ien-nan (p’in) ‘Chapter of the thousand Aporias’ three times: k. 18, p. 195a15-16 (see above, p. 1101F); k. 19, p. 202a5; 203a8. It is the seventh chapter of the [Abhidharma]-Prakaraṇapāda-śāstra entitled in the Chinese versions Ts’ien wen louen p’in (T 1541, k. 8, p. 663a5) or Pien ts’ien wen p’in (T 1542, k. 10, p. 733a17) corresponding to a Sanskrit original like Sahasraparipṛcchā-varga ‘Chapter of the Thousand Aporias’.

The Prakaraṇapāda, also called Prakaranagrantha or simply Prakaraṇa, is part of the Śatpādabhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins made up of the Jñānaprasthāna of Kātyāyanīputra and six annexed treatises (see above, p. 111F, n. 1).

The Sanskrit sources (Kośavyākhyā, p. 9), Tibetan sources (Bu ston, I, p. 49; Tāranātha, p. 296) and the Chinese sources attribute the Prakaraṇapāda to Vasumitra who composed it at Gandhāra, not far from Puṣkarāvati (Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 2, p. 881a15-16). But according to the Traité (above, p. 111-112F), only the first four chapters were by Vasumitra, the last four of which are the Ts’ien-nan p’in were the work of the Kaśmir arhats.


The Prakaraṇapāda is often cited by Vasubandhu in his Kośa, by Yaśomitra in his Kośavyākhyā and by Saṃghabhadra in his Nyāyānusāra (cf. Taisho Index, 16, p. 174).

Two Chinese translations of the Prakaraṇapāda have been made:

a. Tchong che fen a-p’i-t’an louen (T 1541) by the Indian Brahmin Guṇabhadra (394-468) and his disciple Bodhiyaśas (cf. Li tai san pao ki, T 2034, k. 10, p. 91a25; K’ai yuan mou lou, T 2154, K. 5, p. 528b11).

b. A-p’i-ta-mo p’in tsou louen (T 1542) by Hiuan-tsang. The translation was started in the Yun-kouang hall at Yu-houa sseu the 1st of the 9th month of the 5th hien-k’ing year (October 10, 660) and finished the 23rd day of the 10th month of the same year (November 30). Ta-cheng-kouang, etc., wrote it down with the brush (K’ai yuan mou lou, T 2154, k. 8, p. 447a14-15).

123 The canonical sūtra mentioned above, p. 1122F.
Furthermore, when the yogin considers a corpse (mṛtaśārīra), bloated (vyādhmātaka) and rotted (vipūyaka), he grasps the characteristics (nimittāny udghṛṇāti) and examines his own body, saying: “This body, too, is of the same nature, the same constitution and has not gone beyond this state of affairs” (sa ṭam eva kāyam upasāmaḥ kāya evam dharmo evam bhāvyo etad anatīta iti), then the corpse is the ‘outer’ body, whereas the yogin’s body is the ‘inner’ body.

If the yogin, possibly seeing a beautiful woman (abhirūpastrī), becomes attached to her in his mind and then considers the impurities (aśuci) of this female body, it is a matter of an outer body. But if the yogin recognizes that his own body is exactly like it, it is a question of an inner body.

Furthermore, the five organs (indriya), eye (cakṣus), etc., are inner body whereas the five objects (viṣaya), color (rūpa), etc., are outer body.

The four great elements (mahābhūta) are inner body whereas the matter derived from the four great elements (bhautikārūpa) are outer body.

The place where suffering and happiness are experienced is the inner body; the place where one does not experience suffering and happiness is outer body.

One’s own body (svakāya) and the organs (indriya), eye (cakṣus), etc., are inner body; one’s wife (bhāryā), son (putra), wealth (dhana), fields (kṣetra), house (grha) and other utilized objects are outer body. How is that? Since material dharmas (rūpadharma) are all [objects] of mindfulness of the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna).

First the yogin examines the inner body (adhyātmakāya) to find out if he can find a pure (śuci), eternal (nitya) and happy (sukha) ātman there, but he examines thoroughly and can find no ātman, as has been said above (p. 1167F) in regard to the examination of dharmas.

But if he finds no ātman when he examines the inner [body], perhaps this ātman is outside (bahirdhā). Why? Because outer things (bāhyavastu) are an object of attachment (abhiniveśasthāna) for all beings. But when the yogin examines the outer body, the ātman is not found there either.

Then the yogin makes this reflection: “When I examined inwardly (adhyātmam anupaśyan), I did not find the ātman and [I wondered] if it was not on the outside (bahirdhā), but when I examined [things] on the outside, I did not find it either. I wonder if the ātman is not a delusion (bhrānti). Now I must examine internally and externally simultaneously (yugapat). Examining internal and external are two distinct operations (bhinna); examining [internal and external] at the same time (ekakāle) and simultaneously (sārdham) are conjunct operations!” But although he examines [internal and external] conjointly or separately, the ātman is not found anywhere (nopalabhyate): the examination is therefore ended.

[2. In regard to vedanāsmṛtyupasathāna.] – Question. – In regard to mindfulness of the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna), it might be a matter of the inner [body] and the outer [body]. But here, all the

---


125 Therefore capable of being taken for the ‘self’ or ‘mine’
feelings (vedanā) are included (samgrhiṇa) in the external bases of consciousness (bāhyāyatana), so how can there be a difference between inner feelings (ādhyātmikavādanā) and outer feelings (bāhyavādanā)?

Answer. – The Buddha said: “There are two kinds of feelings: bodily feeling (kāyikā vādanā) and mental feeling (caitasikā vādanā).” Bodily feeling is outer (bāhya) and mental feeling is inner (ādhyātmika).

Furthermore, the feelings associated with the [first] five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānasamprayuktavādanā) are outer, and the feelings associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñānasamprayuktavādanā) are inner.

The feelings arise in dependence on the twelve bases of consciousness [202b] (dvādaśāyatana). The group of the six inner bases (ādhyātmikāyatana) produce feelings that are inner; the outer six bases (bāhyāyatana) produce feelings that are outer.

Coarse (audārika) feeling is outer; subtle (sūkṣma) feeling is inner.

There are two kinds of suffering (dukkha): inner suffering and outer suffering.

a. Inner suffering (ādhyātmika dukkha) is of two types: physical suffering (kāyika dukkha) and mental suffering (caitasika dukkha). Physical suffering is the four hundred and four sicknesses (vyādhi), bodily pains (kāyavyādhi), headaches (sirovādhi), etc.; those are physical suffering. – Mental suffering is grief (daurmanasya), sadness (soka), hatred (dveṣa), fear (bhaya), jealousy (ṛṣyā), doubt (vicikitsā), etc.: those are mental suffering. These two sufferings together are inner suffering.

b. Outer suffering (bāhyadukkha) is of two types: i) the king (rājan), the victorious enemy (vijetr), the wicked thief (caura), the lion (simha), tiger (vyāghra), wolf (vrka), snake (sarpa) and other nuisances (viheśhana); ii) the wind (vāṭa), rain (vrṣṭi), cold (śīta), heat (uṣna), thunder (meghagarjita), lightning (vidyut), thunderbolts, etc.: these two kinds of suffering are outer suffering.

It is the same for pleasant feeling (sukhavādanā) and neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling (adukkhāsukhavādanā).

Furthermore, the feeling that takes as object (ālambate) an inner dharma is an inner feeling; that which takes as object an outer dharma is an outer feeling.

Furthermore, the one hundred and eight feelings are inner feelings; the others (śeṣa) are outer feelings.

---

126 The six organs, eye, etc.
127 Saṃyutta, IV, p. 231: Katame ca bhikkhave dve vādanā. Kāyikā ca cetasikā ca.
129 See above, p. 494-495F, 583-585F.
130 The canonical sources distinguish two, three, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six, and one hundred and eight kinds of vādanā: cf. Saṃyutta, IV, p. 231-232; Tsāha han, T 99, no. 485, k. 17, p. 123c-124b. Later the Traité (k. 36, p. 324b4-8) will return to this subject.
[3. In regard to cittasamṛtyupasthāna.] – Question. – The mind is included (saṃgrhita) in the inner bases of consciousness (ādhyātmikāyatana): how can the sūtra say that [the yogin] “also considers the mind outwardly” (bahirdhā vā citte cittānupaśyā viharati)?

Answer. - Although the mind is included in the inner bases of consciousness, when it takes as object (ālambate) an outer dharma, it is outer mind, and when it takes as object an inner dharma, it is inner mind. The mental consciousness (manovijñāna) is an inner mind, and the [first] five consciousnesses (pañcavijñāna) are outer minds.

The concentrated mind (saṃksiaptacitta) that penetrates into meditation (dhyānapraviṣṭa) is an inner mind; the distracted mind (vikṣiptacitta) is an outer mind.

The mind associated (saṃprayukta) with the five inner obstacles (ādhyātmikanīvaraṇa)131 or with the inner seven factors of enlightenment (ādhyātmakabodhyaṅga) is an inner mind; the mind associated with the five outer obstacles (bāhyanīvaraṇa) or with the seven outer factors of enlightenment (bāhyabodyaṅga) is an outer mind.

For various reasons of this kind, we distinguish inner mind, outer mind and both inner and outer mind.

[4. In regard to dharmasamṛtyupasthāna.] – Mindfulness of dharmas (dharmasamṛtyupasthāna) is included (saṃgrhita) in the outer bases of consciousness (bāhyāyatana): how can [the sūtra] say that [the yogin] “also considers dharmas inwardly” (ādhyātmaṃ vā dharmesu dharmānupaśyā viharati)?

Answer. – Outside of feeling (vedanāṃ sthāpayitvā), there are other mental dharmas (caitasika dharma). Mental dharmas that have as object (ālambana) an inner dharma are inner dharmas; mental dharmas that have as object an outer dharma, the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) or the formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasamskāra)132 are outer dharmas.

Furthermore, the dharmas that are the object (ālambana) of the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) are inner dharmas, for it has been said by the Buddha: “The mental consciousness arises in dependence on the object (ālambanam āsṛityotpadyate manovijñānam).” Here, except for feeling (vedanāṃ sthāpayitvā), the other mental dharmas (caitasika dharma) are inner dharmas, whereas the other formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasamskāra) and the unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛtadharma) are outer dharmas.

2. The Four Right Efforts

---

131 The five obstacles preventing entry into dhyāna. The Traité has spoken of them above (p. 1012-1020F). In the same way as the factors of enlightenment, these obstacles are inner or outer according to whether one examines them within oneself or in another.

The four right efforts (samyakpradhāna) are of two kinds: i) right efforts in themselves (svabhāvasamyakpradhāna); ii) right efforts by connection (saṁsargasamyakpradhāna).

Right effort in itself develops four kinds of exertion (vīrya) in view of the path (mārga): it eliminates the two types of bad dhammas (akuśaladharma), [namely, those that have not yet arisen and those that have already arisen], and it brings together the two types of good dhammas (kuśaladharma), [namely, those that have not yet arisen and those that have already arisen.]

During the examination (anupaśyanā) characteristic of the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), when [the yogin] feels some laziness (kausīḍa), when the five obstacles (pañcañīvaraṇa) and the other passions (kleśa) cloud the mind and he strays away from the five kinds of roots of good, faith, etc. (śraddhādhikusālamūla), then he makes an effort (vyāyacchate) and develops exertion (vīryam ārabhate) for: 1) eliminating the bad dhammas that have already arisen (utpānṇāṃ akuśaladharmānāṃ prahāṇāya); 2) preventing the arising of the bad dhammas that have not yet arisen (anupānṇāṃ akuśalānāṃ dharmānāṃ anutpādāya); 3) making the good dhammas, faith, etc., that have not yet arisen, arise (anupānṇānāṃ śraddhādikusālaḥ dharmānāṃ utpādāya); 4) developing the good dhammas that have already arisen (utpānṇānāṃ kuśaladharmānāṃ bhūyobhāvāya). When these [four] exertions are abundant during the fouroundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), they take the name of right efforts (samyakpradhāna). [202c]

Of the seven categories of dhammas [auxiliary to enlightenment (bodhipakṣa)], why are these four called right efforts and the last eight, [namely, samyagdrṣṭi], etc.] not described as right (samyak)?

Answer. – Because these four kinds of exertion (vīrya), of spiritual energy (cittābhyausāha) or efforts (ārambha) are easily damaged by error (bhṛānti), they are called right efforts. Because the [eight] factors of the Path, [samyagdrṣṭi, etc.] take pleasure in the Dharma and are are easily damaged by falling into bad doctrines (mithyādharma), they are called right Path.

[The right efforts] in themselves (svabhāva) are the four kinds of exertions (caturvidhavīrya). [The right efforts] by connection (saṁsarga) are the dhammas of the Path resulting from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), [dhammas other than the four right efforts] but having primarily the four kinds of exertion (caturvidhavīrya) in question. They are impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), with form (ṛūpin) or formless (arūpin), as has been said above (p. 1170F).

3. The Four Bases of Magical Power

When the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna) are practiced, the mind is slightly distracted (viksipta); this is why the concentrations (samādhi) are used to fix the mind: [concentrations of zeal (chanda), of exertion (vīrya), of the mind (citta) and of examination (mīmāṁsā). These concentrations are called bases of magical power (rddhipāda).

133 Canonical formula already cited above, p. 1123F.
Thus, when good food (praṇītāhāra) is under-salted, it lacks flavor (rasa), but when salt (lavaṇa) is added, the taste is sufficient and is in accord with what is desired (yatheṣṭā). Or again, when a person who has two legs finds a good horse (aśva) or a good chariot (ratha), he comes to his destination as desired.

Similarly, when the yogin has obtained the true wisdoms that are the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) and these right exertions (samyagvīrya) that are the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna), his wisdom (prajnā) is increased (vardhate) by means of these exertions; however, the strength of his concentration (samādhibala) remains weak. But when he obtains the four kinds of concentration (caturvidhasamādhi) and therefore fixes his mind (cittam prarūṇati), the strength of his wisdom (prajnā) and concentration (samādhi) are equal (sama) and his vows (prṇidhāna) are realized. [These four concentrations] are called bases of magical power.

Question. – Concentration (samādhi) already was present in the four foundations of mindfulness and the four right efforts. Why not call them the bases of magical power?

Answer. – These practices do indeed contain [a certain measure] of concentration, but although wisdom (prajnā) and exertion (vīrya) are strong in them, concentration is weak. That is why the yogin did not realize his wishes (prṇidhāna) as he desired. [In the bases of magical power], there are four kinds of concentrations:

i) The concentration obtained by giving predominance to zeal (chandam adhipatīṃ kṛtvā).  

ii) The concentration obtained by giving predominance to exertion (vīryaṃ adhipatīṃ kṛtvā).

From these concentrations as causes and conditions there arise [the practices of] the Path, impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava).

iii) The concentration obtained by giving predominance to the mind (cittam adhipatīṃ kṛtvā)

iv) The concentration obtained by giving predominance to examination (mīṃsāṃ adhipatīṃ kṛtvā).

From these concentrations as causes and conditions there arise [practices of] the Path, impure or pure.

Together with the five good elements (kuśalakandhasaṃsargā) these practices are called [bases of] magical power by connection (samsargarddhipāda).

The four kinds of concentrations under the predominating influence of zeal (chanda), etc., are called [bases of] magical power in itself (svabhāvārdhipāda).  

---

134 Formulas appearing in the Vibhaṅga, p. 216, and Kośavyākhyā, p. 601-602; see above, p. 1125F.

135 The four concentrations having zeal, exertion, the mind, examination a predominating respectively are the bases of magical power (see above, p. 382-383F).

Taken by themselves (svabhāva), they are of lower order: they are right views but are impure (sāsrava), having only meritorious value (puṇyabhāgiya) and bearing fruit only in this world (upadhivaipkaya); it is the right view of worldly people who see the truth but stay apart from the path traced by the Buddha.
For the four right efforts (\textit{samyakpradhāna}) and the four bases of magical power (\textit{ṛddhipāda}) see what was said in full detail in regard to the \textit{smṛtyupasthānas} in themselves and as \textit{smṛtyupasthānas} by connection (p. 1169F).

4. The Five Faculties

Here are the five faculties (\textit{pañcendriya}).\textsuperscript{136}

1. Believing in the Path (\textit{mārga}) and in the good dharmas adjuvant to the Path (\textit{mārgapāksika kuśaladharma}) is the faculty of faith (\textit{śraddhendriya}).

2. When the yogin practices the Path and the dharmas adjuvant to the Path and exerts himself without stopping, that is the faculty of exertion (\textit{vīryendriya}).

3. When he thinks about the Path and the dharmas adjuvant to the Path and does not think of anything else, that is the faculty of memory (\textit{smṛtīndriya}).

4. When he meditates attentively (\textit{ekacittena}) and without being distracted (\textit{avikṣepam}), that is the faculty of concentration (\textit{samādhīndriya}).

5. When, in view of the Path and the dharmas adjuvant to the Path, he considers (\textit{anupaśyati}) the sixteen aspects of the truths (\textit{soḍaśākāra}),\textsuperscript{137} impermanence (\textit{anitya}), etc., that is the faculty of wisdom (\textit{prajñendriya}).

5. The Five Strenghs

When the five faculties have increased and are no longer troubled by the affictions (\textit{kleśa}), they take the name of strengths (\textit{bala}).\textsuperscript{138} See what has just been said about the five faculties.

---

On the other hand, together with the five good elements (the \textit{dhammakkhandha} of the Dīgha, III, p. 229, 279, Itivuttaka, p. 107; the \textit{lokottaraskandha} of the Dharmaguptaka, § 23; the \textit{asamasamāḥ skandhāḥ} of the Mahāvyut., no. 103-108) – namely, \textit{sīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti, vimuktijñānadarśana}, -, these four concentrations ‘by connection’ (\textit{saṃsargai}) are the right views of the nobles (\textit{ārya}), pure (\textit{anāśrava}), supraworldly (\textit{lakottara}) and linked to the Path (\textit{mārgāṅga}); this is the view found in the noble mind, purified, joined to the way, following the noble Path. See Majjhima, III, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{136} For the \textit{Traité}, the five \textit{indriyas} concern the Path and the auxiliaries to enlightenment exclusively. The canonical sources cited above (p. 1125F) are less precise: according to them, faith (\textit{śraddhā}), rather, would have the Buddha as object.

\textsuperscript{137} See above, p. 641F.
The five faculties and the five strengths come under the aggregate of volition (saṃskāraskandaḥ), are always associated (sadāsamprayukta), are mental events (caitasikadharma) accompanying the mind (cittānuparivartin); they arise with the mind, endure with the mind and perish with the mind.

When one possesses them, the mind is in right concentration (samyaksamādhi); when one does not possess them, the mind falls into wrong concentrations (mithyāsamadhi).

6. The Seven Members of Enlightenment

On the seven members of enlightenment (sapta sambodhyāṅga), see the explanations above (p. 1149F). [203a]

Question. – You previously gave the meaning but you did not speak from the Abhidharma point of view.

Answer. – It is necessary here to repeat what was said above (p. 1170F) in regard to the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna).

The seven members of enlightenment are formless (arūpin), invisible (anidarśana), non-resistant (apratīgha), pure (anāsrava), conditioned (saṃskṛta), resulting from causes and conditions (hetupratīvaya), included in the three times (tryadhvasaṃgrhīta), included in name (nāmasaṃgrhīta), included in the outer bases of consciousness (bāhūyatanasaṃgrhīta) and not to be destroyed by seeing (na darśanena prahātavaya), things to be cultivated (bāvanādharma) and non-defiled things (asamskīśadharma), being fruit (phala) and involving a fruit (saphala), being neither feeling (na vedanā) nor matter derived (bhautika, upādīya rūpa) from the four great elements, nor cause associated with existence (na bhavanasaṃprayuktahetu). Two sections of the good (kusala) contain the seven members of enlightenment and the seven members of enlightenment contain two sections of the good. [The members of enlightenment] are dissociated from bad, indeterminate, impure dharmas and dharmas containing impurity (akusala-avyākṛta-āsrava-sāsravadharma-viprayukta). Two sections of the anāsrava include the seven members of enlightenment and the seven members of enlightenment include two sections of the anāsrava.

These various things have been discussed fully in the Ts’ien-nan ‘The Thousand Aporias’. 139

---

138 There is only a difference in intensity between the five indriyas and the five balas: see above, p. 1127F; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 141, p. 726b13-20: Kośa, VI, p. 286.


On the Chapter of the Thousand Aporias, see above, p. 1171F, note 1.
7. The Eight Members of the Path

On the eight members of the noble Path (āryaṣṭaṅgamārga), see what has been said above (p. 1150F).

1. [The first member], right view (samyakdṛṣṭi), is the wisdom mentioned in regard to the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya), the strength of wisdom (prajñābala) and the member of enlightenment called discernment of dharmas (dharmapraciyasaṃbodhyāṅga).

2. [The second member], right thought (samyaksaṃkalpa), is, at the time of contemplating the four truths (satyānupāyaṇā), associated with a pure mind (anāsravaścitasamprayukta): it is a reflection (tarka), an enquiry (vitarka), an understanding (avabodha), an examination (mīmāṃsa).

3. [The sixth member], right effort (samyagvyāma) has already been mentioned in regard to the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna), the faculty of exertion (vīryendriya), the strength of exertion (vīryabala) and the member of enlightenment called exertion (vīrasaṃbodhyāṅga).

4. [The seventh member], right attentiveness (samyaksmṛṭi), has already been mentioned in regard to the faculty of attentiveness (smṛtīndriya), the strength of attentiveness (smṛtibala) and the member of enlightenment called attentiveness (smṛtisaṃbodhyāṅga).

5. [The eighth member], right concentration (samyaksamādhi) has already been mentioned in regard to the bases of magical power (ṛddhipāda), the faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya), the strength of concentration (samādhībala) and the member of enlightenment called concentration (samādhisaṃbodhyāṅga).

Now it is necessary to speak [of the three remaining members]: right speech (samyagvāc), right action (samyakkarmānta) and right livelihood (samyagājīva).

6. [The third member or samyagvāc]. – With the exception of the four bad ways of livelihood (mithyājīva), fixing vocal actions (vākkarmacāraṇa) and, by means of a pure wisdom (anāsravaprajñā), rejecting and eliminating bad vocal actions (vānmithyākarman).

7. [The fourth member or samyakkarmānta.] – For right action (samyakkarmānta), it is the same [allowing for a few minor variations].

8. [The fifth member or samyagājīva.] – By means of a pure wisdom (anāsravaprajñā), to reject and eliminate the five bad ways of livelihood is right livelihood (samyagājīva).

Question. – What are the five bad ways of livelihood (mithyājīva)?

Answer. – a. Out of love for profit (lāhalobha), to manifest all kinds of wonders (āścarya) by cheating (kuhāna).

140 These will be discussed in regard to the fifth member or samyagājīva.

141 The five bad ways of livelihood are formulated in sybilline terms which have severely tested the wisdom of translators. Besides, the texts show many variations:
b. Out of love for profit, to boast about one’s own qualities (svaṇalapanā).

c. Out of love for profit, to predict good luck (svasti) or bad luck (asvasti) to people.

d. Out of love for profit, to proclaim loudly (uccais) one’s own power (prabhāva) in order to frighten people and make them respect oneself.

---


Dīgha, I, p. 8, 67; Anguttara, III, p. 111: Kuhakā ca honti, lapakā ca, nemittikā ca, nippesikā ca, lābhena ca lābhāṁ nijīgjanitaro iti. – Transl. L. Renou, Canon bouddhique pāli, vol. I, fasc. 1, 1949, p. 8: ‘They become swindlers, boasters, soothsayers, jugglers, seeking to gain profit upon profit.’


b. Sanskrit sources. – Kośavyākhyā, p. 420: 1) kuhanā, 2) lapanā, 3) naimittikatā, 4) naispeśitā, 5) lābhena lābhaniścikīrṣā.

Bodh. bhūmi, p.168: 1) kuhanā, 2) lapanā, 3) naimittikatā, 4) naispeśitā, 5) lābhena lābhāṁ nīścikīrṣatā.

Abhidharmadīpa, p. 309: 1) kuhanā, 2) lapanā, 3) naimittikatā, 4) naispeśitā, 5) lābhena lābhasya niścikīrṣatā.

Mahāvyut., no. 2493-97: 1) kuhanā = ṇaṇ pa, 2. lapanā = khu=gsag, 3. naispeśitakatva = thob kyis hjal ba, thob ciṅ hjal ba, 4) naimittikatva = gē cog sloṅ, 5) lābhena lābhaniśpādanatā = rfed pas eñed pa sgrub pa. – For the Chinese translations, see Hiuan-tsong (T 1579, k. 41, p. 518a7), preferable to the translations adopted by the editions of the Mahāvyutpatti.

In the Lexica annexe to his edition of the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 21-26, U. Wogihara has succeeded in defining the meaning of these five expressions. Edgerton’s Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (p. 189, 461, 312, 313, 462) is mainly inspired by Wogihara.

The explanations given here by the Traité may be found mainly in the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 310: Abhūtaṅgiṣadārṣaṁ rātham ēryāpathavikalpakre caittaviśeṣah kuhanā. Lābhārtham eva guṇaprīyalapanakṛ lapanā. Upakaraṅnārthvaniṁsavidarṣaṁ rātham ca caittaviṣeṣo naimittikatā. Paragunavad doṣavacanānepānpyaṅkṛd eva caittaviṣeṣo naispeśitakatā. Labdhalābhakhāyāpanenānāyālābhaniścikīrṣayata lābhena lābhasya niścikīrṣatā.

The five bad ways of livelihood are thus special mental evenrs (caittaviṣeṣa). Kuhanā, cheating, resorts to various attitudes to show qualities that one does not have. Lapanā, boasting, consists of praising one’s own qualities towards one’s own interest. Naimittikatā, divination, under pretext of rendering service, to interpret favorable or unfavorable signs. Naispeśitakatā, extortion, to snatch a favor by means of threats. Lābhena lābhaniścikīrṣatā, to try to grab new profit by virtue of a profit previously won.
e. Out of love for profit, to speak of offerings already obtained (ladhapañjā) in order to encourage [other] people [to give in their turn].

These eight right paths (samayamārga) are arranged into three groups (skandha):

a. Three of them, [right speech (samayagvā), right action (samyakkarmānta) and right livelihood (samyagājīva)], make up the class of morality (śīlaskandha).

b. Three others, [right effort (samayagvyāma), right mindfulness (samyaksmṛti) and right concentration (samyaksamādhi)], make up the class of concentration (samādhisandha).

c. Two, finally, [right view (samyagṛṣṭi) and right thinking (samyakṣaṃkalpa)], make up the class of wisdom (prajñāskandha).

The class of morality and the class of concentration are as above. Now we must talk about the class of morality.

The class of morality (śīlaskandha) has form (rūpasvabhāva), is invisible (anidarśana), non-resistant (apratigha), pure (anāsrava), conditioned (samskṛta), non-retribution (avipāka), the result of causes and conditions (hetupratyayaja), included in the three times (tryadhvasaṃgrhiṇa), included in form (rūpasamgrhiṇa), not included in name (na nāmasaṃgrhiṇa), included in the outer bases of consciousness (bāhyāyatana-saṃgrhiṇa), not to be destroyed by meditation (na bhāvanayā prahātavya) and not to be destroyed by seeing (na darśanena prahātavya), something to be cultivated (bhāvanādharma) and something non-defiled (asaṃkliṣṭadharma), being fruit (phala) and involving a fruit (saphala), not being either feeling (na vedanādharma) nor derived from the four great elements (na bhautika), not something of subordinate rank (na sottaradharma) nor a cause associated with existence (na bhavasamprayukta).

One section of the good (kuśala) includes (saṃgrhiṇa) three [members of] the right path and these three [members of the right path] include a section of the good. The members are dissociated from the bad, indeterminate, impure or involving impurity dharmas (akuśala-avyākṛta-sāsrava-sāsravadharma-viprayukta).

One dharma of the anāsrava includes three [other members of] the right path, and these three members also include one dharma of the anāsrava.

These various explanations are presented in full in the Abhidharma.

---

142 Cāḷavedallasutta of the Majjhima, I, p. 301 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 58, p. 788c9-12), cited in Atthasālīni, p. 305: Na kho Visākhā ariyena atthangikena .... dhammā paññākhande saṅgañā ti.

For these three elements (skandha) of the eightfold path, see also Dīgha, I, p. 206; Anguttara, I, p. 125, 291; II, p. 20; III, p. 15-16; V, p. 326; Itivuttaka, p. 51; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 64, 126.
8. Distribution of the Auxiliaries in the Stages

1. The thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (*bodhipaksīkādharma*) are all present in the stage of the first dhyāna (*prathamadhyāna*).

2. In the stage of the *ānāgamya* [preliminary absorption of the first dhyāna], there are thirty-six auxiliaries, excluding the member of enlightenment called joy (*prītisambodhyānga*).

3. In the second dhyāna (*dvitiyadhyāna*), there are also thirty-six auxiliaries, excluding [the member of the path] called right thinking (*samyaksamkalpaṅga*).

4. In the intermediate dhyāna (*dhyānantara*) [subdivision of the first dhyāna], in the third dhyāna (*trīyadhyāna*) and in the fourth dhyāna (*caturthadhyāna*), there are thirty-five auxiliaries, excluding the member of enlightenment called joy (*prītisambodhyānga*) and excluding [the member of the path called] right thinking (*samyaksamkalpaṅga*).

5. In the [first] three formless absorptions (*ārupyasamāpattis*), there are thirty-two auxiliaries, excluding the member of enlightenment called joy (*prītisambodhyānga*) and [the members of the path called] right thinking (*samyaksamkalpaṅga*), right speech (*samyagvāc*), right action (*samyakkarmānta*), and right livelihood (*samyagājīva*).

6. In the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*) [or fourth formless absorption], there are twenty-two auxiliaries, excluding the seven members of enlightenment (*sambodhyānga*) and the eight members of the noble path (*āryamārgaṅga*).

7. In the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*), there are also twenty-eight auxiliaries [excluding the *sambodhyāngas* and the eight *mārgaṅgas*].

---

143 These are the eleven stages (*bhūmi*) of birth (*upapatti*) and concentration (*samādhi*) accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas (*Kośa*, VI, p. 236; VII, p. 71), namely:

1) *kāmadhātu*

2) *ānāgamya* or preliminary absorption (*sāmantaka*) of the first *dhyāna*

3) first *dhyāna*

4) *dhyānantara*, higher type of the first *dhyāna*

5-7) second, third and fourth *dhyānas*

8-11) the four *ārupyasamāpattis*, formless absorptions, the fourth of which is also listed under the name of *bhavāgra*, summit of existence.

For further details, see above, p. 1027-1034F, and the note on p. 1035F.

In regard to the distribution of the auxiliaries among the eleven stages, the *Traité* adopts the views here of the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 96, p. 497c4-15, which will be taken up again in the Abhidhāmartā, T 1553, k. 2, p. 977c21-26 (reconstr. Sastri, p. 117), *Kośa*, VI, p. 291-292 and Abhidharmadīpa, p. 365.
This information is valid for the system of the śrāvakas.

**Third Section THE AUXILIARIES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA**

Question. – What is the meaning (*artha*) of these thirty-seven auxiliaries as taught in the Mahāyāna?

**I. THE FOUR FOUNDATIONS OF MINDFULNESS**

Answer. – The bodhisattva-mahāsattva practices the four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*).

1. Mindfulness of body

He contemplates his inner body as impermanent, suffering, like a sickness, like an ulcer (*so dhīyātmakāyam anityato duḥkhato rogato gaṇḍataḥ samanupaśyati*), a mass of rotted flesh (read *jou tsiu*), filled with impurities (*aśuciparipūrṇa*), oozing from nine gates (*navadvāra*) and a veritable walking latrine. In the same way, he contemplates the repulsive nakedness of the body where there is not even one pure place.

This ‘pile of bones, equipped with flesh and blood, wrapped with tendons’ (*asthīṃkalikā samāśalohitā snāyusambandhā*), this leather bag, that has as causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) the impure actions (*sāravakarman*) of earlier lives (*pūrvajanman*), is provided in this life (*ihajanman*) with baths (*snāpana*), flowers (*puspa*) perfumes (*gandha*), clothes (*vastra*), food (*āhāra*), beds and seats (*śayasana*), remedies and medicines (*glānapratyayabhāsajya*), etc. It is like a two-wheeled cart (*dvicakra ratha*) which, when drawn by the power of an ox (*gobala*), can move: the causes and conditions of the two lifetimes produce the ‘cart’ of the body and, pulled by this ‘ox’ which is the consciousness (*vijñāna*), it turns, goes forwards and backwards.

---


145 See above, p. 1154F, n. 2.

146 Also a canonical expression: cf. Dīgha, II, p. 296; Majjhima, I, p. 58, 89; Anguttara, III, p. 324. For the Sanskrit correspondents, see Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 85 under *asthi-śakatā*. 

975
This body formed by of the complex of the four great elements (caturmahābhūtasāmagrī) is not real (abhūta) and without substance (asāra), like a ball of foam (pheṇapīṇḍa).  

This body is impermanent (anitya) and must perish after a time. The physical characteristics (kāyakāya) are not found inside the body, nor outside, nor in between the two (na te ‘dhyātmām na bahirdhā nobhayam antareṇopalaśākhyante).

The body itself does not know itself: it is ignorant (ajñā), inactive (akāra), like the tiles (kathala) and stones (śilā) of a wall (kaṭya).

In this body there are no definite physical characteristics (kāyanimitta). There is no person who makes the body nor anyone who makes him make it. In this body there is no earlier term (pūrvanta) nor later term (aparānta) nor middle term (madhyānta).

Eighty thousand types of worms (krmikula), innumerable sicknesses (vyādhi), hunger and thirst (ksūtapāsa), cold and heat (śītaṣṇa) and weaknesses always torment the body.

147 The phenapīṇḍāpamaṁ rūpaṁ of Saṃyutta, III, p. 142; see above, p. 370F.

148 According to the Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 193-194, the body is inhabited by eighty families of worms (kikikula) located in the skin, hide, flesh, tendons, bones, marrow, and which feed there: “There they are born, live, die and fill their greater and lesser needs: the body is their maternity ward, their hospital, their cemetery, their latrine ditch and even dies under their rage.” According to the same text, p. 213, the stomach itself is occupied by thirty-two types of worms, round worms, ribbon worms, thread worms, etc., ever in turmoil: when the body is on a light diet, the worms jump around crying and strike against the heart region; when the body is fed, they rush to seize the mouthfuls of food. – According to the Milindapañha, p. 100, these undesirable and undesired guests come into the body and multiply there by the power of bad actions.

The Mahāyāna texts go so far as to postulate the presence in the body of eighty-four thousand types of worms. The Udayanavatsarājaparipṛcchā, cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 81, actually says: Aṣṭiśāṃ krmikulasahasrāṇi yāni tiṣṭhanti antare.

The wise person puts up with their presence. According to the Ratnakūṭa (T 310, k. 114, p. 645b4-6), the forest-dwelling monk (aranyabhikṣu), when he is about to eat, has the following thought: “In this body there are at present 80,000 types of worms. When the worms get this food, they will all be safe; now I am going to attract these worms with this food.” – According to the Avatamsaka (T 279, k. 21, p. 112c12-15: cf. T 278, k. 12, p. 476b12-15), at the time of the bodhisattva’s meal, he has the following thought: “In my body there are 80,000 types of worms; they live in me; when my body is filled, they too are filled; when my body suffers from hunger, they too suffer from hunger. Now by taking this food and drink (pānabhojana), I hope that these beings may be replete. Therefore I am myself eating this food so as to make a gift to them; I do not desire the taste of it.”

But the great Bodhisattva, the ‘irreversible’ bodhisattva (avivartaniya or avaivartika) does not have to formulate such intentions, for one of his numerous privileges is to be completely free of worms. In the Aṣṭāsāhasrikā, p. 326, we read: Yāni khalu punar anyesāṃ sattvānām aṣṭiśāṃ krmikulasahasrāṇi
The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who considers the body in this way knows that there is neither his own body (ātmakāya) nor the body of another (parakāya). There is neither master (śvara) nor agent (kāraka) who makes this body. Empty of characteristics (lakṣaṇaśūnya), the body arises from unreal causes and conditions (abhūtahetupratyaya): this body that has but nominal existence (prajñaptisat) depends on previous actions (pūrvakarman) as causes and conditions.

The bodhisattva then says to himself: “I must not spare the life of the body. Why? The bodily characteristics do not unite and do not separate, they do not come and they do not go, they are not born and they are not destroyed; they do not rest upon anything.”

Pursuing the examination of the body, he says to himself: “Being without ‘I’ (anātman) and without ‘mine’ (anātmiya), this body is empty (śunya). Being empty, it does not have any male (puruṣa) or female (strī) characteristics. Being without characteristics (animitta), it is not to be wished for (apraṇihita).” [203c]

Thinking thus, the bodhisattva enters into the gate of knowledge (jñānamukha) called ‘wishlessness’ (apraṇihita). He knows that the body is not to be considered in the sense that it arises only from a complex of engendering causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī). But these causes and conditions that produce the body also come from mistakes (bhrānti) and errors (viparyāsa). In these causes and conditions, the nature of cause and condition is also lacking, and the arising of causes and conditions is really a non-arising (anupāda).

Reflecting thus, the bodhisattva knows that the body, from the beginning, is without the nature of arising (utpādalakṣaṇa). He knows that this body, without characteristics (animitta), is ungraspable (agrāhya). Since it is not born, it is without characteristics and, not having any characteristics, it is not born. Only stupid worldly people (bālapṛthagjana) speak about the body.

When the bodhisattva considers the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of the body in this way, he eliminates all desire (rāga) and all attachments (saṅgacitta) and, always fixing his attention on the body, he pursues the examination of the body. That is what is called mindfulness of body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna) for the bodhisattva.

It is the same in regard to the consideration of the outer body (bahirdhākāya) and the consideration of the inner and outer body (adhyātmabahirdhākāya).

---

kāye saṃbhavati tāṇi tasya kāye sarveṣa sarvathā sarvam na saṃbhavanti. tat kasya hetoh. tathā hi tasya tāṇi kūkalamūlāni sarvalokabhyugatāni bhavanti: “Moreover, these eighty thousand types of worms that are in the bodies of other beings are never found in his body. Why? Because for him these roots of good transcend the entire world.” This privilege of the avaivartika is mentioned in all the versions of the Prajñā: cf. Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 16, p. 339c27; Mahāprajñāpāramitā, T 220, k. 326, p. 666b4-5; k. 448, p. 261c26-28; k. 514, p. 627b13-14; k. 549, p. 826b10-11; k. 562, p. 901a16. Note also, that according to Taoist ideas, grain takes birth in the bodies of the worms which eat away at vitality. On this subject, see H. Maspero, Mélanges Posthumes, I, 1950, p. 98 seq.
2. Mindfulness of feeling

How does the bodhisattva consider feelings (vedanā)? He considers inner feeling (adhyātma Vedanā). This feeling is of three kinds: unpleasant (duḥkha), pleasant (sukha) neither unpleasant nor pleasant (adukkāsukha). These feelings do not come from anywhere and, once destroyed, do not go anywhere. They arise only from error (bhramātī), mistakes (viparyāsa) and thought-construction (vikalpa). They are fruit of retribution (vipākaphala), depending on causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) constituted by the actions of previous lifetimes (pravrajāyākārāpmān).

In this way, the bodhisattva considers these feelings that are neither in the past (anāgata) nor in the future (anāgata) nor in the present (pratuyāpāna). He knows that these feelings are empty (śūnya), without ‘I’ (anātman) or ‘mine’ (anātmā), impermanent (anātman) and changing (viparītāmadharmaṇa). Considering the feelings distributed in the three times (tryadhvan) as empty (śūnya), without characteristics (ānimitta) and unworthy of being considered (āpranihita), he penetrates into the gates of deliverance (vimokṣamukha).

He also considers the arising (upadā) and the cessation (niruddha) of feelings. He knows that feelings are not united, are not separated, do not arise and do not cease. Thus he penetrates into the gate of non-production (anupadāmukha).

He knows that feelings do not arise, are without characteristics (ānimitta) and, being without characteristics, are not born.

Knowing this, he is not attached to the objects (ālambana) of the mind. If he experiences an unpleasant feeling (duḥkha), pleasant feeling (sukha) or a neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling (adukkāsukha), his mind does not feel it (nāvedayati), is not attached to it (nabhiniṣate), does not rest on it (nāśrayate).

Considering feelings in this way (etena paryāyena) is what is called mindfulness of feelings ( Vedanāśmṛtyupasthāna) for the bodhisattva.

It is the same in regard to the consideration of outer feeling (bahirdhāvedanā) and the consideration of both inner and outer feeling (adhyātmaparāhāvedanā).

3. Mindfulness of mind

What is mindfulness of mind (cittasmṛtyupasthāna) for the bodhisattva? The bodhisattva considers the inner mind (adhyātmacitta). This inner mind has three characteristics (lakṣaṇa): arising (upadā), duration (sthitā) and cessation (bhāṅga). He has the following thought: “This mind comes from nowhere and once destroyed, does not go anywhere. It arises only from a complex of inner and outer causes and conditions (adhyātmaparāhāhetupratyayasamagri).”

149 The three samādhīs which will be studied in the following chapter.
This mind has no fixed and real nature, has no real birth, duration or cessation (*utpādasthitibhaṅga*); it does not occur in past (*atiṅa*), future (*anāgata*) or present (*pratyutpanna*) existence.

This mind is neither inner nor outer nor between the two (*na tad adhyātmam na bahiddhā nobhayam antareṇopalabhyate*).

This mind is also without intrinsic nature (*nihsvabhāva*) and without characteristics (*nirmitta*) and there is nothing that arises or anything that makes it arise. Outwardly, there are various (*nānāvidhā*) mixed (*miśra*) causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*), namely, the six objects (*viśaya*); inwardly, there are erroneous notions (*viparītasamjñā*). But due to the succession of births and cessations (*utpādanirodhaprabandha*), the name of mind (*citta*) is habitually given to all of that.

The true nature of the mind (*cittasya bhūṭalakṣaṇa*) does not exist (*nopalabhyate*) in this mind. In its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), the mind is not born (*notpadyate*) and does not cease (*na nirudhyate*). This mind is always luminous (*prabhāsrava*) but, because of adventitious passions (*āgantuka kleśa*), we [wrongly] speak of the soiled mind (*upakliṣṭacitta*).

The mind does not recognize itself. Why? Because this mind is empty of characteristics of mind (*cittalakṣaṇaśūnya*). From the beginning to the end, this mind has no real attributes.

This mind is not joined with nor separated from dharmas. It has neither an anterior term (*pūrvānta*) nor a posterior term (*aparānta*) nor a middle term (*madhyanta*). It has neither color (*rūpa*), shape (*saṃsthāna*) nor resistance (*pratigha*). It arises only from mistakes (*viparyāsa*) and error (*bhṛanti*).

This mind is empty (*śūnya*), without ‘I’ (*anātman*), without ‘mine’ (*anāmiya*), impermanent (*anitya*) and unreal (*asat*). That is a consideration in accordance with the mind.

Knowing that the nature of the mind is unborn is to enter into ‘the dharmas that do not arise’ (*anutpattikadharma*). Why? Because this mind is without birth (*utpāda*), without intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) and without characteristics (*lakṣana*). The wise person (*jñānin*) can know it. And although the wise person considers the characteristics of birth (*utpāda*) and cessation (*nirodha*) of this mind, he will find no true birth, no true cessation. Not finding any defilement (*saṃkleśa*) or purification (*vyāvadan*) in it, he discovers this luminosity of the mind (*cittasya prabhāsvara*), a luminosity by virtue of which the mind is not defiled by the adventitious passions (na khale āgantukair upakleśair upakliṣyate).150

---

150 Concerning the nature of the mind (*citta*), the general tendency of the Canon is clear. Mind (*citta*, *manas*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) are synonymous. *Vijñāna* constitutes the fifth *skandha* and, like all the aggregates, it is transitory, suffering and impersonal.

However, we find, in the Canon, some passages that seem to attribute to the mind a more stable, almost transcendental, value. Actually, in Anguttara, I, p. 10 and in Atthasālī, p. 140, we read: *Pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittam taṁ ca āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭam... taṁ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippanuttamṁ:* “This mind is luminous, but sometimes it is defiled by adventitious passions; sometimes it is free of these adventitious passions.”
This is how the bodhisattva considers the inner mind (ādhyātmacitta), and it is the same in regard to the outer mind (bahirdhācitta) and the both inner and outer mind (adhyātmabahirdhācitta).

4. Mindfulness of dharmas

How does the bodhisattva practice mindfulness of dharmas (dharmasṛtyupasthāna)? He considers that all dharmas are neither on the inside nor on the outside nor in between (na te ‘dhyātman na bahirdhā nobhayam antarenopalabhyaṁ); they are not in the past (atīta) lifetime, the future (anāgata) lifetime, or the present (pratyurpanna) lifetime. They arise only from the complex of causes and conditions (hetupratiyayasāmagṛ̣ṇi) and wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭī). There is no fixed reality; there is no dharma that is any dharma whatsoever.

In the dharmas there is no characteristic of dharmas and there is no dharma that unites or is separated. All dharmas are non-existent like space (ākāśa); all dharmas are deceptive like a magic show (māyā). The

Basing themselves on this passage, certain sects of the Lesser Vehicle say that the mind is originally and naturally luminous (cittam prabhasvaram) but that it may be soiled (kliṣṭa) by the passions (kleśa) or liberated (vipramukta) from the passions. The latter are not the original nature of the mind and are described as adventitious (āgantuka).

Among the sects advocating this maximalist interpretation, one may cite the Mahāsāṃghika (cf. A. Bareau, Les Sectes bouddhiques, p. 67-68, no. 44), the Vibhajyavādin (ibid., p. 175, no. 23; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 27, p. 140b25-26), the practitioners of the Śāriputrābhidharma (ibid., p. 194, no. 6; Śāriputrābhidharma, T 1548, k. 27, p. 697b18) and the Andhaka (Kathāvattu, p. 238-241).

But the major schools of the Lesser Vehicle resolutely rejected this interpretation. No, the mind is not naturally and originally pure; on the contrary, it is originally defiled by passion and action, and the efforts of the candidate for sainthood consist precisely of eliminating defiled minds (cf. Atthāsālinī, p. 140, l. 24-29; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 27, p. 149b-c; Kośa, VI, p. 299; Nyāyānusarasāstra, T 1562, k. 72, p. 731c).

For the Greater Vehicle in general and the Prajñāpāramitā in particular, the alleged luminous mind of which the Anguttara spoke is in reality a non-mind (cittam acittam), the pure and simple non-existence of the mind (cittābhāvamātra): that which does not exist cannot be defiled nor purified (cf. Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 5-6; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 121, l. 12-122, l. 11; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 495, l. 3-21; āloka, p. 38, l. 24-26; 40, l. 6; Suvikrāntavikrāmin, p. 85, l. 15-86, l. 6).

This is the position which the Traité is defending here, reserving itself to return to the subject later (k. 41, p. 363a20 seq).

For further details, see introduction to Vimalakīrti, p. 51-60.

151 These two examples are part of the stock phrases of the ten comparisons explained above, like space, p. 364-368F; like a magic show, p. 358-363F.
purity of nature (svabhāvavisuddhi) of dharmas\textsuperscript{152} has no contact with defilement (saṃkleśa). Dharmas are not felt (vedita) because feelings (vedanā) do not exist; dharmas are not cognized (jñāta) because the mind (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharma) are deceivers.

Considering things in this way, the bodhisattva sees neither identity (ekatva) nor difference (anyatvā) among dharmas. He considers that all dharmas are empty (śūnya) and without self (anātman). Thus, he has the following thought:

Coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), all dharmas have no intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and are empty of reality (tattvaśūnya). Being empty of reality, they have no characteristics (animitta). Not having characteristics, they are not to be taken into consideration (apraṇihita). Not being taken into consideration, one does not see any dharma that is born, that perishes or that lasts. In this wisdom (prajñā), the bodhisattva penetrates into the gateway of ‘conviction that dharmas do not arise’ (anupattikadharmakṣānti).

From that time on, even if he notices birth (utpāda) or cessation (nirrodha) among dharmas, he enters into the gateway of ‘signlessness’ (ānimitta). Why? Because all dharmas are without characteristics. That is what is understood by the wise person (jñanin).

Considering things in this way, he is not attached to objects of the mind (cittālambara) and, while submitting (anugacchan) to the characteristics of dharmas (dharmaśāna), he does not think about the body (kāya) or about feeling (vedanā) or about the mind (citta) or about dharmas. He knows that these four things are without a basis (apratisṭhāna).\textsuperscript{153}

That is mindfulness of inner dharmas (adhyātmadharma). It is the same for mindfulness of outer dharmas (bahirdhādharma) and mindfulness of both inner and outer dharmas (adhyātmabahirdhādharma).

\section*{II. – III. THE FOUR RIGHT EFFORTS AND THE FOUR BASES OF MAGICAL POWER}

The four right efforts (samyaṃkpradhāna) and also the four bases of magical power (ṛddhipāda) should be analyzed in the same way and considered as empty (śūnya) and without basis (apratisṭhāna).

\section*{IV. THE FIVE FACULTIES}

What are the five faculties (indriya) as practiced by the bodhisattva? The bodhisattva-mahāsattva considers (anupaśyati) and cultivates (bhāvayati) the five faculties.

\textsuperscript{152} We have just seen that this purity of nature is a pure and simple (cittabhāvamātra) non-existence.

\textsuperscript{153} For the apratisṭhāna of all dharmas, see Vimalakīrti, p. 47-51, 269-271, 283.
The faculty of faith (śraddhendriya). – The bodhisattva believes that all dharmas arise from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya), arise from mistakes (viparyāsa) and wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi), like a fire-brand brandished in a circle [204b] (alātrackara), like a dream (svapna), like a magic show (māyā).

He believes that dharmas are impure (aśuddha), impermanent (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), without self (anātmaka), like a sickness (roga), like an ulcer (gaṇḍa), like a thorn (śalya), subject to deterioration and ruin.

He believes that all dharmas are non-existent (asat), like an empty fist deceiving little children (bālollāpanariktamuṣṭivat).

He believes that there are no dharmas in the past (atīta) or in the future (anāgata) or in the present (pratyutpanna), that they come from nowhere and, once destroyed, they go nowhere.

He believes that dharmas are empty (śūnya), without characteristics (ānimitta), not to be considered (apraṇihita), unborn (anupanna) and non-destroyed (aniruddha). Despite this wishlessness (read wou-tso) and this signlessness, he believes [in the five pure elements or (anāsravaskandha): i) morality (śīla), ii) concentration (samādhi), iii) wisdom (prajñā), iv) deliverance (vimukti), v) knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana).

Because he has acquired this faculty of faith, the bodhisattva is non-regressing (avaivartika). Taking the faculty of faith as the major one, he skillfully becomes established in morality (śīla). When he is established in morality, his mind of faith is unmoving (acala) and firm. He believes with his whole mind (ekacittena). He depends on the retribution of the fruit of action (karmaphalavipāka), rejects wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi), no longer believes in the words of others (paravacana). He accepts only the Buddha’s teachings; he believes in the Community (saṃgha) and he becomes established in the true Path (mārga). He is of right mind (ṛjucitta), gentle (mṛdu) and patient (kṣamavat). His supernatural powers (abhiṣīna) are unhindered (apratiṣṭha), immobile (acala) and indestructible (aṅkṣaya); he acquires mastery of powers (balavaśīta).

This is called the faculty of faith.

154 For the alātrackara, see above, p. 372F, n. 1.
155 This comparison is unknown to the Tripitaka I [Lamotte] think, but is frequent in the Mahāyānasūtras: Lalitavistara, p. 176, l. 4; 212, l. 14 (cited in Śikṣāsamucaya, p. 238, l. 2; Pañjikā, p. 532, l. 10): bālollāpana riktamasūtipat.

Suvikrāntavikrāmin, p. 92, l. 23: riktamaṣṭisamā hi sarvadharmaḥ vaśikasmabhāvalakṣaṇatayā.

See also Mahāvyut., no. 2831; Fo pen hing tsi king, T 190, k. 18, p. 737a4; Sūtra of the sermon given by Pindola Bhāradvāja to king Udayana, T 1690, k. 1, p. 786b11; Traité, T 1509, k. 20, p. 211a5; l. 43, p. 375a14.

The Ratnakūṭa (T 310, k. 90, p. 519a7-8) explains the comparison: It is as if one were fooling a little child with an empty fist; one opens one’s hand, but there is nothing in the empty fist; then the child weeps and cries.
2. The faculty of exertion (vīryendriya). – Day and night (aharniśam), the bodhisattva always develops exertion (vīrya). He rejects the five obstacles (pañcanivarāṇa) and protects the five faculties (pañcendriya). He wants to find, understand, practice, read, study and hear the profound teachings (gambhīradharma) of the sūtras.

When evil bad dharmas (pāpaka akuśala dharma) have arisen, he acts so as to destroy them quickly and, if they have not arisen, he acts so as to prevent them from arising. As for the good dharmas (kuśaladharma) that have not yet arisen, he acts so that they will arise and, if they have already arisen, he acts so as to develop them. He has no fondness for dharmas that are neither good nor bad (naivakuśalānākuśaladharma).

Dedicating equal exertion to good dharmas, he advances directly and straight to the point. He develops right exertion (samyagvīrya) and, due to his concentrated mind (samāhitacitta), the latter is called the faculty of exertion (vīryendriya).

3. The faculty of mindfulness (smṛtindriya). – The bodhisattva is always attentive (smṛtimat) and reflective (saṃprajānat). Wishing to perfect generosity (dāna), morality (śīla), meditation (dhyāna), wisdom (prajñā) and deliverance (vimukti), wishing to purify bodily, vocal and mental actions (kāyavānmanaskarman), he is ever attentive and reflective in his knowledge pertaining to the arising (utpāda), disappearance (vyaya) and duration-change (sthityanyathāvā) of dharmas.

He reflects attentively [on the four noble truths] on suffering (duḥkha), its origin (samudaya), its cessation (nirvṛddha) and the path (mārga) to its cessation.

He reflects attentively and analyzes the faculties (indriya), strengths (bala), the [members] of enlightenment (sambodhyānga) and the absorptions (samāpatti), deliverance (vimukti), arising (utpāda) and cessation (nirvṛddha), entering and exit.

He reflects attentively on unborn (anuppana), non-destroyed (aniruddha), ineffective (anabhisaṃskāra) and inexpressible (anabhilāpya) dharmas in order to attain the knowledge of non-production (anutpāda-jñāna) and to realize fully the teachings of the Buddha.

He reflects attentively and prevents the concepts of the śrāvakas from being introduced.

The bodhisattva always reflects and never forgets. Thanks to these very profound (gambhīra), pure (viśuddha) dharmas acquired by meditation and practice (bhāvanācāra-prāpta), he attains this sovereign attentiveness (vibhūtasmrīti) called the faculty of mindfulness (smṛtindriya).

4. The faculty of concentration (samādhindriya). – Grasping well the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of concentration, the bodhisattva is able to produce all kinds of dhyānas and absorptions (samāpatti).

He knows clearly the gates of concentration (samādhimukha); he knows how to enter into concentration (samādhipraveśa), how to remain in concentration (samādhivihāra) and how to come out of concentration (samādhivyuthāna).
He is not attached to concentration (na samādham abhinivīṣate), does not savor it (nāśvate) and does not emphasize it (nāśrayate). He knows well the object (ālambana) of the concentrations and the destruction of this object.

He also knows the objectless concentration (anālambanasamādhī). Without conforming to the words of another (paravacana), without conforming to any [204c] particular absorption, he practices his mastery (vasita) of it and enters it and comes out of it without obstacle.

That is what is called the faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya).

5. The faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya). - In order to exhaust suffering (duḥkha), the bodhisattva is endowed with a noble wisdom (āryaprajñāsampanna), a wisdom that eliminates the dharmanas and realizes nirvāṇa. With this wisdom, the bodhisattva considers the impermanence (anityatā) of the threefold world (traiḍhātuka) burning with the fire of the three rottennesses and the three poisons (viṣayatraya).

When this consideration is finished, the bodhisattva is detached from the threefold world by means of his power of wisdom (the power of wisdom (prajñābala) the bodhisattva accumulates innumerable qualities (gūna) and, without hesitation or difficulty, penetrates directly into the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmanas. He has neither grief (daurmanasya) in samsāra nor joy (saumansaya) in nirvāṇa.

The possession of this sovereign wisdom (vibhūtaprajñā) is what is called the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya).

---

156 In other words, he avoids the concentrations associated with enjoyment (āsvādanamāsārakīrtta) in order to practice only the pure (śuddhaka) concentrations without defilements (anāśrava): see above, p. 1027F.

157 On the object of the dhyānas and samāpattis, see p. 1040F and, for further details, Kośa, VIII, p. 176-177.

158 An implicit reference to the Fire Sermon spoken by the Buddha at Gayaśīrṣa (Vinaya, I, p. 34; Catuspariṣad, p. 322): Sarvaṃ bhikṣava ādīptam... Kenādīptam? Rāgāgninā dveṣāgninā mohāgninādīptam. As for the three (or five?) decays (chouai), they have been discussed above, p. 834F.

159 The expression in the Sanskrit texts is usually ādīptasirāścaīlopana ‘like someone whose head or clothes are on fire’: cf. Gaṇḍavyūha, p. 493, l. 2; Śīkṣasamuccaya, p. 54, l. 3-4; Mahāvyutpatti, no. 1802. The Pāli texts resort preferentially to a periphrasis: Seyyathanhi bhikkhave ādittacelo vā āditassīso vā, tass’ eva cełasa vā sīsasa vā nibbāpanna adhimattani chandañ ca vāyānañ ca ussāhañ ca ussāhiñ ca appatiñvāñiñ ca satiñ ca sampapajñāñiñ caKarayya: cf. Anguttara, II, p. 93; III, p. 307; IV, p. 320; V, p. 98; Samyutta, V, p. 440.
The bodhisattva in possession of the five faculties understands well (prajānāti) the various faculties of beings.

He understands the faculties of beings with desire (sarāga) or without desire (vītarāga), hateful (sadvesa) or without hatred (vītadvesa), stupid (samoha) or without stupidity (vītramoha).

He understands the faculties of beings destined to fall into the bad destinies (durgati), destined to be reborn among humans (manusya) or destined to be reborn among the gods (deva).

He understands the faculties of beings of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) or of sharp faculties (tiṃkṣṇendriya). He understands beings of superior (agra), medium (madhya) or lower (avara) faculties.

He understands the faculties of guilty (sāpattika) or faultless (anāpattika) beings, rebellious or docile.

He understands the faculties of beings who are always reborn in the desire realm (kāmadhātu), in the form realm (rūpadhātu) or in the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu).

He understands the faculties of beings predestined to salvation (samyaktvaniyata), predestined to ruin (mithyātvaniyata) or without predestination (aniyata).

He understands the faculties of careless or impetuous people. He understands the faculties of beings bearing the burden (bhārasaha).

He understands the faculties of miserly (matsarin) or generous (tyāgavat) people, respectful people or disrespectful people, people of pure morality (viśuddhasīla) or of impure morality (aviśuddhasīla), angry (vyāpanna) or patient (kṣamin) people, energetic (vīryavat) or lazy (kusīda) people, people of distracted mind.

Whereas the śrāvaka practices the bodhipakṣikas in his own interest, the bodhisattva practices them for the benefit of others: this is an essential difference.


These are the three categories of beings (sattvarāśi): 1) samyaktvaniyatarāśi, those who have entered onto the Path and will quickly reach nirvāṇa; 2) mithyāniyatarāśi, those who, having committed grave sins, will definitely go to the bad destinies and who, coming out of these bad destinies, will go into the middle rāśi; 3) aniyatarāśi, those who do not belong to either the first or the second rāśi and may enter either the first or the second.

These three rāśi are mentioned in Dīgha, III, p. 217; Tseng yī a han, T 125, k. 13, p. 614b24; k. 27, p. 698c; Kathāvatthu, II, p. 611; Dhammasaṅgani, p. 186; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 96; Mahāvastu, III, p. 318; Lalitavistara, p. 5400; Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 23, p. 384a26-27.

According to the Sukhāvativyūha, p. 44, the last two rāśi are absent in Amitābha’s paradise.

In the later sources, the system of the rāśi is mixed with that of the gotras ‘race, family’; certain eternal or acquired mental dispositions that cause a person to obtain nirvāṇa: on this subject, see Vimalakīrti, appendix, p. 425-430.

On the ‘burden’, see above, p. 215-216F.
mind (vikṣiptacittā) or of concentrated mind (samgrhiñacittā), stupid people (mūḍhā) or wise people (prajñāvat), fearless (nirbhāya) or fearful (sabhāya) people, prideful people (abhimānīka) or people without pride (nirabhimāna), people of right conduct (samyakpratipanna) or of wrong conduct (mithyāpratipanna), controlling their senses (guptendriya) or not controlling their senses.

He understands the faculties of people who seek the path of the śrāvakas, that of the pratyekabuddhas, or that of the Buddhas.

In this knowledge of the faculties of beings, the bodhisattva shows his mastery (vaṣīta), skillfulness (upāya) and power (bala): this is what is called the faculty of wisdom (jñānendriya).

V. THE FIVE POWERS

When the bodhisattva has progressed in the practice of the five faculties (indriya), he is able to destroy the afflictions (kleśa), save beings and acquire the [205a] conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadarmaksānti): this is what is called the five powers or strengths (bala).

Moreover, as the god Māra and heretics (tīrthika) are unable to destroy them, they are called powers or strengths.

VI. THE SEVEN FACTORS OF ENLIGHTENMENT

Here are the seven factors of enlightenment (sambodhyāṅga):

1. The bodhisattva no longer thinks about or reflects on any dharma: this is the factor of enlightenment called attentiveness (smṛtisambodhyāṅga).

2. Looking among the dharmas for good (kuśala), bad (akuśala) or neutral dharmas (avyākṛta), the bodhisattva finds nothing: this is the factor of enlightenment called discernment of dharmas (dharmapravicayāsambojñya).

3. Without entering into the threefold world (traidhātuka), the bodhisattva reduces the characteristic traits (lakṣaṇa) of all worlds into pieces: this is the factor of enlightenment called exertion (vīryasambodhyāṅga).

4. In regard to all the formations (samskāra), the bodhisattva produces no attachment (abhiniveśa) or pleasure (sukha) and, as all signs of grief (daurmanasya) and joy (prīti) have been overcome in him, this is the factor of enlightenment called joy (prītisambodhyāṅga).

5. In all dharmas, there is nothing but an object of mind (cittālambana): this is the factor of enlightenment called relaxation (praśrabdhisambodhyāṅga).
6. The bodhisattva knows that all dharmas, which have as their characteristic being always concentrated (sadāsamāhita), are not [sometimes] scattered (vikṣipta) and [sometimes] concentrated (samāhita): this is the factor of enlightenment called concentration (samādhisaṃbodhyaṅga).

7. The bodhisattva is not attached to any dharma (na dhamam abhiniviśate), does not rest there (nāśrayate) and no longer sees them (na paśyati): this mind of equanimity (upekṣaḥcitta) is the factor of enlightenment called equanimity (upekṣaṣaṃbodhyaṅga).

This is how the bodhisattva considers the seven factors of enlightenment as empty (śūnya).

Question. – Why explain these seven factors of enlightenment so briefly (saṃkṣepeṇa)?

Answer. – Of these seven factors of enlightenment, [four, namely] attentiveness (smṛti), wisdom (prajñā), exertion (vīrya) and concentration (samādhi) have been fully explained above (p. 1149F). Now we must speak of the three others.

1. The bodhisattva who practices the factor of enlightenment called joy (prītiṣaṃbodhyaṅga) considers this joy as unreal (abhūta). Why? This joy arises from causes and conditions (hetupratyayā). These are the formations (saṃskāra), conditioned dharmas (read: yeou tso fa: saṃskṛtadharma), impermanent (anītya) dharmas that produce (read cheng in place of k’a) attachment (abhiniveśa). But if the thing that produces attachment is impermanent (anītyalakṣaṇa), once it has disappeared, it arouses grief (daurmanasya). Worldly people (prthagjana) are attached to it out of error (viparyāsa), but if they know that dharmas are empty of reality (tattvaśūnya), they correct themselves at once and say: “I made a mistake (bhṛanti).”

It is like a man in the darkness (andhakāra) tormented by hunger and thirst (kṣutpipāsāpiḍita) who has swallowed impure things; then, by the light of day, he re-examines the things and finally understands his mistake.

Considering things in this way, the bodhisattva puts his joy (prīti) into real wisdom (bhūtaprajñā): this is true joy (bhūtaprīti).

2. Having acquired this true joy, first he eliminates unwholesome physical states (kāyaḍaśṭhulya), then he eliminates unwholesome mental states (cittadāśṭhulya), and finally he eliminates all characteristics of dharmas (dharmaḷaksana). Thus he acquires well-being that fills the body and the mind and that constitutes the factor of enlightenment called relaxation (prāśrabdhisambodhyaṅga).

3. Since he has attained joy (prīti) and relaxation (prāśrabdhi), he disregards any form of examination (anupāṣyanā), namely, examination of impermanence (anītyānupāṣyanā), examination of suffering (duḥkhānupāṣyanā), examination of emptiness and non-self (śūnyānāmānupāṣyanā), examination of arising and cessation (utpādanirodhaṇupāṣyanā), examination of existence (sadanupāṣyanā), examination of non-existence (asadanupāṣyanā), examination of what is neither existence nor non-existence (naivasanānāsadanupāṣyanā). The bodhisattva abandons all futile proliferation (prapaṇca) of this kind completely. Why? Because absence of nature, absence of object, non-activity, absence of futile discursiveness, perpetual pacification are the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas.
If the bodhisattva did not practice this equanimity (upekṣā), there would still be arguments (raṇa). Indeed, those who hold the existent (sat) to be true consider the non-existent to be false (moha); those who hold the non-existent (asat) to be true consider the existent (sat) to be false; and those who hold to be true what is neither existent nor non-existent (naivasannāsat) consider as false that which is both existent and non-existent (sadasat). They like what they believe to be true (satya), they hate what they believe to be false (moha), and this gives rise to grief (daurmanasya) and joy (prīti). Why not disregard all that?

When the bodhisattva has attained this [real] joy (prīti), this relaxation (prāśrabdhi) and this equanimity (upekṣā), the seven factors of enlightenment are complete (paripūrṇa).

VII. THE EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE PATH

As for the eight members of the noble Path (āryamārgāṅga), [the first] or right view (samyagdrṣṭī), [the sixth] or right effort (samyagyāyāma), [the seventh] or right mindfulness (samyaksmṛti) and [the eighth] or right concentration (samyaksamādhi) have already been explained above (p. 1181F). Now we must speak of right thought (samyaksamkalpa).

[Second member]: right thought (samyaksamkalpa). – In the course of right thinking, the bodhisattva who is established in the emptiness (śunya) and non-existence (anupalabdhi) of dharms examines the characteristics of right thought (samyaksamkalpalakṣaṇa). He knows that all thoughts (saṃkalpa) are false conceptions (mithyāsaṃkalpa), up to and including those concerning nirvāṇa and the Buddha. Why? The cessation of all kinds of conceptions (sarvasaṃkalpaprabhedhaniruddha) is called right thought. All types of conceptions come from falsities, errors (bhrānti) and mistakes (viparyāsa): this is why they differ. But the characteristics of the conceptions are all non-existent, and the bodhisattva established in this right thinking (samyaksamkalpa) no longer sees what is correct (samyak) and what is wrong (mithyā) and bypasses (atikṛṣṇati) all kinds of thinking (sarvasaṃkalpaprabheda): this is right thinking. For him, all types of conceptions are the same (sama) and, because they are the same, his mind does not become attached to them. This is what is called the right thinking of the bodhisattva.

[Third member]: right speech (samyagvāc). – The bodhisattva knows that all words (vāc) come from error (bhrānti), falsities, mistakes (viparyāsa), imaginings that seize the characteristics (nimittodgraṇavikāla). Then the bodhisattva reflects in this way: In speech, the characteristics (lakṣana) of speech do not exist and all vocal actions (vākcarman) have ceased (niruddha). Understanding the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of words is right speech (samyagvāc).

Words come from nowhere and, once they have ceased, they go nowhere. The bodhisattva who is practicing right speech, in everything he says, holds to the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa). Thus the sūtras say that, established in right speech, the bodhisattva is able to accomplish pure vocal action
(pariśuddhavākcarman). Understanding the true nature of all words, the bodhisattva, whatever he may say, does not fall into unwholesome words (mithyāvāc).164

[Fourth member]: right action (samyakkarmānta). – The bodhisattva knows that all actions (karman) are false, erroneous, unreal, having non-activity as nature (anabhisāmskāralakṣaṇa). Why? Because there is not a single action that possesses definite nature.

Question. – If all actions are empty (śūnya), why did the Buddha say that generosity (dāna), etc., is a good action (kusālakarman), murder (prāṇātipāta), etc., a bad action (akusālakarman), and other things, gestures (ceṣṭā), are neutral actions (avyākṛtakarman)?165

Answer. – If there is not even one single kind of action, why should there be three? How is that? When the time of the movement has already been accomplished (gamanakāle gate), there is no motor activity (gamikriyā). When the time of the movement has not yet been accomplished (agate, i.e., future), there is no motor activity either. When the time of the movement is present (pratuyutpanna), there is no motor activity either.166

Question. – In the seat of the movement already accomplished (gate sthāne) there can be neither [motor activity] nor can there be any motor activity in the seat of the movement not yet accomplished (agate sthāne); but in the seat of present movement (gamyamāne sthāne), there must be movement.167

Answer. – In the seat of present movement there is no movement. Why? Because the seat of present movement (gamyamāna) does not exist (nopalabhyate) without a motor activity (gamikriyā). If the seat of the present movement could exist without a motor activity then it ought to involve movement; but that is not the case. Without a present seat of movement, there is no motor activity and without motor activity there is no seat of present movement. Since this is a case of co-existent conditions (sahabhūprataya), we

164 See the paragraph dedicated to the eloquence of the bodhisattva in the Śūraṅgamasaṃādhi, p. 188-189.
166 Almost textual citation from Madh. kārikā, II, 1 (p. 92):
Gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ naiva gamyate /
gatāgatavinirmuktāṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate //
Transl. – J. May, p. 52: “Accomplished movement does not involve movement; no more does unaccomplished movement. A present movement independent of the other two is unintelligible.”
167 Objection formulated in Madh. kārikām, II, 2 (p.93):
Ceṣṭā yattra gatis tatra gamyamāne ca sā yathāḥ /
na gate nāgata ceṣṭā ganyamāne gatis tataḥ //
Transl. J. May, p. 55: “Since there is movement wherever there is gesture and there is gesture in present movement, in contrast to movements [already] accomplished and not [yet] accomplished, there is thus movement in present movement.”
cannot say that that the seat of present movement involves movement (gamyānām gamyate iti nopadyate).

Furthermore, if the seat of present movement had motor activity (gamikriyā), there should be a seat of present movement outside of the motor [205c] activity, and there should be a motor activity outside of the seat of present movement. 168

Question. – If that is so, what would be the error (doṣa)?169

Answer. – There would be two motor activities (gamikriyā) at the same time (samakāla) and, if there were two motor activities, there would be two agents of movement (dvau gantārau). Why? Because movement does not exist without an agent of movement (gantāraṃ hi tiraskṛtya gamanāṃ nopapadyate). Without agent (gantr), the seat of the present movement (gamyāna) does not exist and, since there is no seat of the present movement, neither is there any agent of movement (gantar).170 Furthermore, this non-agent itself does not move either (agantā naiva gacchati) and, outside of agent and non-agent, there cannot be a ‘third’ to move (nāsty anyo gantur agantuś ca kasaścit trīyō gaccheta).171

168 The answer to the objection is a paraphrase of Madh, kārikā, II, 3-4 (p. 94-95):

Gamyānāsya gamanāṃ kathāṃ nāipapatsyate /
gamyānāṃ vigamanāṃ yadā naivopapadyate //
Gamyānāsya gamanāṃ yasya tasya prasajyate /
ṛte gater gamyānāṃ hi gamyate //

Transl. J. May, p. 55-57: “How will movement be applied [as predicated] to present movement, since a present movment without [inherent] movement is completely irrational? – He for whom present movement possesses movement incurs the necessary consequence of a present movement without [inherent] movement: indeed, present movement involves movement.”

169 If the present movement were distinct from the inherent movement.

170 Madh. kārikā, II, 5-7 (p. 95-97):

Gamyānāsya gamane prasakte gamanadvayam /
yena tad gamyānāṃ ca yac cātra gamanāṃ punah //
Dvau gantārau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye /
gantāraṃ hi tiraskṛtya gamanāṃ nopapadyate //
Gantāraṃ cet tiraskṛtya gamanāṃ nopapadyate /
gamane ‘sati gantātha kuta eva bhaviṣyati //

Transl. J. May, p. 58-60: “ If the present movement possesses movement, the existence of two movements will result: one by which it is the present movement, the other contained in this [present movement]. – The necessary consequence of twofold movement involves that of a twofold agent of movement. Indeed, without agent, movement is illogical. – If the movement without agent of movement is illogical, how would the agent exist in turn in the absence of the movement?”

171 Madh. kārikā, II, 8 (p. 97):

Gantā na gacchati tāvad agantā naiva gacchati /
anyo gantur agantuś ca kas trīyō gacchati //
Question. – It is right that the non-agent does not move (agantā na gacchatī yujyate). But why does the agent not move?

Answer. – Without motor activity, the agent does not exist (gamikriyāṃ tiraskṛtya, gantā nopapadyate), and without agent, motor does not exist (gantāraṃ tiraskṛtya, gamikriyā nopapadyate).

This emptiness of all action (sarvakarmaśūnyatā) is called right action (samyakkarmānta). The bodhisattvas who penetrate into the equality of all actions (sarvakarmasamatā) do not consider bad action (mithyākarman) as bad and do not consider right action (samyakkarmānta) as good (kusala). Without activity (anabhisaṃskāra), they do not perform right actions and they do not commit bad actions. That is true wisdom (bhūtraprajñā); that is right action.

Moreover, among the dharmas, none is right (samyak) and none is wrong (mithyā). The bodhisattvas know actions in accordance with the truth and, knowing in accordance with the truth, they do not undertake anything and do not stop anything. Such wise people always have right actions and never have bad actions. In the bodhisatta this is what is called right action (samyakkarmānta).

[Fifth member]: right livelihood (samyagājīva). – All foods (bhojana), all means of subsistence (jīvitaparīśkāra) are right (samyak) and are not bad (mithyā). Established in a knowledge free of futile proliferation (nisprapañcācañāna), the bodhisattva does not choose right livelihood (samyagājīva) and does not reject wrong livelihood (mithyājīva). He does not depend on either the right law (samyagdharma) or the wrong law (mithyādharma), but he remains always in pure knowledge (viśuddhajñāna). Penetrating thus into right living which is equality (samatā), he does not see life and does not see non-life. To practice this true wisdom (bhūtraprajñā) is what is called right livelihood (samyagājīva) [in the bodhisatta].

The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who conceives the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (saptatrimśad bodhipaññakadharma) in this way surpasses the levels (bhūmi) of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, penetrates into the state of bodhisattva (bodhisattvapiṇīyāma) and gradually (krameṇa) realizes the knowledge of things in all their aspects (sarvākārañjatā).

Transl. J. May, p. 60: “The agent of movement does not move; neither does the agent; and what ‘third’ other than agent and non-agent would be able to move?”

172 Madh. kārikā, II, 9 (p. 98):

Gantā tāvat gacchatī katham evapapatsyate /
gamanena vinā gantā yadā naivopapadyate //

Transl. – The objection: “The agent itself, at least, moves”, is not logical whereas in the absence of movement, the agent is completely illogical.”

On the problem of movement closely linked with that of action, there are useful notes and a complete bibliography in J. May, Candrākriti, p. 51-77.

173 Defined fully above, p. 640-642F.
CHAPTER XXXII: THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS AND THE FOUR TRANCES

First Section THE EIGHT CLASSES OF SUPPLEMENTARY DHARMAS (p. 1209F)

PRELIMINARY NOTE

The thirty-seven auxiliaries (bodhipāṣikadharmas) are not the only ones imposed on the bodhisattva; an infinite number of other dharmas equally conducive to the Path must also be completely fulfilled (paripūritavya) or cultivated (bhāvitavya) by him.

Having mentioned the seven classes of bodhipāṣikas, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra is now going to point out eight new classes of dharmas conducive to the Path and the Traité will study them in detail in the next three chapters.

Chapter XXXII will deal with the first two groups: the three meditative stabilizations (samādhi) and the four trances (dhyāna).

Chapter XXXIII will deal with the third and fourth group: the four immeasurables (apramāṇa) and the four formless absorptions (ārūpyasamāpatti).

Chapter XXXIV will deal with the next four groups: the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the eight spheres of mastery (abhibhūyatana), the ten spheres of totality (kṛṣṇāyatana) and the nine successive absorptions (anupūrvasamāpatti).

Except for the three meditative stabilizations (samādhi) which, as gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha), constitute the goal of the Path, the other classes are lower than the seven classes of bodhipāṣikas discussed in the preceding chapter. In general, it may be said that they prepare for and facilitate the practice of the bodhipāṣikas.

From the Abhidharma point of view, the seven classes of bodhipāṣikas have an objective value in that they are based on the fourth noble truth, that of the Path, and in that they share its efficacy. On the other hand, except for the three meditative stabilizations, the classes of supplementary dharmas in question in the following are subjective practices having no other purpose than the relaxing of the ascetic's mind and making it capable of traveling on the Path.
Śūtra. — Question. — After the thirty-seven auxiliaries (pakṣa), why does [the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra] still speak of these eight classes of dharmas?

Answer. —

1. [The samādhis]. — The thirty-seven auxiliaries are the path (mārga) leading to nirvāṇa. When one follows this path, one reaches the city of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇagara). The city of nirvāṇa has three gates (dvāra), emptiness (śūnyatā), signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apranihita). Thus, after having spoken about the path [in chapter XXXI], it is necessary to speak of the gates that lead into it.

2. [Dhyānas and ārūpyasamāpattis]. — The four trances (dhyāna), etc., are dharmas helping to open these gates.

Moreover, the thirty-seven auxiliaries are higher and admirable things, but the mind is distracted (vikṣipta) in the desire realm (kāmadhātu); then on what levels (bhūmi) and on what means (upāya) will the yogin depend in order to obtain them? He will depend on the trances (dhyāna) of the form realm (rupadhātu) and on the absorptions (samāpatti) of the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu).

3. [Apramāṇas, vimokṣas, abhībhāvyatas, navānūpārvavasamāpattis and kṛtsnāyatanas]. — In the four immeasurables (apramāṇa), the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the eight spheres of mastery (abhībhāvyata), the nine successive absorptions (anupārvavārasamāpatti) and the ten spheres of totality (kṛtsnāyatanas), the yogin is testing his mind to see whether it is flexible (mṛdu), powerful (vibhu) and docile (yatheaṣṭa). It

174 These eight classes of supplementary dharmas must be ‘completely fulfilled’ (pūrayitavya) according to the Śatasāhasrikā, or ‘cultivated’ (bhāvitavya) according to the Pañcaviṃśati, but they cannot be ‘realized’ (sāksātkaravya) by the bodhisattva, for then they would contribute to ushering him into nirvāṇa straight away, preventing him therefore from continuing his salvific activity in saṃsāra.
is like the nomad (sārthavāha) who tests his horse (aśva) to see whether it is supple and docile and who, only after that, goes into battle.

It is the same for the ten spheres of totality: the yogin contemplates (anupaśyati) and seizes (udgrhnāti) a blue color (nīlavarna), big (apramāṇa) or small (parīta); then he looks at objects wanting them to be all blue, or else all yellow (piṇa), all red (lohita), all white (avadāta).

Furthermore, in the eight spheres of mastery (abhīhvāyatana), he rules as sovereign (abhībhu) over objects (ālambana).

In the first and the last liberation (vimokṣa), he considers the body as disgusting (aśubha), but in the third liberation, on the other hand, he considers it as fine (āsābha).

In the four immeasurables (apramāṇa), by means of loving-kindness (maitrī), he sees all beings as happy (sukhita); by means of compassion, he sees (karunā) all beings as suffering (duḥkhita); by means of joy (muditā), he sees all beings as rejoicing (mudita); then, with equanimity (upekṣā), setting aside the [preceding] three feelings, he sees beings quite simply without feeling aversion (pratigha) or affection (anunaya) for them.

[Subjective or objective consideration]. – Furthermore, there are two types of consideration (pratyaveksā): i) the subjective consideration (adhimutipratyaveksā); ii) the objective consideration (bhūtapratyaveksā).

The objective consideration is the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipāśikadharma). But as this objective consideration is difficult to acquire (durlabha), it is necessary to follow it up with the subjective consideration. The mind, in the course of the latter,176 becomes supple and so it becomes easy to obtain the objective consideration. By using the objective consideration, the three gates of nirvāṇa are successfully opened.

Second Section THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS (p. 1213F)

PRELIMINARY NOTE

Here the Traité returns to a subject already touched upon above, p. 321-323F. It concerns the three meditative stabilizations on emptiness (śūnyatā), signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apraṇihita).

The canonical sources present them under various names:

175 Or more correctly, ‘wants to see’, for it is a matter of purely subjective considerations serving to purify the ascetic’s mind, but not exerting any influence on the happiness or misfortune of beings.

176 In the course of the subjective consideration relating to the seven classes of supplementary dharmas.
1. The three *samādhis*, or concentrations: Vinaya, III, p. 93; Dīgha, III, p. 219; Saṅyutta, IV, p. 360; Anguttara, I, p. 299; Tch’ang-a-han, T 1, k. 8, p. 50b1-2; k. 9, p. 53a23-24; k. 10, p. 59c5-6; Tseng-yi-a-han, T 125, k. 16, p. 630b4; k. 39, p. 761a5-6.


3. The three *sparśas* or contacts which the ascetic experiences on coming out of the absorption of cessation: Majjhima, I, p. 302.

4. For at least two of them, the *cetovimukti* or liberations of mind: Majjhima, I, p. 297; Saṅyutta, IV, p. 296; Tsa-a-han, T 99, k. 21, p. 149c13-14. Their importance cannot be overestimated: they are the dharmas to be cultivated in order to understand and destroy the three poisons of *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* (Anguttara, I, p. 299); they are the path of the *asamśkṛta* or of nirvāṇa (Saṅyutta, IV, p. 360. 303; Tch’ang-a-han, T 1, k. 10, p. 50c5-6), the gates of nirvāṇa (Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 136, l. 13).

But satisfactory definitions are rare in the early sources. The clearest are in the Ekottara (Tseng-yi a-han, T 125, k. 16, p. 630b), the original Sanskrit of which is reproduced in the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 208 (cf. T 223, k. 5, p. 254c14-18) and Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1440 (cf. T 220, k. 415, p. 80a18-28): *Katame trayah samaādhayah. śūnyatānimitāpranihitah ... ayam ucyate ‘pranihitasamādhiḥ.*

Transl. – What are the three concentrations? Those of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness. What is the concentration of emptiness? It is the position of a mind that considers all dharmas as empty of inherent nature, the gate of liberation “Emptiness”.

What is the concentration of signlessness? It is the position of a mind that considers all dharmas as being without characteristics, the gate of liberation “Signlessness”.

What is the concentration of wishlessness? It is the position of a mind that considers all dharmas as being unworthy of being considered, the gate of liberation “Wishlessness”. – Var. – It is the position of a mind that makes no effort (or no longer has any contention) by saying to itself that all dharmas are unworthy of it.

The Pāli Abhidhamma gives only a relatively modest place to the three *samādhis* (cf. Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 35, 48; Dhammadānaṅga, p. 70-73; Atthasālinī, p. 223; Nettippakaraṇa, p. 90. 119, 126; Milinda, p. 413; Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 564-565).

On the other hand, the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas gives them a important role. Among the numerous sources, there are Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 104, p. 538a-541c), Abhidharmāṇḍita (T 1553, k. 2, p. 975c1-9); Reconstruction by bhikṣu Sastrī, p. 90), Kośa (VIII, p. 184-192), Abhidharmadīpā (p. 424), etc.

For these sources, the three *samādhis* are really wisdoms, but samādhis so perfect that they occur only in a concentrated mind: this is why they are called *samādhi*.

Actually, they penetrate to the very depths of the four noble truths of which they represent the sixteen aspects (ākāra): this is why, in the pure (anāsrava) state, they constitute the three gates of liberation.
(vimokṣamukha). According to whether they are mundane (laukika), i.e., still attached to the threefold world, or supramundane (lokottara), they appear in eleven or nine levels (bhūmi).

The entire system is summarized admirably by Ghoṣaka in his Abhidharmāṅkṣa (l.c.):

“The three samādhis are śūnyatā-, aprāṇihita- and ānimittasamādhi. It is because the mind takes the Anāsrava as object that they are called samādhi.

When concentrated, the ascetic sees the five aggregates of attachment (upādānaskandha) as empty (śūnya), without ‘me’ (anātman) or ‘mine’ (anāmīya): this is śūnyatāsamādhi.

Having entered into this samādhi, he no longer wishes for desire (rāga), hate (dveṣa), ignorance (moha) or rebirth (punarbhava): this is aprāṇihitasamādhi.

There is a samādhi the object (ālambana) of which is free of ten characteristics (nimitta). What are these ten? The five objects, substance, etc, (rūpadipañcaivaśaya), maleness (puruṣa), femaleness (stri), birth (jāti), old age (jarā) and impermanence (anityatā). This is ānimittasamādhi.

Śūnyatāsamādhi has two aspects (ākāra), emptiness (śūnya) and non-self (anātman).

Aprāṇihitasamādhi has ten aspects: impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), and [the eight] aspects [of the truth] of the origin (samudaya) and [of the truth] of the Path (mārga).

Ānimittasamādhi has the four aspects [of the truth] of cessation (nirodha) of suffering.”

Having described the Sārvāstivādin system objectively, the Traité will explain the Madhyamaka point of view of the three samādhis.

They must be interpreted not only from the viewpoint of the non-existence of beings (pudgalanairtmya) as do the śrāvakas, but also from the twofold non-existence of beings and of things (pudgaladharmanairtmya) as the Mahāyānists interpret them.

By practicing the three samādhis, the bodhisattva takes into account that beings and things are empty (śūnya) of inherent nature and of characteristics, that this very emptiness is not a substantial mark (nimitta) and that consequently any aspiration for the world of existence or non-existence is irrational.

The three samādhis are identical because they have as their sole object the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) which is nothing other than what is. When the śrāvakas speak of the emptiness of things, they hold it to be a real nature; on the other hand, the bodhisattva is forbidden to hypostatize this emptiness and to make a thing out of it.

The true nature of things constitutes the single object of the three samādhis, but it is not a reality; it is only a method of purifying the mind which, freed of illusions, notices that there is nothing to hypostatize, nothing to characterize and nothing to hope for. The result is that the world of becoming exists only in our imagination and that, according to the time-honored expression, samsāra is identical with nirvāṇa.
The Traité, as we shall see, in all of this and in the notes, limits itself to condensing the teachings of the old Mahāyānasūtras.

I. THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

1. Definitions of the Three Meditative Stabilizations

a. Śūnyatāsamādhi.

Question. – What is the gate of nirvāṇa called emptiness (śūnyatā)?

Answer. – It considers dharmas as empty (śūnya), without ‘me’ (atman) or ‘mine’ (ātmiya). Dharmas being the result of a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagryutpanna), there is neither agent (kāraka) nor patient [206b] (French, sic) (vedaka)\(^{177}\). This is what is called the gate of emptiness. For more on this gate of emptiness, see what has been said in the chapters on patience (p. 912-926F) and wisdom (p. 1104-1106F)

b. Ānimittasamādhi.

Knowing that there is neither ‘me’ nor ‘mine’, why do beings become attached mentally (citenābhīnaviśante) to dharmas? The yogin reflects and says to himself: “Dharmas being the outcome of causes and conditions, there is no real dharma (bhūtadharma); there are only characteristics (nimitta)\(^{178}\) and beings, seizing these characteristics, become attached to ‘me’ and ‘mine’. Now I must see if these characteristics have a perceptible reality or not.” Having examined them and considered them, he determines that they are all non-existent (amupaladbha). Whether it is a matter of the male characteristic (puruṣanimitta) or of the female characteristic (strīnimitta), the characteristics of identity or difference (ekatvānyatanimitta), etc., the reality of these characteristics does not exist (nopalabhyate). Why? Being without me and mine, all dharmas are empty and, being empty, they are neither male nor female. As for the identity and difference, these are names (nāman) valid only in the hypothesis of ‘me’ and ‘mine’. This is why male and female, identity and difference, etc., are really non-existent.

Furthermore, when the four great elements (mahābhūta) and derived matter (upādāyaarūpa) limit [the element] space (ākāśa), we say there is a body (kāya). Then, within a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī) with the inner and outer bases of consciousness (ādhyātmikaḥbhāgyatana), there

\(^{177}\) Monier Williams: vedaka = making known, announcing, proclaiming, restoring to consciousness

\(^{178}\) In this paragraph, the Traité is roughly keeping to the classical definitions mentioned above (p. 1213F seq.) which it has reproduced more faithfully on p. 322F. But in regard to the marks (nimitta) of which the Ānimitta is free, it adds to the ten traditional marks (pañcaviśaya-strī-puruṣa-trisamskratalakṣaṇaśāda) those of identity (ekatva) and difference (anyatva).
arises the consciousness element (vijñānadhatu) and the body, making use of this grouping of elements (dhatusamagri), performs various activities; it speaks, it sits down, it arises, it goes and it comes. This grouping of six elements, which is empty [of intrinsic nature], is improperly qualified as a man or improperly qualified as a woman.\textsuperscript{179}

If each of these six elements were male, there would have to be six men, for it is impossible that one equals six or that six equals one. But in the earth element (prthividhatu) [entering into the composition of the body], there is neither male nor female characteristic, and it is the same for the other elements, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness (vijñānadhatu). If these characteristics do not exist in each [of the six elements] taken separately, neither do they exist in the grouping of these six elements. Similarly, if six dogs (kukkura), taken separately, cannot give birth to a lion (simha), neither can they do so taken together, for that is not their nature.

Question. – Why would there not be male and female? Although the individuals (purusa) are not different, the parts of the body (kāyavayava) themselves differ and there are sexual distinctions.\textsuperscript{180} The body cannot exist independently of the body parts and the body parts themselves cannot exist independently of the body. If we see the foot, which is part of the body, we know that there is a whole (avayavin) called body. The body parts, foot, etc., are different from the body, and it is the body that has the male or female characteristics.

Answer. – The individual has already been refuted above (p. 736F) and I [Kumarajiva] have also refuted the characteristics (nimitta) of the body. Now I must repeat myself.

If there were a whole (avayavin) called body (kāya), all the parts of the body would exist in each part (avayava) of this body; each of the parts would exist in every part. If the body existed fully in all of the parts, the foot (pāda) would exist in the head (śiras). Why? Because in the head there is an entire body. If

\textsuperscript{179} The human being consists of six elements (dhātu) – earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness – but, whether they are taken separately or together, they do not constitute any difference in sex.

The analysis of the human being into six elements is of canonical origin: cf. Majjhima, III, p. 239: Chadhāturo ayam, bhikkhu, puriso to iti kho pan’ etam vuttaṃ. Kiñ c’etam paṭicca vuttaṃ? Paṭhadhātu āpodhātu tejodhātu vāyodhātu ākāsadhātu viñṇānadhātu.

For these six elements, see also Anguttara, I, p.176; Vibhaṅga, p. 82-85; Tch’ang a han, T 1, k. 8, p. 52a6-7; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 3, p. 435c21-22; K. 7, p. 468a27-28; k. 21, p. 562c17-19; k. 42, p. 690b27-28; k. 47, p. 723b20-21; k. 49, p. 732e28-29; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 9, p. 60c28-29 (cf. E. Waldschmidt, Das Upasenasūtra, Nach. Göttingen, 1957, No. 2, p. 38, ;. 11-12); Tsa a han, T 99, k. 17, p. 119a3; k. 37, p. 269c20-21; k. 43, p. 315b16; Tseng yi a han, Y 125, k. 29, p. 710b14-15; Pitāputrasamāna, T 320, k. 16, p. 964b21-22, the original Sanskrit of which is cited in Śiksāsamuccaya, p. 244, and Pañjikā, p. 508. – See also Madh. avatāra, p. 262 (tr. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Muséon, 1911, p. 307-308); Garbhābhratsūtra cited in Kośa, I, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{180} The problem of the whole and its parts (avayavin, avayava), which opposes the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas, is treated fully in the Kośa, III, p. 210-214.
each part of the body were in all the parts, there would be no difference between the body and its parts, the whole (avayavā) following the parts (avayavin).

Question. – If the parts of the body, the foot, etc., were different from the body, the error (doṣa) that you mention would exist. But here the parts of the body, the foot, etc., are not different from the whole, i.e., the body. Therefore there is no error.

Answer. – If the parts of the body were not different from the whole, then the head would be the foot. Why? Because both of them, as body, would not differ. [206c]

Moreover, the parts of the body are many, whereas the whole is just one. It is impossible that a multiplicity should make a unit and that a unit should make a multiplicity.

Besides, although it is true that the fruit (phala) does not exist when the cause (hetu) does not exist, it is not true that the cause does not exist when the fruit does not exist. If, [as you claim], the parts of the body are not different from the whole, the cause would not exist when the fruit does not exist. Why? Because cause and fruit would be identical.

The body does not exist (nopalabhya) whether you look for it in identity (ekatva) or in difference (anyatva) and, as the body does not exist, on what basis (sthāna) would the male or female characteristics reside? If the latter exist, they are either bodily or different from the body. But the body does not exist. If they occur in some dharma other than the body, since this other dharma is non-material (arūpa), there would be no difference between male and female. It is simply a matter of a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī) in the course of two successive existences and we speak of male and female out of mental error (viparītacitta). Thus it is said:

Lower you head or raise it up,
Bend (samīnīte) or stretch (prasārite),
Stand up (sthite), go forth (pratikrānte) or return (abhikrānte),
Look straight ahead (ālokite) or to the side (vilokite),
Speak or babble:
In all of that, there is nothing true.
It is because the wind moves the viññāna
That these activities take place.
But this viññāna is of temporary nature (ksayadharman)
And it exists no longer from one moment to the next moment.

The distinction
Between male and female
Comes from my mind.
It is out of lack of wisdom
That I see them wrongly exist,
Structures of bones tied one to another,
Without skin or flesh,
Impulses in movement,
Like a mannequin!

No reality on the inside
Outwardly called a man.
Like a foreign coin thrown into the water
Or a jungle fire devouring a bamboo forest,
Sounds issue forth out of it
As a result of a complex of causes and conditions.

For other similar characteristics, see above (p. 1095-1106F). This is the gate of signlessness (ānimittadvāra).
c. Apraṇihitasamādhi.
There is wishlessness (apraṇihita) when, having knowledge of the non-existence of characteristics, there is no longer any reaction. This is the gate of wishlessness (apraṇihitadvāra).

2. Nature of the Three Concentrations

Question. – But it is by means of wisdom that these three things contemplate śūnyatā, ānimitta and apraṇihita respectively. If these are wisdoms, why call them concentrations (samādhi)?

Answer. – If these three kinds of wisdoms were not in meditative stabilization, they would be wild wisdoms (unmattaprajñā); many people would fall into pernicious doubts (mithyāśaṅkā) and do nothing further. But when these wisdoms are in concentration, they are able to destroy all the defilements (kleśa) and find the true nature (bhūtadharma) of dharmas.

181 Or any effort (abhisamāskāra).
Furthermore, they are dharmas of the Path (mārga), different from the world and in opposition to the world (lokaviruddha). The saints (ārya) who are in these meditative stabilizations find the true nature and preach it; and this is not the language of a wild mind.

Finally, the other trances (dhyāna) and absorptions (samāpatti in which these three things do not occur, are not called meditative stabilizations (samādhi).\textsuperscript{182} Why? Because one can stray away from them, lose them and fall back into samsāra. This is what the Buddha said:

The person who observes pure morality
Is called a monk (bhikṣu).

The person who contemplates emptiness (śūnya)
Is called an ecstatic (dhyāvin).

The mindful (smrtimati), vigorous (ātāpin), energetic (vīryavat) person
Is called the real yogin.

The foremost of all happiness (sukha)
Is cutting desires (trṣṇā) and destroying madness.

Rejecting the group of the five aggregates (skandha) and the dharmas of the Path
Is eternal happiness, arriving at nirvāṇa.\textsuperscript{183}

It follows from these stanzas that the Buddha calls the concentration the three gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha). [207a]

Question. – Why are they called gates of liberation?

Answer. – When they are practiced, liberation (vimokṣa) is attained and one reaches nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning (nirupadhiśesanirvāṇa); this is why they are called gates of liberation. Nirvāṇa without residue of conditioning is true liberation for in it one finds liberation from physical and mental suffering (kāyamānasikadukhha). Nirvāṇa with residual conditioning (sopadhiśesanirvāṇa) is the gate to it

\textsuperscript{182} Among the innumerable samādhis, those of śūnyatā, etc., are the only true ones: this idea has already been developed above, p. 324-325F.

\textsuperscript{183} A new translation of two stanzas already cited above, p. 325F. These are two stanzas of the Udānavarga, XXXII, 81 and 82 of the Sanskrit edition (F. Bernhard, p. 458-459), XXXII, 78 and 79 of the Tibetan edition (H. Beckh, p. 142).

“The person who possesses the precepts is a bhikṣu; he who is [in the concentration of] emptiness is an ecstatic; he who is in constancy is a yogin; that is the happiness of extinction.

Actually the bhikṣu who endures pleasure and displeasure, whose bed and seat are isolated (prāṇtsayanāsana), who is settled in purity who is based in mindfulness (apramāda), will uproot the perverse tendency of the desire for existence.
and, although these three concentrations are not nirvāṇa [proper], they are the cause (hetu) of nirvāṇa and that is why they are called nirvāṇa. In the world, it is common usage to designate the cause by the effect and the effect by the cause.

Śūnyatā, ānimitta and apraṇihita are concentrations (samadhi) by nature (svabhāva). The mind and mental events associated with these concentrations (samādhisamprayukta-cittacaittasikadharma), bodily actions (kāyakarman) and vocal actions (vākkarman) that arise following them, the formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasamskāra) that come forth, form a complex (sāmagrī) called concentration. Thus, when the king (rājan) arrives, with him, of necessity, come the prime minister (mahāmāya) and some soldiers (sainika). Here concentration (samādhi) is like the king, wisdom (prajñā) is like the prime minister, and the other dharmas are like the soldiers. Even if these other dharmas are not mentioned, they must necessarily be present. Why? Concentration does not arise by itself; it is unable to have all the activity by itself. The other dharmas arise along with it, endure with it, perish with it, and collaborate with it in realizing the good (hita).

3. Aspects of the Three Concentrations

184 Same comparison above, p. 135F.
185 The three samādhis are the gates of liberation because they penetrate the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths. These sixteen aspects have already been considered during the preparatory path (prayogamārga) by the practice of the four roots of good ‘leading to penetration’ (nirvedhabhāgīya), heat (usmagata), etc. (cf. Kośa, VI, p. 163). But the three samādhis are alone in penetrating them completely.

The Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 104, p. 538c7-10), the Abhidharmārtha (T 1553, k. 2, p. 975c1-9; Reconstruction by bhikṣu Sastrī, p. 90); Kośa (VIII, p. 188-190) and the Abhidharmadipā (p. 424) distribute the aspects understood by the three samādhis in the following way:

Śūnyatāsamādhi perceives emptiness (śūnya) and non-self (anātman) as constituting the 3rd and 4th aspects respectively of duḥkhasatya.

Ānimittasamādhi perceives the four aspects of nirodhasatya.

Apraṇihitasamādhi perceives impermanence and suffering constituting respectively the 1st and 2nd aspect of duḥkhasatya plus the four aspects of samudayasatya plus the four aspects of mārgasatya: in all, ten aspects.

The Traité refers quite often to the theory of the sixteen aspects: cf. k. 11, p. 138a7-10 (above, p. 641F); k. 17, p. 186c28 (above, p. 1036F); k. 19, p. 200a14 and 202c24; k. 23, p. 233b2; k. 29, p. 274a22; k. 54, p. 444a15; k. 63, p. 505a17-18; k. 83, p. 641a16.

A phrase often repeated in the early scriptures (Majjhima, I, p. 435, 500; Anguttara, II, p. 128; IV, p. 422-424) may be thought of as a rough draft of the theory of the sixteen aspects: Dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābhādhato parato palokato suṇṇato anattato samanupassaṭi: “He considers the dharmas as impermanent, suffering, like a sickness, an ulcer, a dart, a misfortune, a torment, a strange object, a decay, empty and without self.” In the Pāli Abhidhamma, e.g.,
A. The meditative stabilization on emptiness (śūnyatāsamādhi) has two aspects (ākāra):

1) Because it considers (samanupaśyati) the five aggregates of attachment (pañca upādānaskandha) as having neither sameness (ekatva) nor difference (anyatva), it is ‘empty’ (śūnya).

2) Because it considers the ‘me’ (ātman) and the ‘mine’ (ātmya) as non-existent (anupalabdha), it is ‘without self’ (anātmaka).

B. The meditative stabilization of signlessness (ānimittasamādhi) has four aspects:

1) Because it considers nirvāṇa as the cessation of all types of suffering (nānāvidhadukhnirodha), it is ‘cessation’ (nirodha).

2) Because it considers it as the extinctions of the fires of the threefold poison (trīviṣa) and the other defilements (kleśa), it is ‘peace’ (śanta).

3) Because it considers it as the foremost of all dharmas, it is ‘excellent’ (pranīta).

4) Because it considers it as separated from the world (lokavisamukta), it is ‘exit’ (niṣaraṇa).

C. The meditative stabilization of wishlessness (apranihitasamādhi) has two aspects:

1) Because it considers the five aggregates of attachment (pañcapādānaskandha) as coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyayajā), it is ‘impermanent’ (anitya).

2) Because it considers them as the torments of the body and mind (kāyikamānasikaviheṭhana), it is ‘suffering’ (duḥkhya).

Next, insofar as it considers the causes (hetu) of the five skandhas of attachment (upadānaskandha), it has four more aspects:

3) Because the complex of defilements and impure actions (kleśasāsravakarmasāmagrī) produces a fruit of suffering (duḥkhaphala), it is ‘origin’ (samudaya).

4) Because the six causes (hetu) produce a fruit of suffering (duḥkhaphala), it is ‘cause’ (hetu).

5) Because the four conditions (pratyaya) produce a fruit of suffering (duḥkhaphala), it is ‘condition’ (pratyaya).

in the Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 118, there are analyses growing out of the four noble truths. But the specification of the sixteen aspects (Mahāvyut., no. 1189-1205) is an innovation of the Sarvāstivādins.

The definitions proposed by their scholars are rather different and are worthy of detailed study: the Kośa gives no less than three different explanations; the Abhidharmāṃṭa (T 1553, k. 1, p. 973a1-9; Reconstruction by bhikṣu Sastri, p. 83), the Abhidharmadīpa (p. 329), the Kośakārikābhāṣya by Saṃghabhadra (T 1563, k. 35, p. 950c27-951a12) have also their individual interpretations.

186 See above, p. 386F, 1038F.
187 See also p. 386F and 1038F.
6) Because a certain number of similar causes and conditions [follow one another] so as to produce this fruit, it is ‘stream’ (prabhava).

Finally, insofar as it considers the aggregates of detachment (anupādānakandha), it has four more aspects:

7) Because the eight members of the noble [path (āryamārga) can lead to nirvāṇa, it is ‘path’ (mārga).

8) Because [this path] is free of errors (viparyāsa), it is ‘reasonable’ or ‘practical’ (nyāya).

9) Because all saintly people (āryapudgala) make use of this path, it is ‘path’.

10) Because the defilements (kleśa) that depend on thirst (ṛṣṇāpatita) and those that depend on wrong views (dṛṣṭipatita)\(^{188}\) do not obscure this path, it is ‘definitive exit’ (nairyāṇika).

4. Distribution of the Three Concentrations in the Levels.\(^{189}\)

The three gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha) occur in nine levels (bhūmi):

1) – 4) the four trances (dhyāna),

5) the level of anāgamya [the preparatory trance of the first dhyāna]

6) the dhyānāntara [the intermediate trance, subdivision of the first dhyāna]

7) – 9) the [first] three formless (ārūpya) absorptions, because the three gates of liberation are essentially pure (anāsravasabhāva).

Some say that the three gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha) are absolutely pure (atytam anāsrava), whereas the three concentrations (samādhi) are sometimes impure (sāsrava), sometimes pure (anāsrava). For those who say this, the concentrations occur in eleven levels:

1)– 6) the six bhūmis [namely, the four dhyānas, the anāgamya and the dhyānāntara].

7) – 9) the [first] three ārūpya.

10) the desire realm (kāmādhūtu).

11) the sphere of the summit of existence (bhāvagra or 4th ārūpya).

When the three samādhis are impure (sāsrava), they are linked (baddha) to these eleven levels. When they are pure (anāsrava), they are not linked to but are associated with the organ (or dominant faculty) of

\(^{188}\) Two classes of passions already noted above, p. 424F.

\(^{189}\) In this section, the Traité proposes a distribution identical with that of the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 104, p. 539b1-2) and of the Kośa (VIII, p.187 n.1).
satisfaction (saumanasyendriya), the organ of pleasure (sukhendriya) and the organ of equanimity (upekṣendriya).  

Beginners (ādikārmika) in the practice of the three concentrations are in [207b] the desire realm (kāmadhātu), the advanced (parinispanna) are in the form realm (rūpadhātu) or the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu). See what has been set forth fully in the Abhidharma on all of those, whether they are advanced or non-advanced, practiced or non-practiced.

II. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

1. Profound Meaning of the Three Concentrations

a. Šūnyatāsamādhi.

Furthermore, there are two ways of understanding emptiness according to whether one considers all dharmas as empty of existence (sattvaśūnya) or empty of dharmas (dharmaśūnya).  

Emptiness of existence (sattvaśūnyatā) is what we have just explained [according to the Abhidharma system]. The emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnya) is the fact that all dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svalakṣaṇaśūnyatā), as the Buddha said to Subhūti:

“Form (rūpa) is empty of the nature of form (rūpavatvā), and feelings (vedanā), concepts (saṃjñā), volitional formations (saṃskāra) and consciousnesses (vijñāna) are empty of the natures of [feeling, concept, volitional formation] and consciousness.”

Question. – One can think about the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā) and the non-emptiness of things (dharmānām aśūnyatā). It is inconceivable that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svalakṣaṇaśūnya). Why? If dharmas were empty of intrinsic nature, they would be without arising (anutpanna) or cessation (aniruddha). Since there would be neither arising nor cessation, there would be no sin (āpatti) or merit (puṇya). If there is no sin or merit, why still practice on the Path?

Answer. – It is as a result of the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā) that there is sin and merit. Without this emptiness of dharmas, there would be neither sin nor merit. Why? If dharmas really had an intrinsic nature (svabhāva), they would be indestructible (avināsa), their intrinsic nature and their characteristic (lakṣaṇa) not coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyayajā). If they do come from causes and conditions, then it is only that they are formations (saṃskāra) [i.e., conditioned dharmas, saṃskṛta-dharma].

---

190 Three organs appearing in the list of 22 indriyas which will be discussed below, p. 1494F.

191 See the lengthy study dedicated to the two emptinesses above, p. 1078-1095F.

192 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 128, l. 10-12 (T 123, k. 3, p. 235a11-12; k. 9., p. 288b10; k. 16, p. 337b4; k. 21, p. 372c11-12, 337c3-4), Śatasāhasrikā, p. 554, l. 6-18: Rūpam rūpatvena śūnyam, vedanā yāvād vijñānam vijñānatvena śūnyam.
It is essential that the intrinsic nature of dharmas be conditioned (samskṛta) in order to be capable of being destroyed.

You will say that the intrinsic nature of dharmas is capable of being created (kṛta) and destroyed (niruddha) but that is not correct (ayukta). [By definition], the intrinsic nature is an unconditioned dharma (asamskṛtadharma) and exists independently of causes and conditions. Dharmas existing by themselves (svabhāvena) are without arising (anupāda) since they exist in themselves before arising. Being without arising (utpāda), they are without cessation (niruddha). Since arising and cessation do not take place, there is neither sin (āpatti) nor merit (punya). If there is no sin or merit, why still practice on the Path?

If beings had a true intrinsic nature (bhūtasvabhāva), they would be incapable of doing evil and incapable of doing good since they would be fixed (niyata) in their intrinsic nature. Such people would misunderstand the value of merit and would ruin [the law] of retribution of action (karmavipāka).

There is no nature of emptiness (śūnyatālakṣaṇa) in the emptiness of dharmas (śūnyatālakṣaṇa). It is because you assume an emptiness of dharmas and you become attached to it that you raise these objections.

---

193 Dharmas existing in themselves and by themselves would be unchanging, without arising and without cessation by definition.

194 All dharmas are empty, but emptiness does not exist: it is valid only as a method of argumentation and not at all as a philosophical principle. Here the Traité returns to a view already explained above (p. 925F, 1091F and n.) which nullifies the recent imaginings about the presence in the Madhyamaka of a negative Absolute resting on purely mystical concepts. To the bibliography on this subject, we may add J. May, Chandrārta, Introduction, p. 18-21, and my [Lamotte’s] Introduction to Vimalakīrti, p. 94-97: “Emptiness is not an entity.”

In the present passage, the Traité seems to draw inspiration from the Ratnakūṭa in the Kāśyapaparivarta, § 63-65, p. 94-97 (transl. F. Weller, p. 101 and n.) cited in the original Sanskrit with some variants in Madh. vṛttī, p. 248-249; Ratnagotravibhāga, p. 28, l. 1.11-13; Lankāvatāra, p. 146, l. 12-13: Yan na śūnyatāyā dharmān śūnyān karoti; api tu dharmā ... yasya khalu punah śūnyatataiva drṣṭis tam aham acikitsyam iti vaddmi.

Transl. – It is not by means of emptiness that dharmas are made to be empty, but dharmas are by themselves empty. It is not by means of signlessness that dharmas are made to be without characteristics, but dharmas are by themselves without characteristics. It is not by means of wishlessness that dharmas are made to be not taken into consideration, but dharmas by themselves are not to be taken into consideration. That very consideration, O Kāśyapa, is called the Middle Way, the real consideration of dharmas. Indeed, O Kāśyapa, those who, by grasping an emptiness, take refuge in emptiness, I declare them to be completely lost for my teaching. Moreover, O Kāśyapa, a view of the self as high as Sumeru is worth more than a view of emptiness in those who adhere to it wrongly. Why? Emptiness, O Kāśyapa, is the way to escape from all kinds of false views; on the other hand, the person who has this very emptiness as a belief, I declare him to be incurable. Suppose, O Kāśyapa, there is a sick man and a physician gives him medicine, but this medicine, after having eliminated all the guilty humors of this
illness, penetrates into his belly and does not come out. What do you think, O Kaśyapa; will this man be freed of his illness? – Certainly not, O Blessed One; his sickness will become greater if this medicine, having eliminated all the guilty humors, should penetrate into his belly and not come out. – The Blessed One said: In the same way, O Kaśyapa, emptiness is the means of escaping from all the wrong views; on the other hand, the person who holds this very emptiness as a belief, I declare him to be incurable.

The image of wrong view of the self ‘high as Sumeru’ and the example of the medicine not eliminated are used again in Vimalakīrti, p. 291, 339.

In the Wou chang yi king, T 669, k. 1, p. 471b8-10, the Buddha says to Ānanda: "He who produces the view of emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭi), I declare him to be incurable (acikitsya). If a person is attached to a view of the self (pudgaladṛṣṭi) as high as Sumeru, I am not surprised by that and I do not condemn him. But if a fool (abhīmānika) is attached to a view of emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭi) as minute as the sixtieth part of a single hair, that I cannot allow."

In this regard, a passage from the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 46-47, should be cited, hostile as it is toward the Mādhyamika doctrines: Idaṃ ca samdhīyāyoktaṃ Bhagavatā. Varam ihaikatyasya pudgaladṛṣṭir na tv evaikatyasya durgṛhitā .... evaṁbhūtaṃ vastu apavadāmānāḥ pranaśto bhavaty asmād dharma-vinaññāt. Transl. – “It is with this intention that the Bhagavat said: ‘The view of the self in an absolute individualist is better than emptiness wrongly understood in an absolute nihilist [in this case, a Mādhyamika]. Why? A person who believes in the self is mistaken only on [the nature of] the knowable, but does not deny the [existence] of the knowable. This is why he will not be reborn in the bad destinies; he does not criticize and does not deceive his neighbor, the believer, who is seeking to free himself from suffering, but to establish him [on the other hand] in the Dharma and the Truth; furthermore, he does not slacken in observing the rules. On the contrary, by means of emptiness completely misunderstood, the person is mistaken about the reality of the knowable and even rejects it entirely. This is why he will be reborn in the bad destinies; he destroys his neighbor, the believer, who is seeking to free himself from suffering and, further, he slackens in his observation of the rules. By rejecting reality as it is, he separates himself from our teachings.’

By thus attacking the person who misunderstands emptiness, the Bodh. bhūmi manifestly quarrels with the Mādhyamika whom it wrongly confuses with the nihilist. But the Traité has already given the answer (p. 1090-1094F): “The nihilist denies the things that he sees; the Mādhyamika-Śūnyavādin denies nothing because there is nothing and he sees nothing.” See also Madh. vṛtti, p. 159-160, with the translation and note of J. May, Candrakīrti, p. 122-124. The Bodhisamāṁbhāraśāstra (T 1660, k. 6, 539c25-28), the author of which may have been Nāgārjuna and commentator the bhikṣu Iśvara, continues the Mādhyamika position in the following way:

“We resort to emptiness in order to stamp out the great mass of ignorance (mahāvidyāskandha), but the wise man does not act by basing himself on emptiness. If he acts by basing himself on emptiness, it is in order to combat ands refute those who are difficult to convert and who profess the wrong view of the self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), for those who are prey to wrong views (drṣticarita) can escape from them only by emptiness. But those who are attached to the view of emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭyabhīvinīṣṭa) are incurable.”
The emptiness of dharmas was preached by the Buddha with the feeling of compassion (karuṇācitta) in order to cut through the fetters of thirst (tṛṣṇāsanyojana) and destroy wrong views (mithyādrṣṭi).

Furthermore, the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas destroys suffering (duḥkha): it is the true domain (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of holy individuals (āryapudgala). If the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā) had an intrinsic nature (svabhāva), [i.e., existed by itself], how could we say, in speaking of the emptiness of dharmas, that they are substantially empty? But if the emptiness of dharmas is without intrinsic nature, what objection do you have?

When we contemplate the emptiness of dharmas in the light of the twofold emptiness [of beings and of dharmas], the mind is separated from all the dharmas: we know that the world (loka) is false and deceptive like a magic show (māyā). That is the contemplation on emptiness.

b. Signlessness.

When the yogin has understood (udgrhaṇī) the empty nature (śūnyalakṣaṇa) of dharmas, he produces the fetters of pride, etc. (abhimānādisanyojana) by that very fact, and he says: “I have understood the true nature of dharmas.” It is then that he must practice the gate of signlessness (ānimittadvāra) in order to destroy his grasping onto the empty nature (śūnyanimittodgrahaṇa).

c. Wishlessness.

When the yogin gives himself up to futile proliferation (prapañca) in regard to signlessness (ānimitta), when he is about to imagine something as desirable, when he becomes attached (abhiniviśate) to

The last word in this matter remains with Śāntideva whose three well-known stanzas, IX, v. 33-35) cut through the problem:

Śūnyatāvāsanādhnād dhīyate bhāvavāsanā /
kincin nāstītī cābhyaśāt sāpi paścāt prahīyate // 33 //
Yadā na labhyate bhāvo yo nāstītī prakalpyate /
tadā nirāśrayo 'bhāvo kathāṃ tiṣṭhāna mateḥ puraḥ // 34 //
Yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ /
tadānyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati // 35 //

Transl. by L. de La Vallée Poussin. – When one assumes the idea of emptiness, when one is saturated with it, the idea of existence disappears; and later, by the habit of this mind that ‘nothing exists’, the idea of emptiness itself is eliminated.

Indeed, when one no longer perceives [as a consequence of the elimination of the idea of existence] an existence that one is able to deny, how then would the non-existence henceforth deprived of support arise to the mind?

And when neither existence nor non-existence present themselves to the mind, then the mind is pacified, no longer having any form [to affirm or deny], which are these two modes of action.

- According to Tāranātha (p. 165), Śāntideva, in the middle of stanza 35, rose up into the air and disappeared, but these words came to the ears of the monks who were able to concentrate until the end of the Bodhicaryāvatāra.
signlessness, then he must say to himself: “I am wrong. Why find characteristics, why grasp characteristics, why give myself up to futile proliferation about empty dharmas without characteristics? [207c] Now is the
time to be based in emptiness and signlessness in order to control the body (kāya), speech (vāc) and mind (manas). One should not have prāṇidhāna, ‘desire for’. One should consider this nature of wishlessness (apraṇihitalakṣaṇa) to destroy the three poisons (triviṣa). One should not be producing actions, bodily, vocal or mental. One should not be seeking rebirth in the threefold world (traiṇaka).” By reflecting in this
way, the yogin enters into apraṇihitavimokṣamukha.

2. Sameness of the Three Concentrations

These three gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha) in the Mahāyāna are one and the same thing: it is as a result of the way they are practiced that we speak of three things.195

Considering the emptiness of dharmas is called sūnyatā. When there is no place to grasp characteristics in this emptiness, this sūnyatā changes its name and is called ānimitta. When there is no place in the presence of this signlessness to experience ‘desire for’ or rebirth in the threefold world, this ānimitta changes its name and is called apraṇihita.

It is like a city with three gates. A single person cannot simultaneously enter by the three gates. If he enters, it is by going through one single gate.

Here the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas is the City of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇagara). This City has three gates, Śūnyatā, Ānimitta and Apraṇihita.

---

195 However, even in the Lesser Vehicle, there was a suspicion of the identity of three samādhis also called vimokṣamukha and cetovimukti. On this subject, see Saṃyutta, IV, p. 296-297; Ts' an han, T 99, k. 21, p. 149c: Ya cāyaṁ āvuso appamāṇa cetovimutti vā ca ākiñcaṇṇa cetovimutti ... ekaṭṭhā, byañjanam eva nānaṁ.

Transl. – “In regard to the mind-liberations called Immeasurable, Nothing-at-all, Emptiness and Signlessness respectively, there is, O venerable One, a way of teaching in which these dharmas are at the same time of different meaning and of different words, and there is also a way of teaching according to which these dharmas are of the same meaning and different words.”

Developing the second point, the text explains that the Immeasurable, the Nothing-at-all, the Emptiness and the Signlessness are alike empty of desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and ignorance (moha), the three bad roots (akusalamūla) that create standards (pramāṇakaṇa) [Fr., measures, p. 1230F, n.] constitute obstructions (kiṃcana) and produce signs (nimittakaṇa). The result is that in their unchangeable (akopya) form, the four mind-liberations are one and the same thing under different names.

– For detail see translation and notes of I. B. Horner, Middle Length Sayings, p. 358, 260.
If a person enters the śūnyatā gate, does not hypostatize this śūnyatā and no longer grasps at characteristics (nimitta), this person penetrates directly [into the City of nirvāṇa] and, with his end attained, has no need of the other gates.

But if he enters the śūnyatā gate, grasps at its characteristic and hypostatizes śūnyatā, the śūnyatā is not a gate for this person: the path of entry is closed to him. And so in order to avoid the characteristic of śūnyatā, he makes use of the ānimitta gate.

If his mind becomes attached to the characteristics of ānimitta and he gives himself up to futile chatter (prapañca), then he stops grasping the characteristics of ānimitta and goes through the apraṇihita gate.

3. Single Object of the Three Concentrations

In the system of the Abhidharma, the emptiness gate of liberation (śūyatāvimokṣamukha) has as its object (ālambate) the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya) and comprises (saṃgrhnati) the five skandhas.\(^\text{196}\) The signlessness gate of liberation (ānimittavimokṣamukha) has as its object a single dharma, the pratisamkhyaṇirodha [or disjunction from impure dharmas obtained by understanding the truths].\(^\text{197}\) The wishlessness gate of liberation (apraṇihitavimokṣamukha) has as its object three truths [a part of the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatyā), the truth of the origin of suffering (samudayasatyā) and the truth of the cessation of suffering (niruddhasatyā)]; it comprises five aggregates (skandha).

In the Mahāyāna, these three gates of liberation (vimokṣamukha) pertain to the true nature (bhūtalakṣana) of dharmas. By means of these three gates of liberation, the ascetic sees that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are the same Why? Because nirvāṇa is empty (śūnya), without characteristics (ānimitta), not worthy of being taken into consideration (apraṇihita), and saṃsāra likewise.

Question. – If the Sūtra says that nirvāṇa has only one gate,\(^\text{198}\) why is it a matter of three gates here?

Answer. – I have already said above that, although the dharma is single, its meaning (artha) is threefold.

Furthermore, beings to be converted (vineya) are of three kinds: those who abound in craving (trṣṇābahu), those who abound in wrong views (dṛṣṭibahu) and those in whom craving and wrong views are equal.

To those who abound in wrong views, the śūyatāvimokṣamukha is preached. In this way they will see that all dharmas are impermanent (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), the result of causes and conditions

\(^{196}\) Whoever enters into samādhi necessarily possesses the four formless aggregates depending on mind and mental events, namely, saṃjñā, vedanā, saṃskāra and viññāna, plus the ‘discipline (saṃvara) of concentration’ which is rūpa. Cf. Kośa, VI, p. 107, 170; VIII, p. 128 and n. 4.

\(^{197}\) For more details, see Kośa, VIII, p. 190.

\(^{198}\) The single gate of Immortality (ekam amatadvāram) mentioned in the Sūtras: Majjhima, I, p. 353; Aṅguttara, V, p. 346.
(hetupratyayaja), have no intrinsic nature (svabhāva); not having intrinsic nature, they are empty (śūnya).
By means of this emptiness, wrong views (dṛṣṭi) are stopped.

To those who abound in craving, the apraṇihitavimokṣamukha is preached. In this way they will see that all dharmas are impermanent, suffering, the result of causes and conditions. Having seen in this way, they will be mentally detached from thirst and will enter into the Path.

To those in whom craving and wrong views are balanced, the ānimittavimokṣamukha is preached. Learning that the characteristics of male and female do not exist, they will cut through craving. Learning that the characteristics of sameness (ekatva) and difference (anyata) do not exist, they will cut through wrong views.

Sometimes the Buddha preaches two gates of liberation at the same time, sometimes he preaches three at the same time. Since the bodhisattvas must [208a] always exert themselves in knowing all the paths, he preaches the three gates to them.

We could say yet other things, but the question of the three gates of liberation is treated here in summary (saṃkṣepena).

Third section THE FOUR TRANCES (p. 1233F)

I. THE FOUR TRANCES ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

The four dhyānas are of two types: i) śuddhaka, pure in the mundane order of purity; ii) anāsrava, pure in the supramundane order of purity.¹⁹⁹

What is called dhyāna śuddhaka? The five impure but good aggregates (sāsravakūśala).²⁰⁰

What is called dhyāna anāsrava? The five pure aggregates (anāsrava).²⁰¹

---

¹⁹⁹ See above, p.1027F and n. 3; 1038F; 1042F and n. 4. Cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 144-146.
²⁰⁰ Whoever enters into dhyāna, i.e., possesses the concentration called dhyāna, necessarily possesses, in addition to mind and mental events (four skandhas), the discipline (samvara) of dhyāna which is rūpa: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 128 and n. 4.
The bodily and vocal actions (kāyavakkarman) contained in the four dhyānas are material dharmas (rūpa); the rest are non-material (arūpa). All of them are invisible (anidāraṇa), without resistance (apratigha), sometimes sāsrava, sometimes anāsrava. Those that are sāsrava are the five kusala-sāsrava skandhas; those that are anāsrava are the five anāsrava skandhas. The sāsrava belong to the desire realm (kāmadhātuvacara); the anāsrava do not belong to any realm.

The dhyānas include bodily actions (kāyakarman), vocal actions (vākkarman) and formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasāṃskāra) that are neither mind (citta) nor mental events (caitasika dharma), nor associated with the mind (cittasamprayukta).

The dhyānas also contain the feeling aggregate (vedanāskandha), the discrimination aggregate (saṃjñāskandha) and the volition aggregate (saṃskāraskandha) associated with it. The mental events (caitasika dharma) also are associated with the mind (cittasamprayukta).

The dhyānas include mind (citta and manas), and consciousness (vijñāna): this is only mind.

In the dhyānas, there are:
1) things accompanying the mind (cittānuparivartin) and non-associated with feeling (na vedanāsamprayukta).
2) things associated with feeling (vedanāsamprayukta) and not accompanying mind (na cittaparivartin).
3) things accompanying mind (cittānuparivartin) and associated with feeling (vedanāsamprayukta).
4) things not accompanying mind (na cittānuparivartin) and non-associated with feeling (na vedanāsamprayukta).

There are things accompanying mind and non-associated with feeling. Actually, the four dhyānas contain:

a. bodily actions (kāyakarman) and vocal actions (vākkarman).
b. formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasāṃskāra) but accompanying mind (cittānuparivartin).
c. feelings (vedanā).

There are things associated with feeling and not accompanying mind. As a result, the four dhyānas contain mind (citta and manas) and consciousness (vijñāna).

There are things accompanying mind and associated with feeling. Actually, the four dhyānas contain:

a. the aggregate of discrimination (saṃjñāsāṃskāra)
b. the ‘associated’ aggregate of volition (saṃprayukta saṃskāraskandha)

There are things not accompanying the mind and non-associated with feeling. Actually, with the exception of the formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasāṃskāra) but accompanying the mind.
(cittānuparivartin) – formations contained in the four dhyānas -, these are all the other formations dissociated from the mind (cittaprayuktasamskāra) and associated with the discrimination aggregate (samjñāskandhasamprayukta).

Of the four dhyānas, the [last] three are not endowed with investigation (na vitarkānuparivartin) and are not associated with analysis (na vicārasamprayukta).

In the first dhyāna, there are:
1) things accompanying investigation (vitarkānuparivartin) but non-associated with analysis (na vicārasamprayukta)
2) things associated with analysis (vicārasamprayukta) but not accompanying investigation (na vṛrtkānuparivartin)
3) things accompanying investigation (vitarkānuparivartin) and associated with analysis (vicārasamprayukta)
4) things not accompanying investigation (na vitarkānuparivartin) and non-associated with analysis (na vicārasamprayukta).

There are things accompanying analysis but non-associated with investigation. Actually, the first dhyāna contains:

a. bodily actions (kāyakarman) and vocal actions (vākkarman)
b. formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasamskāra) and accompanying investigation (vitarkānuparivartin)
c. analysis (vicāra).

There are things associated with analysis, but not accompanying investigation, namely, investigation (vitarka)

There are things accompanying investigation and associated with analysis, namely, the mind (citta) and mental events (caitasika dharma) associated with investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra).

There are things not accompanying investigation and non-associated with analysis. Actually, with the exception of the formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasamskāra) that accompany investigation (vitarkānuparivartin), they are all the other formations dissociated from mind.

The four dhyānas are all causes and conditions (hetupratiyaya) and constitute all the causes and conditions.

In the first of the four dhyānas, there are:
1) things that follow upon an antecedent (samanantara) and constitute an antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya),

2) things that follow upon an antecedent and constitute an antecedent condition,

3) things that do not follow upon an antecedent and do not constitute an antecedent condition.

There are things that follow upon an antecedent, but do not constitute an antecedent condition. This is the mind (citta) and mental events (caitasika dharma) called ‘to arise in a future existence’.

There are things that follow upon an antecedent and constitute an antecedent condition. This is the past (atīta) and present (pratyutpanna) mind.

There are things that do not follow upon an antecedent and that do not constitute an antecedent condition. Actually, with the exception of mind and mental events that will arise in a future existence, these are the other minds and mental events of the future, physical and mental actions dissociated from the mind.

It is the same for the second and third dhyānas.

In the fourth dhyāna, there are:

1) Things that follow an antecedent but that do not constitute an antecedent condition. These are:
   a. The mind and mental events called ‘to arise in a future existence’
   b. The absorption of non-discrimination (asaṃjñīsamāpatti), arisen or to arise

2) Things that follow upon an antecedent and that constitute an antecedent condition. This is the past and present mind and mental events.

3) Things that do not follow upon an antecedent and that do not constitute an antecedent condition. These are:
   a. With the exception of the mind and mental events called ‘to arise in a future existence’, all the other minds and mental events of the future.
   b. With the exception of the formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasamāskāra) and following upon an antecedent, all the other formations dissociated from the mind.
   c. Bodily and vocal actions.

The four dhyānas include bodily actions (kāyakarman), vocal actions (vākkarman) and formations dissociated from the mind (cittaviprayuktasamāskāra); some constitute conditions (pratyaya) and do not have conditions. Others both have conditions and constitute conditions.202

These four dhyānas are also dominating conditions (adhipatipratyaya) and constitute dominating conditions.203 All this is fully explained in the Abhidharmavibhāga.

202 This subject is treated in detail above, p. 1038-1040F.
203 See above, p. 1040F.
II. THE FOUR TRANCES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA (p. 1237F)

The bodhisattva possesses the skillful means of trance (dhyānipāya),204 the characteristics of trance (dhyānanimītta)205 and the factors of trance (dhyānāngā).206 This has all been fully explained already in the context of the dhyānapāramitā (p. 1043-1057F).

Question. – In the present Prajñāpāramitāpadeśa,207 you speak only of dharmas empty of characteristics (lakṣaṇaśūnya); then how is the bodhisattva able to produce trance (dhyāna) or absorption (samāpatti) on empty dharmas?

Answer. – The bodhisattva knows that the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa) and the five obstacles (pañcāṇīvaraṇa) are the result of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva), empty (śūnya) and non-existent (anupalabdha). Thus it is very easy for him to reject them. But under the influence of errors (viparīṭa), beings are attached to ordinary pleasures and are guilty of abandoning the profound and wonderful happiness of dhyāna.

The bodhisattva experiences great compassion (mahākaruṇā) for these beings and practices (bhāvayī) trance and concentration:

1) Being attached to the object of mind (cittālambana), he avoids the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa), rejects the five obstacles (pañcāṇīvaraṇa) and enters into the first dhyāna which is great joy (mahāprīti).

2) Suppressing investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra) and concentrating his mind, he penetrates deeply into inner peace (adhyātmasamprasāda), obtains a subtle and wonderful joy (prīti) and enters into the second dhyāna.

---

204 The bodhisattva uses the dhyānas as salvific skillful means (upāya) to convert beings: this perfection of trance (dhyānapāramitā) has been the object of a description in 18 points above (p. 1043-1057F).
205 These nimittas are 23 in number: see above, p. 1038F.
206 These āṅgas are 28 in number:
   First dhyāna: vitarka, vicāra, prīti, sukha, samādhi.
   Second dhyāna: adhyātmasamprasāda, prīti, sukha, samādhi.
   Third dhyāna: upekṣā, smṛti, samprajanya, sukha, samādhi.
   Fourth dhyāna: upekṣā, upekṣapatirūpapariśuddhi, smṛtipariśuddhi, samādhi.
207 The seven Chinese characters Pan-jo-po-lo-mouen-yi appearing here remove any doubt about the exact title of the present work, [Mahā]Prajñāpāramitopadesa and not [Mahā]Prajñāpāramitāsāstra. See above the Introduction to the present volume.
3) Because this profound joy is distracting to concentrations, the bodhisattva avoids all joy, obtains a complete happiness (sukha) and enters into the third dhyāna.

4) Destroying all suffering and all happiness, rejecting all sadness (daurmanasya) and all satisfaction (saumanasya) as well as inhalation and exhalation (ānāpāna), he adorns himself with a pure and subtle equanimity (upekṣa) and enters into the fourth dhyāna.  

This bodhisattva knows well that dharmas are empty (śūnya) and without characteristics (animitta), but as beings themselves do not know it, he resorts to the signs of dhyāna (dhyānanimitta) in order to convert them.

If the emptiness of dharmas (dharmasūnyatā) truly existed in itself, we would not call it emptiness and it would not be necessary to abandon the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa) to obtain dhyāna since, existing substantially, this emptiness would involve neither abandoning (tyāga) nor acquiring (lābha).  

[208c] But the empty nature of dharmas also being non-existent, you cannot raise the objection [that you have just brought up] by saying: “How can the bodhisattva produce trance on empty dharmas?”

208 Here the Traité, taking a few liberties, reproduces the canonical definitions of the four dhyānas, the original formulation of which in Pāli and in Sanskrit has been cited above (p. 1024F, n.). This formula is commented on word by word in Vibhaṅga, p. 256-261, Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 112-115, 126-137, etc.

It is to this information that the great exegetists of the 4th century turned: the five hundred arhats of Kaśmir who compiled the Mahāvibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 85, p. 442a1-8) and, as we will see, the author or authors of the Traité.

2) When Devadatta asked the Buddha to retire and to entrust the community to him, the Buddha refused curtly and treated his cousin as a mūḍha ‘fool’, śava ‘corpse, and kheṭāśika ‘eater of spit’.

Those who recalled the kiss exchanged between Devadatta and Ajātaśatru could not help but see an allusion to this repugnant action. This is why the translators of the afore-mentioned sources translated kheṭāśika as follows:

a. Tan t’o ‘eater of spit’ (Sarv. Vin., T 1435, k. 36, p. 258b7),


c. Che jen t’o tchô,’ eater of human spit’ (Mahāvibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 85, p. 442a6-7).

d. Seou t’o jen, ‘swallower of spit’ (Traité, T 1509, k. 26, p. 252c3).

If the Buddha treated Devadatta as a swallower of spit, it is because the latter had taken Ajātaśatru’s spit, and the Buddha spoke only the truth.

Now in the Majjhima, I, p. 395, the Buddha said: Yañ ca kho Tathāgato vMačam jāmnati bhūtaṃ... tatra kālaṇā Tathāgato hoti tassā vācāya veyyākarāṇāya: “Every word that the Buddha knows to be true, he waits for the opportunity to utter it’, and that whether it is unpleasant or pleasant for others.

In this case, the Buddha was completely right in calling Devadatta khetāśika and the accusation against the Buddha does not hold. In the words of the 14th āvenikadharma, every word of the Buddha is preceded by knowledge and accompanied by knowledge.
Furthermore, the bodhisattva practices dhyāna without being attached to grasping characteristics (animittodgrahṇabhinivesāt). And in the same way that a man swallows medicine (bhaiṣajya) to eliminate sickness (vyāḍhi) and not because of its taste, so the bodhisattva practices dhyāna for the purification of morality (śīlavishodhana) and the perfecting of wisdom (prajñāsampādana).

In each dhyāna, the bodhisattva cultivates great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī). In dhyāna, the contemplation of emptiness (śūnyatāsamapāyanā) does not take place. Since it is a matter [of overcoming] the five objects of enjoyment (pañcāmaguṇa), gross errors and mistakes (viparyāsa), it is necessary to resort to subtle (sūksma) but false (vitatha) subterfuges to destroy them, in the same way that a poison (viṣa) is required in order to destroy other poisons.
CHAPTER XXXIII: THE FOUR IMMEASURABLES AND
THE FOUR FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS

First Section THE FOUR IMMEASURABLES

PRELIMINARY NOTE

The third class of supplementary dharmas recommended by the Prajñāparamitā for the bodhisattva is made up of the four immeasurables: loving kindness (maitrī or maitrā), compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā) and equanimity (upeksā). These are the four limitless ones (apramāṇa), the four liberations of the mind (cetovimukti) or the four abodes of Brahmā (brahmavihāra). This last term is by far the most frequent in the post-canonical Sanskrit texts and in the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.


- On the other hand, the Sanskrit wording, imperfectly reproduced in the Prajñāparamitā editions, has many variants: Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 350; Mahāvastu, III, p. 213; Pañcaviṃśatī, p. 181; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1444; Daśabhūmika, o. 34; Mahāvyut., no. 1504-1509.

Pāli: So mettāsahagatena cetasā skam disam pharitvā viharati, thatā duriyam .... Upekhāsahagatena cetasā - pe – pharitvā viharati.

Sanskrit: Sa maitrīsahagatena cettena vipulena mahadvagatenādvyenāpramāṇenāvairēnāsapatnēvyāvadhyena ... spharitvopasampadya viharati.

Transl. of the Pāli. - He abides, having encompassed the first region with a mind associated with loving-kindness. In the same say, he abides, having encompassed the second, the third and the fourth region, the zenith, the nadir, the [four] intermediate regions. Having encompassed the entire world everywhere and in every way with a mind associated with loving-kindness, with an extended mind, a grand immense mind free of enmity, free of malice, he abides.

He does the same with a mind associated with compassion, with a mind associated with joy and with a mind associated with equanimity.

In the chapters dedicated to the immeasurables, the Abhidharma comment at greater or lesser length on this canonical formula. For the Pāli Abhidhamma, see Vibhaṅga, chap. XIII, p. 272-284; Atthaālīni, p. 192-197; Vidhuddimagga, ed. Warren, chap. IX, p. 244-270 (transl. Nanamoli, p. 321-353); Vimyimagga, transl. Eharā, p. 181-197. For the Sanskrit Abhidharma, see Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 81-83, p. 420b-431b;
Abhidharmāṁṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 975c9-22 (reconstruction by Sastrī, p. 99-100); Kośa, VIII, p. 196-203; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 79, p. 768c-771a; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 427-429.

Here, contrary to its custom, the Traité avoids its usual method of first explaining the Sarvāstivādin theories and then opposing them with the Mahāyāna point of view, perhaps because the two Vehicles are in agreement on an essential point: in the meditation on loving-kindness, etc., nobody receives, nobody is satisfied and, nevertheless, merit arises in the mind of the benevolent one by the very power of his benevolence (Kośa, IV, p. 245). The four immeasurables are purely platonic wishes: it is not enough to wish (adhimuc-) that beings be happy, free of suffering or full of joy for this wish to be realized.

There are, however, three differences between the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna conceptions on this subject.

First a difference in intention. The śrāvaka practices the immeasurables in his own interest, to purify his own mind. The bodhisattva has in mind only the interests of others which he realizes indirectly. By practicing the immeasurables, he personally gains merit which he then can apply to the welfare and happiness of all beings.

Next, there are differences in domain or object. The śravaka brings the immeasurables to bear upon the beings of kāmadhātu who alone are able to call forth the feelings of loving-kindness, compassion, joy or equanimity in him. The bodhisattva puts no limits on his feelings and includes in them all beings of the three worlds (kāma-, rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu) distributed in the numberless universes of the ten directions.

Further, the bodhisattva never loses sight of the twofold emptiness of beings and things that forms the very basis of his philosophical outlook. His feelings are brought to bear upon beings, things and even, by a supreme paradox, on nothing whatsoever. Although he has beings in mind, he does not forget that these do not exist; although he has things in mind, he remembers that they come from a complex of causes and conditions and are empty of intrinsic nature and of characteristics; although he has nothing in view, he keeps from hypostatizing this true nature of things which dissolves into a pure and simple non-existence.

To my [Lamotte] knowledge, the distinction between loving-kindness that has beings as object, things as object, or not having any object is a Mahāyanist invention. In the following pages, the Traité does not fail to exploit it.
I. DEFINITION OF THE IMMEASURABLES (p. 1242F)

The four immeasurable feelings (apramāṇacitta) are loving-kindness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā) and equanimity (upeksā).

*Maitrī* is to think about beings with love and always to seek for the safety (yogakṣema) and happy things (sukhvastu) in order to bring them good.

*Karuṇā* is to think with compassion of beings who are suffering in the five destinies (gati) all sorts of bodily suffering (kāyikadukha) and mental suffering (caitasikadukha).

*Muditā* is to wish that beings obtain joy as a result of happiness (sukha).

*Upekṣā* is to abandon the three previous feelings and think of beings without either aversion (pratigha) or fondness (anunaya).

*Maitrī* is practiced to remove hostility (vyāpāda) toward beings.

*Karuṇā* is practiced to remove harm (vihimsā) toward beings.

*Muditā* is practiced to remove dissatisfaction (arati) toward beings.

*Upekṣā* is practiced to remove sensual attachment (kāmarāga) and hostility (vyāpāda) toward others.

Question. –The four immeasurables (apramāṇa), [the four formless absorptions (ārūpyasamāppati), the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the eight masteries (abhibhvāyatana), the nine successive absorptions (anupūrvasamāppati) and finally the ten spheres of totality (kṛtsnāyatana) are already contained in the four trances (dhyāna). Why speak of them separately here?

---

209 It should be noted that, for the Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 83, k. 427b10-24, the Kośa, VIII, p. 200-201 and the Kośavyākyā, p. 687), the passions are merely removed (dūrīkṛta) or weakened (viskhambhita), not abandoned, by the apramāṇas.


The corresponding Sanskrit phrases are cited in the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 442, l. 3-6: *Maitryāśevitā bhāvitā bahulīkṛtā vyāpādaprahaṇāyā samvartate, karuṇā vihimsāprahaṇāyā, aratiprahaṇāyā muditā, kāmarāgavyāpādaprahaṇāyopeksā.*

See also Kośa, VIII, p. 196; Kośavyākyā, p. 686, l. 6-8; Lalitavistara, p. 442, l. 3-5; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 181, l. 10-11; Bodh, bhūmi, p. 98, l. 18-19, p. 204, l. 24.
Answer. – Although all these things are contained in the four dhyānas, if they are not mentioned separately by name, their particular virtues (guṇa) would not be known. It is like precious objects in a sack; if you do not open the sack to take them out, nobody can know about them.

1) For those who want to obtain great merit (mahāpuṇya), one should talk about the four immeasurables (apramāṇa).

2) In order to inspire disgust for visibles (rūpanirveda), like spending time in prison (kārāgrha), one should talk about the four formless absorptions (ārūpyasamāpatti).

3) To those who cannot obtain mastery (abhibhava) over objects (ālambana) so as to see objects at will (yatheṣṭam), one should speak about the eight masteries (abhibhvātana).

4) To those who take blocked paths (pratisiddhamārga) and do not succeed in freeing the obstacles, one should speak of the eight liberations (vimokṣa).

5) To untamed minds (adāntacitta) that cannot merge from one trance (dhyāna) in order to enter into the others successively, one should speak of the nine successive absorptions (anupūrvasamāpatti).

6) To those who do not possess complete illumination (krṣṇāvabhāsa) on all objects (ālambana) in order to liberate them at will, one should speak of the ten totalities (krṣṇāyatana).

When one thinks about the beings of the ten directions, wishing them to obtain happiness, a mental event (caitasika dharma) occurs called maitrī. The aggregates associated with this maitrī, feelings (vedanā), concepts (saṃjñā), formations (saṃkāra) and consciousnesses (vijñāna), give rise to bodily actions (kāyakarman), vocal actions (vākkarman) and formations dissociated from the mind (cittaprayuktasaṃskāra): the group of these dharmas (dharmasāmagrī) is called maitrī. Since they are loving-kindness or arise with loving-kindness as dominant (adhipati), these dharmas are given the name of maitrī. In the same way, all minds (citta) and all mental events (caitasika dharma), although they are all causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) of future actions, are called cetana because, among their activities (kriyā), “thinking” (cetana) is the strongest.

It is the same for karunā, muditā and upekṣā.

---

211 See above, p. 323-324F, 1040F.
212 All bodily or vocal actions derived from loving-kindness are called maitrī in the same way that bodily or vocal actions derived from ‘thinking’, i.e., from volition (cetanā), are themselves volition. This is why the Buddha said in the Anguttara, III, p. 415: Cetanāhaṃ bhiikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā: “I say, O monks, that action is volition: it is after having wished that one acts with body, speech and mind.”

On this subject, see Tchong a han, T 26, k. 27, p. 600a24; Kathāvatthu, p. 393; Atthasāliṇī, p. 88; Kośa, IV, p. 1-2; Karmasiddhiprakāraṇa, MCB, IV, p. 152, 207-208; Madh, vṛtti, p. 305-306.
This maitrī occurs in the form realm (rūpadhātu), it is impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), to be destroyed (prahātavya) or not to be destroyed (na prahātavya). It also occurs in the [four] root trances (mauladhyāna) and again in the dhyānāntara [variation of the first dhyāna]. Associated with the three sovereign organs (indriya), it excludes the faculty of unpleasantness (duḥkhendriya) and the faculty of dissatisfaction (daurmansayendriya). This is all explained in detail in the Abhidharma.

When maitrī still grasps (udgrhaṇāti) the nature of the beings [towards whom the loving-kindness is expressed], it is impure (sāsrava); when, after having understood the nature of beings, it enters into the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas, it is pure (anāsrava). This is why the Wou-tsin-yi p‘ou- sa-wen (Akṣayamatibodhisattvaparipṛcchā) says:

---

213 This is then a maitrī in the non-concentrated state, in kāmadhātu.

214 Cf. Vībhāṣa, T 1545, k. 81, p. 421a1-6: "The four apramāṇas occur in kāmadhātu. As for the levels (bhūmi), maitrī, karuṇā and up ekṣā occur in seven levels: kāmadhātu, the four dhyānas, the anāgamya and the dhyānāntara. Some say that they occur in ten levels: the four dhyānas, four sāmantakas, the dhyānāntara and kāmadhātu. The āpramāṇa of muditā occurs in three levels: kāmadhātu, first and second dhyānas. Other teachers say that the first and second dhyānas do not have the apramāṇa of karuṇā. Why? Because the first and second dhyānas have a strong feeling of joy."

215 Of the twenty-two indriyas of which the Sūtra speaks, five are faculties of feeling (vedanendriya). Maitrī is associated with the feeling of pleasure (sukhendriya), the faculty of satisfaction (saumanasyendriya), and the feeling of equanimity (upekṣendriya). On the other hand, it is without the feeling of displeasure (suḥkhendriya) and the feeling of dissatisfaction (daurmansayendriya).

216 The Akṣayamatibodhisattvaparipṛcchā, which will be cited again below, p. 1272F and which is mentioned in the Mahāvyut., no. 1400, forms the 45th section of the Chinese Ratnakūṭa and the 44th section of the Tibetan Ratnakūṭa:

1) Wou-tsin-houei p‘ou-sa houei, T 310, k. 115, p. 648a-650b, translated by Bodhiruci (Dharmaruci) between 693 and 727 AD.

2) Blo-gros-mi-zad-pa sles pa, OKC, no. 760 (44), translated and revised by Śurendrabodhi and Ye-ses-sde.
“There are three kinds of maitrī: i) that which has beings as object (sattvālambana), ii) that which has things as object (dharmālambana), iii) that which has no object (anālambana).”

II. ASPECTS OF THE IMMEASURABLES

1. Loving-kindness, compassion and joy

Question. – What are the aspects (ākāra) of these four immeasurables (apramāṇa)?

Answer. – As the Buddha said everywhere in the sūtras: “With a mind associated with loving-kindness (maitrīsahagatena citten ādhimucya spharati), free of enmity (avaiṛa), free of hostility (anupañhena), free of rivalry (asapatnena), free of malice (avyāvadhyena), extended (vipulena), expanded (mahadhagatena), immense (apramāṇena) and well cultivated (subhāvita), the bhikṣu intentionally includes in this mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcitten ādhimucya spharati) the beings of universes in the eastern direction (pūrvā diś), then he intentionally includes in this mind of loving-kindness the beings of the universes of the ten directions: those of the south (dakṣinā), the west (paścimā), the north (uttarā), of the four intermediate directions (vidiś), of the zenith (upariṣṭā) and the nadir (adhaṃstā). And in the same way, he includes them by means

But the passage cited here does not belong to the Aksayamatibodhisattvaparipṛccchā: it comes from the Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra or simply Aksayamatisūtra, of which there are two Chinese translations and one Tibetan translation:

1) A-tch’a-mo p’ou-sa king, T 403, translated by Dharmarakṣa between 265 and 313.
2) Wou-tsin-yi p’ou-sa p’in, translated by Dharmakṣema between 414 and 421 and later incorporated in the Mahāsaṃnipātā where it forms the 12th section (T 397, k. 27-30, p. 184-213).
3) Blo-gros-mi-zad-pas bstan-pa, OKC, no. 842, anonymously translated.

This sūtra, under the name Aksayamatisūtra, is cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 11, 21, 33, 34, 117, 119, 158, 167, 183, 190, 212, 233, 236, 271, 278, 285, 287, 316; in the Pañjikā, p. 81, 86, 118, 173, 522, 527; and the Traité will refer to it later (k. 53, p. 442a2) , calling it A-tch’a-mo king. It is also cited under the name Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra in the Pañjikā, p. 20, and the Mahāvyut., no. 1344. 217 Aksayamatinideśa, T 403, k. 4, p. 500a13-17; T 397, k. 29, p. 200a15-18. The original Sanskrit is cited in Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 212: Sā [maitrī] trividhāksayamatisūtre 'bhihitā: sattvārambhaṇā maitrī prathamacittotpādikānāṁ bodhisattvānāṁ; dharmārāmaṇā caryāpratipannānāṁ bodhisattvānāṁ; anārāmaṇā maitrī anuttappakadharmaśāti pratilabhānāṁ bodhisattvānāṁ iti. – “In the Aksayamatisūtra, this loving-kindness is threefold: that which has beings as object belongs to the bodhisattvas who have just produced the mind of bodhi; that which has dharmas as object belongs to bodhisattvas cultivating the practices; that which has no object belongs to the bodhisattva having the conviction that dharmas do not arise.”

As we will see later, p. 1251F, this threefold maitrī is mentioned frequently in the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.
of a mind associated with compassion (karuṇāśahagatena), associated with joy (muditāsahagatena) and associated with equanimity (upekṣāsahagatena cittena).\footnote{218}

\textit{a. maitrīsahagatena cittena.}

“With a mind associated with loving-kindness.” – Maitrī is a mental event (caitasika dharma) capable of counteracting the corruptions (kaśāya) contained in the mind, namely, hatred (dveṣa), hostility (upanāha), avarice (māsarya), lust (rāga), and the other passions (kleśa). Thus, when the purifying pearl (mani) is placed in dirty water, it becomes clear.

\textit{b. avaireṇānupanāhena cittena.}

“With a mind free of enmity and free of hostility.” – Let us suppose that, with or without reason, one hates someone. If one wants to insult him, curse him, strike him or rob him, this is enmity (vaira). If one waits for the proper moment and, given the chance, one torments him with all one’s strength, this is hostility (upanāha). Since maitrī counteracts both these things, it is said to be free of enmity and hostility.\footnote{219}

\textit{c. asapatnenābyāvadhyena cittena.}

“With a mind free of rivalry and free of malice.” – Hostility (upanāha) is rivalry (sapatnātā). The first offensive movement (āghāta) is of hostility (upanāha). In time, hostility becomes rivalry (sapatnātā). When one inflicts torment (vyābhāda) by means of physical and vocal actions (kāyavākkaran), this is malice (vyāvadhya).

Furthermore, the fetter ‘hostility’ (pratighasanyojana) is called enmity (vaira). When enmity increases, is prolonged and becomes attached to but not yet fixed (niyata) in the mind, it takes the name of hostility (upanāha) and also rivalry (sapatnātā). When the mind is determined and no longer has any scruples, this is called malice (vyāvadhya).\footnote{220}

Because the power of maitrīcitta rejects, abandons and leaves behind these three things, it is said to be ‘free of enmity, free of hostility, free of rivalry and free of malice’. The Buddha praised maitrīcitta in regard to this fourfold exemption.\footnote{221}

\footnote{218} Here the \textit{Traité} reproduces, with a few liberties, the canonical stock phrase cited above, p. 1239F, with references. Like the Kośa, VIII, p. 199, and the Visuddhimagga, p. 255, it is careful to state that the apramānas include not the directions but the beings in these regions. It insists on the voluntary nature of their action, for the ascetic voluntarily (adhimucaya) and in contradiction to the actual fact that the ascetic sees beings as happy, unhappy, joyful: see Kośa, IV, p. 245; VIII, p. 198-199.

\footnote{219} According to the Visuddhimagga, p. 256, the mind is without enmity (avera) inasmuch as it destroys malice and hostility (byāpādadapaccaṭṭhikapahānena).

\footnote{220} On the other hand, for the Visuddhimagga, p. 256, the mind is \textit{abyāpajjha} ‘without affliction’, because it destroys sadness (domanassappahānato). The expression then would mean absence of suffering (niddukkha).

\footnote{221} Notably in the Mettasutta of the Suttanipāta, p. 26, v. 149-151: 

\textit{Mātā yathā niyāṇ puttraṃ}
All beings fear suffering and are attached to happiness. Enmity is cause and condition for suffering, and maitrī is cause and condition for happiness. Beings who hear it said that this concentration of loving-kindness (maitrīsamādhi) can chase away suffering and bring happiness become mindful (smṛtimat), brave (ātāpin) and full of energy (vīryavat) to practice this meditative stabilization, and this is why they are ‘without enmity, without hostility, without rivalry and without malice.’

d. vipulena, mahadhagnāpramāṇena cittena.

“With a vast, expanded, immense mind”. 222 – This mind is single, but as its magnitude differs, there are three attributive adjectives used.

This mind is vast (vipula) when it includes one single region, extended [209b] (mahadgata) when it goes far and high, immense (apramāṇa) when it includes the nadir (adhasād dīś) and the other nine regions.

Furthermore, if it is low (avara), maitrī is called vast (vipula); middling (madhya), it is called extended (mahadgata); higher (agra), it is called immense (apramāṇa).

222 Cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 256: *Vipulena ti attha ca pharaṇavasena vipulatā daṭṭhabbā. Bhūmivasena pana etam mahaggataṃ. Paṇuṇavasena ca appamāṇasattārammaṇavasena ca appamāṇam: “By vast here we should understand its amplitude as inclusion. It is also expanded in regard to the levels in which it is applicable [from kāmadhātu up to rūpadhātu included]. It is immense in regard to its competence and to the fact that it has innumerable beings as object.”
Furthermore, if it bears upon the beings of the four main directions (diś), maitrī is called vast (vipula); if it bears upon the beings of the four intermediate directions (vidiś), it is said to be extended (mahadgata); if it bears upon the beings of the zenith and the nadir, It is said to be immense (apramāṇa).

Furthermore, if it destroys223 the minds of enmity (vairacitta), maitrī is called vast (vipula); if it destroys the minds of rivalry (sapatnacitta), it is called extended (mahadgata); if it destroys the minds of malice (vyāvadhya) it is called immense (apramāṇa).

Furthermore, all the defiled minds (kliṣṭajñāna) cultivated by vile individuals giving rise to evil things are called vile (hiṇa). The most vile of them are enmity (vairā), rivalry (sapatnā) and malice (vyāvadhya). Since maitrī destroys these vile minds, it is called vast (vipula), extended (mahadgata) and immense (apramāṇa). Why? Because great causes and conditions are necessary to destroy vile things. The ‘vast’ mind (vipulacitta) that fears sin (āpatti), that fears falling into hell, eliminates the bad dharmas from the mind; the ‘extended’ mind (mahadgatacitta) that believes in the retribution of merits (punyavipāka) eliminates the bad thoughts; the ‘immense’ mind (apramāṇacitta) that wants to attain nirvāṇa eliminates the bad thoughts.

Furthermore, when the yogin observes the purity of the discipline (śīlaviśuddhī), this is a ‘vast’ mind; when he is endowed with trance and absorption (dhyānasamāpattisampāna), this is an ‘extended’ mind; when he is endowed with wisdom (prajñāṃpanna), this is an ‘immense’ mind.

When the yogin, by means of this mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcitta), thinks about the noble people (āryapudgala) who have found the Path, this is an ‘immense’ mind because he is using immense means to distinguish these noble people. When he thinks about the noble abodes (āvāsa) of gods and men, this is an ‘extended’ mind. When he thinks about lower beings (hiṇasattva) and the three unfortunate (durgatī) destinies, this is a ‘vast’ mind.

When he thinks with loving-kindness about a being that is dear to him (priyasattva) and he extends this thought [to all dear beings], this is a ‘vast’ mind. When he thinks with loving-kindness about people who are indifferent to him (madhyasthapuruṣa), this is an ‘extended’ mind. When he thinks with loving-kindness about his enemies (vaīra) and thus his merits (guṇa) are many, this is an ‘immense’ mind.224

| 223 | In fact, it does not destroy the passions; it removes them and undermines them. |
| 224 | Maitrī should be practiced gradually in this way to include with all beings, friends, neutrals and enemies, in the same loving-kindness. This is called ‘breaking the barriers (sīnasamabheda). Cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 246: Bhikkhunā... sīnasamabhedaṃ katthkāmena... atippiyasahāyake, atippiyasahāyakato majjhatte, majjhattato veripuggate mettā bhāvetabbā. Bhāventena ca ekekasmiṃ kotṭāse mudum kammaniyam cittam katvā tadanantare tadanantare upasamharitabbam: “The monk who wishes to break the barriers should cultivate loving-kindness toward a very dear friend, then toward a neutral person as though he were very dear, then toward an enemy as though he were neutral. While he is doing this, in each case he should make his mind soft and gentle before going on to the next one.” |

For the way in which beginners (ādikarmika) should practice loving-kindness, see also Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 82, p. 421c15-22; Kośa, VIII, p. 201-202.
The mind that bears upon a limited object is called ‘vast’; that which bears upon a small object is called ‘extended’; that which bears upon immensity is called ‘immense’.

This is the meaning of these distinctions.

*e. subhāvitena citta.*

By a ‘well-cultivated’ mind is meant a strong (*dṛḍha*) mind of loving-kindness (*maitrīcitta*). The mind is not yet ‘well-cultivated’ when one is just beginning to acquire it. In order that it be ‘well-cultivated’, it is not enough to practice it just toward fond people, or toward good people, or toward those who do good to us, or toward beings of a single direction; following long practice, it is necessary to acquire deep affection for and love equally and without any difference the three types of beings, friends (*priyapudgala*), enemies (*vairipudgala*) and neutrals (*madhyastha*), to look upon beings in the five destinies (*pañcagati*) and the ten directions with the same loving-kindness as one regards one’s mother, father, older brother, younger brother, older sister, younger sister, one’s son, nephew, one’s friend; one should always look for good things to procure their welfare (*hita*) and safety (*yogakṣema*); finally, one should include the beings of the ten directions in this loving-kindness.

2. The three kinds of loving-kindness

225 The *Traité* will return later (k. 40, p. 350b25-28; k. 53, p. 442a2-3) to these three types of loving-kindness and compassion. They are often mentioned in the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras, especially in the Aṣṭāyamatisūtra cited above, p. 1245F. Here are some other texts where they are mentioned:

Mahāyana Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (T 374, k. 15, p. 452c; T 375, k. 14, p. 694c): O son of noble family, there are four other brahmanical conduct: *maitrī, karuṇā, muditā* and *upekṣā*. – The bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: O Bhagavat, if one practices *maitrī* well, one destroys malice (*vyāpāda*), and if one practices *karuṇācitta*, one also destroys malice. Then why speak of four *apramāṇa cittas*? By examining the meaning, there should be three. Bhagavat, there are three kinds of *maitrī*: 1) that which has beings as object (*sattvālambana*); 2) that which has things as object (*dharmālambana*); 3) that which has no object (*anālambana*). It is the same for *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekṣā*. Consequently, the *apramāṇas* should be three in number and not four. The *maitrī* that has beings as object is concerned with the five skandhas and wishes to bring them happiness: we say that it has beings as object. The one that has things as object is concerned with the things that are necessary to beings and brings them to beings: we say that it has things as object. The one that has no object is concerned with the Tathāgata: we say that it has no object. In general, *maitrī* concerns poor beings (*daridrasattva*), but the Tathāgata, the great Teacher, is always free of poverty and enjoys absolute happiness (*paramasukha*). Thus, although it concerns beings, *maitrī* does not concern the Buddha. It is the same for the *maitrī* that concerns objects. O Bhagavat, the *maitrī* that has all beings as object concerns, for example, a father, mother, wife, son, relative; consequently we say that it has beings as object. The *maitrī* that has things as object does not see the father, mother, wife, son, relative; it see all the things that result from causes and conditions (*pratītyopanna*): we say that it has things as object. The *maitrī* that has no object is based upon neither
the characteristic of a thing (dharmanimitta) nor the characteristic of a being (sattvanimitta): we say that it has no object. It is the same for the minds of karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā. Therefore the apramāṇas should be three and not four.

Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra, T 1530, k. 5, p. 314b8-13: There are three kinds of maitrī: 1) that which has beings as object (sattvālambana); 2) that which has things as object (dharmālambana); 3) that which has no object (anālambana).

Bodhisattvas at the stage of those who have just produced bodhi mind (prathamacittotpādikāvasthā) practice mainly the maitrī that has beings as object. This is most frequently impure (sāsrava) for its realm (gocara) is purely conventional (saṃvyrtisat) things.

Bodhisattvas at the stage of those who are cultivating the practices (caryāpratipannāvasthā) mainly practice the maitrī that has things as object. This one also is impure (sāsrava) most frequently, for its realm (gocara) is the Mahāyāna teachings.

Bodhisattvas who have acquired the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anupatikkadharmakṣāntipratilabdha) practice maitrī mainly without object. Even though it has an object, the fundamental element (dharmadhātu), it is, like the dharmas of retribution (vipākadharma), eye, etc., without thought-construction (vikalpa), makes no effort (prayoga) and functions spontaneously (svarasena pravartate). This is why it is called ‘great maitrī without object’ (anālambana), associated with the knowledge of equality (samatājñānasamprayuktā). Another meaning: as it bears upon the fundamental element (dharmadhātu) only and is always without thought-construction (vikalpa), as it does not bear upon either beings or things, it is called the maitrī without object.

The Sūtrālāṃkāra, p. 121, also mentions these three kinds of apramāṇa. Those that have no object, it says, concern suchness (tathatā): they are without object insofar as they are without thought-construction (te hy avukapatvād anālambanāḥ).

Bodh. bhūmi, p. 241-242 (T 1579, k. 44, p. 535c7-18). Transl. – In short, the bodhisattva develops the four apramāṇas in three ways: those having beings as object, those having things as object and those having no object.

The bodhisattva arranges beings into three groups, happy, unhappy and neither unhappy nor happy, but all aspiring to happiness; he conceives towards them loving-kindness accompanied by the great resolve to procure happiness for them. Having included the ten directions in this mind of loving-kindness, he dwells with the aspiration (adhimokṣa = adhimuktisamjñā: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 199) that this is about beings.

Then, no longer having the notion of things, the bodhisattva cultivates this loving-kindness by intentionally considering this metaphor of beings in what are just things. This is the maitrī of bodhisattvas having things as object.

Finally, the bodhisattva cultivates this loving-kindness by not even imagining things. This is the bodhisattva’s maitrī without object.

It is the same for karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā.
1) The mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcītta) of which we have just spoken is that which has beings as object (sattvālambana). It is found mainly among worldly people (prthagjana) practicing the trances or in adepts on the path of practice (śaikṣa) who have not yet destroyed the impurities (aṣṭiṇasrava).

2) There are those who practice a loving-kindness that has things as object (dharmaśānti); these are the arhats who have destroyed the impurities (kṣīṇasrava), the pratyekabuddhas and the Buddhas. Having destroyed the concept of self (ātmaśānti) and eliminated notions of identity and difference (ekatvānyatvasaṃjñā), these holy individuals (āryapudgala) consider only the objects of enjoyment (kāmaguna) continually (prābandika) coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyaya). When they think about beings with loving-kindness, they think only of the emptiness (śūnya) coming continually from causes and conditions together. The ‘being’ is the five [empty] skandhas. When they think with loving-kindness, they are thinking about these five skandhas. But beings themselves ignore this emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā) and, with their whole heart, always want to find happiness (sukha). The holy individuals (āryapudgala) of whom we are speaking take pity on them and make them find happiness as they wish, but only from the conventional point of view (saṃvṛtītas). This is what is called loving-kindness having things as object (dharmaśānti).

3) As for the loving-kindness that has no object (anālamabana), this is the one that only the Buddhas possess. Why? The mind of the Buddhas does not rest on the conditioned (saṃskṛta) or on the unconditioned (asamskṛta); it does not rest on the past (atīta), the future (anāgata) or the present (pratyutpanna). The Buddhas know that all objects (ālamabana) are not real, are erroneous and deceptive: this is why their mind is without object (anālamabana). Beings do not know the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of things; they wander through the five destinies (pañcagati), their minds are attached (abhinivīśate) to things, they make distinctions, take [certain things] and reject other things. And so the Buddhas use the wisdom (prajñā) of the true nature of things and make beings obtain it: this is the loving-kindness ‘without object’.

It is as if one gave material (vasu) objects to a needy person (daridra), precious things of gold or silver (suvarṇarūpyamayaratnadravya) and [finally] the precious wish-fulfilling gem: it is the same for the
loving-kindness that has beings as object, the loving-kindness that has things as object and the loving-kindness without object, respectively.\textsuperscript{226}

This briefly (samkṣepena) defines the meaning of the mind of loving-kindness. It is the same for the mind of compassion (karunācitta): the ascetic includes with compassion the suffering of beings of the ten directions and reflects as follows: “Beings are in misery; they should not endure all these sufferings.” Then “with a mind free of enmity (avaira), free of hostility (anupanāha), free of rivalry (asapatna), free of malice (avyāvadha),” etc., “he includes the ten directions.”

3. The subjective nature of loving-kindness

Question. – There are three kinds of beings: i) those who experience happiness (sukhita), such as the gods and a small portion of humans (manusyaṇāṃ prabheda); ii) those who undergo suffering (duḥkhita), such as the beings of the three unfortunate destinies (durgāti) and a small portion of humans; iii) those who experience neither suffering nor happiness (aduḥkhāsukhita), such as a small portion of beings in the five destinies. How do those who practice loving-kindness see all beings as experiencing happiness, and those who practice compassion see all beings as undergoing suffering?

Answer. - When the yogin wants to use the infinite feeling of loving-kindness, first he makes the following vow (prāṇidhāna): “I wish that beings may experience all kinds of happiness.”\textsuperscript{227} Having in this way grasped (udgṛhya) the character of the happy man (sukhitanimitta), he concentrates his mind (cittamālātā) and enters into dhyāna. This nature increases gradually (krameṇa vadhate) and then the yogin sees all beings as experiencing happiness.

Thus, when one is making fire by friction (mathana), first the flame takes fire on the soft grass (mṛdutṛṇa) and dried cow dung (śuskagomaya) and, as the strength of the fire increases, it is able to consume big pieces of moist wood (sasnehakāṣṭha).\textsuperscript{228} It is the same for the concentration of loving-kindness (maitrīsamādhi): at the beginning, when one makes the vows for loving-kindness (maitrīprāṇidhāna), one applies them only to one’s friends (mitra); but when the mind of loving-kindness has grown, enemies (amitra) and relatives (bandhu) become mixed up and one sees them all as experiencing happiness: this is

\textsuperscript{226} The three kinds of maitri are comparable to the gift of an ordinary object, the gift of a precious object, and the gift of the cintamani, respectively.

\textsuperscript{227} We may recall that the practice of the apramānas is limited to formulating and extending to infinity purely platonic vows: cf. Abhidharmadīpa, p. 428: Sukhitā vata santu sattvā iti manasi kurvan maitrīṃ samāpadyate, duḥkhītā vata sattvā iti karunāṃ, modantāṃ vata sattvā iti mudiāṃ, sattvā ity eva manasi kurvan upeksāṃ samāpadyate madhyasthāt. See also Kośa, VIII, p. 198.

\textsuperscript{228} Cf. Majjhima, I, p. 240: Api nu... puriso allaṃ... kathāṃ ocasneham udake nikkhittam uttarāraṇīṃ ādāya abhinamthento aggiṃ abhinibbatteyya tejo pātukareyyāti. – “A man who rubs a soaking wet piece of wood with a fire stick, would he be able to produce fire and create heat?”
because the dhyānas or samāpattis of loving-kindness have grown (vardhita) and are becoming complete (sampanna).

It is the same for the minds of compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā) and equanimity (upeksā).

4. Object and merit of equanimity

Question. – In the course of the mind of compassion (karuṇācitta), one takes hold of the character of the unhappy man (duḥkhanimittam udgrññāti); in the course of the mind of joy (muditā) one takes hold of the character of the joyful man (muditānimitta). What character does one take hold of in the course of the mind of equanimity (upeksanimitta)? [210a]

Answer. – One takes hold of the character of the neither unhappy nor happy man (aduḥkāsukhita). When this mind has increased gradually, the yogin sees the entire world as being neither unhappy nor happy.

Question. – The first three minds – loving-kindness, compassion and joy – are certainly meritorious (punya). But what benefit (arthakriyā) can there be in the mind of equanimity bearing on beings who are neither unhappy nor happy?

Answer. – The yogin thinks thus: “When they lose their happiness (sukha), beings encounter suffering (duḥkha), and in the time of suffering, they are unhappy (duḥkhita). Finding a state without either suffering or happiness would be safety for them (yogakṣema).” This is how {the mind of equanimity} presents a benefit (arthakriyā).229

When the yogin practices the minds of loving-kindness (maitrī) and joy, it may happen that a feeling of attachment (abhisvyangacitta) arises in him; when he practices the mind of compassion (karuṇā), it may happens that a feeling of sadness (daurmansayacitta) arises in him. His mind is distracted (vikṣipta) by this attachment or this sadness. Then he enters into the mind of equanimity (upeksacitta) and drives away (apanyati) this attachment and this sadness. Since attachment and sadness are eliminated, there is a ‘mind of equanimity’.

5. Differences between loving-kindness and joy

Question. – We can ascertain the differences (viśeṣa) that exist between the mind of compassion (karuṇācitta) and the mind of equanimity (upeksacitta). [But the differences are less evident between the other two.] The mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcitta) wishes that all beings be happy (sukhita) and the mind of joy (muditācitta) wishes that all beings be joyful (muditā). What difference is there between happiness (sukha) and joy (muditā)?

229 An advantage for the person who is practicing it, but not for the person who is the object of it.
Answer. – Happiness is bodily happiness (kāyika sukha); joy is mental happiness (caitasika sukha).

We call happiness the happiness associated with the first five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānasamprayutasukha); we call joy the happiness associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñānasamprayuktasukha).

We call happiness the happiness that arises in regard to the first five bases of consciousness (pañcāyatana); we call joy the happiness that arises in regard to the base made up of mental objects (dharma>yatana).

First the yogin formulates vows of happiness (sukhapradipidhāna) that beings find this happiness and that, after this happiness, they find joy (muditā). Thus, when someone has pity on a needy person, first he gives him a precious thing (ratnadravya): that is ‘happiness’; next, he invites the poor person to trade it for money so that he can enjoy the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguna): that is ‘joy’.

Furthermore, we call happiness the happiness of the desire realm (kāmadhātusukha) which one is wishing for beings; we call joy the happiness of the form realm (rupadhātusukha) which one is wishing for beings.

Furthermore, we call happiness: i) the happiness associated with the five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānasamprayuktasukha) in the desire realm (kāmadhātu); ii) the happiness associated with the three consciousnesses (trivijñānasamprayuktasukha) in the first dhyāna; iii) all the happiness in the third dhyāna. – We call joy: i) the happiness associated with the mental consciousness (manovijñānasamprayuktasukha) in the desire realm (kāmadhātu) and the first dhyāna; ii) all the happiness in the second dhyāna.

We call happiness coarse (audārika) happiness; we call joy subtle (śūkṣma) happiness.

‘Happiness’ refers to the time of the cause (hetukāla); ‘joy’ refers to the time of the fruit (phalakāla). When one is beginning to find happiness, that is called ‘happiness’; when the joyful mind arises within (adhyātman) and the signs of happiness appear outwardly (bahirā) by way of singing, dancing and leaping about, that is called ‘joy’. Thus when one starts to swallow a medicine (bhaiṣajya), it is happiness, but when the medicine has penetrated the whole body, that is joy.

Question. – If that is so, why not combine these two minds into one single immeasurable (apramāna)? Why, on the contrary, distinguish two different things?

Answer. – At the start, the yogin’s mind is not concentrated (pragrhīta) and as he cannot love beings deeply, that gives him happiness only; but when he has concentrated his mind and loves beings deeply, that gives him joy. This is why he is first happy and, only after that, is he joyful.

\[230\] Eye, ear, nose, tongue and body consciousnesses.

\[231\] Color, sound, smell, taste and tangible.

\[232\] On the nature of sukha in the kāmadhātu and the first three dhyānas, see Kośa, VIII, p. 150-151.
Question. – If that is so, why does [the sūtra] not mention loving-kindness (maitrī) and joy (muditā) one after the other [but interposes compassion]?

Answer. – When the mind of loving-kindness is being practiced, one loves beings as one’s son and one wishes to bring them happiness. But having emerged from the concentration of loving-kindness, one sees beings undergoing all kinds of suffering. Then, producing a mind of deep love, one has compassion for beings and makes them obtain deep happiness.

Just as parents who love their son at all times, nevertheless redouble their affection for him when he falls sick, so the bodhisattvas who have entered into minds of compassion (karuṇācitta), considering the sufferings of beings, develop a feeling of pity (anukampācitta) and grant them profound happiness. This is why the mind of compassion takes an intermediate place [between the mind of loving-kindness and the mind of joy].

6. Reasons for practicing equanimity

Question. – If one loves beings so deeply, why practice the mind of equanimity (upekṣācitta) in addition?

Answer. – The yogin sees things in the following way: he never abandons beings and he thinks only of abandoning the three minds [of loving-kindness, compassion and joy]. Why? First of all, to put an end to other dharmas. Then, by the mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcitta), he wished that beings be happy, but he did not succeed in making them happy. By the mind of compassion (karuṇācitta), he wished that beings could escape from suffering, but he did not succeed in making them free of suffering. When he practiced the mind of joy (muditācitta) he did not succeed in causing them to experience great joy either. All of that was mere mental activity (manakāra) without any real reality (bhātārtha). And so, wishing to make beings find the real truth, the yogin makes the resolve (cittam utpādayate) to become Buddha. He practises the six perfections (pāramitā) and perfects within himself the attributes of Buddha so that beings may find true happiness. This is why the yogin abandons the three minds [of loving-kindness, compassion and joy] so as to enter into the mind of equanimity (upekṣacitta).

Finally, the minds of loving-kindness, compassion and joy are minds of love so deep that it is hard to abandon beings. [On the other hand], if one enters into the mind of equanimity, it is easy to separate from them.

233 The canonical expression for the four apramānas is cited above, p. 1239-40F.

234 Psychologically, joy (muditā) follows after compassion (karuṇā); we should note that beings are unhappy before wishing to be joyful.

235 By practicing equanimity (upekṣā), the yogin removes sensual attachment (kāmarāga) and hostility (vyāpāda) towards beings: see above, p. 1242F.

236 This mind of equanimity is indispensable to becoming Buddha.
7. Limit to the salvific action of the immeasurables

Question. – The bodhisattva, who has finally become Buddha after having practiced the six perfections cannot do anything further so that beings may escape from suffering and find happiness. Then why do you limit yourself to saying that the three minds [of loving-kindness, compassion and joy] are mental activity arising in the mind and without any real truth? [Why not say that also of the mind of equanimity]?

Answer. – It is true that the bodhisattva, having become Buddha, cannot do anything to make beings find happiness, but when he is still bodhisattva, he makes the great vows (mahāprāṇidhānāṃ utpādayati); as a result of these great vows, he gains great merit (mahāpunyā) and, as the reward of this great merit, he is able to do great good for worldly people (prthagjana).

When the śrāvakas practice the four immeasurables (apramāṇa), it is to tame themselves (ātmadamanāya), for their own welfare (svahitāya), and they think about beings in vain. The bodhisattvas, however, practice the mind of loving-kindness so that beings may escape from suffering and find happiness. As a result of this mind of loving-kindness, they themselves gain merit and teach others how to gain merit. Gathering the ripened fruits (vipākaphala) of their merit, these bodhisattvas sometimes become noble cakravartin kings, rich in kind deeds; sometimes also they leave home (pravrajanti), practice the dhyanas, guide beings and teach them how to practice the dhūnas to be reborn in pure universes (suddhalokadhātu) and there enjoy the happiness. Finally, when they become Buddha, they enter into nirvāṇa without residue (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa) with immeasurable and incalculable beings (apramāṇāsamkhyeyasattva). Compared to the mind of emptiness (śūnyatācitta), their vows (prāṇidhāna) are much more salutary, and still other things, including their relics (śarīra), are very beneficial.

Furthermore, if a single bodhisattva completely saved all beings, the other bodhisattvas would have no one to save. From then on, there would be no more future (anāgata) Buddhas, the lineage of the Buddhas (buddhavaṃśa) would be interrupted (samucchinna) and other faults of the same kind would ensue. This is why a single Buddha does not save all beings without exception.

Finally, what is called the nature of beings (sattvasvabhāva) is only a product of error (mohaja): it is not a real thing (bhūta) nor is it determinate (niyata). If all the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions went to look for a being, they would find none. Then how would they save all completely?

8. Is the idea of salvation is purely conventional?

---

237 In the sense that beings will derive no benefit, for the vows formulated by the śrāvakas profit only themselves.
Question. – If [the beings] who are empty [of intrinsic nature] cannot all be saved (trāta), a small number of beings will be equally empty. Then how do [the Buddhas] save a small number of them?

Answer. – I have just said that if the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions went to look for beings, they would find not a single one and, consequently, that there is no one to save. If you object: “Why do they not save them all?”, you fall into a questionable position (nigrahasthāna), a position from which you cannot extricate yourself. And if you object: “Since the categories of few and many do not apply to beings, how could the Buddhas save a small number of them?”, you fall into an even more questionable position.

Furthermore, from the absolute point of view (paramārtha), the true nature (bhūtalaksāna) of things, there are no beings (sattva) and there is no salvation (trāṇa). It is merely conventionally that we affirm the existence of salvation. As for you, you seek the absolute (paramārtha) in the conventional (saṃvṛti), which is inadmissible (nopapadyate). It is as if you were looking for a precious pearl (maṇiratna) in a brick or a stone: never would you find it there.

Furthermore, all the qualities acquired by the Buddhas in the interval of time between their first production of the mind of awakening (prathamacittotpāda) until the disappearance of the Holy Dharma (saddharmavipralopa), all these qualities are formations (saṃskāra), limited (saparyanta), measurable (sapramāṇa), having a beginning (ādi) and an end (paryavasāna). This is why the number of beings to be converted (vaineyasattva) must also be measurable. It is not possible, with measurable qualities, fruits of retribution [of a given number] of causes and conditions, to completely save beings without number in their totality.

It is like a strong man (balavān puruṣah): no matter how powerful his bow (dhanus) and no matter how far his arrow (iṣu) can fly, it will necessarily finally fall down. Or it is like the great fire (mahāgni) at the end of the kalpa (kalpasamvatana) 238 that burns the trīṣāhasralokadhātu: its brilliance (arcis) is immense, but although it burns for a long time, it is finally extinguished. It is the same for the bodhisattva become Buddha. From his first production of the mind of awakening, he holds the bow of exertion (vīryadhanus) in his hand, wields the arrow of wisdom (prajñēṣu), penetrates deeply into the Buddhadharma and accomplishes the great deeds of the Buddhas (buddhakārya), but he also must end up becoming extinguished. When the bodhisattva has won the knowledge of dharmas in all their aspects (sarvakārajñāna), his body emits rays (raśmi) that light up innumerable universes (apramāṇalokadhātu); each of these rays creates numberless bodies (apramāṇakāya) that save numberless beings (apramāṇasattva) in the ten directions by metamorphosis (nirmāṇa). After his nirvāṇa, the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma that he has taught (caturśītisahasra dharmaskandha) and his relics (śarīra) convert (pariśācayanti) beings. But, like the fire at the end of the kalpa, having shone for a long time, he too must become extinguished.

Question. – You yourself say that these rays create innumerable bodies by metamorphosis that save the innumerable beings of the ten directions. Why did you sometimes say that, due to measurable causes and conditions, the number of beings to be converted should also be measurable?

Answer. - There are two kinds of immeasurable (apramāṇa).²³⁹

1) The true immeasurable (bhūtāpramāṇa) which cannot be measured by any holy individual (āryapudgalā). Space (ākāśa), nirvāṇa and the true nature of being (sattvabhāva) cannot be measured [in any way].

2) Measurable things (prameyadhama) which only weak people are incapable of measuring; for example, the weight (gurutva) of Mount Sumeru, or the number of drops of water (bindu) in the great ocean (mahāsamudra). The Buddhas and bodhisattvas know these things, but they are unknown to gods and humans.

It is the same for the number of beings to be converted (vinītasattva) by [211a] the Buddhas; the Buddhas know it, but as it is not within your range, it is described as immeasurable.

Finally, dharmas, coming from causes and conditions (hetupratyasamagṛi), have no intrinsic nature (nihsvabhāva). Since their intrinsic nature does not exist, they are eternally empty (śūnya) and, in this eternal emptiness, the being does not exist (sattva nopalabhyate). Thus the Buddha said:

When I was seated on the sphere of enlightenment,²⁴⁰

My wisdom was non-existent.

Like the empty fist that deceives little children,²⁴¹

I have saved the entire world.

The true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of things

Is the mark of beings (sattvanimitta).

But to seize the mark of beings

Is to stray far from the true Path.

Always thinking about the eternally empty,

²³⁹ The same distinction is made above, p. 152F, 393F, 451F.
²⁴⁰ The bodhimaṇḍa, in its proper sense, the diamond seat (vajrāsana) at Gayā where Śākyamuni reached supreme enlightenment; in the figurative sense, the spiritual presence of the Dharma or of the dharmakāya of the Buddhas which is independent of any material localization: cf. Vimalakīrti, p. 199-200, note.
²⁴¹ Bālollāpana riktamuṣṭivat: cf. above, p. 1195F and n. 2.
A person does not follow the Path.
He invents imaginary characteristics
For dharmas that are without birth or cessation.

Imaginings, reflections, concepts
Are the net of Māra (mārajāla).
Not moving, not standing still
That is really the seal of the Dharma (dharmamudrā).

9. Differences between ‘happiness’ and ‘compassion’

Question. – If ‘happiness’ (sukha) is subdivided into two parts, the mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcitta) and the mind of joy (muditācitta), why is not the mind of compassion (karunācitta) that contemplates suffering (duḥkha) considered to be of two parts?

Answer. – Happiness (sukha), loved by everyone, is important (guru); this is why it is divided into two parts, [loving-kindness and joy]. On the other hand, suffering (duḥkha), which nobody loves, which nobody commemorates, is not divided into two parts.

Furthermore, when happiness is experienced, the mind is soft (mṛdu); but when suffering is endured, the mind is hard (dṛḍha).

[The story of Vītāsoka]. – When Wei-t'o-chou (Vītāsoka), the younger brother of King Aśoka, was king of Jambudvīpa for seven days, he was permitted to indulge in the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa) on a grand scale. At the end of the seven days, king Aśoka asked him: “As king of Jambudvīpa, did you experience happiness (sukha) and joy (muditā)?” Vītāsoka answered: “I saw nothing, heard nothing, noticed nothing. Why? Because each morning, some caṇḍālas rang a bell and shouted: “Of the seven days [that you have been granted], so many have already gone by, and at the end of the seven days, you will die.” Hearing this proclamation, although I was king of Jambudvīpa and loaded down with the five objects of enjoyment, my sorrow (daurmanasya) and my suffering (duḥkha) were so great that I heard nothing and saw nothing.”

---

242 The story of Vītāsoka, also called Vigataśoka, Sudatta or Sugātra, is told fully in Aśokavadāna, T 2042, K. 2, p. 106a-107c (transl. Przyluski, Aśoka, p. 270-280); Aśokasūtra, T 2043, k. 3, p. 141b-44a; Divyāvadāna, p. 419-429 (transl. Burnouf, Introduction, p. 370-379); Tchou yao king, T 212, k. 6, p. 641a-c (transl. Chavannes, Contes, III, p. 297-302); Fen pie kong tō louen, T 1507, k. 3, p. 39c. – Vītāsoka, the younger brother of king Aśoka, had faith in heretical doctrines and jeered at the disciples of the Buddha whose easy life he begrudged. In order to convert him to the Holy Dharma, Aśoka resorted
From that, we know that the power of suffering is strong whereas that of happiness is weak. When a person who experiences happiness throughout his body is stabbed some place, all his happiness disappears and he feels nothing but the pain of his wound. The power of happiness (sukhabala) is so weak that two parts are needed to make it strong; that of suffering (duḥkhabala) is so strong that it needs only one part.

III. FRUITS OF THE IMMEASURABLES

Question. - What fruits of retribution (vipālaphala) does the person who is practicing the four immeasurables (apramāṇa) receive?

to a trick. While the king was bathing, his ministers, in connivance with him, invited Vīṭaśoka to try on the royal crown which the chances of succession might someday lead him to wear. Vīṭaśoka was ready for the experiment and, mounting the throne, he donned the crown. Suddenly the king came out of his bathroom and, seeing his brother seated on the throne, pretended to be indignant. He treated him as an usurper and sent him to the caṇḍalas, ordering him to be put to death. However, in order to permit him to repent, he allowed Vīṭaśoka to reign effectively for seven days after which he would be executed. Thus Vīṭaśoka enjoyed all the royal prerogatives, but each morning, the caṇḍalas, counting off the days remaining to him, reminded him of his forthcoming death. When the seventh day had passed, Vīṭaśoka was led into the presence of his brother the king. Aśoka questioned him about his impressions during the days of his reign. Vīṭaśoka answered: “All the sense pleasures with which I was loaded were spoiled by the perspective of my imminent death. Tormented by the fever of death, I remained sleepless for the entire time.” Embracing his brother, Aśoka said to him: “I will not put you to death; I wanted you to have faith in the Buddha’s Dharma and explain how his disciples, while abstaining from the arduous practices imposed on the Brahmins, turn away from sense objects, the complete vanity of which they calculate.” Convinced by this experience, Vīṭaśoka became a śramaṇa.

In the Ceylonese tradition, the hero of this story is Tissa-kumāra, brother of Aśoka and his vice-regent (Mahāvamsa, V, v. 151-60); for Huan-tsang, it was Mahendra (the Maninda of the Pāli sources), wrongly presented as the king’s brother, whereas he was his son (Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 8, p. 912a; transl. Watters, II, p. 93-94).

243 Namely, happiness (sukha) and joy (muditā).

244 In order to understand the discussion that will follow, one should recall the distribution of gods in the three worlds, a distribution discussed among scholars (cf. Kośa, III, p. 2-4, note) but which the Traité has already presented above, p. 517F, 519F, 954F:

1) Kāmadhātu is the abode of six groups of gods: i) Caturmahārajika, ii) Trāyāstrimśa, iii) Yāma, iv) Tuṣita, v) Brahmaloka, vi) Paramīrmitavāsāvarin.

2) Rūpadhātu, also called Brahmaloka, world of the Brahman gods, with its four dhyānas, is the abode of seventeen groups of gods.

First dhyāna: i) Brahmakāyika, ii) Brahmapurohita, iii) Mahābrahman.
Second dhyāna: i) Parittābhā, ii) Āpramāṇābhā, iii) Ābhāsvara.

Third dhyāna: i) Parittasūbhā, ii) Āpramāṇasūbhā, iii) Śubhakṛtsna.


3) Ārūpyadhātu, formless realm, has no abodes: it is inhabited, one might say, by formless beings belonging to four spheres: i) ākāśanāntyāyatana, ii) vijñānānāntyāyatana, iii) ākiṅcanyāyatana, iv) naivasamjñānaṃsaṃjñāyatana.

In principle, the ascetic who has practiced the apramāṇas is reborn in the two higher realms, rūpadhātu and ārūyadhātu, but the exact place is disputed by scholars because the canonical sources give the impression of being contradictory. Here, without any pretense of being complete, is a series of canonical topics that are under discussion:

1) Anguttara, IV, p. 150; V, p. 342 (T 125, k. 47, p. 806a26; Vinaya, V, p. 140; Paṭisasambhidā, II, p. 130; Milindapaṇha, p. 198; Visuddhimagga, p. 253, 258-260. – If he does not penetrate any higher, the person who practices maitrī gains Brahmāloka (uttāriṃ appatīvijjhaṇaṃ brahmaṃ kūpago hoti). ‘If he does not penetrate any higher’ means: if he is incapable of attaining the state of arhat (arahaṭṭhaṃ adhipigantum asakkondo).

2) Dīgha, I, p. 251; Majjhima, II, p. 195 (T 26, k. 6, p. 458b1); Majjhima, II, p. 207, 208. – The practice of maitrī, of karunā, of muditā or of upekṣā is the path leading to rebirth in the company of the Brahṛma gods (Brahmaṇaṃ sahavyataya maggo).

3) Anguttara, II, p. 130. – The good man who practices maitrī, karunā, muditā or upekṣā, when his body dissolves after death, is reborn in the company of the Śuddhavāsas (kāyaṃ bhedaṃ paraṃ Śuddhavāsasāṃ devaṃ sahavyatam uppaṇati). These gods constitute the five classes of Brahṛma gods occupying the summit of the 4th dhyāna in rūpadhātu.

4) Tseng yi a han (T 125, k. 21, p. 656b1-9); Vibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 82, p. 425c13-23); Nyāyānusāra (T 1562, k. 44, p. 594c3-6); Kośa, IV, p. 250; Kośavyākhya, p. 438 (Sanskrit original). – The person who practices the apramāṇaṃ is one of the four individuals ‘who gain brahmic merit’ (brahmaṃ puṇyaṃ prasavanti).

According to Anguttara, V, p. 76, the holder of brahmic merit ‘rejoices in the heavens for a kalpa’ (kappam saggamhi modati), and according to Kośa (III, p. 174; IV, p. 251), the gods whose lifespan is one kalpa are the Brahmaphurohiitas forming the second group of gods of the first dhyāna.

Therefore the person who, having loving-kindness, gains a brahmic merit and is reborn among the Brahmaphurohiitas.

5) Anguttara, II, p. 129. – The person who practices maitrī is reborn in the company of the Brahmakāyaikas whose lifespan is one kalpa. The person who practices karunā is reborn among the Ābhāsvara whose lifespan is two kalpas. – The person who practices muditā is reborn among the Śubhakṛtsnas whose lifespan is four kalpas. – The person who practices upekṣā is reborn among the Bṛhatphalas whose lifespan is five hundred kalpas.

concludes that the reward in these discrepancies. The Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣikas have expended a wealth of ingenuity in order to harmonize all these discrepancies. The Traité has not ignored them, but, refusing to enter into these subtleties, it concludes that the apramāṇas, dealing with all the beings of the ten regions without exception, receive their reward in ārūpyadhātu as well as in the rupadhātu of the Brahmā gods. Five benefits in the sūtra cited by the Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 83, p. 427a6-7; eight benefits according to Anguttara, IV, p. 150; eleven benefits according to Anguttara, V, p. 342; Vinaya, V, p. 140; Paṭisambhidā, II, p. 130; Milinda, p. 198; Visuddhimagga, p. 253.

Anguttara, V, p. 342 (Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 47, p. 806a17-806b3; Che yi siang sseu nien jou lai, T 861a23-b-7): Mettāya cetovimuttiyā āsevitāya… ekādasānisamsā pātikkhaḥ… Sukham supati, sukham paṭibujjiha, na pāpakam supinan passati, manussāsanā piyo hoti, amanussāsanā piyo hoti, devatā rakkhanti, nāsa aggy vīsaṃ vā satthāṃ vā kamati, tuvaṭam cittaṃ samādhīvati, mukavānno vippasīdati, asammūlho kālam karoti, uttarīṃ appativighanto brahmālokāpago hoti.

Transl. – If the liberation of the mind consisting of loving-kindness is observed and cultivated, eleven benefits are in store: 1) The benevolent person sleeps happily; 2) he awakes happy; 3) he has no bad dreams; 4) he is dear to humans; 5) he is dear to non-humans; 6) the gods protect him; 7) fire, poison and the knife do not harm him; 8) his mind becomes concentrated quickly; 9) his face is serene; 10) he dies without worry; 11) if he goes no higher, [after death] he wins the world of the Brahmā gods.

The reservation uttarīṃ appativighanto ‘if he does not penetrate any higher’, i.e., ‘if he is incapable of attaining the state of arhat’ (arahattam adhigantuṃ asakkonto) is necessary as it permits one to understand that loving-kindness can, by way of exception, accede to the supreme fruit of the religious life. But judging from the Chinese versions, this reservation does not appear in the Sanskrit āgamās.

The sūtra on the eleven benefits of maitri is fully commented on, with supporting stories, in Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 258-260. See also Manorathapūrṇi, V, p. 82-84.
Question. – Why did the Buddha say that the reward (vipāka) for loving-kindness is to be reborn in the Brahmā heavens?  

Answer. – Because the Brahmadevas are venerated by beings, everyone has heard of them and everyone knows them.

The Buddha lived in the Indian kingdoms where there were always many brahmins in whose religion virtuous men were all reborn among the Brahmadevas. When they learn that the devotees of loving-kindness (maitrācārin) are reborn among the Brahmadevas, beings have great faith (śraddhā) and are ready to practice loving-kindness. This is why the Buddha said that devotees of loving-kindness are reborn among the Brahmadevas.

Furthermore, the gods who have cut through sexual desire (rāga) are all called Brahmā, and it is said that these Brahmās dwell in the form realm (rūpadhātu). And so the fact of having cut through sexual desire is called brahmacarya ‘celibacy’ and those who have cut through are called brāhmaṇas.

When the Buddha speaks here of the ‘Brahmā heavens’, he means not only the four dhyānas [of rūpadhātu, inhabited by the Brahmadevas] but also the four ārūpyasamāpattis [formless absorptions of ārūpyadhātu, inhabited by the formless deities]. Investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra), [which are eliminated in the dhyānas of ārūpyadhātu], are so difficult to destroy that the Buddha does not speak here about the levels higher than these dhyānas [namely, the four ārūpyasamāpattis]. In the same way, when he spoke about the discipline of speech (vāksanvarta) which is part of the fivefold discipline (pañcaśīla) of the upāsaka, the Buddha mentioned only one [abstention], the abstention from lying (mṛṣāvādagaramaṇa), but he implied the other three abstentions [regarding slander (paiśūnyavāda), harmful speech (pāruṣyavāda) and idle chatter (saṃbhinnapralāpa)].

Question. - So loving-kindness brings the five benefits (anuṣamsa) in question; but why did the Buddha say nothing about the benefits brought by compassion, joy and equanimity?

Answer. - Refer to the above comparison (upamāna): by speaking of one single thing, the Buddha intends the other three. This applies here also. What the Buddha said about loving-kindness is equally true for compassion, joy and equanimity.

Furthermore, loving-kindness is the immeasurable par excellence. Loving-kindness is like the king (rājan); the other three immeasurables that accompany it are like the people (jana). Why? First, the yogin, by the mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcittā), wants beings to find happiness (sukha). Seeing that there are some

246 Anguttara, III, p. 225: So ime cattāro brahmavihāre bhāvetvā kāyassa bhedā parammaraṇā sugatiṃ brahmaṇokatā upapajjati. – See also Dīgha, I, p. 251; Majjhima, II, p. 195, 207-208, where the practice of the apramānas is given as the path leading to rebirth in the company of the Brahmā gods: ayaṃ pi kho Brahmaṇaṃ sahavyatāya maggo.

247 This comment which is evidently addressed to Chinese readers is not attributable to the author of the Traité, Nāgārjuna or others; it is probably a gloss of the translator Kumārajīva.

248 In regard to the fivefold morality (pañcaśīla), it is enough to say ‘lying’ and by that to include the other three misdeeds of speech: see above, p. 820F.
who do not find happiness, he produces the mind of compassion (karunācitta). Wanting beings who are free from painful thoughts to find the joy of the Dharma, he produces the mind of joy (muditācitta). Feeling neither aversion (pratigha) nor fondness (amunaya) nor sorrow (daurmanasya) towards these three things, he produces the mind of equanimity (apekṣācitta).

Finally, it is loving-kindness that gives happiness (sukha) to beings.

Moreover, in the Tseng yi a han (Ekottarāgama), the Buddha spoke about the mind of compassion (karunācitta) ‘endowed with the five benefits (anusāmsa)’.249

In many places in the Mahāyānasūtras, he spoke about the benefits it presents. Thus, in the Wang-ming p’ou-sa king (Jālinīprabhābodhisattvästra or Viśeṣacintībrahmāparipṛccchā),250 he said: “The bodhisattva practices the thirty-two kinds of compassion (karuṇā) among beings. The former increase gradually and change into great compassion (mahākaruṇā). Great compassion is the root of the qualities (guṇamāla) of all the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; it is the mother (matr) of Prajñāpāramitā and the grandmother (mahāmatr) of the Buddhas. By means of great compassion, the bodhisattva attains Prajñāpāramitā and, having acquired Prajñāpāramitā, he becomes Buddha.”251 He praises great compassion in every way.

---

249 Unidentified passage.

250 A sūtra in which the brahmārājan Viśeṣacintī, the bodhisattva Jālinīprabha and the bodhisattva Maṇjuśrī appear. The Traité cites it impartially under the name of Jālinīprabhābodhisattvästra (k. 20, p. 211b19; k. 22, p. 227b4; k. 28, p. 267a16) or under the name of Tch’e sin king = Viśeṣacintisūtra (k. 27, p. 257b2; k. 29, p. 275a18; k. 32, p. 279c9; k. 66, p. 524a24; k. 77, p. 604a23; k. 81, p. 631a18). The Mahāvyutpatti mentions the bodhisattva Jālinīprabha (no. 705) and a Brahmaviśeṣacintīparipṛccchā (no. 1367).

The Viśeṣabrahmaparipṛccchā is known to us by three Chinese versions and one Tibetan version:
1) Tch’e sin fan-t’ien so wen king (T585) by Dharmanakṣa; translated the 10th day of the 3rd month of the 7th T’ai-k’ang year (April 20, 286): cf. K’ai yuan mou lou, T 2154, k. 2, p. 494a26.
2) Sseu-yi fan-t’ien so wen king (T 586) by Kumārajīva; translated at Tch’ang-ngan, in the garden of Siao-yao, the 1st day of the 12th month of the 14th hong-che year (January 9, 403): cf. Li ti san pao ki, T 2034, k. 8, p. 77c12. Seng-jouei wrote the preface.
3) Cheng-sseu-wen fan-t’ien so wen king (T587) by Bodhiruci; translated at Lo-yang in the 1st chen-kouei year (518): cf. Li tai san pao king, T 2034, k. 9, p. 85c20. – A Cheng-sseu-wen king louen (T 1532), commentary by Vasubandhu (?) on this paripṛccchā was translated by this same Bodhiruci in the 1st p’ou-t’ai ai year (531): cf. Li tai san pao ki, T 2034, k. 9, p. 86a15.
4) Tshaṅs-pa khyad-par-sems-kyis śus-pa (OKC 827), translated by Śakyaprabha, etc.

251 The same passage also appears in two Chinese versions of the Ratnameghasūtra: T 660, k. 5, p. 302a9-302c19; T 489, k. 8, p. 723a8-723c11; and its original Indian is in the Mahāvyutpatti, no. 154-186.

It is not a matter of the thirty-two kinds of mahākaruṇā but of the thirty-two reasons impelling the Tathāgata to practice. Here is the first: Nairātmayāh sarve dharmāḥ sattvāś ca nairātmayan nādhimucyante. atas tathāgatasya sattveṣu mahākaruṇotpadyate: “All dharmas are without self and yet
Also in other places, he praises the mind of joy (muditācittā) and the mind of equanimity (upekṣācittā), but as loving-kindness and compassion are very important, the Buddha praises their advantages (anuśamsa) by preference: loving-kindness because of its qualities (guna) is difficult to get, and compassion realizes great deeds.

Question. – However, in explaining the benefits (anuśama) of the four immeasurables (apramāṇas) the Buddha said: “The mind of loving-kindness, properly observed, properly developed, ends up at best [in a rebirth] among the Śubhakṛṣṇa gods (maitrīcittam āśevitam subhāvitaṃ Śubhakṛṣṇeṣhyyo devabhayaḥ saṃvartate). – The mind of compassion (karuṇācittā), properly observed, properly developed, leads at best to the sphere [of the infinity] of space (ākāśānantāyatana). – The mind of joy (muditācittā), properly observed, properly developed, ends up at best in the sphere [of the infinity] of consciousness (vijñānantāyatana). – The mind of equanimity (upekṣācittā), properly observed, properly developed, leads at best to the sphere of nothing at all (ākiṃcayāyatana).”

beings do not believe in non-self; this is why great compassion for beings arises in the Tathāgata”; and so on.

The great compassion of the Tathāgata will be the subject of chapter XLII.

252 An extract from the Haliddavanasasutta of Saṃyutta, V, p. 119-121 (Tsahān, T 99, no. 743, k. 27, p. 197c11-13). – Some bhikṣus were paying a morning visit to the Parivrājaka heretics established at Haliddavasana, a Koliya village. The latter stated that they taught the same ‘liberations of mind’ (cetovimutti), i.e., the same apramāṇas, as the Buddha, and asked the bhikṣus how the Buddha’s teaching differed from their own. The bhikṣus, unable to answer, came to consult the Buddha, and this is what he told them:

Subhaparamāhaṃ, bhikkhave, mettaṃ cetovimuttīṃ vadāmi… Ākāśānaḥcayatanaparamāhaṃ, bhikkhave, karuṇaṃ cetovimuttīṃ vadāmi… Viññāṇānaḥcātaranaparamāhaṃ, bhikkhave, cetovimuttīṃ vadāmi… Ākiṃcaññaḥyatanaparamāhaṃ, bhikkhave, upekkhaṃ cetovimuttīṃ vadāmi. – “I state, O monks, that the liberation of mind which is loving-kindness has the Śibha [in the Chinese versions, the heaven of the Śubhakṛṣnas] as supreme as supreme goal. That which has compassion has the sphere of infinity of space as its supreme goal. That which has compassion has the sphere of infinity of space as its supreme goal. That which is joy has the sphere of infinity of consciousness as supreme goal. That which is equanimity has the sphere of nothing at all as supreme goal.”

Among the four ultimate goals, only the first, namely the heaven of the Śubhakṛṣnas belongs to the form realm (rūpadhātu), also called the world of the Brahmās (brahmaloka). The other three belong to the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu).

The Haliddavanasasutta is the only sūtra where rebirth in the formless realm is promised to those who practice the apramāṇas. Everywhere else the Buddha affirmed that adepts of the apramāṇas “are reborn in the Brahmaloka”, i.e., in the form realm.

These contradictory teachings naturally struck the old exegetists, and both Sanskrit and Pāli scholars have brooded over the Haliddavanasasutta. See especially Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 269; Comm. of Saṃyutta, III, p. 172; Vimuttimagga, tr. Ebara, p. 195; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 83, p. 430c22-24; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 79, p. 770c3-8.
[The three spheres in question belong to the ārūpyadhatu and not to rūpadhatu which forms the Brahmaloka.] Why then did the Buddha say above [211e] (p. 1267F) that the fruit of retribution of loving-kindness [and the other immeasurables ‘is rebirth in the Brahmā heavens’?

Answer. – 1. The teaching of the Buddhas is inconceivable (acintya).253 He speaks in this way in order to conform to the needs of those to be converted (vaiveyasattvānuvartanāt).

2. Furthermore, when one emerges from the concentration of loving-kindness (maitrīsamādhi), it is easy to be led to the third dhyāna [the summit of which the Śubhakṛṣṇa gods occupy]. – On emerging fromm the concentration of compassion (karunāsamādhi), it is easy to enter into the ākāśanāyatanā. – On emerging from the concentration of joy (multīsamādhi), it is easy to enter the vijñānānāntyāyatanā. – On emerging from of the concentration of equanimity (upekṣāsamādhi), it is easy to enter into the ākīṃcanyāyatanā.

3. Furthermore, by means of the mind of loving-kindness, the yogin wishes that all beings may find happiness (sukha) and, as a reward for this thought, he himself finds happiness. In the threefold world (traiḍhātukā), the Śubhakṛṣṇa gods are the happiest.254 This is why the Buddha says that ‘the mind of loving-kindness’ leads at best to rebirth among the Śubhakṛṣṇa gods. – By means of the mind of compassion, the yogin sees beings who are old, sick, weak, tormented and suffering. A feeling of pity (ānukampācitta) arises in him and he wonders how he can liberate these beings from suffering (duḥkhā):

- actually, if one eliminates the internal suffering (ādhyātmikadukhā), the external sufferings (bāhyadukhā) go away and if one eliminates the external suffering, the internal suffering goes away. The yogin then says: Those who have a body (dehin) necessarily encounter suffering; only those who have no body meet up with no suffering. And yet the ākāśa excludes all form (rūpa) and, [by that very fact, escapes from suffering]. This is why the Buddha said that [the mind of compassion] ends up at best in the ākāśānāntyāyatanā. – By means of the mind of joy, the yogin wants to brings beings the spiritual happiness (vijñānasukhā) called ‘joy’. In this spiritual happiness, the mind (citta), freed from the body (kāya), is like a bird (paksin) that has escaped from its cage (pañjara).255 In the ākāśānāntyāyatanā, the mind, although free of the body, was still attached to space (ākāśa). The vijñānānāntyāyatanā is immense (apramāṇa): it is consciousness in all the phenomena, and this consciousness enjoys unlimited sovereignty (aśīvarya). This is why the Buddha said that joy ends up at best in the vijñānānāntyāyatanā. – By means of the mind of equanimity, the yogin remains neutral (upeksante) to the suffering (duḥkha) and the happiness (sukha) of beings and, since he ignores suffering or happiness, he attains true equanimity (bhūtopeksādharma), namely, the ākīṃcanyāyatanā. This is why the Buddha said that the mind of equanimity ends up at best in the ākīṃcanyāyatanā.

These four immeasurables are acquired only by the noble individuals (āryapudgala) and not by the worldly people (prthagjana).

253 Anguttara, II, p. 80: Buddhānam, bhikkhave, buddhavisayo acinteyyo na cintetabho yam cintento unmmādassa vigātassa bhāgī assa.
254 See above, p. 499F, 504F.
255 Similar considerations have been developed above, p. 1032F.
4. Finally, the Buddha knew that, in future times \( \text{anāgata 'dhvani} \), because they were of weak faculties \( \text{mṛdvindriya} \), his disciples would become attached to dharmas by way of making distinctions \( \text{vikalpa} \) and would wrongly say about the four immeasurables: “The four limitless ones, having beings as their object \( \text{ālambana} \), are exclusively impure \( \text{sāsrava} \), concern the desire realm \( \text{kāmadhātu} \) exclusively and do not exist in the formless realm \( \text{ārūpyadhātu} \).”\(^{256}\)

In order to destroy the wrong views \( \text{mithyādrṣṭī} \) of these people, the Buddha said that the four immeasurables also concern the ārūpyadhātu. And since the Buddha considers these four immeasurables as concerning all the beings of the ten directions, they must also have the ārūpyadhātu as object.

Thus it is said in the \textit{Wou-tsin-yi p’ou-sa wen} (Akṣayamatiparipṛchchā): “Loving-kindness is of three kinds: i) that which has beings as object \( \text{sattvālambana} \); ii) that which has things as object \( \text{dharmālambana} \); iii) that which has no object \( \text{anālambana} \).” The śāstra explains: “That which has beings as object is impure \( \text{sāsrava} \); that which has no object is pure \( \text{anāsrava} \); and that which has things as object is sometimes impure and sometimes pure.”\(^{257}\)

All this is a summary of the four immeasurables.

\(^{256}\) Here the \textit{Traité} counters the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika theses according to which the \textit{apramāṇas} have beings as object \( \text{apramāṇāḥ sattvālambanāḥ} \) and, more precisely, that their domain is the beings of the desire realm \( \text{kāmasattvās tu gocarāḥ} \): cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 199; Abhidharmaḍīpa, p. 429. The Mahāyānasūtras and particularly the Akṣayamatinirdesa, cited here for the second time, state that they also can have things as object and even no object.

\(^{257}\) Quotation from the Akṣayamatinirdesa and not from the Akṣayamatiparipṛchchā: see above, p. 1245F, n. 1.
Second Section THE FOUR FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS (p. 1274F)

I. THE FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

The four formless absorptions (ārūpyasamāpatti) are: i) the sphere of infinity of space (ākāśānāntyāyatana), ii) the sphere of infinity of consciousness (vijñānānāntyāyatana), iii) the sphere of nothing at all (ākiṃcanyāyatana), iv) the sphere of neither-discrimination-nor-non-discrimination (naivasaṁjñānāśamjñāyatana).

1. Defiled absorptions, acquired by birth, acquired by effort.

These four formless absorptions are each of three kinds: stained (samala), acquired by birth (upapattiprātilambhika) or acquired by effort (prāyogika).258 [212a]

1) The thirty-one bad propensities (anuśaya) contained in the four ārūyas259 and the formations associated with the mind (cittasamprayuktasāṃskāra) arising within these propensities are stained (samala).

2) Acquired by birth (upapattiprātilambhika). – Those who have practiced the four immaterial absorptions (ārūpyasamāpatti) are reborn by virtue of ripening of these actions (karmavipāka) in the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu) and obtain four clear (vispaṭa) and morally undefined (avyākṛta) skandhas.260

258 Like the dhyanas, the samāpattis may be samāpattis of enjoyment (āsvādana) associated with craving (satrṣṇa) or pure samāpattis (śuddhaka), but of worldly order (laukika) and still involving āśrava: see above, p. 1027F, and also Kośa, VIII p. 145-146, with notes by de La Vallée Poussin. Moreover, the samāpattis may be acquired by birth (upapattiprātilambhika) as is the case among beings who, in the form of a ‘mental series without body’, come to be reborn in the four spheres of the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu). Finally, the samāpattis may be acquired by effort (prāyogika) as is the case for ascetics who momentarily become concentrated on these spheres: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 134.

259 There are six anuśayas: 1) rāga, 2) pratīgha, 3) māna, 4) avidyā, 5) dṛṣṭi, 6) vimāti. These six make ten by dividing dṛṣṭi into five. These ten anuśayas constitute the thirty-six anuśayas of kāmadhātu, thirty-one of rūpadhātu, the thirty-one of ārūpyadhātu, in all ninety-eight anuśayas: cf. Jñānaprabhāśa, T 1544, k. 5, p. 943a, discussed by Kośa, V, p. 9.

260 Whereas the dhyanas are accompanied by the five skandhas, the samāpattis have only four, because all rūpa (dhyanasamvarā, anāravasamvarā) is absent there (anuparivartakarūpābhāvāt). This is why the four samāpattis as well as the preliminary absorptions (sāmantaka) of the three higher samāpattis are called vibhūtarāpasamjñā ‘having overcome the notion of form’. The samantaka of the first samāpatti, the ākāśānāntyāyatana, is not given this name because the notion of rūpa is not completely overcome. It
3) Acquired by effort (prāyogika). – Examining the grossness (audārya) and harmfulness of form (rūpa), the cause of old age (jarā), sickness (vyākhā), death (maraṇa) and all kinds of suffering, the yogin considers it ‘as a sickness, as an ulcer, as a poisoned arrow’ (rogatagocāṇḍo sālāyataḥ samunapāṣyati).261 He tells himself that all of it is deception (vañcana) and falsehood (mṛṣāvāda) that he must avoid. Having reflected in this way, he overcomes all notion of matter, he destroys all notion of resistance, he forgets all notion of multiplicity and penetrates into the absorption of infinity of space (sa sarvōṣoropasaṃjñānāṁ amanaskārād ākāśāntyāvatanasamāppattir praviśati).262

261 Cf. Majjhima, I, 436, 500; Anguttara, IV, 422-423: So yad eva tattha hoti... te dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gandhato sallato ughato abādhato parato palokato suṇñato anattato samanupassatī. 262 The overcoming of these notions takes place in the preliminary (sāmantaka) of the first ārūpyasamāpatti. 263 Here the Traité repeats the old canonical phrases already quoted above, p. 1025, n.

2. Process of access to the absorptions

Question. – How can these three kinds of notions [of matter, resistance, multiplicity] be destroyed?

Answer. – These three kinds of notions (samjñā), all coming from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagri), are without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) and, since their intrinsic self nature does not exist, they are all deceptions, non-realities, easily destroyed. Furthermore, [the yogin says to himself], distinctions (vikalpa) regarding form are eliminated little by little (bhāgaśaḥ) and finally no longer exist. This is why, if they do not exist later, neither do they exist now. Under the influence of error (viparyāsa), beings seize the characteristics of identity (ekatva) and difference (anyatva) in composite matter, and their minds become attached to the nature of matter. As for me, I must not imitate these fools; I must seek the true reality (bhūtvastu) in which there is neither identity nor difference.

Furthermore, the yogin reflects thus:263

1) When I rejected and avoided dharmas, I obtained considerable benefits. First I abandoned my wealth, my wife and children; I left home and found the pure discipline (viśuddhaśīla): my mind is secure (yogakṣema); I have no more fear.

2) Putting away desires (kāma), evil and wicked dharmas (pāpa akusala dharmāḥ), I obtained the first dhyāna. joy and happiness (prītisukha), the result of detachment (viveka).

3) By suppressing enquiry and analysis (vitarkavicārāṇāṃ vyutpaśamā), by inner purification (adhyātmaṃ samprasadāt), I obtained the second dhyāna where there is great joy and happiness (mahāprītisukha).

is actually in this samantaka that the ascetic overcomes the notion of matter (rūpasamajñānātātikrāmati) and connected notions. See Kośa, VIII, p. 134-135; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 412.

261 Here the Traité repeats the old canonical phrases already quoted above, p. 1025, n.
4) By renouncing joy (prīter virāgā), I found myself in the third dhyāna which is by far the happiest.

5) Suppressing this happiness (sukhasya prahāṇāt), I obtained the fourth dhyāna, purified by renunciation and reflection.

6) Now I abandon these four dhyānas, for it is still necessary to obtain the wonderful absorptions (samāpatti).

This is why the yogin ‘transcends the notion of matter (rūpasamjñām atikrāmati), destroys the notion of resistance (pratighasamjñām nirodhayati) and no longer thinks about the notion of multiplicity (nānāVASamjñām na manasikaroṭi)’.

3. Transcending ideas

The Buddha spoke of three kinds of form (rūpa): “1) There is form that is visible and resistant (asti rūpam sanidarsanam sapratigham); 2) There is invisible resistant form (asti rūpam anidarśanam sapratigham); 3) There is invisible non-resistant form (asti rūpam anidarśanam apratigham).”

When the yogin ‘transcends the notion of matter (rūpasamjñā)’, this concerns visible resistant form (sanidāsana-sapratigha); when he ‘destroys the notion of resistance (pratisamjñā)’, this concerns invisible resistant form (anidarśana-sapratigha); when he ‘no longer thinks about the notion of multiplicity (nānāVASamjñā)’ this concerns invisible non-resistant form (anidarśanāprtigha).

Furthermore, by the destruction of invisibles seen by the eye (cakṣus), the yogin ‘transcends matter’; by the destruction of the ear (śrotṛa) and sounds (śabda), the nose (ghṛṇa) and smells (gandha), the tongue (jihvā) and tastes (rasa), the body (kāya) and tangibles (śrasṭavya), he ‘transcends the notion of resistance’. In regard to other forms and many varieties not described as form, we speak of ‘the notion of multiplicity’.265

---

264 Rūpasamgrahasūtra cited in Kośavyākhya, p. 352; Pāli correspondent, Dīgha, III, p. 217; Vibhaṅga, p. 13, 72, 89; Dhammasāṅgīl, p. 125, 146-147, 244-245.

265 An obscure and possibly corrupt passage. For the Kośavyākhya, the rūpasanidāsana-sapratigha is the rūpa to be cognized by the eye consciousness; the rūpa anidarśana-sapratigha is the eye, etc. and also the nine material bases of consciousness; the rūpa anidarśana-apratigha is the avijñāpti.

For the Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 273-274, the rūpasamjñās are the dhyānas of subtle form mentioned here under the name of ‘notion’, and things that are their object (rūpasaiñānasā sanātāsīsa vattaraupacarajñānānan c’ eva tadārammanānan ca). The pratighasamjñās are the notions of resistance coming from the contact between the physical bases of consciousness, eye, etc., and their respective objects, color, etc. (cakkhādiṇāma vatthūnān rūpādiṇāma ārammanān ca pratighātena samuppanān paṭighasaiñān). The nānāVASamjñās are the notions that function with variety as their domain (nānattā vā gocare pavattā saññā) or that are varied themselves (nānattā vā saññā). The Visuddhimagga is here inspired by the Vibhaṅga, p. 261-262.
Seeing this, the yogin eliminates the defilements (saṃkleśa) of the form realm (rūpadhātu) and obtains the ākāśānantyaĀyatana. In regard to the causes and methods of obtaining the other three ārūpyas, refer to what was said in the chapter on the Dhyānapāramitā (p. 1032-1034F).

4. Moral qualities of the absorptions

Of the four formless (ārūpya) [absorptions], one, namely, the [212b] naivasaṃjñānā-saṃjñāyatana, is always impure (sāsrava). For the other three, one can single out: the ākāśasnantyaĀyatana is sometimes impure (sāsrava) and sometimes pure (anāsrava). If it is impure, this ākāśāyatana contains four impure aggregates (sāsravasthānā); if it is pure, it contains four pure aggregates. It is the same for the vijñānānantyaĀyatana and the ākimcanyāyatana.

All these absorptions are conditioned (saṃskṛta) and good (kuśala). If it is impure, the ākāśāyatana involves retribution (savipāka) and is morally indeterminate (avyākṛta); if it is pure, it does not involve retribution (avipāka). It is the same for the vijñānāyatana and the ākimcanyāyatana.

If it is good, the naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana involves retribution and is morally indeterminate, but [in itself] it does not involve retribution.267

II. THE FORMLESS ABSORPTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Question. – What do these four absorptions consist of in the Mahāyāna? [213b]

Answer. – In the Mahāyāna, these four formless absorptions are modes of wisdom (prajñākāra) connected with the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas.

Question. – What is the true nature of dharmas?

Answer. – It is the fact that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāvaśūnya).

Question. – We accept that material dharmas (rūpādharma) composed of and coming from various causes and conditions are empty; but why would non-material dharmas be empty?

Answer. – If the coarse (audārika) substances (rūpa), seen by the eye and heard by the ear, can be accepted as empty, then why would non-material invisible, non-resistant (apratigha), experiencing neither suffering nor happiness, not be empty?

266 In this āyatana, also called the bhavāgra ‘Summit of existence’, awareness is so weak that in it one cannot meditate on the Path: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 145.

267 Here the Traité continues with a series of technical considerations which I [Lamotte] do not translate. The reader may find a similar set of analyses in the Vibhaṅga, p. 269-271.
Furthermore, material dharmas that can be analyzed as far as their subtle atoms (*paramāṇu*) are scattered, perish and return to the void. [But the non-material dharmas are still less consistent]: these minds (*citta*) and mental events (*caitasikadharma*) do not exist (*nopalabhyante*) for a month (*māsa*), a fortnight (*parvan*), an hour (*muhūrta*), a minute (*lava*) or even a single second (*kṣāṇa*).268

This is the significance of the four formless absorptions and all of this summarizes (*samkṣepataḥ*) the four immeasurables.

---

268 Cf. Anguttara, I, p. 10: *Nāhaṁ, bhikkave, aṇāhaṁ ekadhammaṁ pi samanupassāmi yaṁ lahuparivattam yathayidam cittam*: “I do not see, O monks, a single other dharma the transformation of which is as brief as the mind.” This may be compared to the river that never stops: “There is no *khaṇa*, *laya*, or *muhutta* when the river stops” (Anguttara, IV, p. 137).

According to the Atthasāliṁī, p. 60: *Yāva pan’ uppannaṁ rūpaṁ titṭhati tāva soḷassa citāni uppajjivā bhījanti*: “Sixteen moments of mind arise and perish during the time a material dharma lasts.”

First Section LIBERATIONS, MASTERIES AND TOTALITIES

PRELIMINARY NOTE

The fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth classes of supplementary dharmas recommended for bodhisattvas by the Prajñāpāramitā include:

1) Eight liberations: Sanskrit āṣṭau vimokṣāḥ; Pāli aṭṭha vimokkha (& vimokkha); Tibetan rnam par thar ba brgyad; Chinese pa pei chō or pa kai t’ouo.

2) Eight spheres of mastery: Sanskrit āṣṭāv abhibhavāyatana; Pāli attha abhīhāyatāni; Tibetan gzil gyis gnon paḥi skye mched brgyad; Chinese pa tch’ou tch’ou (or jou) or pa cheng tch’ou.

3) Ten spheres of totality: Sanskrit daśa kṛṣṇāyatana; Pāli dasa kasiṇāyatana; Chinese che yi tsie tch’ou (or jou) or che pien tch’ou (or jou).

These three lists intersect one another and are partially mingled so that it is useful to study them at the same time.

I. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE THREE LISTS


Sanskrit: Aṣṭau vimokṣāḥ: 1. rūpī rūpāṇi paśyaty ayaṃ ... viharaty ayaṃ aṣṭamo vimokṣa iti.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – The eight liberations:

1) Being [in the sphere of subtle form], he sees visibles; this is the first vimokṣa.

2) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles; this is the second vimokṣa.

3) Producing the pleasant vimokṣa, he abides in this absorption; this is the third vimokṣa.
4) By means of complete transcendence of notions of form, disappearance of notions of resistance, rejection of notions of multiplicity, he thinks: “Space is infinite” and he penetrates into the sphere of infinity of space and abides there in the manner of the gods attached to this sphere; this is the fourth vimokṣa.

5) Further, having completely transcended the sphere of infinity of space, he thinks: ‘Consciousness is infinite”, he penetrates into the sphere of infinity of consciousness and abides there in the manner of the gods attached to this sphere; this is the fifth vimokṣa.

6) Further, having completely transcended the sphere of infinity of consciousness, he thinks: “Nothing exists”, he penetrates into the sphere of nothing at all and abides there in the manner of the gods who are attached to it; this is the sixth vimokṣa.

7) Further, having completely transcended the sphere of nothing at all, he penetrates into the sphere of neither identification nor non-identification and abides there in the manner of the gods who are attached to it; this is the seventh vimokṣa.

8) Further, having completely transcended the sphere of neither identification nor non-identification, the cessation of notions and sensations being realized, he penetrates into it and abides there; this is the eighth vimokṣa.


Pāli: Aṭṭha abhibbāyatanāni: 1. aṭṭhātaṃ rūpasāṇī ēko bāhiddhā ... evamāpasāṇī hoti. idam aṭṭhamamaṃ abhibbhāyatanam.

Sanskrit formula in Daśottarasūtra, p. 95-97; Kośavyākhya, p. 690-691; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 431-432; Daśāsāhasrikā, p. 101-102; Mahāvyut., no. 1520-1527. Sanskrit: Aṣṭāv abhibhvāyatanāni: 1. adhyatmaṃ rūpasamjñā bahirdhā ... ca bhavati. idam aṣṭamamaṃ abhibbhāyatanam.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – The eight spheres of mastery:

1) Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees narrow outer visibles, beautiful or ugly, and he cognizes these visibles by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them and he is aware of them; this is the first abhibhū.

2) Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles very extensive (var. very enlarged), beautiful or ugly, and these visibles (etc., as in 1); this is the second abhibhū. outer visibles.

3) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer narrow visibles, and these visibles (etc. as in 1); this is the fourth abhibhū.

4) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer extensive (var. very enlarged) visibles, beautiful or ugly, and these visible (etc. as in 1); this is the fourth abhibhū.
5) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles blue, blue in color, blue in aspect, blue in luster. Just like the flax flower or like fine blue Benares muslin, blue in color, blue in aspect, blue in luster, in the same way, without having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles blue, blue in color, blue in aspect, blue in luster, and he cognizes them by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them and he is aware of them; this is the fifth abhibhu.

6) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles yellow, yellow in color, yellow in aspect, yellow in luster. Just like the *karnikāra* flower (Pterospermum acerifolium) or like fine yellow Benares muslin, yellow in color, yellow in aspect, yellow in luster, in the same way, without having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles yellow (etc., as in 5); this is the sixth abhibhu.

7) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles red, red in color, red in aspect, red in luster. Just like the *bandhujivaka* flower (Pentapetes phoe nicea) or fine red Benares muslin, red in color, red in aspect, red in luster, in the same way, without having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles red, (etc. as in 5); this is the seventh abhibhu.

8) Not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles white, white in color, white in aspect, white in luster. Just like the planet Venus or fine white Benares muslin, white in color, white in aspect, white in luster, in the same way, not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles white (etc. as in 5); this is the eighth abhinhu.


Sanskrit formula in Mahāvyut., no. 1528-1540: Daśa kṛt snāyatanāni: 1. prthivikṛt snāyatanam. ... 10. vijñānakṛt snāyatanam.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – The ten spheres of totality: 1) Totality of earth; 2) totality of water; 3) totality of fire; 4) totality of wind; 5) totality of blue; 6) totality of yellow; 7) totality of red; 8) totality of white; 9) totality of space; 10) totality of consciousness. This totality of earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red and white, he recognizes them above, below, on the side, without duality and limitless.

The last two kaśinas are sometimes omitted in the lists of the Paṭisambhidā (I, p. 49, 143-144, 149-150) or replaced by the āloka- and the paricchinn′ākāsa- in the Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 89.

The kṛsnas are not objective observations but ‘voluntary seeings’: *adhimuktimanasikāra* (Kośa, II, p. 325). This is well-explained in the Daśaśāhasrikā, p. 102: Sarvadhātūn prthivīdātāv adhimucya sarvam api prthivīdātāt evaikadātār bhavati: “When one ‘wills’ all the elements into the element earth, everything becomes a single element, namely, the ‘earth’ element. In the same way, when one ‘wills’ all the elements into the element water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, space or consciousness.” And the Daśaśāhasrikā concludes: “We call sphere of totality the fact [that as a result of ‘voluntary seeing’] everything becomes a single element: earth, water, etc.”
II. KAŚINA IN PĀLI SCHOLASTICISM

Of the three classes of supplementary dharmas, the ten kaśinas have captured the attention of Pāli scholasticism: cf. Paṭisambhidā, I p. 6, 95; Dhammasaṅgāni, p. 42; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 89. 112: and especially Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 96-144 (transl. Nanamoli, p. 122-184) which describes fully the process of the earth kasiṇa. As in the subsequent seven, it is a process of autosuggestion to reach the dhyānas. Here is a brief summary of the stages of the mental operation:

1) Creation of the sign (nimitta). – If he is specially endowed, the monk chooses as visible sign a ploughed earth surface (kasitāṭṭhāna) or a threshing area (khalamaṇḍala). Most frequently, on the advice of a teacher, he makes an earthen disc (mattikamaṇḍala) of dark color, without the intrusion of blue, yellow, red or white color that could cause confusion with the other kasiṇas and thus contaminate the earth kasiṇa. Whether or not this disc is transportable, it should be set up on a pedestal in an isolated place and the ascetic sits down at the appropriate distance to see it well.

2) Appearance of the sign of learning (uggahanimitta). – Having vowed to eliminate sense desires that are so unpleasant (appassādā kāmā), the monk looks calmly at the earth disc without resting on its color (vanṇa) or its nature (lakkhana) but by fixing his mind on the nominal concept (paññatti dhāma) of ‘earth’ the different names of which he recites mentally: paṭhavī, mahī, medinī, bhūmi, etc. Sometimes with his eyes open and sometimes with his eyes closed (kālena ummiḷetvā kālena nimimetvā), the monk contemplates this semi-abstract, semi-concrete image until he sees it as clearly with his eyes shut as with his eyes open. It is at this moment that the sign of learning (uggahanimitta) is produced. The monk then leaves his seat and goes back into the monastery still keeping clearly in his mind this sign of learning and recovering it each time that he loses it.

3) Appearance of the counter-sign (paṭibhāganimitta). – There comes the time when the five obstacles (nīvarana) to the jhāna (see above, p. 1012-1020F) disappear and when the factors (aṅga) of the jhāna (see above, p. 1237F) manifest. In the first case, the ascetic enters into the samadhi of approach (upacārasamādhi); in the second case, he enters into the mental stabilization of absorption (appanāsamādhi). But the entry into samadhi coincides with the appearance of the counter-sign (paṭibhāganimitta):

“The difference between the sign of learning (uggahanimitta) and the counter-sign is the following: In the sign of learning, any defect (dosa) of the kasiṇa (intrusion of foreign colors?) is evident; but the counter-sign, the sign of learning having come to en end, is somehow removed from it and appears purer, a hundred times purer, a thousand times purer than it, like a glass removed from its case, like a well-polished pearly shell, like the disc of the moon coming out from behind a cloud. This counter-sign has neither color (varṇa) nor shape (santhana), for if it had any, it would be cognizable by the eye, coarse, susceptible of being grasped and marked by the three characteristics [impermanence, suffering and selflessness?]. But it is not like that. It is just a way of representation, a state of awareness belonging solely to the holder of the stabilization. Starting from the moment when it is produced, the obstacles [to the jhāna] are weakened, but the negative emotions (kilesa) remain and the mind is stabilized in the samadhi of approach
(upacārasamādhi).” In the samādhi of approach (appanāsamadhi) which follows, the factors of the samādhi appear and grow.

4) Protection of the counter-sign (pañcāṭātātanimittarakkhaṇa) and attainment of the jhānas. – The ascetic should keep the counter-sign as if it were his most precious treasure and, to this end, take great care of his dwelling (āvāsa), his domain (gocāra), his words (bhassa), the people (puggala) he meets, his food (bhojana), the atmosphere (utu) and the postures (iriyāpatha) he takes. Thus, thanks to the earth kasiṇa, he attains the first dhyāna and abides there.

5) Extension of the counter-sign (pañcāṭātātanimittavadhana). – In the course of the concentrations of approach and of absorption, the ascetic should gradually extend the counter-sign by noting its progress: one span, two spans and finally the outer limit of the cosmic sphere.

6) Acquisition of the spheres of mastery (abhibhāyatanapatilābha). – This complete mastery over the sign assures the ascetic a complete mastery over things and gives him magical powers. This is how the earth kasiṇa allows him to multiply himself when he is one, etc. (cf. above, p. 382F, n. 2).

The other nine kasiṇas progress in the same way as the earth kasiṇa. Here it is sufficient to determine their respective ‘signs’ and to specify the type of ‘mastery’ they will exert upon things.

In the water kasiṇa, the sign of learning is moving (calamāna) and the counter-sign is inert (nipparipphanda), like a crystal fan held in the air or like a crystal mirror. It brings the following powers: plunging into the earth and emerging from it, bringing rain-storms, creating rivers and seas, shaking the earth, mountains, palaces, etc.

In the fire kasiṇa, the sign of learning is like a spark of fire that becomes detached and falls; the counter-sign is motionless (niccala) like a piece of red wool held up in the air. Thanks to this practice, the ascetic can emit smoke and flames, cause a rain of ash, extinguish one fire by means of another, burn whatever he wishes, create lights that allow him to see objects visible to the divine eye and, at the moment of his parinirvāṇa, burn his body by the fire element.

In the wind kasiṇa, the sign of learning appears in movement (cala) like an eddy of hot steam coming out of a pot of rice-gruel; the counter-sign is calm (sannisinna) and motionless (acala). From this kasiṇa come the powers of walking with the speed of wind and causing wind storms.

The four color kasiṇas use as signs of learning a blue, yellow, red or white flower or cloth. Their counter-sign appears like a crystal fan. They permit the ascetic to create colored objects and particularly to reach the 5th to the 8th abhibhāyatanas (spheres of mastery of colors) as well as the 3rd vimokha, namely the subhavimokha or pleasant liberation.

The kasiṇa of light (āloka) and that of limited space (paricchinnākāśa) have as their respective counter-signs a mass of light (ālokapuñja) and the circle of space (ākāśamaṇḍala). Thanks to the first, the ascetic is able to create luminous forms, to banish languor and torpor and chase away shadows; by means of the
second he is able to discover whatever is hidden, create empty spaces in the earth and rocks and occupy them, pass through walls at will, etc.

III. VIMOKṢA, ABHIBHU AND KṚTSNA ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

These technical procedures aimed at complete detachment from the things of the threefold world are fully studied by the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivādins and related texts: Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 18, p. 1013 seq.; Saṃgīniparipāya, T 1536, k. 18-20, p. 443a26-446a18, 447a25-452c11; Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 7, p. 96b-929a; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 976117-b16 (reconstruction by Sastri, p. 103-107); Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 84-85, p. 434b15-442b14; Kośa, VIII, p. 203-218; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 80, p. 771b-775a; Abhidharmasamuccahaya (of the Vijñānavādins), T 1605, k. 7, p. 680c23-691a22 (reconstructed by Pradhan, p. 95-96).

Here is a summary of the Abhidharma scholasticism.

In general, the vimokṣas are the gateway into the abhibhus, which in turn are the gateway into the kṛtsnas. The vimokṣas are ‘complete emancipation’ (vimokṣamātra) from the object. The abhibhus exert a twofold mastery (abhibhavana) over the object, entailing the view of the object as one wishes it (yathāṣṭam adhimokṣaḥ) and the absence of the negative emotion provoked by the object (kleśānupatti). The kṛtsnas embrace the object without a gap and in its totality (nirantarakṛtsnaspharaṇa). All are derived from the dhyānas and the saṁpattis.

A. Vimokṣas 1-3, eight abhibhus and kṛtsnas 1-8.

1) In nature they are the five skandhas and they have as object the visibles of kāmadhātu.

2) Vimokṣas 1-2 and abhibhus 1-4 are contemplations of the horrible (asubhabhāvana), i.e., of the decomposing corpse, and are practiced in the 1st and 2nd dhyānas. When practiced in the first, they counteract attachment to color (varṇarūga) of kāmadhātu; when practiced in the second, they counteract attachment to color of the first dhyāna.

3) In vimokṣa 1 and abhibhus 1-2, the ascetic still has the notion of inner visibles, those of his own body; in vimokṣa 2 and abhibhus 3-4, he no longer has them. But in all cases, he contemplates unpleasant outer visibles (amanojñā), less numerous (parīta) in abhibhus 1 and 3, numerous (mahodgata or paramāna) in abhibhus 2 and 4.

4) Vimokṣa 3, abhibhus 5-8 and kṛtsnas 1-8 are contemplations on the beautiful (subhabhāvana) and are practiced exclusively in the 4th dhyāna. No longer having the notion of inner visibles, the ascetic contemplates the outer pleasant visibles (manojñā) of kāmadhātu: in vimokṣa 3, the beautiful (subha) in
general, which he actualizes (kāyena sākāṭkaroṭī); in abhibhus 5-8 and kṛtñas 5-8, the four pure colors (blue, yellow, red and white); in kṛtñas 1-4, the four great elements (earth, water, fire and wind).

B. Vimokṣas 4-7 and kṛtñas 8-10.

1) Being formless, in nature they are the four skandhas with the exception of rūpaskandha and are practiced in the formless absorptions (ārūpyasamāpatti): vimokṣa 4 and kṛtña 9 and the ākāśānantyāyatana; vimokṣa 5 and kṛtña 10 in the vijñānānantyāyatana; vimokṣa 6 in the ākimcānāyatana; vimokṣa 7 in the naivasamjānāsantyāyatana.

2) For object they have the suffering of their own level and a higher level (svabhūmyūrdhvabhūmikāṃ duḥkham), the cause and cessation of this suffering (taddhetunirodha), the Path relative to the totality of the anvayajñāna (sarvānvayajñānapaksomārgaḥ), the apratisamkyānirodha and the ākāśa.

C. Eighth vimokṣa.

This is the absorption of cessation of concepts and feelings (samjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti), [a dharma] which stops the mind and mental events.

The qualities that constitute class A are acquired only by humans; those of classes B and C are acquired by beings of the threefold world. All these qualities may have as support (āśraya) the mental series of a worldly person (prthagjana) or a saint (ārya), except the last one, the nirodhavimokṣa, which can be produced only by the saint.

1. The Eight Liberations (p. 1291F)

A. General definition

The eight liberations (aṣṭau vimokṣāḥ): [k. 21, p. 215a]

1) Having [the notion] of inner visibles, he also sees outer visibles, this is the first vimokṣa (adhyātmaṃ rūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyaty ayaṃ prathamo vimokṣaḥ).269

2) Not having [the notion] of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles, this is the second vimokṣa (adhyātmaṃ arūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyaty ayaṃ dvitīyo vimokṣaḥ).

3) He physically actualizes the pleasant vimokṣa, this is the third vimokṣa (śubham vimokṣaṃ kāyena sāksātkaroty ayaṃ tṛitiyo vimokṣaḥ).

269 In place of the canonical phrase rūpī rūpāṇi paśyati, the Traité substitutes this new wording borrowed from the definition of the first abhibhu. Harivarman does the same in his Satyasiddhi śāstra, T 1646, k. 12, p. 339a17.
4-8) – The four formless absorptions (catasra ārūpyasamāpattayāḥ) and the absorption of cessation of concept and feeling (samjñāvedīti nirodhasamāpatti) are the [last] five vimokṣas.

In all, eight vimokṣas. They ‘turn the back’ (pei) on the five objects of enjoyment (kāmagnuṇa) and [they ‘reject’ (chō)] or eliminate the mind of attachment (saṅgacitta) towards them; this is why they are called ‘turning the mind and rejecting’ (pei-chō, in Sanskrit vi-mokṣa).

B. The first two vimokṣas

The yogin has not destroyed inner and outer visibles: he has not suppressed the notion of both [his own] inner and outer visibles (rūpasamjñā) and he sees these visibles with a feeling of horror (asubhacitta).

The yogin has destroyed the inner visibles and suppressed the notion of inner visibles (adhyātam rūpasamjñā), but he has not destroyed outer visibles nor suppressed the notion of outer visibles (bahirdhā rūpasamjñā) and it is with a feeling of horror that he sees outer visibles: this is the second vimokṣa.

These two vimokṣas both contemplate the horrible (asubha); the first contemplates inner as well as outer visibles; the second does not see inner visibles and sees only outer visibles. Why is that?

Beings (sattva) have two kinds of behavior (pratipad). Sensualism (ṛṣṇācarita) and rationalism (ṛṣṭicarita). The sensualists (ṛṣṇābuhula) are attached to happiness (sukharakta) and are bound (baddha) by outer fetters (bāhyasamyojana). The rationalists (ṛṣṭibuhula) are strongly attached to the view of the individual (satkāyadṛṣṭi), etc., and are bound by inner fetters (adhyāmasamyojana). This is why the sensualists [usefully] contemplate the horrors of outer visibles (bāhyarūpāsubha), whereas the rationalists [usefully] contemplate the horrors (asubha) and corruption (vikāra) of their own body.

Furthermore, at the beginning of the practice, the yogin’s mind lacks sharpness (asūksma) and at the start it is difficult for him to fix his mind on a single point [viz., outer visibles]. That is why he disciplines his mind and tames it by gradual practice (kramābhyāsa) consisting of the [simultaneous] consideration of both outer and inner visibles. Then he can destroy the notion of inner visibles and see only outer visibles.

Question. – If the yogin no longer has the notion of inner visibles, why can he see outer visibles?

270 This paragraph is undoubtedly a note by Kumārajīva aimed at justifying the translation of vimokṣa by the Chinese characters pei-chō.

For the Indian exegesis, see Athasālinī, p. 191-192: Ārammane adhimuccanatthena paccanikadhammehi vimuccanatthena vimokkho ti vuttam; Kośavyākhya, p. 689: sarvasaṃskṛtavimukhyād vimosah, samāppattivaraṇavimokṣaṇād vimokṣa iti.

271 Actually, during the first two vimokṣas, the ascetic cultivates the nine notions regarding the decomposing corpse, notions that will be the subject of the next chapter.

272 For these two kinds of behavior, see Nettippakaraṇa, p. 7, 109; Kośa, IV, p. 174, 208; V, p. 82; Kośavyākhya, p. 427.
Answer. – This is a matter of a subjective method (adhimuktimarga) and not an objective method (bhūtamarga). The yogin thinks about his future corpse burned by the fire (vid개더카), devoured by insects (vikhāditaka), buried in the ground and completely decomposed. Or, if he considers it at present, he analyzes this body down to the subtle atoms (paramāṇu), all non-existent. This is how ‘he sees outer visibles, not having the notion of inner visibles’.

Question. – In the [first] two abhibhāyatanas, the yogin sees inner and outer visibles; in the [last] six abhibhāĀtanās he see only outer outer visibles. In the first vimokṣa, he sees inner and outer visibles; in the second vimokṣa, he sees only outer visibles. Why does he destroy only the concept of inner visibles and not destroy the outer visibles?

Answer. – When the yogin sees with his eyes this body marked with the marks of death (maraṇanimitta), he grasps the future characteristics of death; as for the actual body, in it he sees, to a lesser degree, the disappearance (nirōdhalaksana) of the outer four great elements (mahābhūta). Therefore, since [215b] it is difficult for him to see that they do not exist, the [Sūtra] does not speak of the destruction of the visibles.

Besides, at the time when the yogin will have transcended the form realm (rūpadhātu), he will no longer see outer visibles.

C. The third vimokṣa

“He actualizes the pleasant vimokṣa” (śubham, vimokṣaṃ kāyena sākṣātkaroti). – This is a pleasant meditation in regard to unpleasant things (aśubheṣu śubhabhāvanā), as is said about the eight abhibhāyatanas.

The first eight krṣnāyatanas contemplate, in the pure state (śuddha): 1) earth (prthivi), 2) water (ap), 3) fire (tejas), 4) wind (vāyu), and also 5) blue (nīla), 6) yellow (piṇa), 7) red (lohitā), 8) white (avadāta).

The [fifth] sees visibles as blue (rūpāni nīlāni) like the blue lotus flower (nilotpalapuṣpa), like the kintsing-chan, like the flax flower (umakapuṣpa) or like fine Benares muslin (sampannam vā vārāṇaseyam vastram). It is the same for the visions of yellow (piṇa), red (lohitā) and white (avadāta), each according to its respective color. The entire thing is called ‘the pleasant vimokṣa’.

Question. – If all of that is the pleasant vimokṣa, it should not be necessary to speak of the krṣnāyatanas [under the pain of repeating oneself].

273 An adhimuktimanasikāra or adhimuktisamjñāna or ‘voluntary seeing’ of the object; see Kośa, VIII, p. 198-199 and notes.
274 I.e., in the five vimokṣas and the two krṣnas called ārūpya.
275 This detail is necessary because, in the course of the first eight krṣnas, the yogin contemplates the four great elements and the four colors in their most pure form, without the intrusion of foreign elements or colors. This is what the Visuddhimagga calls the ‘counter-sign’ (paṭihāganimitta) of the object: see above, p. 1287F.
276 This must be a flower or a blue metal. However, there is a mountain in Kiang-Si with this name.
Answer. – The vimokṣas are the initial practice (prathamacaryā); the abhibhvāyatanas are the intermediate practice (madhyamacaryā) and the kṛtständyanas are the long-standing practice.277

The meditation of the horrible (aśubhabhāvāna) is of two types: i) unpleasant (aśubha); ii) pleasant (śubha). The [first] two vimokṣas and the [first] four abhibhvāyatanas are of the unpleasant type. One vimokṣa, [i.e., the third], the [last] four abhibhvāyatanas and the [first] eight kṛtständyanas are of the pleasant type.

Question. – When the yogin takes as pleasant (śubha) that which is unpleasant (aśubha), he is making a mistake (viparyāsa).278 Then why is the meditation that he practices in the course of the pleasant vimokṣa not erroneous?

Answer. – The error is in seeing wrongly as pleasant a woman’s beauty which is unpleasant, but the meditation practiced during the pleasant vimokṣa is not a mistake due to the extension (viśālatva) of all true blue color, [etc].

Moreover, in order to tame the mind (cittadamanārtham), the pleasant meditation presupposes a lengthy practice of the meditation on the horrible (aśubhabhāvāna) and on mental revulsion (cittanirveda): this is why practicing the pleasant meditation is not a mistake and there is no desire (lobha) in it.279

Moreover, the yogin begins by contemplating the horrors of the body and fixes his mind on all the inner and outer horrors in bodily things. Then he feels revulsion (nirveda): [his negative emotions], lust (rāga), hatred (dveśa) and stupidity (moha) decrease; he becomes frightened and understands: “I do not possess these characteristics as a person at all: it is the body that is like that. Then why am I attached to it?”

He concentrates his mind and really meditates so as not to commit mistakes. As soon as his mind becomes disciplined and gentle, he avoids thinking of the horrors of the body, such as skin (tvac), flesh (māṃsa), blood (lohita) and marrow (asthimajjan): for him there are only white bones (śvetāsthika) and he fixes his mind on the skeleton (kaṅkāla). If his mind wanders outward, he concentrates and gathers it back. Concentrating his mind deeply, he sees the diffused light of the white bones (śvetāsthika) like a conch-shell (śaṅkha), like shells (kapardaka), lighting up inner and outer things. This is the gateway of the pleasant vimokṣa.

Then, noting the disappearance of the skeleton, the yogin sees only the light of the bones (asthīprabhā) and grasps the characteristics (nimitta) of outer and inner visibles. For example:

1) diamond (vajra), pearl (manī), precious golden and silver objects (hemarajataratnavastu).281

278 The third of the four errors consisting of taking what is impure to be pure (aśucau śucir iti viparyāsah).
279 The third vimokṣa is the root of good, alobha: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 206; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 430.
280 Cf. the atīkāni satāni saṅkhavanyūpanibhāni about which the canonical sources speak: Dīgha, II, p. 297; Majjhima, I, p. 58,59; III, p. 93; Anguttara, III, p. 324.
281 The contemplation of these precious objects is not mentioned in the traditional list of the kṛtständyanas.
2) very pure (supariśuddha) earth (prthīvī);[282] [first krṣnā],
3) pure water (ap): [second krṣnā],
4) pure fire (tejas) without smoke (dhūma) or kindling (indhana): [third krṣnā],
5) pure wind (vāyu), without dust (rajas): [fourth krṣnā],
6) blue visibles (rūpāṇī niṅgā), like the kin-tsing-chan: [fifth abhibhu and fifth krṣnā],
7) yellow visibles (rūpāṇī pīṇā), like the ginger flower (campakāspa): [sixth abhibhu and sixth krṣnā],
8) red visibles (rūpāṇī lohitāni), like the flower of the red lotus (padmapūpa): [seventh abhibhu and seventh krṣnā].
9) white visibles (rūpāṇī avadātāni), like white snow (hima): [eighth abhibhu and eighth krṣnā].

Grasping these characteristics (nimmītānī udgrhnān), the yogin fixes his mind on the pleasant meditation (subhābhāvāna) on the pure light (pariśuddhaprabhā) belonging to each of these visibles. Then the yogin experiences joy (prīti) and happiness (sukha) filling his entire body (kāya): this is what is called the pleasant vimokṣa (subha vimokṣa). Since it has pleasant things as object (ālambana), it is called ‘pleasant’ vimokṣa. Since the ascetic experiences this [215c] happiness in his whole body, it is said that the yogin ‘actualizes it physically’ (kāyena sākṣātkaroti). Having obtained this mental happiness (cittasukha), the yogin ‘turns his back and rejects’ (vi-muc) the five objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa) and is henceforth without joy (prīti) or happiness (sukha):[283] this is indeed a vimokṣa.

As the yogin has not yet destroyed the impurities (aksīnārava), it happens that, from time to time, passionate thoughts (samyojanacitta) arise in him and he becomes attached (anusajate) to pleasant visibles (subhārupa). Then he vigorously (ātāpin) and energetically (vīravat) cuts this attachment (tam āsāngam samucchinattī). Actually, this pleasant meditation is a result of his mind. And just as a master magician (māyākāra), in the face of objects that he has created magically, knows that they come from him, so the yogin is no longer attached (āsānga) and no longer pursues objects (ālambana). Then the vimokṣa ‘liberation’ changes its name and is called ‘sphere of mastery over the object’ abhibhva-Ātana.

Although the yogin thus masters (abhibhavati) the pleasant meditation (subhābhāvāna), he is still incapable of extending it (vistārayitum). Then he returns to grasp the pleasant characteristics (subhanimitta):

---

[282] Cf. the first eight counter-signs (paṭibhāganimitta) defined by the Visuddhimagga in the chapters on the kasiṇas (above, p. 1288F).

[283] This is explained by the fact that the third vimokṣa and consequently the eight abhibhus and the first eight krṣnās are practiced in the fourth dhāyāna where there is no longer any happiness or suffering, neither joy nor sadness: see above, p. 1031-1032F.

The expression kāyena sākṣātkṛtvā is absent in the Pāli canonical sources and is used by the Sanskrit sources only in regard to the fourth and eighth vimokṣa. This is due to their excellence (prādhānyā) and because they are in the final stages of rūpadhātu and ārūpadhātu respectively: cf. Kośa, VIII, p. 210-211; Kośavyākhya, p. 690.
a. Using the power of the vimokṣas and the power of the abhibhāyatanas, he grasps the nature of pleasant earth (subhaḥprthivī) and gradually extends it (krameṇa vistārayātī) to all the empty space (ākāśa) of the ten directions. He does the same with water (ap), fire (tejas) and wind (vāyu).284

b. He grasps the nature of blue (nīlanimitta) and gradually extends it to all the space of the ten directions. He does the same with yellow (pīta), red (lohitā) and white (avatātā).285

Now the abhibhāyatanas are transformed and become the kṛtṣnāyatanas ‘spheres of totality of the object’. These three, [namely the vimokṣas, the abhibhāyatanas and the kṛtṣnāyatanas], are one and the same thing (ekārtha), with three name-changes.

Question. – The [first] three vimokṣas, the eight abhibhāyatanas and the ten kṛtṣnāyatanas are either objective considerations (bhūtapratyaveksā) or subjective considerations (adhimuktipratyaveksā).

If they are objective considerations, since the body still contains skin (tvac) and flesh (māṃsa), how can one see only white bones (śvetasthīka) in it? Besides, the body is constituted by an assemblage of thirty-six substances (sātrīṃśaddhātusāmagnī).286 why distinguish them and consider them separately? The four great elements (mahābhūta) [entering into the constitution of the body] each have their own nature (svaḷaṅkāra).287 why exclude three of them [water, fire and wind] and consider just the earth element

---

284 In the course of kṛtṣnas 1 to 4.

285 In the course of kṛtṣnas 5 to 8.

286 In the Sanskrit sources of both the Lesser and the Greater Vehicles, physical substances are 26 in number (cf. Tseng yi a han, T 125, p. 687b9; k. 27, p. 712b7; k. 49, p. 815c5; Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, T 201, k. 5, p. 285b1; Po yu king, T 209, k. 4, p. 555b15; Tch’ou yao king, k. 212, k. 1, p. 612b17; k. 5, p. 632c22; k. 17, p. 699c7; k. 26, p. 749c16). They are listed, with many faulty readings, in the Sanskrit editions of the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 205, l. 16-19 (T 223, k. 5, p. 253c26-29) and the Śatasāhasrikā, p.1431, l. 9-13 (T 220, k. 53, p. 298b26-28).

The Pāli suttas list 31 (Dīgha, II, p. 293; III, p. 104; Majjhima, I, p. 57; III, p. 90; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 111; V, p. 278; Anguttara, III, p. 323; V, p. 109). The Visuddhimagga gives their number as 32 and discusses them at length. Here is the latter list with corresponding terms in Pāli and Sanskrit:

1) Hair of the head (kesa, keśa); 2) hairs (loma, roman). 3) nails (nakha); 4) teeth (dānta); 5) skin (taca, tvac); 6) flesh (mamsa, māṃsa); 7) tendons (nāru, snāyu); 8) bone (aṭṭhi, asthi); 9) marrow (aṭṭhimaṇḍa, asthimajan); 10) kidneys (vakka, vṛkka); 11) heart (hada, āṭṭhada); 12) liver (yakana, yakrt); 13) pleura (kilamaka, kloman); 14) spleen (pihaka, plīhan); 15) lungs (pappāsa, pūphusa); 16) intestines (anta, antra); 17) mesentery (antāgīṇa, antraṅgaṇa); 18) stomach (usuṭīya, udara); 19) excrement (karīva, karīṣa); 20) brain (matthalaṅga, maṭṭaluṅga); 21) bile (pītta); 22) phlegm (samha, śleṣman); 23) pus (pubba, pūya); 24) blood (lohitā); 25) sweat (seda, sveda); 26) fat (meda or medas); 27) tears (assu, aśru); 28) suint (vasā); 29) saliva (khela, keṭa); 30) snot (śinghānākā, saṅghānaka); 31) synovial fluid (lāṣikā); 32) urine (mutta, mūra).

287 The nature of the four great elements is, respectively, solidity (khakkhatatva), moistness or fluidity (dravatya), warmth (usṣatva) and movement (īraṇatva).
The four colors are not blue (nīla) exclusively; why then practice meditation just on blue (nīlabhāvana)?

Answer. – [In these considerations] there is an objective consideration (bhūtapratyaveksā) as well as a subjective consideration (adhimuktipratyaveksā).

Bodily characteristics (kāyanimitta), objectively, are unpleasant (aśubha): that is an objective consideration. Among outer things (bāhyadharma), there are all kinds of colors of pleasant nature (subhalakṣaṇa): this is also an objective consideration. The pleasant (subha) and the unpleasant (aśubha) come within objective considerations.

On the other hand, when one takes the small number of pleasant things and extends it to consider everything as pleasant, when one chooses the single element water and extends it to see everything as water, when one chooses the small amount of blue that exists and extends it to see everything as blue and so on, those are subjective considerations that are not objective.

**D. Vimokṣas four to seven**

The four formless vimokṣas (ārūpyavimokṣa) are similar to meditations practiced in the four formless absorptions (ārūpyasamāpatti). The person who wants to acquire these vimokṣas first enters into the formless absorptions: the latter are the gateway into these vimokṣas, for the sphere of the infinity of space (ākāśānantyāyatana) ‘turns the back on and rejects’ material objects (rūpyālambana).

Question. – If it is the same for the formless absorptions, how do [the formless vimokṣas] differ?

Answer. – The worldly person (prthavigjana) who acquires the formless absorptions is arūpin [‘without form’ or without the concept of form]. But when the saint (āryapudgala) with high resolve (adhyāśaya) acquires these formless absorptions, [he is arūpin] absolutely and without regression: that is why it is called vimokṣa.

It is the same for the other vimokṣas coming within the spheres of infinity of consciousness (viṁśaśānantyāyatana), nothing at all (ākīṃcanyāyatana) and neither identification nor non-identification (naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana).

**E. The eighth vimokṣa**

---

288 This is done in the first kṛtsna.
289 This is done in the fifth abhibhu and the fifth kṛtsna.
290 In the course of the third vimokṣa.
291 In the course of the second kṛtsna.
292 In the course of the fifth abhibhu and the fifth kṛtsna.
293 See above, p. 1274F seq.
Turning the back on and suppressing feelings (vedita) and concepts (saṃjñā) as well as all mind (citta) and all mental events (caitasikadharma) is what is called ‘liberation consisting of the cessation of feeling and concept’ (saṃjñāveditanirodhavimokṣa).

Question. – Why is the absorption of non-identification (asamjñāsamāpatti) not a vimokṣa?

Answer. – Because when beings with wrong view (mithyādārśin) who do not discern the defects (doṣa) of dharmas enter into the absorption [216a] [of non-identification], they identify it with nirvāṇa and when they emerge from this absorption, they feel regret (vipratīśāra) and fall back into their wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi). This is why the absorption [of non-identification] is not a vimokṣa.

On the other hand, by the cessation of feeling and concept that suppresses all distraction (vikṣipta-citta), the yogin penetrates into a nirvāṇa-like cessation (nirvāṇa). Since he acquires it by attaching to it [just] his body, the Sūtra says that he ‘actualizes it physically’ (kāyena sākṣātkarati).

2. The Eight Masteries

A. General definition

The eight spheres of mastery (aṣṭāv abhibhvāyatanaṁ):

1) Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles, few in number, beautiful or ugly, and he cognizes these visibles by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them; this is the first abhibhū (adhyātmaṁ rūpasamjñī habhirdhī rūpaṇī paśyati parītāṁ suvarṇadurvarṇāni, tāni khalu rūpāny abhibhūya jānāty abhibhūya paśyatīdaṁ prathamamam abhibhvāyatanaṁ).

2) Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles, numerous, beautiful or ugly, and he cognizes these visibles by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them; this is the second abhibhū (adhyātmaṁ rūpasamjñī nāhirdhī rūpāṇī paśyaty adhimātrāṁ suvarṇadurvarṇāni, tāni khalu rūpāny abhināhyā jānāty abhibhūya paśyatīdaṁ dvitinīyaṁ abhibhvāyatanaṁ).

3-4) It is the same for the third and fourth abhibhāyatana, with the only difference that, not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles (adyātmaṁ arūpasamjñī bahirdhī rūpāṇī paśyati).

5-6) [In these āyatana], not having the notion of inner visibles, the yogin sees outer visibles blue, yellow, red or white (adhyātmaṁ arūpasamjñī bahirdhī rūpāṇi paśyati nilapiṇālohitāvadāṇāṁ).

These are the eight abhibhvāyatanaṁ.

---

294 The yogin who has entered into cessation is drṣṭadharmanirvāṇaprāpta: in the present lifetime (drṣṭe janmani) is in the nirvāṇa with residue of conditioning (sopadhiśeṣaṁ nirvāṇaṁ).

295 The absorption of non-identification is practiced by worldly people (prthāgjana) who identify non-identification with true liberation. The saints (ārya) do not practice it; they reserve their efforts for the absorption of cessation which they consider to be the peaceful absorption: cf. Kośa, II, p. 201-214.
B. The first abhibhu

“Having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles “ (adhyātmaṃ rūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpaṇī paśyati): himself unhurt, he sees outer objects (bāhyālambana).

“He sees few of them” (parītāṇī): being rare, these objects are said to be ‘few in number’. The path of seeing not being developed in him, the yogin sees objects few in number for, if he saw a large number of them, he would grasp them with difficulty. In the same way, when deer run about in confusion, one cannot see them from far away.

“He sees the beautiful or ugly” (suvarṇadurvarṇāni). At the start of the practice, the yogin fixes his mind on an object (ālam,bana), the space between the eyebrows, the forehead or the end of the nose. With the notion of unpleasant inner visibles (adhyātmaṃ asubhasamjñī) and the notion of unpleasant things in his own body, the yogin sees outer visibles which sometimes will be beautiful (suvarṇāni) by virtue of the retribution for good actions (kusalakarmavipāka), sometimes ugly (durvarṇāni) by virtue of retribution for bad actions (akuśhalakarmavipāka).

Furthermore, when the yogin, following the instructions of his teacher, grasps and sees all kinds of unpleasant things (nānāvidhāny asubhāni) in outer objects (bāhyālambana), this is a matter of ‘ugly visibles’ (durvarṇāni rūpāṇi). But sometimes when, by loss of attentiveness (smṛtiḥāṇī), the yogin conceives a pleasant notion (subhasanījā) and sees pleasant visibles (subhāni rūpāni), this is then a matter of ‘beautiful visibles’ (suvarṇāni rūpāni).

Furthermore, when the yogin by himself fixes his mind on a given place, he sees two kinds of visibles (dvividhāni rūpāṇi) inherent in the desire realm (kāmadhātu): i) the visibles that give rise to lust (rāga), ii) the visibles that give rise to hatred (dveṣa). Those that give rise to lust are pleasant visibles (subhāni rūpāṇi) described here as beautiful (suvarṇāni); those that give rise to hatred are unpleasant visibles (asubhāni rūpāni) described here as ugly (durvarṇāni).

The yogin is master (vaśavartin) over these objects (ālam,bana):296 “He cognizes them by mastering them, he sees them by mastering them” (abhibhūya jānāty abhibhūya paśyati). Faced with beautiful visibles

296 Although the vimokṣas liberate from the object, the abhibhus exert a real mastery (aśvarya) over it. According to the Kośa, VIII, p. 213, this domination (abhibhavana) over the object is twofold: i) yatheṣṭam adhimokṣah: the voluntary seeing of the object as one wants it to be; ii) kleśānutpatti: the absence of negative emotion evoked by the object. Here the Traité particularly stresses this second point: the ascetic in possession of the abhibhus no longer feels any lust (rāga) for pleasant objects or any hatred (dveṣa) toward unpleasant objects.

But the abhibhus still allow one to see the object as one wishes it to be. Indeed, “when the mind is absorbed, very pure, very clean, stainless, free of impurities, supple, ready to act, the ascetic can direct his mind (cittom abhinīharati) to the supernatural powers (abhirujñā) and especially toward magical power (ṛddhi)” (Dīgha, I, p. 77). Then he can, at will, transform the great elements and the colors so as to see them as he wishes. See Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 142-143. Thus, the contemplation on yellow can
(abhīrūpa) capable of generating lust (rāga), the yogin feels no lust; faced with ugly visibles capable of generating hatred (dveṣa), he feels no hatred. He sees only that visibles coming from the four great elements (mahābhūta) and from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī) are lacking in substance (asāra) like a water bubble (budbuda). That is how it is for beautiful and ugly visibles.

In this abhibhvāyatana, the yogin stays on the threshold of the [meditation] on the horrible (aśubhabhāvana). When the fetters of lust, hate, etc. (rāgadvēsādisamyojana) occur, he does not follow them: that is the sphere of mastery [of the object] for he masters the mistake that consists of taking as pure that which is impure (aśucuṣucir iti viparyāsa) and the other defilements (kleśa).

Question. – While having the notion of inner visibles (adhyātmaṃ rūpasamjñā), how does the yogin see outer visibles (bahīrdhā rūpāṇi paśyatī)?

Answer. – The eight abhibhvāyatanas can be attained (prāpti) by ascetics who have entered deeply into concentration and whose mind is disciplined and softened. Sometimes the yogin sees the horrible (aśubha) of his own body and also sees the horrors of outer visibles.

The contemplation of the horrible (aśubhabhāvana) is of two types: i) that which contemplates all kinds of impurities (nānāvidhāsucī), such as the thirty-six bodily substances (dravya), etc.; ii) that which, disregarding in one’s own body as in others’ bodies, the skin (tvac), flesh (māṃsa) and the five internal organs, contemplates only the white bones (śvetāsthika), like a conch-shell ( śrokha), like snow (hima).

The sight of the thirty-six bodily substances is called ‘ugly’ (durvarṇa); the sight of the conch or snow is called “beautiful” (suvarṇa).

C. The second abhibhu

At the time he is contemplating inner and outer [visibles], the yogin is distracted (vikiśiptacitta) and only with difficulty can he enter into dhyāna. Then he excludes notions of his own body (ādhymatmikasaṃjñā) and considers only outer visibles (bāhyarūpa). As is said in the Abhidharma, the yogin who possesses vimokṣa contemplates and sees the dead body: after death, the latter is picked up and taken to the charnel-ground (śmaśāna) where, burned by fire (vidagdhaka) and devoured by insects (vikhāditaka), it have the effect of creating yellow forms (pītakarūpanimmānaṃ), the volition that something be golden (suvaṇṇanti ti adhimuccanā), etc. This creative power of ‘volitional seeing’ (adhimokṣa) is mentioned in the canonical sources, e.g., Samyutta, I, p. 116: Ākaṅkhamāno Bhagavā Himavantaṃ pabbatarājaṃ suvaṇṇaṃ tv eva adhimuceyya, suvaṇṇaṃ ca pabbat’ assā ti.

297 See above, p. 359, n.

298 A typically Chinese expression appearing in the canonical versions, although the Indian originals show no trace of it: cf. Fo pan ni yun kai, T 5, k. 1, p. 163c15; k. 2, [. 171a16; Fo k’ai kai, T 20, p. 262a3; Hong chouei, T 33, [. 817b3; Ni-li, T 86, p. 908b15; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 25, p. 658b12; k. 51, p. 828c18. The five viscera are the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the lungs and the spleen. The Commentary to the Vihārīgā, p. 249, also speaks of the vakkapaṭcaka “the five [constituents of the body] starting with the kidneys.”
disintegrates. From then on, the yogin sees only the insects and the fire, but does not see the body: this is why the Sūtra says that “not having the notion of inner visibles, he sees outer visibles” (adhyātmaṃ ārūpasamjñī bahirdhā rūpāṇi paśyatī).

In accordance with instructions, the yogin perceives and looks at the body as a skeleton (kaṅkāla). When his mind is distracted outwardly, he brings it back and concentrates on the skeleton as object. Why is that? At the beginning of the practice, this person was unable to see subtle objects (sūkṣmālambana), and that is why the sūtra said [in regard to the first abhibhu that the yogin sees only] visibles “few in number” (rūpāṇi parītāni). But now, this yogin, whose path of seeing is developing, deepening and broadening, uses this skeleton in order to see Jambudvīpa as skeletons everywhere, and this is why the Sūtra says here that he sees ‘numerous visibles’ (rūpāṇy adhimatrāṇi).

Then he concentrates his mind again and no longer sees a single skeleton; this is why the sūtra says that “he cognizes visibles by mastering them and sees visibles by mastering them” (tāni khalu rūpāṇy abhibhūya jānāty abhibhūya paśyatī).

And since, the yogin is able at will (yatheṣṭam) to master the concept of man and woman (puruṣastrīṣamjñā) and the concept of beauty (śucisamjñā) in regard to the five objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa), that is indeed a ‘sphere of mastering the object’ (abhibhvāyatana).

Thus a strong man (balavat) mounted on his horse who captures the enemy is able to destroy them is said to ‘master’ them and, as he is also able to control his horse, he ‘masters’ it. It is the same for the yogin: in the meditation on the horrible (asūbhābhāvana), he is able to do a lot with just a little, and do a little with a lot: that is an abhibhāvatana. He is also able to destroy his enemies, the five objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa); that also is an abhibhāvatana. When without destroying inwardly [the notion] of his own body, the yogin sees visibles outwardly, numerous or few in number, beautiful or ugly, that is a matter of the first and second abhibhvāyatanas.

D. The third and fourth abhibhus

When, no longer having the notion of visibles concerning his own body, the yogin sees visibles outwardly, numerous or few, beautiful or ugly, that is the third and fourth abhibhu.

E. The four last abhibhus

When, having concentrated his mind, the yogin deeply penetrates into the absorptions (samāpatti), suppresses [the concept] of inner body (adhyātymakāya), sees outer objects perfectly pure (bāhyapariśuddhālambana), blue (nīla) and blue in color (nīlavarṇa), yellow (pīta) and yellow in color (pītavarṇa), red (lohita) and red in color (lohitavarṇa), white (avadāta) and white in color (avadātavarṇa), this is a matter of the last four abhibhvāyatanas.

Question. –What is the difference between the last four abhibhvāyatanas and the last four krūṭsnāyatanas of color, blue, etc., that are part of the ten krūṭsnāyatanas?
Answer. – The krṣṇāyatana of blue grasps absolutely everything as blue; the corresponding abhibhāyatana sees a large number or a small number of objects only as blue, at will (yatheṣṭam), without, however, eliminating foreign thoughts. Seeing and mastering these objects, it is called abhibhāyatana.

Thus, for example, whereas the noble cakravartin king totally dominates the four continents (cāturdvīpaka), the king of Jambudvīpa dominates only a single continent. In the same way, whereas the krṣṇāyatanas totally dominate all objects, the abhibhāyatanas see only a small number of visibles and dominate them but are unable to include all objects.

This is a summary (samkṣepeṇa) explanation of the eight abhibhāyatanas.

3. The Ten Totalities

[216c] As for the ten krṣṇāyatanas ‘spheres of totality of the object’, we have already spoken of them in regard to the vimokṣas and the abhibhāyatanas. They are called ‘spheres of totality’ because they embrace their object in its totality (ālambanakṛṣṇāyatana).

Question. – [Of the four formless spheres (ārūpyāyatana), only the first two, ākāśananyāyatana ‘sphere of infinite space’ and vijnānāyatana ‘sphere of infinite consciousness’, are krṣṇāyatanas. Why are [the other two formless spheres], namely, ākṣicanyāyatana ‘sphere of nothing at all’ and naivasanjanāśaṃjñāyatana ‘sphere of neither identification nor non-identification’] not krṣṇāyatanas as well?

Answer. – The krṣṇāyatanas are subjective views (adhimokṣamanasikāra) and, of the formless spheres, only two, those of infinity of space and infinity of consciousness, lend themselves of subjective extensions.

“Safety (yogakṣema), happiness (suḥkha), vastness (viśāla), immensity (apraṃaṇa) and infinitity (anantā), the sphere of space”, said the Buddha. – Throughout all the krṣṇāyatanas there is a consciousness (vijnāna) capable of quickly bearing upon all things and, faced with these dharmas, one determines the presence of consciousness. This is why the two spheres (āyatana) [of space and consciousness] constitute the krṣṇāyatana.

On the other hand, in the sphere of nothing at all (ākṣicanyāyatana), there is no substance (dhātu) capable of being extended; there is no happiness (suḥkha) there and, in regard to nothing-at-all, the Buddha said nothing about infinity, immensity.

299 Cf. Kośavyākhya, p. 692: Nirantarakṛṣṇaspharanād iti nirantarāṃ krṣṇāṇāṃ prthivyādinaṃ spharanād vyāpanāt krṣṇāyataniṃity ucyante. – Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 85, p. 40b18-23: They are called krṣṇāyatana for two reasons: i) because they are without intervals (nirantarā) and ii) because they are extended (viśāla). Because deliberate reflection (adhimokṣamanasikāra) bears uniquely on blue, etc., without being mixed with another object, they are ‘without interval’; because deliberate reflection on all of blue, etc., is of infinite scope (gocara), they are ‘extended’. The Bhadanta says: Because their object (ālambana) is vast and extended, because there are no intervals-gaps, they are called krṣṇāyatana.
In the sphere of neither identification nor non-identification (naiwasamjñānasamjñāyatana), the mind is dull (mṛdu) and it is hard for it to grasp a concept (nimittodgrahaṇa) and extend it to infinity, as is the case for the krṣnasnas.

Furthermore, the ākāśiyatana is close to the form realm (rūpadātu) and it can still be concerned with visibles (rūpa). The vijñānāyatana also can be concerned with visible objects. Besides, coming out of the vijñānāyatana, one can leap into the fourth dhyāna and, on coming out of the fourth dhyāna, one is able to leap into the vijñānāyatana. On the contrary, the ākimcānāyatana and the naiwasamjñāyatana [as the higher spheres of the ārūpyadhātu] are very distant in formlessness: this is why they are not krṣnasnāyatanas.

4. Objects and Distribution of the Vimokṣas, Abhibhus and Krṣnasnas

Every utilization of these three types of dharmas realizes a mastery over the object (ālambanāḥbibhavana).

1) The krṣnasnāyatanas are impure (sāsrava).

The first three vimokṣas, the seventh and eighth vimokṣas are impure. The others are sometimes impure (sāsrava), sometimes pure (anāsrava).

2) The first two vimokṣas and the first four abhibhāyatanas are contained (saṃgrhīta) in the first and second dhyānas.

The śubhavimokṣa (3rd vimokṣa), the last four abhibhāyatanas and the first eight krṣnasnāyatanas are contained in the fourth dhyāna.

---

300 A possibility that may be verified during the vyutkrāntakasamāpatti or the 'absorption of the leap': see above, p. 1048F, and, for detailed description, see Hobogirin, IV, p. 353-360, article Chījī by J. May.

301 We may recall that the absorption of worldly order practiced by ordinary people (pythagiana) is śuddhaka, i.e., kuśala sāsrava ‘good but mixed with impurities’. The absorption of supraworldly order practiced as Path by the saints (ārya) who have seen the Buddhist truths is anāsrava ‘free of impurities’. See above, p. 1027F, 1035-36F, and Kośa, VIII, p. 145, n.

302 Thus the eight vimokṣas are distributed over eleven levels: cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 689: “These vimokṣas occur in the other eleven levels, except for the seven threshold absorptions, viz., 1) the desire realm, 2-3) the anāgamya and the dhyānāntara. 4-11) the eight levels made up of the [four] dhyānas and the [four] samāpattis.” – See also Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 84, p. 434c-435a: The first two vimokṣas occur in the first two dhyānas, the anāgamya and the dhyānāntara… The third vimokṣa occurs in the fourth dhyāna… The fourth vimokṣa is in the ākāśānantyāyatana… The fifth vimokṣa is in the vijñānānantyāyatana… The sixth vimokṣa is in the ākāśānantyāyatana… The seventh vimokṣa is in the naiwasamjñānasamjñāyatana… The Vimokṣa of samjñāveditanirodha also.

Why are there no vimokṣas in the third dhyāna? On this point see Kośa, VIII, p. 209.
3) The first two kṛṣṇāyatana are called ākāśāyatana. The ākāśāyatana contains the vijñānāyatana. The vijñānāyatana contains the first three vimokṣas, the eight abhībhāyatana and the [first] eight kṛṣṇāyatana, all of which have as object (ālambana) the visibles of the desire realm (kāmadhūturūpa).

The four next vimokṣas (nos. 4-7) have as object the formless realm (ārūpyadhatu), the marvelous qualities of pure dharmas (anāsravadharmavācavyāvatāra) and the good (kuśala: read chan instead of jo) in [the four] fundamental [absorptions] (maulasammapatthāna), because the fundamental formless absorptions (ārūpyamaulasamāpatti) do not concern the levels lower than them.

The absorption of the cessation of concepts and feeling (saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti) constituting the eighth vimokṣa, being neither mind (citta) nor mental event (caitasikadharmasamāpatti), has no object (anālambana).

The seventh vimokṣa, namely, the absorption of neither identification nor non-identification (naivasamānyanāsamjñāyatana) alone has as its object the four formless aggregates (ārūpyaskandha) and the pure dharmas (anāsravadharmasamāpatti).

Second Section THE NINE SUCCESSIVE ABSORPTIONS (p. 1308F)

Preliminary Note

Designated by the name anupūrvavaihāra (Dīgha, III, p. 265; Anguttara, IV, p. 410), anupūrva-samāpatti (Divya, p. 95), anupūrva-vaihāra-samāpatti (Samyutta, II, p. 216; Anguttara, IV, p. 410; Pañcavimśati, p. 19; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 58, 1445; Vibhaṅga, p. 343; Mahāyutt., no. 1498), anupūrva-samādhi-samāpatti (Dharmasamgraha, §82), the nine successive absorptions are the four dhyānas of the rūpadhatu, the four samāpattis of ther ārūpya, plus the samājñaveditanirodhasamāpatti.

To define them, the Pāli and Sanskrit texts (df. Dīgha, III, p. 265-266; Anguttara, IV, p. 410-414; Śatsāhasrikā, p. 1445-1446) repeat the words of the old Dhyānasūtra, the text of which has been given above, p. 1024F. Dīgha, III, p. 266, and Anguttara, IV, p. 410-414, explain that these nine absorptions are acquired by nine successive cessations (nirodha) eliminating in turn: 1) bad desires (kāma), 2) investigation and analysis (vitarkavicāra), 3) joy (prīti), 4) inhalation and exhalation (āśvāsasparāsvāsa) or indifference and happiness (upekṣāsuṣkha), 5) the concept of substance (rūpasamjñā), 6) the notion of infinite space (ākāsānanatāyatana), 7) the concept of infinite consciousness (vijñānānantaḥāvatāra), 8) the concept of nothing at all (ākimcanyāvatana), 9) the concept of neither identification nor non-identification (naivasamānyanāsamjñāyatana) and finally, all concept (samjñā) and sensation (vedanā).

---

303 This passage is obscure; there is possibly a gap.
304 The object of the vimokṣas, etc., is treated in the same manner in Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 84, p. 435a16-28; Kośa, VIII, p. 208-209.
The nine successive absorptions (anupūrvasamāpatti):

Emerging from of the first dhyāna, the yogin then [directly] enters into the second dhyāna in such a way that there is no other intervening mind, whether good (kuśala) or defiled (saṃkliṣṭa). [From the dhyāna into the samāpatti], the yogin continues in this way until the absorption of cessation of concept and feeling (saṃjñāveditanirodhasamāpatti).

Question. – But other things can still follow one another [directly]. Why would just the nine absorptions be successive?

Answer. – There are always foreign minds that happen to be interpolated among the other qualities (guṇa); this is why they are not successive. But here, lofty resolve (adhyāśaya) and wisdom (prajñā) are sharp (tiṣṇa); the yogin puts his own mind to the test and, coming out of the first dhyāna, he enters directly into the second in such a way that no other mind intervenes. In these very qualities, the mind is supple (mṛduka) and easily cuts through desire (ṛṣṇā): this is why the minds succeed one another.

Of these successive absorptions, two are impure (sāsrava) and the other [217a] seven are sometimes impure and sometimes pure (anāsrava). On the other hand, the dhyānāntara ‘variation of the first dhyāna’ and the anāgamya ‘threshold absorption of the first dhyāna’ are without stability (asāra).305

Moreover, [the successive absorptions] are acquired by the āryas only, and their great benefits are not found in the samānantaka ‘threshold absorptions’: this is why the latter are not ‘successive’ (anupūrva).

The eight vimokṣas, the eight abhibhāyatanas, the ten kṛtsnāyatanas and the nine anupūrvasamāpattis have been explained in brief (samāsatas) according to the śrāvaka system.

305 For detail, see Kośa, VIII, p. 178-181.
CHAPTER XXXV: THE NINE HORRIBLE NOTIONS (p. 1311F)

PRELIMINARY NOTE

By Navasaṃjñā, the Traité means the nine notions of the horrible (navāsubhasamjñā) cultivated by the ascetic in the course of the contemplation of the decomposing corpse.

I. ĀŚUBHĀ IN THE CANONICAL TEXTS


Āśubhā or āśubhasamjñā also appears in the canonical lists:

1. List of three dharmas: Anguttara, III, p. 446.

But āśubha is a complex entity since it concerns the various stages of decomposition of the corpse. However, the canonical sources mention only a few without enumerating them.

Among the most frequently mentioned stages of decomposition mentioned are the corpse reduced to bones (atṭhika), rotten (puḷuvaka), turning blueish (vinīlika), torn apart (vicchiddaka), bloated (uddhumātaka), and a few others, but the description is not systematic: cf. Anguttara, I, p. 42; II, p. 17; V, p. 310; Tsa a han, & 99, k. 31, p. 221b27-28; Tseng yi a han, Y 125, k. 42, p. 781a19-21; k. 44,p. 789b2-5.
There is an almost complete list in a Sanskrit sūtra cited in the Kośavyākhya, p. 55, l. 1-2: i) vinīłaka, ii) vipūyaka, iii) vyādhmātka, iv) vipaṭumaka, v) vilohitaka, vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asthi, ix) asthisamkalikā.

II. THE TEN ASUBHASĀṆĀ IN THE PĀLI ABHIDHAMMA

The Abhidhamma, its commentaries and related treatises fix the number of asubhasāṇās at ten and cite them in the following order:

i) Bloated corpse (uddhumātaka), ii) blueish (vinīłaka), iii) rotten (vipubbaka), iv) torn apart (vicchiddaka), v) devoured (vikkhhāyitaka), vi) scattered (vikkhittaka), vii) chopped up and scattered (hatavikkhittaka), viii) bloody (lohitaka), ix) infested with worms (puḷuvaka), x) reduced to bone (aṭṭhika).

These terms are cited and commented upon in Dhammasaṅgani, p. 55 (tr. Rhys Davids, p. 63 and n. 3); Atthasāliṇī, p. 197-198 (tr. Tin, p. 264-267); Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 89, 145-146 (tr. Nanamoli, p. 185-186); Vimuttimagga, tr. Ehara, p. 146-158 (tr. Nanamoli, p. 186-200) deals at great length with the manner of practicing the first asubhabhāvana. As in the kasinas, the ascetic must apprehend a twofold sign, the sign of learning (uggahanimitta) and the counter-sign (paṭibhāganimitta). To this end, he goes to a charnel-ground and contemplates with extreme attentiveness the ten stages of decomposing corpses, the bloated corpse, etc. The pertinent uggahanimitta appears to him as a unit (paripuṇṇa). See two fine articles in Ceylon Encyclopedia, II, p. 270-281.

III. THE NINE AŚUBHASAṀJÑĀŚ IN THE SANSKRIT ABHIDHARMA

The Sanskrit Abhidharma and, following it, the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras, list only nine notions of the horrible, but rarely cite them in the same order and not always in full. Descriptions will be found in Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 40, p. 205a-210a; Kośa, VI, p. 148-153; VIII, p. 197, 205; Kośavyākhya, p. 526-537; Nyāyānusāra, Y 1562, k. 59, p. 671a; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 372.

The Traité, being a Prajñāpāramitā commentary, cites lists of the nine notions found in this literature. Unfortunately, the Sanskrit editions available to us are rather defective. Edgerton (Dictionary, s.v. aśubha) has tried to correct them. Perhaps it is more useful to reproduce here the texts of the editions, simply noting the variants:

Pañcaviṃśati, p. 19, l. 19-20, l. 2; p. 165, l. 7: i) ādhmātaka, ii) vidhūtaka (var. vipaḍumaka,) iii) vipūyaka (var. vipūryaka), iv) vilohitaka, v) vinīłaka, vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) vidagdhaka, ix) asthi-samjñā.

Śatasahasrikā, p. 59, l. 2-18: i) dhyātaka, ii) vipāda, iii) vipūrtika, iv) vilohitaka, v) vinīłaka, vi) vikhāditaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asthi, ix) vidagdhaka-samjñā.


Three other lists should also be mentioned:

Bhikṣuṇīkarmavacana, p. 139, l. 13-16: i) vinīlaka, ii) vilōyaka, iii) vipaṭumaka, iv) vyādhmātaka, v) vikhyāditaka, vi) vilōhitaka, vii) vikṣiptaka, viii) asthi, ix) śīnyātā-pratyavekṣaṇa-samjñā.


Mahāvyut., no. 1156-1164: i) vinīlaka, ii) vidhūtika-(vilōyaka), iii) vipaṭumaka, iv) vyādhmātaka, v) vilōhitaka, vi) vikhyāditaka, vi) vikṣiptaka, vii) vidagdhaka, ix) asthi-samjñā.

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśatī, p. 19, l. 18-20, l. 2; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 59, l. 2-18). – The [bodhisattva-mahāsattva must cultivate] the nine notions (navasamjñā)306 of the horrible:

1) that of the bloated corpse (vyādhmātakasamjñā),
2) that of the torn-up corpse (vidhūtakasamjñā),
3) that of the bloody corpse (vilōhitakasamjñā),
4) that of the rotting corpse (vilōyakasamjñā),
5) that of the corpse turning blueish (vinīlakasamjñā),
6) that of the devoured corpse (vikhyāditakasamjñā),
7) that of the scattered corpse (vikṣiptakasamjñā),
8) that of the corpse reduced to bones (asthisamjñā),
9) that of the burned corpse (vidagdhakasamjñā).

Śāstra. –

306 Here and in the following pages, the variant kieou siang will be adopted by preference.
First Section THE NINE NOTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

I. THE POSITION OF THE NINE NOTIONS

Question. – It is necessary first to have cultivated these nine notions and be free from desire in order to then attain the dhyānas. Why does [the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] speak of the nine notions here after having dealt with the dhyānas and the absorptions (samāpatti)?

Answer. – First the Sūtra spoke about the fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) which is [the dhyānas and the samāpattis] in order to encourage the yogin’s heart. Although the nine notions are horrible (aśubha), the person who wants to obtain their fruit of retribution must have practiced them previously.

II. HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE NINE NOTIONS

Question. – How does the yogin meditate on these nine things, the bloated corpse (vyādhmātaka), etc?

1. Reflection on death

Answer. – First the yogin observes pure discipline (śīlaśuddhi) in order to have no regrets (kaukṛtya), and thus he will easily find the meditation subjects (bhāvanadharma) to destroy the enemies (amitra) that are the negative emotions, lust, etc. (rāgādiklesa).

He thinks about a man on the very day of his death: the words of farewell that he speaks, the outbreath (apāna) which does not return and, immediately afterwards, his death. The family is in turmoil: they weep and invoke the heavens saying: “Just a moment ago he passed away; his breath is no more, his body is cold, he is no longer conscious.”

Death is a great calamity; it is impossible to avoid it. It is like the fire at the end of the kalpa (kalpoddāha) from which there is no escape. Thus it is said:

When death comes, neither rich nor poor,
Neither benefactors nor criminals,
Neither nobles nor lowly people
Neither old nor young can escape it.
There are no prayers that can save you,
There are no tricks by which you can escape,
There are no stratagems to free you,
There is no way to avoid it.

Death is the place where one leaves one’s attachments forever; it is hated by all, but no matter how much one hates it, no one can escape it. The yogin says: “Soon my body will be like this, no different from a piece of wood or stone. Therefore, from now on I must not covet the five objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa) and I must not think of the coming of death like oxen and sheep. Even when these animals see a dead animal, they leap about and squeal without taking anything into account. I, who possess a human body and differentiate between beautiful and ugly, must seek the ambrosia (amṛta) of immortality.” Thus it is said:

Having the six faculties (ṣaḍindriya), the human being is complete,
His knowledge is clear and his vision is keen,
But he does not seek the Dharma of the Path;
It is in vain that he has received body and knowledge.

All animals also are able to free themselves
From the objects of enjoyment (kāmaguṇa)
[217b]But they do not know how to cultivate
The good in view of the Path.

The person who has acquired a human body
But who only devotes himself to licentiousness
And does not know how to develop the good practices,
How is he different from the animals?

The beings in the three unfortunate destinies (durgati)
Are incapable of accomplishing the deeds of the Path.
The person who has obtained a human body
Must look after his own interests.
2. Vyādmātakasāṃjñā

The yogin goes to a dead body (mṛtaśarīra) and sees this corpse bloated (vyādhamātaka) like a leather bag blown up by the wind and quite different from what it was originally. He feels disgust (nirveda) and fear of it and says to himself: “My body too will be like that and will not escape this end. In this body a sovereign consciousness governed it, saw, heard, spoke, committed wrong deeds (āpatti), won merits (puṇya) and used it as it pleased: where has it gone? Now I see only an empty house (śūnagrha). This body had fine features (lakṣaṇa): a fine waist, nice shoulders, long eyes, a straight nose, a smooth forehead, arched eyebrows, and all these beautiful things troubled men’s hearts; now I see only a swollen thing: where has its beauty gone? The characteristics of man or woman (puruṣastrāṇimitta), they too, are unrecognizable.”

Having made this meditation, the yogin condemns any attachment to lust (rāgādhyavasāna). Indeed, this bloated sack of rotten excrement is detestable; how could it evoke any lust?

3. Vidhūtakasāṃjñā

With the heat of the wind, the corpse gets bloated and lies on the ground, split open and broken up (vidhūtaka). The five viscera ooze forth excrement (vis), urine (mūtra), pus (pūya) and blood (śoṇita) and a repugnant liquid appears.

The yogin grasps this ‘notion of the torn-up corpse’ (vidhūtakasāṃjñā) and compares his own body to it, saying to himself: “I too, in the same way, contain all these horrible things; how am I any different? I was very foolish to allow myself to be seduced by this fine skin, a simple sack of excrement. Like moths (adhipātika) flying into the fire, I coveted bright colors without knowing that they burn the body. At last I have seen this split and torn corpse in which the male and female characteristics (puruṣastrāṇimitta) have disappeared. Everything that I was attached to is nothing but that.”

4. Vilohitakasāṃjñā

When the corpse is torn up, a ‘jumble of flesh and blood’ (māṃsavilohitaka) spreads out.

5. Vinīlakasāṃjñā

See also below, k. 37, p. 333b17. This is a canonical comparison: cf. Udāna, p. 72: Patanti pajjotam iv’ādhipātā, dīthe sute iti h’ekte nivīṭṭhā: “Like moths that fall into the flame of a lamp, some people become attached to what they see and hear.”
Sometimes the yogin sees some ‘blueish’ (vinīlaka), yellowish, reddish or even, under the sun’s heat, blackish, spots on the corpse of a flogged man. Grasping all these signs, the yogin contemplates them and says to himself: “Then how is the purity and beauty of the red and white colors to which I am attached different from these?”

6. Vipūyakasāṃjñā

The yogin soon sees these blueish, yellowish, reddish and blackish spots which the birds and beasts have not devoured or buried or hidden, putrefy; all kinds of worms develop in it. Seeing all of that, the yogin says to himself: “Once this corpse had lovely colors; the body was smeared with fine makeup, dressed in superb garments and adorned with flowers. Today it is no more than a rotten mass, torn up and ‘putrid’ (vipūyaka): that is its real constitution; the former adornments were nothing but deceptions.”

7. Vikhāditakasāṃjñā

If the corpse has not been burned or buried but abandoned in a deserted place (kāntāra), it is ‘devoured’ (vikhāditaka) by the birds and beasts. The crows (kāka) tear out the eyes; the dogs (śvan) share its hands and feet amongst themselves; the jackals (śṛgāla) and wolves (vrka) tear up the belly, and the corpse is completely torn to pieces.308

8. Vikṣiptakasāṃjñā

The pieces lying on the ground are more or less complete. Seeing that, the yogin feels disgust (nirveda) and says to himself: “This body, when it was not yet torn to pieces (vidhūtaka), was an object of attachment for people; now that it is torn to pieces and ‘scattered’ (vikṣiptaka), it no longer has its original characteristics and only the pieces are seen: the place where the birds and beasts have devoured is appalling.”

9. Asthisāṃjñā

When the birds and animals have gone, when the wind has blown it about and the sun has heated it up, the tendons (snāyu) become detached and the bones (asthi) are scattered, each in a different place. The yogin says to himself: “Once I saw the bodily elements, the combination (sāmagrī) of which formed a body and I was able to distinguish a man or a woman. Now that the corpse has been scattered in different places, the whole body has disappeared and the body itself no longer exists. It is completely different from what it was originally. Where is that which I once loved?”

The body is now white bones (śvetāsthika) scattered in various places. When the birds and beasts have devoured the corpse, there is nothing but bones. When one contemplates this skeleton (asthisamkhalikā), there is the ‘notion of the corpse reduced to bones’ (asthisaṃjñā).

There are two kinds of skeletons (asthisamkhalikā): i) the skeleton in which the tendons and bones are still attached (snāyavasthisambandha); ii) the skeleton in which the tendons and bones are separated (apagatāsthisnāyusambandha). The skeleton in which the tendons and bones are still attached already excludes the notions of male or female (puruṣastra), of tall or short (dirghahrasva), of fine colors, of slenderness and gentleness (sūkṣmaślašaṇa). That in which the tendons and bones are separated excludes the original notion (maulasaṃjñā) of human being (sattva).

Furthermore, there are two kinds of bones (asthi): i) beautiful (śubha) bones, and ii) ugly (aśubha) bones. The beautiful bones are those that are always white, free of blood (lohita) and fat (vasā), the color of which is like white snow. The ugly bones are those where the bloody (vilohitaka) and greasy remains have not yet disappeared.

10. Vidagdhakasaṃjñā

The yogin goes to a charnel-ground (śmaśāna) and sees that sometimes piles of grass and wood have been collected and that corpses are being burned. The belly bursts open, the eyes pop out, the skin burns and becomes blackened; it is truly dreadful. In a moment (muhūrta), the corpse becomes ashes (bhasman). The yogin grasps this ‘notion of the burned corpse’ (vidagdhakasaṃjñā) and says to himself: “Before he died, he bathed this body in perfumes and gave himself up to the five objects of enjoyment (kāmaguna); now it is burned in the fire, it is worse than if he had suffered the soldier’s sword (śastra). Immediately after death, this corpse still resembled a man, but as soon as it is burned, its original marks (maulanimitta) have all disappeared. All physical (dehin) beings end up in impermanence (anityatā). I too will be like that.”

309 Cf. Dīgha, II, p. 296; Majjhima, I, p. 58, 89; III, p. 92; Samyutta, II, p. 255; Anguttara, III, p. 324:
Sarīraṃ sīvathikāya chaḍḍitaḥ, ātthikasaṅkhaliṅkaṃ samāṃsaḷohitaṁ nahārusaṃbandhaṁ,
ātthikasaṅkhaliṅkaṃ nimmaṃsaḷohitaṁ mahāruṣaṃbandhaṁ, ātthikasaṅkhaliṅkaṁ
apagatamaṃsaḷohitaṁ nahārusaṃbandhaṁ, ātthikāṇi apagatasaṃbandhāṇī.
These nine notions destroy the negative emotions (kleśa) and are very powerful in destroying lust (rāgaprahāṇāya). It was to destroy lust that [the Buddha] preached the nine notions.  

III. CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NINE AND THE TEN NOTIONS

Question. – What do the ten notions (daśasamjñā) beginning with the notion of impermanence (anityasamjñā) destroy?

Answer. – They also serve to destroy the three poisons (triviṣa), lust (rāga), etc.

Question. – If that is so, how do these two groups differ?

Answer. – 1) The nine notions prevent those who have not attained the dhyānas and the samāpattis from being enveloped (pratīcchanna) by lust (rāga). The ten notions remove and destroy the three poisons, lust, etc.

2) The nine notions are like the enemy who puts [the three negative emotions] in chains. The ten notions are like the enemy who kills them.

3) The nine notions are a beginner’s practice (pūrvaśīkṣā). The ten notions are a perfected practice (sampannaśīkṣā).

4) Of the ten notions, [the seventh], that of the horrible (aśubhaśīkṣā), includes (samgrhāṇī) the nine notions [called ‘of the horrible’].

Some say that, of the ten notions, [the seventh, the fourth and the fifth], namely, the notion of impurity (aśucisamjñā), the notion of the loathsome nature of food (āhāre pratikūlasamjñā) and the notion of displeasure in regard to the world (sarvaloke ‘nabhārisamjñā), include the nine notions.

Others say that the ten and the nine notions are equally detachment (vairāgya) and, together, nirvāṇa.

Why?

310 The Buddha said in several places (Anguttara, III, p. 446; IV, p. 353, 358) that the horrible should be cultivated in order to destroy lust (asubhā bhāvetabbā rāgassa pahāṇāya). The fact remains that the horrible does not destroy the negative emotions but merely weakens them (Kośavyākhyā, p. 526: Nāsubhāyā kleśaprahāṇāṃ viṣkāṃbhāṣaṃāraṇaṃ tu bhavati), for, as an act of attention on an imaginary object (adhimuktimanasikāra), it is impure (sāsrava) and only meditations that entail the view of the sixteen aspects of the noble truths cut through the negative emotions. Cf. Kośa, VI, p. 150; Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 16, p. 367b1-2.

311 These ten notions will be the subject of chapter XXXVII.

312 In regard to the five or the seven notions, the Buddha said (Anguttara, III, p. 79, 80; IV, p. 46, 48-51): Imā kho bhikkhave saññā bhāvitā bahukīkatā mahaooḥalā honti mahānisaṃsā aamatoḥadhā
1. When the first signs of death appear, in the time it takes to say it, one is dead already. The body swells up, putrefies, breaks apart, is scattered and everything changes; this is impermanence, anityatā, [the first of the ten notions]. [218a]

2. One was attached to this body but when impermanence has destroyed it, it is duḥkha, suffering, [the second of the ten notions].

3. Being impermanence and suffering, it cannot be independent (svatantra): thus it is anatman, non-self, [the third of the ten notions].

4. Being impure (aśuci), impermanent (anitya), suffering (duḥkha) and non-self (anatman), it is anabhīrata, an object of displeasure, [the fifth of the ten notions]. This is the meditation on the body (kāyabhāvāna).

5. When food (āhāra) is in the mouth (mukha), the cervical saliva (śīghāṇaka) runs down and, together with the mucus (khetā), becomes flavor (rasa), but swallowing (abhyavahāra) is no different from vomiting (vāntikṛta), and penetrates the stomach (udara): hence āhāre pratikūlasamjñā, the notion of the repugnant nature of food, [the fourth of the ten notions].

6. When the yogin makes use of the nine notions [of the horrible] to meditate on the impermanent (anitya), changing (vipariṇāmadharman) body that perishes from moment to moment (kṣananirodha), there is maraññasamjñā, the notion of death, [the sixth of the ten notions].

7. When the yogin uses the nine notions to become disgusted with the joys of the world (lokanirveda) and knows that suppression of the negative emotions (kleśaprahāna) is salvation (yogakṣema) and peace (kṣānti), there is prahānasamjñā, the notion of cutting, [the eighth of the ten notions].

8. When the yogin uses the nine notions to oppose the negative emotions (kleśapratīṣedhāya), there is vairāgyasamjñā, the notion of detachment, [the ninth of the ten notions].

9. When, by using the nine notions, the yogin becomes disgusted with the world (lokanirvinna) and knows that the destruction of the five aggregates (pañcaskandharirodha) and the fact that they will not re-arise (apunarbhava) constitutes abiding (vihāra) and salvation (yogakṣema), there is nirodhasamjñā, the notion of suppression,[313] [the tenth of the ten notions].

5) Moreover, the nine notions are the cause (hetu), while the ten notions are the fruit (phala). This is why the [Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] speaks of the nine notions first and then the ten notions.

amatapariyosāṇā: “These notions have great results if they are cultivated and gathered, they present great benefits, they plunge one into immortality, they lead to immortality.”

313 Cf. Saṃyutta, V, p. 133: Nirodhasaṃñā bhikkhave bhāvitā bahulikatā mahato atthāya saṃvattati, mahato yogakkhēmāya saṃvattati, mahato samvegāga saṃvattati, mahato phāsuvihārāya saṃvattati:

“The notion of destruction, if cultivated and increased, leads to great benefit, to great security, to great discipline, to comfortable abiding.”
6) Finally, the nine notions are the outer gate (bāhyadvāra) while the ten notions are the inner gate (ādhyātmikadvāra). This is why the sūtras speak of the two gates of the immortal (amrtadvāra), i.e., that of meditation on the horrible (aśubhabhāvāna) and that of attention to the breath (ānāpānasmṛti).314

IV. RESULTS OF THE NINE NOTIONS

1. Rejection of the seven types of lust

These nine notions [of the horrible] eliminate the seven types of lust (saptavidha rāga) in people.315

1) There are people who are attached to colors (varṇa), red (lohita), white (avadāta), reddish-white (śvetaraktā), yellow (piṇa), black (kṛṣṇa).

314 Cf. Itivuttaka, p. 80: Aṇubhānupassī bhikkhave kāyasmin viharatha ... vitakkāsya vighātapakhikā te na honti. “Remain, O monks, in the contemplation of the horrible in the body and let the attention to the breath be inwardly well established in you… If you remain contemplating the horrible in the body, the perverse tendencies to beauty will be suppressed and if attention to the breath is inwardly well established in you, the perverse troublesome tendencies to think of outer things will no longer exist.”

This is why, in the words of the Kośa, VI, p. 148-149 and of the Nyāyānusāra (T 1562, k.59, p. 671a), “Entry into bhāvanā occurs by contemplation of the horrible or attention to the breathing” (tatrāvatātārābhaya cānāpānasmṛtena ca). Those of passionate nature (rāgādhika) enter by way of aśubha which is directed outwardly (abhirmukha); those who are of rational nature (vitarkādhika), by way of ānāpānasmṛti which, not being directed outwards, cuts vitarka.

315 Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 40, p. 207c10-13: “Although aśubhabhāvanā concerns only visibles (rūpa), it counteracts lust (rāga) in regard to the six sense objects. Thus, those who are prey to lust for visibles (rūpa) eliminate the latter by practicing aśubhabhāvanā; those who are prey to lust for sounds (śabda) eliminate the latter by practicing aśubhabhāvanā, etc.”

Kośa, VI, p. 149; Kośavyākhyā, p. 526; Nyāyānusāra,T 1562, k. 59, p. 671a18-20: The nine notions are in opposition to fourfold rāga: lust for colors (varṇa), shapes (saṃsthāna), touch (sparśa) and honors (upacāra).

Here the Traité departs from classic scholasticism: for it, the nine notions are horrors opposed to the seven kinds of rāga: lust for colors (varṇa), shapes (saṃsthāna), postures (īryāpatha), fine language (vāda), pleasant touch (sparśa), of all five at once, and finally of the human appearance. Undoubtedly the Traité was inspired by the Tch’ an yao king ‘Summary sūtra on the dhyāna’ (T 609), wrongly thought to be an anonymous translation by the Han, where these kinds of lust are mentioned (k. 1, p. 237c19-21).

The same classification of rāga is adopted by Kumārajīva in his Tch’ an fa yao kiai ‘Summary explanation of the dhyāna method’ (T 616, k. 1, p. 286b16-18), an original work that he composed between 402 and 405, during which time he was busy with his translation of the Traité. On this subject, see P. Demiéville, La Yogacārabhūmi de Saṅgarakṣa, p. 354.
2) There are people who are not attached to colors but who are attached only to shapes (saṃsthāna), delicate skin, tapered fingers, expressive eyes, arched eyebrows.

3) There are people who are not attached to either colors or shapes, but who are attached only to postures (īryāpatha), ways of entering, of stopping, sitting, rising, walking, standing, bowing, raising or lowering the head, raising the eyebrows, winking the eye, approaching, holding an object in the hand.

4) There are people who are not attached to colors or shapes or postures, but who are only attached to language, soft sounds, elegant words, speech appropriate to the circumstance, replying to a thought, honoring orders, capable of moving people’s hearts.

5) There are people who are not attached to colors or shapes or positions or soft sounds, but who are only attached to fine smooth [furs], gentle to the skin, softening the flesh, refreshing the body in the heat and warming it in the cold.

6) There are people who are attached to all five things listed above at once.

7) There are people who are not attached to these five things but who are only attached to the human appearance, male or female. Even if they were to enjoy the five lusts (kāma) mentioned above, when they come to lose the loved person, they refuse to separate from them and they renounce the five objects of enjoyment (pañcākāmaguṇa) so esteemed by the world so as to follow their loved one in death.

[But the nine notions of the horrible reject these seven kinds of lust]:

1. The notion of death (maranasaṃjñā) eliminates lust for postures (īryāpatharāga) and lust for fine language (vādarāga) in particular.

2. The notion of the bloated corpse (vyādhmātakasamjñā), the notion of the torn-up corpse (vidhūtakasamjñā) and the notion of the scattered corpse eliminate lust for shapes (saṃsthānarāga) in particular.

3. The notion of the bloody corpse (vilohitakasamjñā), the notion of the blueish corpse (vinīlakasamjñā) and the notion of the rotting corpse (vipūyakasamjñā) eliminate the lust for colors (varṇarāga) in particular.

4. The notion of the corpse reduced to bones (asthisamjñā) and the notion of the burned corpse (vidagdhasamjñā) eliminate the lust for fine and gentle touch (sūksmaślaksṇaspraṣṭavayarāga) in particular. 316

Thus the nine notions eliminate these various lusts and also lust for the loved person. But it is the notion of the devoured corpse (vikhāditakasamjñā), the notion of the burned corpse (vidagdhasamjñā) and the notion of the corpse reduced to bones (asthisamjñā) that preferentially eliminate lust for an individual because it is hard to see how a person can be attached to devoured, scattered or white bony remains (śvataśthīka).

316 ‘Soft’ is one of the eleven kinds of touch: cf. Kośa, I, p. 18.
2. Diminishing of hatred and delusion

By means of the meditation on the nine notions, the minds of lust [218b] (rāga) are eliminated, but hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha) are also decreased. If one is attached to the body, it is because of delusion (moha), an error consisting of taking what is impure to be pure (aśucau sūcīr iti viparyāsāh). But now, with the help of the nine notions [of the horrible], the interior of the body is analyzed and the [impure] nature of the body is seen. From now on, error (mohacitta) decreases; as error decreases, lust (rāga) diminishes and, as lust diminishes, hatred (dveṣa) also decreases. It is because a person loves their own body that they experience hatred [when the latter is menaced]. But now that the yogin has contemplated the impurities (aśuci) of his own body and is disgusted (nirvinna) by them, he no longer loves his own body and, not loving his own body, he does not have hatred [when the latter is menaced].

3. Realization of great benefits

As the threefold poison (triviṣa) [of lust, hate and delusion] decreases, the entire mountain of the ninety-eight perverted tendencies (anuśaya) is shaken and the yogin gradually (kramaśas) progresses towards Bodhi. Finally, by the diamond-like concentration (vajropamasamādhi), he breaks the mountain of the fetters (samyojana) to pieces.

Although the nine notions are meditations on the horrible (aśubhābhāvanā), one depends on them to realize great benefits (mahānāsamsa). Similarly, when a repulsive corpse is floating in the sea, the shipwrecked sailor clings to it to save himself from the waves.

V. NATURE, OBJECT AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NINE NOTIONS

Question. – What is the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of these nine notions, what is their object (ālambana) and where are they contained (samgrhīta)?

317  The third of the four errors.
318  See above, p. 242F and note, 940F, 986F, 1068F.
319  These questions are dealt with in detail in Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 40, p. 206c; Kośa, VI, p. 152;
Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, K. 59, p. 672b. Aśubhā has as its nature the absence of desire (alobha). The ascetic can produce it in ten levels: kāmadhātu, dhyānāntara, the four dhyānas and their four respective sāmantakas. The object of aśubhā is the visible – color and shape – in the realm of rūpādhātu. Only men produce it. For its aspect (ākāra) it has the horrible and therefore does not show the sixteen aspects of the noble truths, impermanence, etc. As it is the act of attentiveness on an imaginary object (adhimuktimanasikāra), it is impure (sāsrava). Finally, it may be acquired either by detachment
Answer. – As their nature, they have the grasping of characteristics (nimittodgrahaṇa); they are contained in the aggregate of form (rūpaskandha).

They are also contained in a small part of the foundation of mindfulness on the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna), in the desire realm (kāmadhātu) or also in the first, second and fourth dhyāna.

The person who has not yet renounced desire (avītarāga) and who has a distracted mind (vikṣiptacitta) belongs to the domain of the desire realm (kāmadhātvacara); the person who has renounced desire (vītarāga) belongs to the domain of the form realm (rūpadhātvacara).

Eight notions, those of the bloated corpse (vyādmātaka), etc., are contained in kāmadhātu and the first and second dhyānas. The notion of pure bone (asthisamjñā) is contained in kāmadhātu, the first second and fourth dhyānas. As there is a great deal of happiness (sukha) in the third dhyāna, this one is exempt from the notion of horror.

VI. THE PLACE OF THE NINE NOTIONS IN THE DHARMAS OF THE PATH

These nine notions open the gate of the foundation of mindfulness on the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna). Mindfulness of the body opens the gate of the other three foundations of mindfulness. The four foundations of mindfulness open the gate of the thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipākṣhika dharma). The thirty-seven auxiliaries to enlightenment open the gate to the city of nirvāṇa. Entering into nirvāṇa, the suffering of sadness, sorrow, etc. (sokaurmanasyādiṣukha) are eliminated and, as the process of interdependency of the five aggregates (pañcaskandhaparītyasamutpāda) has been destroyed, one enjoys the eternal bliss of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇanītyasukha).

(vairagyā) or by practice (prayoga). The Kośakārikā, VI, II, condenses all this into one line: alobho daśabhūḥ kāmadṛśyālambā nṛjāsubhā.

320 This is why the meditation on the horrible is found in the sūtras dedicated to the smṛtyupasthānas, e.g., Majjhima, I, p. 58.
321 On the city of nirvāṇa, see above, p. 1150F, 1231F.
Second Section THE NINE NOTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYANA (p. 1327F)

Question. –The śrāvaka who meditates [on the nine notions] in this way experiences disgust (nirveda) and wants to enter nirvāṇa quickly. But the bodhisattva has compassion for all beings; he gathers all the attributes of the Buddha, saves all beings and does not seek to enter nirvāṇa quickly. Then, by meditating on these nine notions, why does he not fall into the class of an adept of the first two Vehicles, [i.e., that of the śrāvakas and of the pratyekabuddhas]?

Answer. – The bodhisattva feels compassion for beings. He knows that, because of the three poisons (trīṣa) [passion, aggression and ignorance], beings experience mental and physical suffering (cātāsiṇkāyikādikā) in the present lifetime (iha janmani) and in the future lifetime (paratā). The three poisons are not destroyed by themselves, and there is no other way to destroy them than to contemplate the inner and outer physical characteristics (ādhyātmikabhāṣyāyanimitta) to which one is attached [but that are repulsive]. The three poisons are destroyed only after this contemplation. That is why the bodhisattva who wants to destroy the poison of lust (rāgaviśa) contemplates the nine notions [so as to teach them to beings]. The bodhisattva is like a person who, out of compassion for the ill, gathers all the medicines (bhāṣajya) to cure them. To beings who love colors (varṇarakta), the bodhisattva preaches the notion of the blueish corpse (vinīṭakasilajña) and, according to that to which they are attached, he explains the other notions [of the horrible] of which we have spoken above. This is how the bodhisattva practices the meditation on the horrible (aśubhabhāvanā). [218c]

Furthermore, the bodhisattva who is practicing these nine notions with a mind of great compassion (mahākaraṇacitta) has the following thought: “Not completely possessing all the attributes of the Buddha, I do not enter into nirvāṇa: this would be using only one gate of the Dharma (ekadharmadvāra); but I should not keep to a single gate, I should use all the gates of the Dharma.” This is why the bodhisattva practices the nine notions without any restriction.

When the bodhisattva practices these nine notions, it may happen that thoughts of disgust (nirvedacitta) rise up in him and he may say: “This horrible body is hateful and miserable: I want to enter nirvāṇa.” Then the bodhisattva has the following thought: “The Buddhas of the ten directions have said that all dharmas are empty of nature (lakṣanaśānya). But in emptiness, there is no impermanence (anitya): then how (kah punarvādaḥ) could there be impurities (aśuci)? This meditation on the horrible is practiced only to destroy the error consisting of taking [what is impure] to be pure (aśucau iti viparyāsaḥ). These horrors (aśubha) that come from a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyāyasaṃgrāḥ) are without any intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) and all end up in emptiness. And so I cannot cling (udgrah-) to these horrors (aśubhadharma) that come from a complex of causes and conditions and are without intrinsic nature to allow me to enter into nirvāṇa.”
Moreover, it is said in a sūtra: “If there were no satisfaction (āsvāda) derived from the visible (rūpa), beings would not be attached to the visible; but because there is satisfaction deriving from the visible, beings are attached to the visible. If there were no defects (ādīnava) in the visible, beings would not be revolted by the visible; but because there are defects in the visible people are revolted by the visible. If there were no exit (niḥsaraṇa) from the visible, beings would not come out of the visible; but because there is an exit from the visible, beings come out of the visible.”

Therefore satisfaction (āsvāda) is the cause and condition of pure notions (śubhasamjñā). This is why the bodhisattva does not pay attention to the horrible and abstains from entering nirvāṇa prematurely.

This ends the explanations of the nine notions.

---


323 By considering pleasant visibles and then determining their defects (ādīnava), the bodhisattva accounts for the fact that they are completely empty (śūnya), without nature and, from the point of view of the true nature of things, unworthy of acceptance or rejection. The meditation on the horrible thus leaves him quite cold and in no way encourages him to hasten into nirvāṇa, as is the case for the śrāvaka. Personally, he does not believe in these horrors, but he preaches them to those whom he judges to be too attached to visibles. Briefly, preaching the horrible is one of the skillful means (upāya) used by the bodhisattva to ripen beings.
CHAPTER XXXVI: THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS (p. 1329f)

PRELIMINARY NOTE

The tenth class of supplementary dharmas to be fulfilled (paripūritavya) by the bodhisattva is made up of the eight recollections (anusmṛti, in Pāli, anussati).

I. LISTS OF RECOLLECTIONS

The lists of anussati and anusmṛti presented by the Pāli Nikāyas and the Sanskrit Āgamas respectively coincide general and here only the first will be mentioned:

A. THREE ANUSSATI in Dīgha, III, p. 5; Saṁyutta, I, p. 219-220; IV, p.304; Anguttara, I, p. 222:
1) Buddha-; 2) Dhamma-; 3) Sangha-anussati.

B. FOUR SOTA PATTIYANGA, practically identical with the anussati, by means of which the noble disciples (ariyasāvaka), inspired by perfect faith (aveccappasādena samannāgata), give evidence of their respect for the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha and the Discipline (Śīla) of the saints. – Cf. Dīgha, II, p. 93-94; III, p. 227; Saṁyutta, II, p. 69-70; V, p. 343, 365, 386-387; Anguttara, II, p. 56; III, p. 212-213; IV, p. 416-407; V, p. 183-184.


D. SIX ANUSSATI in Dīgha, III, p. 250, 280; Anguttara, III, p. 284-287, 312-313. 452; V, p. 329-332:
1) Buddha-; 2) Dhamma-; 3) Sangha-; 4) Śīla-; 5) Cāga-; 6) Devatā-anussati.


The six and the ten anussati are mentioned in the Pañisambhidā, I, on p. 28 and 95 respectively. They are commented on at length in Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 189-243 (transl. Nanamoli, p. 204-320).

The Prajñāpāramitā literature has the following lists:

A. EIGHT ANUSMRTI in Kumārajīva’s translation of the Pañcaviśāti (T 223, k. 1, p. 219a10-11):


E. NINE ANUSMRTI in the edition of the Śatasāhrsmikā by P. Ghosa, p. 59,l. 20-60, l. 15:


II. CANONICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE SIX ANUSMRTI

1. Buddhānusmṛti


Sanskrit formula: passim. Iti hi sa Bhagavān tathāgato ṛhān ...sāstā devamanusyānāṃ buddho bhagavān.

Transl. – First the holy disciple recollects the Tathāgata, saying: Yes, this Blessed One, fully and completely enlightened, endowed with knowledge and practice, well-come, knower of the world, supreme leader of men to be tamed, instructor of gods and men, the awakened one, the blessed one, is worthy of homage.

2. Dharmānusmṛti

Sanskrit formula: Mahāvastu, III, p. 200, 19-11; Mahāvyut., no. 1291-1297: Svākhyāto Bhagavato dharmah sāmdṛṣṭiko ... pratyātmaṇḍaṇīyo vijñaiḥ.

Transl. – Then the holy disciple recollects the Dharma, saying: The Dharma has been well enunciated by the Blessed One: it receives its retribution in the present lifetime; it is without frenzy; it is independent of time; it leads to the good place; it says “Come and see”; it is cognizable inwardly by the wise.

The present translation departs somewhat from the Pāli commentaries: see Manorathapūranī, II, p. 256, 333.

3. Saṃghānusmṛti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 186; V, p. 330: Puna ca param arīyasāvakā saṅghāṃ ... anuttaram puṇṇakhettaṃ lokassā tī.

Sanskrit formula reconstituted by the help of the Mahāvyut., no. 1119, 11220, 1121, 1122, 1772, 1773: Supratipanno Bhagavatāḥ śravakaṃgah ... ‘nuttaram punyakṣetraṃ lokasya.

Transl. – Then the holy disciple recollects the Community, saying: Of good conduct is the Community of the Blessed One’s disciples; of logical conduct is the Community of the disciples of the Blessed One; of correct conduct is the Community of disciples of the Blessed One, namely, the four pairs of individuals, the eight classes of individuals. This Community of disciples of the Blessed One is worthy of sacrifice, is worthy of offerings, is worthy of alms, is worthy of being greeted with joined palms: this is the best field of merit for the world.

4. Śīlānusmṛti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 286; V, p. 330: Puna ca param arīyasāvakā attano sīlāṃ ... aparāmaṭṭhāni samādhisāṃvatānikāni.

Sanskrit formula reconstituted according to the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 132 and the Mahāvyut., no. 1619, 1621, 1622-27: Śīlāṃ akhaṇḍāṃ acchidrāṃ ... vijñapraśastānīgarhitāṃ vijñaiḥ.

Transl. of the Pāli. – Furthermore, the holy disciple recollects the correct precepts unbroken, without cracks, unstained, without spots, liberating, praised by the wise, free of thoughtless attachment [to his own benefit], leading to meditative stabilization.

Transl. of the Sanskrit. – Precepts without breakage, without cracks, without stains, without spots, liberating, without attachment [to one’s own benefit], well achieved, well taken up, praised by the wise, not blamed by the wise.
5. Tyāgānusmṛti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 287; V, 331: Puna ca paraṃ ariyasāvako attano cūgaṃ ... yācayogadānasamvībhāgarato ti.

Transl. – Furthermore, the holy disciple recollects his own renunciation (i.e., his own generosity), saying: This is a gain for me, this is a great gain for me, for me in the midst of people who are prey to avarice, to living at home, my mind free of the stain of greed, giving freely, my hand extended, happy to give gifts, accessible to requests, happy to distribute gifts.

6. Devatānusmṛti

Pāli formula: Anguttara, III, p. 287; V, p. 331-332: Puna ca paraṃ ariyasāvako devatānussatiṃ bhāveti ... mayham pi tathārūpā paññā samvijjatī ti.

Transl. - Furthermore, the holy disciple practices the recollection of the deities, saying: There are the Caturmahārajika, Trāyastriṃśa, Yāma, Tuṣita, Nīmaratāta, Paranirmitavaśaśavatīra gods. There are the Brahmakāyika gods and the higher gods. It is because they were endowed with such faith, such discipline, such generosity and such wisdom that these deities, having left this world, have been reborn there [in their paradise]. This same faith, this same discipline, this same learning, this same generosity and this same wisdom is in me as well.

Śāstra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 20, l. 2-5; Śatasahāsrīkā, p. 59, l. 20-60, l. 15). – [The following should be cultivated (bhāvāvyā) by the bodhisattva]:

1) recollection of the Buddha (buddhānusmṛti),
2) recollection of the Dharma (dhammānusmṛti),
3) recollection of the Community (saṅghānusmṛti),
4) recollection of discipline (śīlānusmṛti),
5) recollection of abandonment (tyāgānusmṛti),
6) recollection of the deities (devatānusmṛti),
7) recollection of inhalation and exhalation (ānāpānasmṛti),
8) recollection of death (marāṇānusmṛti).

Śāstra. -
I. POSITION OF THE RECOLLECTIONS IN THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ

Question. – Why do the eight recollections follow the nine notions [of the horrible] [in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra]?

Answer. – In a forest (aranya), an empty house (śūnyāgāra), a charnel-ground (śmaśāna), a mountain (giri), a woods (vana) or a desert (kāntāra), the disciples of the Buddha who are meditating properly on the nine notions and who are practicing the meditation on the inner and outer horrors (adhyātmabahirdbhābhahavanā) feel disgust for the body and say to themselves: “Why do we carry around this vile and horrible sack of excrement (viṣ) and urine (mūtra)?” They are pained and frightened by it. Also there is wicked Māra (Māra pāpiyat) who plays all kinds of evil tricks on them and who comes to frighten them in hopes of making them regress. This is why the Buddha, [in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra], continues by explaining the eight recollections.
Thus, in a sūtra, the Buddha said to the bhikṣus: When you are meditating in a forest, an empty house, a charnel-ground, a mountain, a woods or a desert, and you experience fear (bhaya), trembling (chambitatva) or exasperation (romahārṣa), then recollect the Buddha, thinking:


---

324 The Sūtra on the “Top of the Standard” is well known. At Śrāvastī in the Jetavana in the garden of Anāthapiṇḍada, the Buddha advised the monks who were afraid of solitude to recollect the Buddha, the Dharma or the Saṃgha, a recollection the nature of which could dispel their fear. For this purpose, he related to them how once the god Śakra advised his devas who were in battle against the Asuras to think of his standard or that of Īśāna or Varuṇa in order to conquer their fears.

The sūtra in question is known in several versions in Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese and Tibetan. They have been studied by E. Waldschmidt, *Bruchstücke buddh. Sūtras*, p. 43-54:


C. Mdo chen po rgyal mtshan dam pa (Dhvajāgranāmamahāsūtra), OKC no. 959 (Tib.Trip., vol. 38, p.285-5-1 to 285-3-5.

D. Dhvajaggasutta, in Saṃyutta, 1, p. 218-220.

E. Kao tch’ouang king, in Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 14, p. 615a6-b6.

The Sūtra of the “Top of the Standard” should be compared and, on occasion, completed by another sūtra the title of which is poorly defined. Coming from the land of the Vṛjī, the Buddha stayed at Vaiśālī at the Markaṭahara, in the Kūṭāgāraśālā. Invited by some embarking merchants who were fearful of the dangers of the journey, he advised them also to recollect the Buddha, the Dharma or the Saṃgha in order to conquer their fears. To this end, he reminded them of the advice once given by Śakra to his devas. This sūtra, a simple variant of the preceding one, is attested by a Chinese version and a Tibetan version:


In sources A, B, C, F, G, the advice addressed by the Buddha to his monks precedes the recommendations once given by Śakra to the devas; in sources D and E, it is the reverse.

The version of the Dhvajāgrasūtra given here by the *Traité* is very close to sources A and B, but slightly more developed.
Śāstā devamanusyāṇām ‘teacher of gods and men’, Buddha ‘awakened’ and Bhagavat ‘blessed’. Your fears will immediately disappear.325

If you do not recollect the Buddha, you should recollect the Dharma saying: The Dharma of the Buddha is pure (pariśuddha), skilfully announced, well said (svākhya), receiving its retribution in the present lifetime (sāmādyāṇā), offering itself to be shared (veditavya vijñāḥ). If you recollect the Dharma thus, your fear will immediately disappear.

If you do not recollect the Dharma, you should recollect the Saṃgha, saying: The Community of disciples of the Buddha (buddhaśrāvakasamgha) cultivates the proper path (ṛjupratipanna) and acts in accordance with the instructions (sāmicpratipanna). In this Community, there are arhats and candidates for the fruit of arhat (arhatphalapratipannaka) and so on, down to srotāpāpanna and candidates for the fruit of srotāpañna (srotāpañnapralapratipannaka): thus four pairs of individuals (catvāri puṇḍrayugāni) or eight classes of individuals (aṣṭau puṇḍrapadgalāḥ). This Community of disciples of the Buddha is worthy of offerings (dakṣīṇa), worthy of being greeted with joined palms (aṅjaliṣaparāni), venerated (ārcaṇā), saluted and welcomed: for the world, it is the supreme field of merit (anuttarāṃ puṇyaśrātram lokasya). If you commemorate the Community thus, your fears will immediately disappear.

The Buddha said to the bhikṣus: In the struggle against the asuras, in the midst of a great battle (saṃgāma), Devendra said to his army of devas: When you are struggling against the asuras and you feel afraid, recollect my standard made of seven jewels (mama saptaratnamayo dhvajah samanusmartavyah) and immediately your fear will disappear. If you do not recollect my standard, recollect the precious standard of devaputra Yi-chö-na (Īśāna) [Kumārajīva’s note: the devaputra who is on the left of Indra-Śakra]. At once your fear will disappear. If you do not recollect the precious standard of Īśāna, recollect the standard of devaputra P’o-leou-na (Varuṇa) [Kumārajīva’s note: the devaputra to the right of Indra]. At once your fear will disappear.

From that we know that [the Prajñāpāmatāsūtra] continues its account here by speaking of the eight recollections as the means to drive away fear.

II. ALL THE RECOLLECTIONS DRIVE AWAY FEAR

Question. – But the [Dhvajāgra]-sūtra mentions only three recollections, [those of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha] as the means to drive away fear. Are the other five recollections also able to drive away fear?

325 In the Pāli sutta, Śakra advises the devas to look at his own standard and, that lacking, that of the Prajñāpati gods, Varuṇa and Īśāna. In sources E, F, G and here in the Traité, only his own standard and that of Īśāna and Varuṇa are mentioned. Indra, Soma, Varuṇa, Īśāna, Prajñāpti, Brahmā, Mahārddhi and Yama are deities invoked by the Brahmins.
Answer. – 1-2) If the bhikṣu thinks about his own virtues of abandonment (tyāga) and discipline (śīla), his fear also disappears. Actually, immoral (duḥśīla) beings fear falling into hell (niraya) and misers (matsarin) fear being reborn among the hungry ghosts (preta) or among poor people (daridra). The bhikṣu himself remembers that he has pure morality (parīsuddhasīla) and generosity-abandonment (tyāga). If he recollects his pure discipline or his own abandonment, his mind is joyful and he says to himself: “As long as my life (āyus) is not exhausted (kṣīṇa), I will still increase my virtues (guṇa) and, at the end of my life, I will not be afraid of falling into the unfortunate destinies (durgatī).” This is why the recollection of discipline (śīlasūnasmitta) and the recollection of renunciation (tyāgānusmitta) can also prevent fear from arising.

3) The bhikṣu remembers that the higher heavens (uttamasvarga) are the fruits of retribution (vipākaphala) resulting from abandonment (tyāga) and discipline (śīla) and that if the deities (devatā) have taken rebirth there, it is precisely because of these merits (puṇya). “I too”, he says to himself, “possess these merits.” This is why the recollection of the deities (devatānusmitta) also can prevent fear from arising.

4) When the bhikṣu recollects the sixteen ways of breathing (ānāpāna), even the subtle discursiveness (sūksmavitarka) disappears; then what can be said (kāḥ punar vādaḥ) of the coarse thoughts (audārikavitarka) [such as fear]?

5) In the recollection of death (maraṇānusmitta), the bhikṣu says to himself: “The group of the five aggregates (pañcaskandhakāya) arises and perishes in a moment and, from its very birth, it is always associated with death. At this moment, why should I fear death particularly?”

The Buddha did not speak about these five recollections [in the Dhvajāgrasūtra]; nevertheless, they too can drive away fear. Why [did the Buddha not speak of them]? When we think about the qualities (guṇa) of another, [be they those of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Community], it is difficult to drive away fear. On the other hand, when we think of our own qualities, [those of discipline, generosity, etc.], it is easy to drive away fear. This is why the Buddha did not speak of them [in the Dhvajārasūtra].

Second Section THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA (p. 1340F)

I. RECOLLECTION OF THE BUDDHA

1. The ten names

---

326 See above, p. 641-642F.
327 These ten traditional names (adhivacana) have been studied above, p. 126-144F. Here the Traité adds some new explanations.
Question. - How does one recollect the Buddha?

Answer. –

[1. Tathāgata.] – The yogin thinks of the Buddha one-pointedly (ekacittena): The Buddha has acquired right knowledge (yathābhūtajñāna); he is endowed with great loving-kindness and great compassion (mahāmaitrīmahākāruṇāsamanvīgata). This is why his words (āgada) are infallible (aviparīta): whether they are coarse (audārika) or subtle (sūksma), numerous (bahula) or few (alpa), profound (gambhīra) or superficial, there is nothing false in them. Since all his words (āgada) are true (tathā), the Buddha is called TATHĀGATA ‘of true speech’.328

Past (atīta), future (anāgata) or present (pratyutpanna), the Buddhas of the ten directions feel great compassion (mahākarunā) for beings, practice the six perfections (pāramitā) and discover the [true] nature of dharmas: they have reached (āgata) the anuttarasaṃyaksambodhi. The present Buddha too has arrived (āgata) there in the same way (tathā): this is why he is called TATHĀGATA ‘thus come’.

The body of the Buddhas of the ten directions in the three worlds emits great rays (raśmi) that illumine the ten directions and drive away the shadows (tamas); from their minds there come rays of knowledge that destroy the shadows of ignorance (avidyā) in beings; their virtues (guna) and their glory (yakṣas) also fill the ten directions: they have gone to nirvāṇa. The present Buddha has also gone (gata) in the same way (tathā): this is why he is called TATHĀGATA ‘thus gone’.

[2. Arhat]. – Because he possesses such qualities (guna), the Buddha is entitled (arhati) to the supreme worship (pūjāviśeṣa) of all gods and men: this is why he is called ARHAT ‘entitled to’.

[3. Samyaksambuddha]. – Some ask why only the Buddha “speaks in accordance with the truth” and “has gone” in the same way [as his predecessors] and is “entitled to” supreme worship. It is that the Buddha has obtained samyak-saṃ-bodhi ‘complete perfect enlightenment’: samyak ‘perfect’ insofar as it accords with the immovable indestructible nature (acalākasalakṣaṇa) of all dharmas; saṃ ‘complete’ because, instead of concerning merely one or two dharmas, it completely cognizes all dharmas without exception. This is why the Buddha is called SAMYAKSAṂBUDDHA ‘fully and perfectly enlightened’.

[4. Vidyācaranasaṃpanna]. – This samyaksambodhi has not been obtained without cause (ahetu) or without condition (apratyaya). Here it is by depending on the perfection (sampad) of knowledge (jñāna) and moral discipline (śīlasamvara) that the Buddha has obtained samyaksambodhi.

By knowledge (jñāna) we mean the sciences (vidyā) that the bodhisattva possesses from the time of the first production of the mind of Bodhi (prathamacittotpāda) until reaching the diamond-like samādhi (vajropamasamādhi). Moral discipline (śīlasamvara) is the fact that for the bodhisattva, from the first production of the mind of Bodhi until the diamond-like samādhi, his bodily actions (kāyakarman) and his vocal actions (viśuddha) are pure (viśuddha) and accomplished as he wishes (yattheṣṭam).

328 This etymology is valid only in the hypothesis that ‘Tathāgata’ is an erroneous reading for ‘Tathāgada’: cf. Sumāṅgala, p. 66: Evaṃ tathavādiya Tathāgata. Api ca āgadanaṃ āgada vacanān ti attho. Tatho aviparīto āgada assāti da-kārassa ta-kāraṃ katvā Tathāgatā ti.
This is why the Buddha is called VIDYĀCARANASAMPANNA ‘endowed with sciences and practices’.

[5. Sugata]. – Going along with this twofold course [of sciences and practices], the Buddha makes good progress (sugati), like a chariot (ratha) that runs well when it has two wheels (cakra). Since the Buddha also goes in this way to the place (sthāna) where the earlier Buddhas have gone (gata), he is called SUGATA ‘well-gone’.

[6. Lokavid]. – If someone tells us that the Buddha, using his own qualities (svaguna), does not know certain things, for example, the ātman, etc., we answer: It is because he knows the world (loka), the origin of the world (lokasamudaya), the cessation of the world (lokanirodhā) and the path that leads to the cessation of the world (lokanirodhagāminipratipada)329 that the Buddha is called LOKAVID ‘knower of the world’.

[7. Anuttarāḥ puruṣadamyasārathīḥ]. – Knowing the world, the Buddha tames (damayati) beings, and of all the kinds of teachers (ācārya), he is truly [219c] without superior (anuttara): this is why he is called ANUTTARĀ PURUṢADAMYASĀRATHĪ ‘supreme leader of those beings to be tamed who are humans’.

[8. Śāstā devamanusyānām]. – By means of the three kinds of paths, the Buddha is able to destroy the threefold poison (triviṣa) and make beings travel on the paths of the Three Vehicles (yānatrīya): this is why he is called ŚĀSTĀ DEVAMANUSYĀNĀM ‘teacher of gods and men’.

[9. Buddha]. – If someone asks us how the Buddha, who is able to assure his own good (svahita) without limit, is able to assure the good of others (parahita), we answer: Being endowed with omniscience (sarvajñānasamanvāgata), the Buddha cognizes clearly and fully the past (atīta), the future (anāgata) and the present (pratyutpanna), perishable things and imperishable things (kṣarāksara), moveable things and immoveable things (calācalā), the whole world: this is why he is called BUDDHA.

[10. Bhagavat]. – The Buddha who possesses these nine kinds of names (adhivacana) has great glory (mahāyaśas)330 filling the ten directions: this is why he is called BHAGAVAT ‘the blessed one’.

In the sūtras, the Buddha himself said that it is necessary to recollect him under these ten names (adhivaraṇa).

2. The miracles of his birth

Furthermore, all the various qualities (guna) are found in full in the Buddha:

329 Anguttara, II, p. 23: Loko bhikkhave Tathāgatena abhisambuddho ... lokasamudayo ... lokanirodhā ... lokanirodhagāminī patipadā Tathāgatena abhisambuddhā.

330 Among the six meanings of the word bhaga, the Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 174, l. 25, also mentions that of glory (yaśas).
1) The Buddha is of the lineage of Mo-ho-san-mo-t’o (Mahāsaṃmata), the noble cakravartin king who ruled at the beginning of the kalpa. He was born among the Chetseu (Śākya), a wise and powerful family in Yen-fou-t’i (Jambudīpa) in the clan (gotra) of the noble Kiao-t’an (Gautama).

2) At the time of his birth, rays (raṣmi) illumined the trisāhasramahāsahasralokadhātu. Brahmā Devarāja held a precious parasol (ratnacchattra) and Śakra Devendra received him on celestial precious garments (divyaratnavastra). Then Āgarāja Anapota (Anavatapta) and the Āgarāja Pok‘i-to [read So-k‘ie-lo (Sāgara)] bathed him with warm perfumed water.

---

331 He was of the solar race and appears in most of the genealogies of the Buddha: cf. Dīpavaṃsa, III, v. 3; Mahāvamsa, II, v. 1; Mahāvastu, I, p. 348,4.

332 According to the old canonical tradition (Dīgha, II, p. 14; Sanskrit Mahāvadāna, p. 88; Majjhima, III, p. 122), it is the custom that the Bodhisattva, issuing forth from his mother’s womb, is first received by the gods and then by men; before he touches the earth, the four devaputras take him and present him to his mother. - According to the Nidānakathā (Jātaka, I, p. 52-53) the four Mahābrāhmās of pure mind received the Bodhisattva on a golden net (suvaṇṇajāla), the four heavenly Mahārājas on antelope skins (ajinappaveṇi), and finally humans on a roll of fine linen cloth (dukūlacumbataka). - According to the Lalitavistara, p. 83, Śakra Devendra and Brahmā Sahāpati covered him with a heavenly garment made of Benares cloth (divyakāśikavastra). This last version, the most common in the literature, is adopted here by the Traité.

333 Although the Bodhisattva came from his mother’s womb completely clean, he underwent the traditional bathing ceremony of the newborn. But as Foucher, La Vie du Buddha, p. 49-50, comments, the tradition of the bath is very variable:

1) Two currents of water (vārīdhāra), one cold, the other warm, fell like rain from heaven to bathe the Bodhisattva and his mother: cf. Dīgha, II, p. 15; Majjhima, III, p. 123; Sanskrit Mahāvadāna, p. 91; Nieānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 53, l. 5-7; Mahāvastu, I, p. 222, l. 12; II, p. 24, l. 20.

2) Two currents of water (vārīdhāra), arising from the earth, filled two pools (udapāna) to bathe the infant, like a golden statue: cf. Mahāvastu, I, p. 220, l. 19-221, l. 2; II, p. 23, l. 4-7.

3) The nāgarājas Nanda and Upananda, appearing half-way from the sky, created two currents of water (vārīdhāra), cold and warm, and bathed the Bodhisattva. Śakra, Brahmā, the Lokapālas and many other devaputras bathed the Bodhisattva with all kinds of scented water: cf. Lalita, p. 83, l. 21-84, l. 3.

4) Remaining in the sky, Brahmā and Śakra bathed the Leader par excellence with pure scented water. Also the nāga kings (uragarāja) remaining in the sky made two currents of water flow, cold and warm. A hundred thousand gods bathed the Leader par excellence with scented water: cf. Lalita, p. 93, l. 1-5.

5) The nāgarājas bathed the Bodhisattva with two kinds of scented water, one cold, the other warm. In front of his mother there arose a large pool for her to wash in: cf. Mülasarv. Vin, T 1450.k. 2, p. 108a20-23.

Folklore and carved monuments reflect the uncertainties of the literary tradition.
At the moment of his birth, the earth trembled in six ways (ṣaḍvikāram akampata). The Bodhisattva took
seven steps (sapta padāni vikramate) calmly like the king of the elephants and, having regarded the four
directions (caturdiśam vilokya), he uttered the lion’s roar (simhanādam anadat) and proclaimed: I will have
no further rebirths (iyaṃ me paścimā jātiḥ) and I will save all beings.\(^334\)

3. Physical marks and superhuman power

The recluse A-sseu-t'o (Asita)\(^335\) examined him and said to king Tsing-fan (Śuddhodana):

“In the garden of Lumbinī, the place where the two nāgas bathed the divine child is shown side-
by-side with the twin springs that no less miraculously appeared to furnish water for his bath.” (A.
Foucher): cf. Si yu ki, T 2087, k. 6, p. 902a28-902b5.

The carved monuments may be divided into two groups. In the first, the Bodhisattva is bathed,
or more precisely, sprinkled by Brahmā and Śakra: this is the case at Gandhāra (Foucher, Agb., p. 309,
fig. 156 = Ingholt, fig. 16 = Marshall, fig. 58) and at Swāt (Tucci, Il trono di diamante, Bari, 1967, fig.
80-81). In the second group, he is escorted by two nāgas or sprinkled by them: this is the case at Mathurā
(Vogel, pl. 51a, right; pl 52b) and on the steles at Benares (Foucher, Agb., p. 413, fig. 209a, left).

We may ask why here the Traité replaces the two traditional nāgas, Nanda and Upananda, by
two of their fellows, Anavatapta and Śāgara. This may be because at the time of the birth of the Buddha,
the first two were not yet converted and still had to be tamed by Maudgalyāyana (see below, k. 32, p.
300a29 seq.; k. 100, p. 752b12. However, it is doubtful that such a care for verisimilitude bothered the
ancient exegetists. Identical in their behavior, the nāgarājas were practically interchangeable and it was
permissible to choose freely from the list of the eight most important of them: Nanda, Upananda, Śāgara,
Vāsukin, Takṣāka, Manasvin, Anavatapta, Utpalaka (cf. Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 4, l. 11-12).

\(^334\) For the seven steps of the Bodhisattva, see above, p. 6F and note.

\(^335\) According to the Pāli sources, Asita, the old teacher and titular chaplain to king Śuddhodana,
became a recluse and was living in retreat close to the royal palace, which did not prevent him from
going to the Himalayan peaks and even to the Caturmahārājikadeva heaven. In the Sanskrit sources, he
was a native of Dakṣīnāpatha, the son of the Brahmin Ujjayinī and spent his leisure time between Mount
Vindhya and Mount Kailāsa, a chain of the Himalayas. However it may be, the hermit enjoyed extensive
powers that allowed him to foretell the future. Hearing from the Trāyastriṃśa gods that Śuddhodana had
just had a son, he hastened to the royal palace to examine the newborn. Earlier, the experts in signs had
already discovered that two paths only were open to the little Siddhārtha: he would be a cakravartin king
or a full Buddha. Having carefully studied the 32 physical marks and the 80 minor marks of the child,
Asita declared that without a doubt Siddhārtha would become Buddha some day. However, Asita was
not present at this fortunate event for his death was near and he was destined to be reborn in ārūpyadhātu.
And so, having rejoiced, Asita burst into tears. He was, however, consoled at the thought that his
1) On the soles of his feet are [two] wheels with a thousand spokes (adhas tasya pādayoś cakre jāte sahasrāre); his toes are joined by a web (jālāvanaddhāṅguli); he will be able to be firmly established in the Dharma (dharme supratiṣṭitah) and nobody can shake him or destroy him.

2) His hands are marked with the śrīvatsa (śrīvatsalakṣitapāṇi) and adorned with a web (jālāvāṃkṛta): with these hands he will be able to reassure beings and prevent them from being fearful.

3) On his head there is a fleshy bone (uṣṇīṣaśiraskatā) like the top of a mountain of blue pearls; rays of blue light radiate on all sides from it.

4) On his head there is the mark of the cranium, the height of which cannot be seen (anavalokitamūrdhatā); among gods and men, nobody will be able to surpass him.

nephew, Nālaka or Naradatta, according to the sources, would one day benefit from the presence and teachings of the Buddha.

Later, the Traité (k. 29, p. 274b4; k. 40, p. 350a12-13) will return to this recluse, famed in Buddhist literature and art:


Chinese sources: Sieou hing pen k’l king, T 184, k. 1, p. 464a28; Ying pen k’i king, T 185, k.1, p. 474a4-5; Lalitavistara, T 186, k. 2, p. 495b6; Abhiniśkrmanāsūtra, T 188, p. 618a27; Yin kouo king, T 189, k. 2, p. 636a18-19; Fo pen hing tasi king, T 190. k. 9, p. 693b23; k. 10, p. 697a6, p. 700a25; k. 12, p. 707b17-18; k. 14, p. 720c19; k. 15, p. 722c14, 723c14; k. 17, p. 734c17; Fo pen hing king, T 103, k. 1, p.60b19; Tchong pen k’i king, T 196, k. 1, p. 155c16; Mahiśasakavinaya, T 1421, k. 15, p. 106a6; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1442, k. 17, p. 716a26; T 1443, k. 8, p. 947c12; T 1450, k. 2, p. 108a26; 109b4; 19 and 21; k. 3, p. 109c4; 110a7; T 1451, k. 20, p. 298a19 and 21; 298c24; 299b9; 299c4; Chan ken liu, T 1462, k. 17, p. 791a9.

Illustrations: Gandhāra (Foucher, Agh., p. 313, fig. 160d; p. 315, fig. 161; p. 316, fig. 162; p. 323, fig. 165a); Swāt (Facenna, II, 2, pl. 63, no. 4276; II, 3, pl. 467, no. 922); Nāgārjunakonḍa (Longhurst, pl. 20a; pl. 21a on right); Ājanṭā (Griffiths,pl. 45); Barabuḍur (Krom, pl. 31).

336 Here the Traité limits itself to citing the first of the 32 lakṣānas and the 84th and last of the anuvyāñjanas according to the order established by the Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 24, p. 395b28-396b9. Above, p. 272-279F, it has commented fully on the 32 lakṣānas, to which the reader is referred.

337 In the lines that follow, the Traité draws attention to twelve of the marks, namely, nine lakṣānas and three anuvyāñjanas.

338 32nd lakṣaṇa.

339 Anavalokitamūrdhata ‘Invisible cranial summit’, in Chinese wou kien ting siang, in Tibetan, spyi gtsug bltar mi mhoṅ ba. This anuvyāñjana does not appear in the lists of marks given by the canonical
scriptures or the early biographies of the Buddha mentioned above (p. 271 and 272 as note) and seems to be an invention of the Mahāyāna.

The Sanskrit word *anavalokitāṃdhatā* is attested in the Suvikrāntavikrāmin, p. 114, l. 11 and the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 381, l. 2-3. In the editions of the Gandavyūha, p. 65, l. 18, the reading *avalokitāṃdhitā*, reproduced in Edgerton, *Dictionary*, p. 74, is faulty.

In the Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 24, p. 395c28, *anavalokitāṃdhatā* is the first *anuvyañjana*; in the Śatasāhasrikā, T 220 (vol. VI), k. 381, p. 968c18-19, it is the 66th *anuvyañjana*. This minor mark appears again in numerous Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras: Bimbisārarāja, T 41, p. 825b7; Brahmāyus, T 76, p. 884a18; Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka, T 157, k. 2, p. 177c4-5; Avatāmsaka, T 278, k. 6, p. 432c5; k. 17, p. 508a13; k. 46, p. 691b5-6; T 279, k. 27, p. 146a7 and 16; k. 62, p. 335c21; Śraddhābalādhānāvarāra, T 305, k. 5, p. 955a25-955b25; Che tchou touan kie, T 309, k. 4, p. 997b29-997c1; Ratnakūṭa, T 310, k. 10, p.54b9; Tathāgataguhya, T 312, k. 8, p. 724a16; Bodhisattvapiṭaka, T 316, k. 27, p. 851b11; Amitāyurbuddhānusmṛti, T 365, p. 344a9; Wou chang yi king, T 669, k. 2, P. 474c24; Upāsakaśīla, T 1488, k. 1, p. 10293-6; Upadeśa, T 1509, k. 26, 256a9 and 17; king kang sien louen, T 316, k. 27, p. 851b11; Amāśīṣikāyupāyana, T 310, k. 10, p. 1101.

We know that the 80 *anuvyañjanas* are supplementary to the 32 *lakṣanas*. In fact, the *anavalokitāṃdhitā* is a property of the 32nd *lakṣaṇa* of the Buddha, the cranial protuberance (*uṣṇīṣa*). This is what the Bodh. bhūmi says, p. 381: *Tatroṣṇīṣaśirvāpanavalokītimādhatā caikamahāpurasalakṣaṇam veditavāyam tadvaytirekenānupalāṃbhāt*: “The two make up a single mark of the Great Man; there is no difference between them.”

When the *Traité* says here that nobody can see the top of the Buddha’s cranium and that nobody among gods and men can surpass him, it should be taken literally: the *uṣṇīṣa* of the Buddha is invisible and nobody can go above it. This explains several mysterious episodes in the Buddha’s life:

When the recluse Asita wanted to examine the new-born Buddha, the baby’s feet turned upside-down and placed themselves on the chignon of the recluse (bodhisattvavā parīvattitvā tāpasassa jatāsu patiṭṭhajīsū): cf. Nidānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 54, l. 25-26.

“When Gautama travels, heavenly gifts, precious parasols and flowers rain down like snow. The devas, nāgas and flying birds do not dare to fly above him for, among beings of the threefold world, none can see the summit [of his cranium]”; cf. Brahmāyuṣṭīra, T 76, p. 884a16-18.

Sātāgira and Hemavata who were flying to an assembly of yakṣas were stopped in full flight and forced to land because, if they had continued on their route, they would have passed above the Buddha: cf. Comm. on the Suttanipāta, I, p. 221-223; Comm. on the Udāna, p. 64.

Near Rājaigrha, at Yaśṭivāna ‘Perch Forest’: “Once a Brahmin, having heard that the Buddha’s body was sixteen feet high, persisted in doubting and did not believe it. He wanted to measure the Buddha with a bamboo rod sixteen feet long, but the Buddha’s body constantly rose above the top of the rod and surpassed sixteen feet. He continued growing so that the Brahmin, quite unable to reach the true height, threw away his stick and went away. As a result of this event, the bamboo stick remained planted...
5) A tuft of white hair grows between his eyebrows (ūrṇā cāṣya bhruvor madhye jātā) the white brilliance of which surpasses that of crystal (sphotika).

6) He has clear eyes (viśuddhanetra), wide eyes (viśalanetra), the color of which is deep blue (abhinīlanetra).

7) His nose is high (tūganāsa), fine (śucināsa) and pleasing.

8) His mouth has forty teeth (catvārimśaddanta), white (sūkla), pure, sharp and wondrous.

9) His four canine teeth are very white (śukladaṃśtra) and very shiny.

10) His upper and lower lips (aṣṭha) are equal (sama), neither too big nor too small, neither too long nor too short.

11) His tongue is thin and long (tanuprabhūtajīva); it is soft (mrdu), red (lohitavarṇa), like a heavenly lotus (divyapadma).

12) His brahmic voice (brahmavāra) is deep (gambhīra) and carries afar; those who hear him rejoice and are never tired of listening.

in the ground and took root there.” This anecdote is told by Hiuan-tsang in the Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 9, p. 920a7-12, and is represented on the bas-reliefs at agndhāra (Foucher, Agb. p. 505, pl. 251b; p. 522, pl. 256c) but has left no trace in the texts. However, a canonical passage should be noted where the Teacher forbade everyone except himself to measure a pudgala: Mā puggalesu pamāṇikā ahuvatthu … yo vā pan’assa madiso. “Do not be one of those who measure men, for the person who takes the measure of men wounds himself. It is I who am able to take the measure of men, or someone like me.” (Anguttara, III, p. 350, 351; V, p. 140, 143; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 35, p. 258a23-25; 258c7-8; Śūraṃgamasamādhi, p. 208; Śīkṣāsamuccaya, p. 92).

Like all the lakṣaṇas and anuvyañjanas, the anavalokitamūrdhatā is the fruit of immense merit accumulated over innumerable kalpas: “When he was Bodhisattva, the Buddha venerated the teachers, the ancient ones, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, for innumerable lifetimes; he prostrated [at their feet] with the top of his head, destroying all pride in himself: this is why he has obtained the mark of the invisible top of the cranium” (Upāsakaśīla, T 1488, k. 1, p.1039b3-6). Same explanation in King kang sien louen, T 1512, k. 5, p. 831b29; k. 9, p. 863a4-5.

For other comments, see H. Durt, Note sur l’origine de l’Anavalokitamūrdhatā, Indian and Buddhist Studies, XVI, p. 1967, p. 443-450.

340 31st lakṣaṇa according to the list of the Prajñāpāramitā.
341 29th lakṣaṇa.
342 2nd anuvyañjana.
343 22nd lakṣaṇa.
344 24th lakṣaṇa.
345 29th anuvyañjana.
346 27th lakṣaṇa.
13) The color of his body (kāyavarṇa) is marvelous, more beautiful than the gold of the Jāmbu river (jāmbunadakāṇcana).\footnote{348}

14) A halo one arm-span in width (read tchang kouang = vyāmaprabha) surrounds his body, of varied colors, incomparable in beauty.\footnote{349}

Endowed with these thirty-two marks, this man will, before long, leave home (pravrajita), will attain omniscience (sarvajñāna) and will become Buddha.

This is how the physical qualities (kāyaguna) of the Buddha should be \footnote{220a} recollected.

Moreover, the qualities (guna) and the physical strength (kāyabala) of the body of the Buddha surpasses ten myriads of white gandhahastins:\footnote{350} this is physical power inherited from his parents. His supernatural powers (abhijñā), his qualities and his strength are immense and limitless. The body of the Buddha is adorned with the thirty-two marks (dvātrimśallakṣaṇa) and the eighty minor marks (aśītyanuvyañjanāni); inwardly he has the innumerable attributes and qualities of the Buddhas: this is why one does not tire of seeing him. Those who see the Buddha’s body forget about the five worldly objects of enjoyment (paṁcakāmaṇgaṇa) and never think of them again. One’s happiness is complete on seeing the Buddha’s body; one never tires of seeing it.\footnote{351}

These are the qualities of the Buddha’s body under which one should recollect him.

4. The five pure aggregates (anāsravaskandha)\footnote{352}

\footnote{1. Śīlaskandha}. – Furthermore, in the Buddha, maintenance of morality (śīla) is perfect (saṁpanna) and complete (pariṣuddha). From the first production of the mind of Bodhi (prathamacittotpāda), he practices morality and accumulates it without measure. Endowed with the mind of compassion (karuṇācitta), he does not seek the fruit of retribution (vipākapāla). He does not lean toward the Bodhi of the śrāvakas or of the pratyekabuddhas. He is without fetters (saṁyojana). He maintains discipline from birth to birth only for the purification of his own mind (svacittapariśodhana) and so as not to harm beings. Thus, when he obtains the Bodhi of the Buddhas, his morality is perfected.

\footnote{347} 28th lakṣaṇa.
\footnote{348} 40th lakṣaṇa.
\footnote{349} 50th lakṣaṇa: see above p. 277F, 453-456F.
\footnote{350} The Buddha has the physical strength of Nārāyana, equal to myriads of white elephants in rut. See Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 36, p. 749b23-749c13; Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 30, p. 155a-b; k. 83,p. 428c20; k. 191, p. 957a26; Kośa, VII, p. 72-74; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 748b; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 388-389.
\footnote{351} Thus at the moment of his death, the disciple Vakkali had nothing to blame himself for, but he felt one cruel regret; he confessed: “For a long time I wanted to go to the Buddha to contemplate him, but I did not have the strength in my body to go to visit him.” (Samyutta, III, p. 120).
\footnote{352} For these five anāsravaskandha, see references above, p. 1233, n. 3.
This is how one should recollect the aggregate of morality (śīlaskandha) of the Buddha.

[2. Samādhiskandha]. – Furthermore, the aggregate of samādhi (samādhiskandha) is perfected in the Buddha.

Question. – We can know that the Buddha is disciplined because his bodily and vocal actions (kāyavakkarman) are pure; we can know that he is wise because he explains the Dharma in detail and cuts through the doubts (samsāyā) of beings. But in regard to meditative stabilization (samādhi), it is impossible to know if a third person is practicing it, especially if it is a Buddha.

Answer. – As the great wisdom (mahāprajñā) of the Buddha is perfect (samaṃpanna), it must be concluded that his dhyānas and his absorptions (samaṃpattis) are perfected. Similarly, when we see that the flowers (padmapuspā) are large, we agree that the pool (hrada) must also be large. When we see that the light of the lamp (dīploka) is large, we agree that there is also abundant oil (taila). And so, since the supernatural powers (abhijñā) and the prodigious strength (prāthāryabala) of the Buddha are immense and incomparable, we know that the power of his dhyānas and his absorptions is also perfected. When we see that an effect (phala) is great, we know that its cause (hetu) is necessarily great.

Furthermore, in some circumstances, the Buddha himself said to people that his dhyānas and samāpattis are very deep (gambhīra).

[The Miracle of Ādumā].353 – It is said in a sūtra that the Buddha was in the land of A-t’eou-mo (Ādumā), seated in meditation under a tree (niṣāṇṇaḥ pratisaṃlayanāya). Suddenly there was a heavy rainstorm with lightning and thunder. Four cowherds (gopālaka) and two workmen (kārṣaka)354 were so frightened by the noise that they died. A few moments later, calm returned and the Buddha went out to walk (caṅkrame caṅkramyate).

---

353 Meeting the Buddha between Kuśinagarī and Pāpā, a minister of the Mallas called Putkasa spoke to him about his teacher Ārāḍā Kālāma and his extraordinary power of concentration: one day when he was deep in meditation, Ārāḍā did not hear the noise of a caravan of five hundred wagons that passed by close to him. The Buddha affirmed that he too possessed a similar power of absorption and gave him as proof an incident that had occurred in the village of Ādumā (in Pāli, Ātumā).

This miracle appears in the various recensions of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra: Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 272-276; Mahāparinibbāna in the Dīgha, II, p. 131-132; and various Chinese translations: T 1, k. 3, p. 19a21; T 5, k. 2, p. 168b13-21; T 6, k. 2, p. 183c23-184a3; T 7, k. 2, p. 198a17-198b4 (see E. Waldschmidt, Lebensende des Buddha, p. 155-157, a comparative study of these versions). The miracle is also told in Lieou tou tsi king, T 152, k. 7, p. 42c23-29 (tr. Chavannes, Contes, I, p. 281) and Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1451, K. 37, p. 391b3-18. Here is the Sanskrit version of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra:

Eko ’yam Putkasa samaya Ādumāyām viharāmi bhūtāgūre. pūrvānne nivasya pātracīvaram ādāyādumāṃ pīṇāya ... sphoṭatyāḥ śadbam. Prasannas ca me puruṣo vaśikṛtaḥ.

354 Most other sources say four oxen (balivardaka) and two workmen (kārṣaka).
A vaisya, having bowed down to the Buddha’s feet, walked along after him and said: Bhagavat, for a moment there was thunder, lightning and four cowherds as well as two workmen were so frightened by this noise that they died. Did the Bhagavat not hear the crash?

The Buddha said: I heard nothing.

The vaisya: Was the Buddha sleeping at that moment?

The Buddha said: No, I was not asleep.

The vaisya: Had you entered into the absorption of non-identification (asaṃjñisaṃpatti)?

The Buddha: No, I was conscious (saṃjñeyevasammanah), and I was just in meditative stability.

The vaisya exclaimed: That is wonderful (āścaryām bata)! The dhyānas and the samāpattis of the Buddha are great and profound (mahāgambhiṇa). Being in meditation, fully conscious and fully awake (saṃjñeyevasamāno jāgram), he did [220b] not hear this great noise!

In other sūtras, the Buddha said to the bhikṣus: “The samādhis into which the Buddha enters and comes out of, Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana do not even know the names of them.” How then (kim puna vādah) would they know their nature?

See, for example, the samādhi of the King of Samādhi (samādhirājasamādhi),356 the samādhi of the Lion’s Play (simhavikrūḍitasamādhi),357 etc.: when the Buddha enters them, he makes the universes of the ten directions shake in six ways; he emits great rays (raśmi) and by emanation he creates innumerable Buddhas who fill the ten directions.

[The miracle of the multiplication of the Buddhas].358 – One day Ānanda reflected thus: Formerly, under the Buddha Jan-teng (Dīpankara), people were good, had long life (dīrghaśyasa) and were easily converted. Today, under the Buddha Śākyamuni, people are actually bad, have a short life (alpāśyasa) and are hard to convert. Is Śākyamuni going to enter into nirvāṇa without having completed his work as Buddha (buddhakārā)?
In the morning, Ānanda questioned the Buddha about this. The sun had just risen and, at that very moment, the Buddha entered into the samādhi of Daybreak (sūryodayasamādhi). Just as the rays of the rising sun lit up Jambudvīpa, so, from the body of the Buddha and from the pores of his skin (romakūpa) rays were emitted that illumined universes of the ten directions as many as the sands of the Ganges (gaṅgaladiāvālukopama).

From each of these rays arose lotus flowers with a thousand petals made of the seven jewels (saptaratnamayānī sahasrapatrāṇī padmānī). On each of these flowers there was a seated Buddha each of whom emitted innumerable rays. From each of these rays arose other thousand-petalled lotus flowers made of the seven jewels on each of which was a seated Buddha.

All these Buddhas filled universes in the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges and converted beings. Some preached the Dharma, others were silent, others walked about, still others, by feats of magic (rddhiprāthīrya), shot out water and fire successively. They converted beings of the five destinies in the ten directions by these skillful means (upāya).

By the power of the Buddha (bhagavataḥ prabhāvena), Ānanda saw all these things. Then the Buddha withdrew the bases of his magical power (rddhipādān punar eva pratisamharati sma), emerged from meditation and asked Ānanda if he had seen and heard these things. Ānanda replied: “Thanks to the Buddha’s power, I saw and I heard.”

The Buddha asked him: “Does the Buddha have enough power to be able to finish [quickly] his task as Buddha?”

Ānanda answered: “O Bhagavat, suppose that the beings filled universes in the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges and the Buddha lived only one single day, if, [in order to convert them], the Buddha used the power [which you have just demonstrated], he could certainly fully accomplish completely (atyanam) his task as Buddha (buddhakārya).” And Ānanda exclaimed: “It is truly wonderful (adhbhutaṃ bata), O Bhagavat! The Buddha’s attributes are immense (apuramāṇa) and inconceivable (acintya).”

This is why we know that the dhyānas and the absorptions of the Buddha are perfected (sampanna).

359 This bodhisattva found a manuscript of the Prajñāpāramitā at Gandhāra in the city of Gandhavatī in the middle of a tower where the bodhisattva Dharmodgata had hidden it. It had been written on gold-leaf with molten beryl; sealed with seven seals, it was enclosed in a precious casket resting on a bed set with
Furthermore, as he has cultivated great compassion (mahākarunā) and wisdom (prajñā), the Buddha has perfected the wisdom aggregate (prajñāśankhā). Other people do not have this great compassion, and even if [220c] they do have wisdom, they do not perfect great compassion. Wanting to save beings and seeking all kinds of wisdoms, the Buddha has destroyed even his attachment to the Dharma (dhammasaṅgha) and suppressed the sixty-two kinds of wrong view (dṛṣṭigata). He does not fall into the pairs of extremes (dvāv antau):360 a life attached to the five objects of enjoyment and pleasure (pañcakāmaguṇeṣu kāmasukhaliṅkānyuyoga) or a life of personal mortification (āmaklāmathānuyoga), nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭī) or eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭī), existence (bhava) or non-existence (vibhava), and other extremes of this kind.

Furthermore, the Buddha’s wisdom is peerless (anuttara) and his penetration (prativedha) without equal (asama), for they are all the result of very deep concentrations (gambhiṛasamādhi) and are not disturbed by coarse or subtle emotions (sthūlasūkṣmakleśa). He practices well the thirty-two auxiliaries to enlightenment (bodhipāṣikadharma), the four trances (dhyāna), the four formless absorptions (āruṇyasamāpatti), the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the nine successive absorptions (anupāravīhārasamāpatti) and the other qualities (guna); he possesses the ten strengths (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaśaradya), the four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvīd), and the eighteen special attributes (āvenikadharma); he has obtained the unhindered and inconceivable liberations (asaktācintyavimokṣa):361 this is why the wisdom aggregate of the Buddha is perfected (sampanna).

Furthermore, the Buddha has vanquished the great heretical scholars (ūrthikamahopadeśācārya), namely:

the seven jewels. To pay homage to bodhisattva Dharmodgata, Sadāprarudita ‘Eternally Weeping’ sacrificed his body several times and, not finding any water to wash the place where he was to meet the bodhisattva, “he took a sharp blade, pierced his body everywhere and sprinkled the place with his own blood” (tiṅṣnaṃ śastraṃ ghṛṭvā svākāyaṃ samantato vīdhvā tam prthivipradeśaṃ svarudhiṃ dha sarvam asiṅcata). The adventures of Sadāprarudita are told at length in various recensions of the Prajñāpāramitā:

2) Pañcavīṃṣati, T 221, k. 20, p. 141b-146b; T 223, k. 27, p. 416a-423c.

But the chapters on Sadāprarudita and Dharmodgata are not part of the original edition of the Prajñāpāramitā. Actually, the Ratnaguṇasamayagāthā which makes up the earliest summary of this literature does not mention these two bodhisattvas, and the chapters in question show indirect contacts with the Mediterranean gnosia of the beginning of our era. See E. Conze, The Composition of the Aṣṭāsāhasrikā, BSOAS, XIV, 1952, p. 251-262.

The Traité will comment fully on the two chapters in question (k. 96-100, p. 731a-753c) and will often evoke the spirit of Sadāprarudita’s sacrifice (k. 30, p. 283a20; k. 34, p. 314a12; k. 49, p. 412a20, 414c13.

360 See above, p. 23F and note, 396F, 655F and below, k. 25, p. 246a.
361 For these acintyavimokṣa of the bodhisattva, see Vimalakīrti, p. 250-258.
Yeou-leou-p’iin-li kia-chô (Urubilvākśyapa),\textsuperscript{362}

Mo-ho-kia chô, Mahākāśyapa,\textsuperscript{363}

Chô-li-fou (Śāriputra),

Mou-k’ien-lien (Maudgalyāyana),\textsuperscript{364}

Sa-tchô Ni-k’ien-tseu (Satyaka Nirgranthiputra),\textsuperscript{365}

P’o-ts’o-cheou-lo,\textsuperscript{366}

Tch’ang-tchao (Dīrghanakha),\textsuperscript{367} etc.

\textsuperscript{362} The same year as his enlightenment, the Buddha went to Urubilvā to convert the thousand Jaṭilas, fire worshippers, led by Urubilvākśyapa, a venerable old man aged one hundred and twenty years, and his two brothers, Nadī- and Gatākśyapa. To impress these heretics, the Buddha performed no less than eighteen miracles, beginning with the taming of a venomous snake. Finally convinced of not having attained sainthood (\textit{arhattva}) and that he did not even know the Path, Urubilvākśyapa asked to be received into the Buddhist order and his five hundred disciples made the same request. The Buddha agreed and the newly converted threw their garments of hide and their religious objects into the river in order to put on the Dharma robe.

Nadī- and Gayākśyapa, further downstream, saw the cast-off garments of their co-religionists and fearing that some misfortune had occurred to them, they rushed to find out what had happened. They found their friends already shaven and wearing the saffron robes of the disciples of the Buddha. Influenced by this example, they too asked to be accepted into the Sangha of monks.

For these conversions, see Catuspariṣad, p. 304-315; Pāli Vin, I, p. 32-34; Mahīśāsaka Vin. T 1421, k. 16, p. 109a27-109b22; Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 33, p. 796b1-797a11; Mūlasarv. Vin. T 1450, k. 7, p. 133b25-134b2; Mahāvastu, III, p. 425-432; Nidānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 82; Buddhacarita (Tib.), XVI, v. 23-38; Ying pen k’l king, T 185, k. 2, p. 482c2-483a8; Yin kouo king, T 189, k. 4, p. 649b6-650a22; Tchong hiu mo ho ti king, T 191, k. 9-10, p. 960b27-962a10; Tchong pen k’l king, T 196, k. 1, p. 151c4-28.

For the miracles and the conversion of Urubilvā, see the list of sources in E. Waldscmidt, \textit{Vergleichende Analyse des Catuspariṣarsūtra}, Festscrift Schubring, 1951, p. 106-113, from which the preceding references have been taken; an analysis of the illustrated monuments in Foucher, \textit{La Vie du Bouddha}, p. 217-220; a study of the foundations in Bareau, \textit{Recherches}, p. 253-320.

\textsuperscript{363} For Mahākāśyapa, see above, p. 87-103F, 190-196F, 287F and n.

\textsuperscript{364} The conversion of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana has been told above, p. 621-640F

\textsuperscript{365} For Satyaka Nirgranthiputra, see above, p. 48F and n.; below, k. 25, p. 242c7; k. 26, p. 251c10.

\textsuperscript{366} Perhaps Śrenika Vatsagotra, already mentioned, p. 32F note, 46F, 184F. See below, k. 37, p.334b4; k.77, p. 602b13.

\textsuperscript{367} Dīrghanakha (or Mahākausṭhila): see above, p. 46-51F, 184F, 633F, 639F; below, k. 25, 242c7; k. 26, p. 254b10.
The Buddha vanquished all these great scholars: this is why we know that his wisdom aggregate (prajñāskandha) is perfected (samppanna).

Furthermore, in the three Baskets (tripiṭaka), the twelve classes of texts (dvādaśāṅgabuddhavacana) and the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma (caturśītisasradharmaskandha), we see how numerous were the words of the Buddha (buddhavacana): this is why we know that his wisdom also is great.

Thus, a vaisya, seeing at dawn a place where there had been a lot of rain, said to the people: “Last night, the power of the rain-dragon (varṣa-nāga) was very great.” The people asked him: “How do you know?” He answered: “I see that the ground is damp, the mud abundant, the mountain collapsed, the trees knocked down and the animals killed; that is how I know that the power of the dragon was great.”

It is the same for the Buddha: although his profound wisdom is not visible to the eye, it makes the mighty rain of the Dharma (mahādharmavarṇam abhīvarṣati) rain down; he vanquishes the great scholars (mahopadesācārya) like the kings of the gods Śakra and Brahmā: this is why it is possible to know that the Buddha’s wisdom is great.

Furthermore, as the Buddhas have acquired the unhindered liberations (asaktavimokṣa) over everything, their wisdom is unhindered.

Furthermore, this wisdom of the Buddha is completely pure (pariśuddha) and surpasses all ordinary analysis (vicāra). He does not see any nature in dharmas that is eternal (nitya) or non-eternal (anitya), finite (antavat) or infinite (anantavat), mobile (gamika) or immobile (agamika), existent (sat) or non-existent (asat), impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), conditioned (samskṛta) or unconditioned (asamskṛta), arising and perishing (utpanna-niruddha) or non-arising non-perishing (anuspanna-aniruddha), empty (śūnya) or non-empty (aśūnya). The eternal purity (nityaviśuddhitā) of dharmas is immense (apramāṇa), like space (ākāsasama)! This is why his wisdom is unhindered (asakta).

Those who see arising and cessation (utpādaṇirodha) [in dharmas] cannot see non-arising and non-cessation (anusṭhānāniruddha) in them; those who see non-arising and non-cessation in dharmas cannot see arising and cessation in them. If non-arising and non-cessation are real (bhūta), then arising and cessation are false (abhūta). If arising and cessation are real, non-arising and non-cessation are false. It is the same for all analyses of this type (evamvidhavicāra). As the Buddha has unhindered wisdom (pratisamvid) [on this subject], we know that his wisdom is perfected.

[4. Vimuktiskandha]. – Furthermore, one recollects the perfection of the deliverance skandha (vimuktiskandhasaṃpad) in the Buddha. The Buddha is free from all the disturbing emotions (kleśa) and their traces (vāsanā). As he has [221a] uprooted them, his deliverance is real (bhūta) and indestructible (akṣaya). Since he is endowed with omniscience (sarvajñānasamanvāgata), it is ‘unhindered deliverance’ (asaktavimuktī). Since he has the eight liberations (vimokṣa) and these are profound (ganbhūra) and universal (vyāpī), it is ‘complete deliverance’ (samppannavimuktī).

Furthermore, since the Buddha has left [the lower stages] of those who are liberated by chance (samayavimukta) and those liberated by wisdom (prajñāvimukta), he realizes the twofold deliverance
As he has these [two] deliverances, it is `perfected deliverance aggregate' (sampamppavimuktisandha).

Furthermore, the Buddha has obtained deliverance because he has destroyed Māra’s armies (mārasenā), eliminated the negative emotions (kleśa), rejected the dhyāna systems, and also because he enters into and comes out of samādhi supremely and without obstacle.

Finally, in the path of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga), the Bodhisattva attained sixteen profound deliverances (vimukti):

(i) [The first vimukti] was a conditioned deliverance (samskṛtavimukti) associated with duḥkhe dharmaṇā. [Commonly called duḥkke dharmaṇānaksānti].

(ii) [The second vimukti] was an unconditioned deliverance (asamskrtevimukti) resulting from the abandonment (prahāna) of the ten fetters (samyojana) relating to the suffering [of kāmdhātu]. [Commonly called duḥkke dharmaṇā.]

And so on up to [the sixteenth Vimukti] called mārge 'nvayajñāna.

Then, in the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), the Bodhisattva obtained eighteen deliverances:

(i) [The first vimukti] was a conditioned deliverance (samskṛtavimukti) associated either with anvayajñāna or with dharmaṇā.

(ii) [The second vimukti] was an unconditioned deliverance (asamskrtevimukti) resulting from the abandonment of the three fetters to meditation (bhāvanāsamyojana) in ārūpyadātu.

And so on up to the eighteenth vimukti where there is a conditioned deliverance associated with the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñāna) and an unconditioned deliverance resulting from the

368 Of the six kinds of arhats, five are liberated as a result of chance (samayavimukta): their deliverance of mind (cetovimukti) is thus by chance (sāmayiki) because it depends on circumstance and is cherished because it must be guarded constantly: cf. Anguttara, III, p. 173; Kośa, p. 251, 154, 167, 274.

The saint who is liberated from the obstacle of the disturbing emotions (kleśāvaraṇa) by the power of wisdom is said to be liberated by wisdom (prajñāvimukta): cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 452-453; Kośa, VI, p. 274, 276, 297; VII, p. 97; VIII, p. 181.

The saint who, by the power of wisdom, is freed from the obstacle of the disturbing emotions (kleśāvaraṇa) and who, by the power of concentration (samādhi), is freed from the obstacle which stands in the way of the eight liberations (vimokṣāvaraṇa), is said to be doubly delivered (ubbhayatobhāgavimukta): cf. Anguttara,l, p.73; IV, p. 10, 77: Kośa, II, p. 205; VI, p. 273, 276.

369 Above, p. 341-343F.

370 An allusion to the enlightenment of Śākyamuni who attained Bodhi in thirty-four moments of mind: sixteen of darśanamārga and eighteen of bhāvanamārga: see above, p. 130F note, and especially p. 1036F note.

371 On the difference between conditioned vimukti and unconditioned vimukti, see Kośa, VI, p. 2906.
abandonment of all the fetters (sarvasamyojanaprahāṅa). These two deliverances together constitute the ‘perfection of the deliverance aggregate’ (vimuktiskandasampad).

[5] Vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha. – Furthermore, one recollects the perfection of the aggregate of the Buddha called knowledge and seeing deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha). This aggregate is of two types:

(i) In regard to emancipation from his disturbing emotions, the Buddha puts the knowledge of destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñāna) to work: from his own experience (adhyātmasākṣākāra) he knows: “In me, suffering is completely known, its origin has been abandoned, its destruction has been realized and the path [to its destruction] has been practiced” (duḥkham me parijñātāṃ, samudayo me prahīno, nirodho me sākṣātkṛto, mārgo me bhāvita iti). This is the vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha consisting of the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñāna).

Next, he knows this: “The suffering completely known by me is no longer to be known; [its origin abandoned by me is no longer to be realized]; the path [to its destruction] practiced by me is no longer to be practiced” (duḥkham me parijñātāṃ na punah parijñātavyāṃ, samudayo me prahīno na punah p rahātavyo, nirodho me sākṣātkṛto na punah sākṣātkartavyo, mārgo me bhāvito na punar bhavitavya iti). This is the vimuktijñānadarśana consisting of the knowledge that the impurities, once destroyed, will not arise again (āsravānupadaśajñāna).

(ii) The Buddha knows that this particular person will find deliverance by entering the concentration of emptiness (śūnyatā), another person by entering into the concentration of signlessness (ānimitta), yet another into the concentration of wishlessness (apraṇihita). He knows that one individual will be led to deliverance without resorting to any skillful means (upāya). Another will find deliverance after a long time, a third after a short time, a fourth in this very moment. One individual will find deliverance if he is addressed in subtle words, another in coarse words, yet another in varied conversation (saṃbhinnapralāpa). One individual will find deliverance if he sees miracles (rddhibala), another if the Dharma is preached. The person in whom lust predominates (rāgabahula) finds deliverance if his desire (rāga) is increased; the one in whom hatred predominates (dveṣabahula) finds deliverance if his hate is increased, as was the case for the nāgas Nan-to and Ngeou-leou-p’in-louo (Urubilva).


373 Kośavyākyā, p. 600, l. 11-14.

374 One day the Buddha accompanied by five hundred monks went to the Trāyastrimśa gods but, in order to do so, he had to fly over the home of the nāga king Nandopananda. Fearing that the dust from the feet of these shaven monks might fall on his head, the nāga wanted to prevent them from passing overhead. He wound his coils seven times around Mount Meru in order to hide the Trāyastrimśa heaven.
It is for various reasons of this kind that people find deliverance, as it is explained in regard to the Dharma eye (dharmacakṣus). Knowing and clearly seeing these various deliverances is called vimuktiñānadarśanaskandhasampad. [221b]

Furthermore, one recollects the Buddha who knows all (sarvajñā), who sees all (sarvadarśin), his great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī), his great compassion (mahākarunā), his ten powers (bala), his four from them. The Buddha entrusted the task of conquering him to Maudgalyāśana. The disciple took the form of a royal nāga and wound his coils around the body of his adversary fourteen times. Against the flames and smoke of Nandopananda, he sent out still stronger flames and smoke. Then taking on his human form, he entered the nāga’s body which he traversed from top to bottom. When he came out, Nandopananda breathed out on him ‘the wind from his nose’, but Maudagalāyana, in the fourth dhyāna, changed into the suparṇa bird, the sworn enemy of the dragons and began to chase the nāga while giving off ‘the suparṇa breath’. Completely humbled, Nandopananda changed into a young Brahmin and took refuge in the Buddha.


Elsewhere there are frequent allusions to the discomfiture of Nanda: Divyavadāna, p. 395; Legend of Aśoka (T 99, k. 23, p. 168a; T 2042, k. 2, p. 104b13; T 2043, k. 2, p. 138b9; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 28, p. 703b24;Jātaka, V, p. 126. The Traité will return to it later, k. 32, p. 300a29; k. 100, p. 752b12.

375 This is the nāga of Urubilvā on the Nairaṅjanā who occupied the Fire House (agnyāgāra) of the Jātīlas. Urubilvākāśyapa, the leader of these heretics, had authorized the Buddha to stay there. When the Buddha entered, the furious snake spat out smoke and flames; the teacher replied with the same, so much so that the building seemed about to burst into flame. During the night, Kāśyapa, who watched the stars, noticed the fire and wondered if the Buddha had not been burned to ash. But in the meantime, the Buddha, in meditation, developed so much light and heat that the nāga, completely dazzled, allowed himself to be placed peacefully in the Buddha’s begging bowl. The next day Kāśyapa, a witness to the nāga’s submission, sincerely admired the Buddha’s magical powers, not without thinking himself to be more saintly than the Buddha.

Pāli sources: Vinaya, I, p. 24-25; Nidānakathā in Jātaka, I, p. 82; Manorathapūraṇī, I, p. 299.
Sanskrit sources: Catuspāraṇī, p. 238-244; Mahāvastu, III, p. 428-429.

Chinese sources: Mahāśākā Vin., T 1421, K. 16, p. 108a8-24; Dharmagupt. Vin., T 1428, K. 32, p. 793b16-c9; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 6, p. 131a12-131b19; Ting pen k’l king, T 185, k. 2, p. 480c20-281a18; Yin kouo king, T 189, k. 4, p. 646a13-b16; Abhinīkramaṇa, T 190, K. 40-41, P. 958a6-b7; Tchong penk’l king, T 196, k. 1, p. 150b1-c3.

Illustrations: Sañcī (Marshall-Foucher, p. 210, pl. 51-52); Ganbdhā (Foucher, Agb., I, p. 446-453, fig. 223-226; II, p. 343, fig. 461).
fearlessnesses (vaśāradya) his four unhindered knowledges (pratisāmvid) his eighteen special attributes (āvenikadharma), etc.

Recollecting the immense and inconceivable qualities (apramāṇa-cintyaguṇa) is what is called ‘recollection of the Buddha’ (buddhānusmṛti).

This recollection takes place in seven stages (bhūmi). Sometimes it is impure (sāsrava), sometimes it is pure (anāsrava). If it is impure, it entails retribution (saṃvāka); if it is pure, it does not entail retribution (avipāka). It is associated with three indriyas (indriyatrayasamprayukta), namely, the indriyas of happiness (sukha), satisfaction (saumanasya) and indifference (upekṣā).376

It is acquired by effort (prāyogika) or by retribution (vaipākika). That of the present universe is acquired by effort, e.g., when one practices the concentration of recollection of the Buddha (buddhānusmṛtisamādhi). That of the buddhafiel of the Buddha Wou-leang-cheou (Amitāyus) is acquired by retribution; the people who are born there spontaneously (svaraseṇa) recollect the Buddha.377

All this is fully explained in the Abhidharma.

II. RECOLLECTION OF THE DHARMA

Recollection of the dharma (dharmānusmṛti). – The Buddha said: “The yogin should recollect the Dharma, skillfully presented, obtaining its retribution in the present lifetime (sāmṛṣṭika) without fear of burning

376 These three indriyas ‘sovereign organs’ in fact make up the members (aṅga) of dhyāna: see above, p. 1237F, n. 3; Kośa, VIII, p. 147.
377 The inhabitants of Sukhāvatī, the buddhafield of Buddha Amitāyus, spontaneously and effortlessly recollect the Buddha, because it is precisely by the practice of anusmṛti that they are reborn in Sukhāvatī. See Amitāyurbuddhānusmṛtisūtra, T 365, p. 344c13-17: “There are three kinds of beings who will reborn in Sukhāvatī. Who are these three? 1) Beings with loving-kindness of mind (maitrīcitta), who do not kill and are endowed with morality (śīla); 2) those who study and recite the Vaipulyasūtra; 3) those who practice the six recollections (ṣāḍanusmṛti). If in applying these merits (puṇyaparinañāmanā) they express the wish to be reborn in this buddhafield and they fulfill these qualities (guṇa) in one to seven days, they will be reborn in Sukhāvatī.”

Later (k. 29, p. 276a17-22), the Traité will return to this subject: “The bodhisattva always practices the buddhānusmṛtisamādhi and, for that reason, wherever he is reborn, he always encounters the Buddhas. Thus it is said in the Pan tcheou san mei (Pratyutpannasamādhi, T 318): The bodhisattva who enters this samādhi sees the Buddha Amita. This Buddha is asked: As a result of what action has he acquired rebirth in this field? – The Buddha answers: O son of noble family, it is because he has always practiced the buddhānusmṛtisamādhi and his mindfulness was infallible that he obtains rebirth in my buddhafield.”

1113
(nirjvara), independent of time (akālika), leading to the good place (aupanāyika), the penetration into which is unhindered.\textsuperscript{379}

1. Dharma skillfully presented

It is skillfully presented because it is not contradictory to the two truths (satyadvayāvirodhā), i.e., the conventional truth (saṃvrtisatya) and the absolute truth (paramārthasatya). The wise man (vijña) cannot refute it and the fool (bāla) cannot criticize it.

This Dharma is also free of the pairs of extremes (antadvaya), i.e., a life attached to the five objects of enjoyment and pleasure (pañcakāmaguṇeṣu kāmasukhallikānyoga) or a life of personal mortification (ātmaklamathānyoga).\textsuperscript{380}

It is free of other pairs of extremes: eternalism (śāśvata) and nihilism (uccheda), self (ātman) and non-self (anātman), existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhava). Because it is not attached to these pairs of extremes, the Dharma is said to be 'skillfully presented'.

Heretics who boast of their own system (svadharmotkarṣa) and denigrate the systems of others (paradarmapaṇsaka) cannot express themselves skillfully.

2. Dharma, obtaining its retribution in the present lifetime

The Dharma obtains its retribution in the present existence (samārṣṭika): as it eliminates the various problems of the world caused by lust (rāga) as well as the various teachings (upadeśa) and arguments caused by wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi), body (kāya) and mind (citta) find happiness in it. Thus the Buddha said:

Observing morality is happiness:

Body and mind do not burn;

One sleeps well and, on awakening, one is happy;

One’s fame extends afar.\textsuperscript{381}

\textsuperscript{378} In place of tche-nao, read je-nao, as in the following lines.

\textsuperscript{379} Here the Traité is taking liberties with the canonical formula cited in the preliminary note to this present chapter.

\textsuperscript{380} See above, p. 23F, 396F, 655F, 1354F.

\textsuperscript{381} Udānavarga, VI, 3, p. 149.
Moreover, in this Dharma of the Buddha, the linking of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya prabandha) produces the following fruit: Because of [221c] the purity of his morality (śīlaviṣuddhi), the yogin has no regrets (kaukṛtya). His mind being without regrets, he produces the joy inherent in the Dharma (dharmopasamhitaprāmodya). By means of the joy of the Dharma, his body and mind have pleasure (praśarabdhi) and happiness (sukha). His body and mind having pleasure and happiness, he can concentrate his mind. Concentrating his mind, he understands in accordance with the truth (yathābhūtam prajñātī). Understanding in accordance with the truth, he finds disgust (nirveda). Finding disgust, he becomes detached from desire (virajyate). Detached from desire, he obtains deliverance (vimukti), he obtains the fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) of deliverance, he obtains nirvāṇa.382

As for the heretics (tīrthika), their Dharma is void (śūnya), painful (duṣkaracārin) and without result.

[Story of Jambuka]. – Thus the arhat Yen-fou (Jambuka) said the following when he acquired bodhi:

Formerly I was a heretic
For fifty-five years;
I ate only dried cow-dung
And I slept on thorns.

Having endured such cruel tortures, I gained nothing from them, not like today when, having seen the Buddha and having heard the Dharma, I have left home (pravrajita) and, in three days, having done what had to be done (kṛtaṃpratya), I have become arhat.383

382 Phrases borrowed from the stock of nava prāmodyapūrvakā dharmāḥ: Mahāvyuty., no. 1586-1595: Prītimudiosya prītir jāyate, prītimanasaḥ kāyah ... vimukto 'smīti jñānadarśanaṃ bhavati.

Saṃyutta, IV, p. 79; II, p. 95: Pamuditassa pūi jāyati, pūtimanassa kāyo ... vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttaṃhitī hānaṃ hoti.

383 Theragāthā, p. 34, v. 283-286: Pañcapaññāsa vassāni raojallaṃ adhārayim / ... tīsso vijjā amuppattā, kataṃ buddhassa sāsanaṃ ti //

Transl.- “For fifty-five years I covered myself with dust and dirt, eating only one meal per month, and I tore out my hair and beard.

I stood on one foot and refused to sit down; I ate dry dung and accepted no invitations.

Having followed this path that leads to the bad destinies for so long, borne along by the stream, I took refuge in the Buddha.

Wonder at this refuge! Admire the excellence of the Dharma! I have obtained the three knowledges and have carried out the Buddha’s command.”

For more details, see Comm. on the Theragāthā, I, p. 386 seq. (tr. Rhys Davids, Brethren, p. 179-180) and Comm. on the Dhammapada, II, p. 52-63 (tr. Burlingame, II, p. 130-137):

At the time of the Buddha Kāśyapa, Jambuka as an elder lived with a lay devotee. A wandering monk, in the course of his alms-round, came to the layman and was welcomed there. In a fit of jealousy,
This is why we know that the Dharma of the Buddha ‘obtains its fruit in the present lifetime’.

Question. – If the Dharma of the Buddha obtains its fruit in the present lifetime, how is it that, among the disciples of the Buddha, some derive nothing from it?

Answer. – The yogin who knows the words of the Buddha and applies them constantly cannot fail to receive his reward (vipāka). In the same way, the sick person (glāna) who follows the orders of a good physician (vaidya) and takes all the medicine (pratipakṣa) cannot fail to be cured.

On the other hand, if the yogin does not conform to the Buddha’s instructions and does not apply them constantly, his immorality (dausīlya) and his distractions (cittavikṣepa) will cause him to obtain nothing. But it is false that the Dharma is not good.

Moreover, if those who have not attained bodhi do not arrive at nirvāṇa in the present lifetime, in the future lifetime they will, nonetheless, have wealth and happiness and, little by little (kramaṣas), they will attain nirvāṇa. Finally, their efforts will not be in vain. Thus the Buddha said: “Those who have gone forth from home (pravrajita) in view of nirvāṇa will all reach nirvāṇa, some slowly (mandam) and other quickly (śīghram).” Thus the Dharma ‘obtains its fruit in the present existence’ (sāṃdṛṣṭika).

3. Dharma without torment of burning

The Dharma is without the torment of burning (nirjvara). These sufferings of burning are of two kinds: torments of the body (kāyopāyāsa) and torments of the mind (cittopāyāsa). The torments of the body are fetters, prison, beatings, being put to death, etc. The torments of the mind are sadness (daurmanasya), fear

Jambuka insulted the visitor and declared that for his part he would never accept anything from lay people and rather preferred to eat dung, tear out his hair, go naked and sleep on the ground.

At the time of Buddha Śākyamuni, Jambuka took birth in a wealthy family of Rājağrha, As a child, he refused all normal food and ate his own excrement; when he was grown, he went quite naked and slept on the ground. His parents put him in the hands of the Ājivikas, naked ascetics, who accepted him into their order. But Jambuka refused to follow his colleagues on their alms-rounds. When they were far away, he went into the public latrines to eat excrement. When he felt someone watching him, he stood on one foot and turned his open mouth into the wind. Among those who questioned him, he passed as a great ascetic, an eater of wind, refusing all food. Once a month, however, he accepted putting on his tongue a bit of butter and honey on the end of a piece of kuša grass: such condescension, he said, would assure the spectators eternal salvation. He lived thus for fifty-five years. One day the Buddha came to stay in a near-by cave and Jambuka noticed that, during the night, the four kings of the gods, Śakra and Brahmā came to serve the Teacher. To his astonishment, the Buddha explained that he was superior to these great deities. Jambuka converted and attained arhathood.

This story should be compared to the Jāmbāḷāvādana contained in the Avadānaśatsks, I, p. 279-288 (transl. Feer, p. 190-194) and translated into Chinese as the Siuan tso po yuan king, T 200, k. 5, p. 227a-228a.

384 Unidentified passage. On the superiority of the monastics’ morality, see above, p. 839-846F.
(bhaya), etc., caused by desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), avarice (mātsrya) or jealousy (īrṣyā). In the Dharma of the Buddha, since morality is pure, the body escapes from the torments of fetters, prison, beatings, being put to death, etc. Since the mind has eliminated the five objects of enjoyment (pañcākāmaguṇa), eliminated the five obstacles (pañcānīvaraṇa) and obtained true bodhi, it escapes from the torments of desire, hatred, avarice, jealousy, doubt (vīcikitsā), etc., and as there are no torments, there is no burning (jvara).

Moreover, the trances (dhyāna) and the pure absorptions (sammāpatti) produce joy and happiness including all the physical sensations (kāyavedanā): this is why all the burning has gone away. Thus, when a man tormented by great heat (gharmārta) reaches a clear cool pool (taḍāga), the cold revives him and he no longer suffers from the heat.

Moreover, whether they depend on wrong views (dṛṣṭyapekṣa) or whether they depend on thirst (trṣṇāpekṣa), the disturbing emotions (kleśa) are called ‘burnings’ (jvara). Since they are absent in the Dharma of the Buddha, the latter is called ‘without torment of burning’ (nirjvara).

4. The Dharma is independent of time

The Dharma is independent of time (akālika). The Dharma of the Buddha acts [222a] independently of time and gives its fruit (phalam dadāti) independently of time. Among the heretics (tūrthika), some rules hold when the sun has not risen but do not hold when the sun has risen; some hold when the sun has risen but do not hold when the sun has not risen; yet others are valid in the daytime but are not valid at night, and finally some hold at night but do not hold in the daytime. In the Dharma of the Buddha, time does not intervene: when one has cultivated the noble eightfold Path (āryaṭṭhakramārga), one attains nirvāṇa. Just as fire (agni) burns when it finds kindling (indhana), so pure wisdom (anāsraṇa prajñā), as soon as it arises, burns all the disturbing emotions (kleśa), and that independently of time.

Question. – But the Buddha spoke of medicine at the proper time (kālabhaiṣajya), of clothing at the proper time (kālavasana), of food at the proper time (kālabhojana),386 and the good roots that are not yet ripe (aparipakvakusalamāla) will ripen in a person when they meet up with the favorable time. How can you say that [the Dharma] is independent of time (akālika)?

Answer. – In these cases, when speaking of time, the Buddha is speaking in accord with worldly usage (lokasamvitri) and, in order that his doctrine should last for a long time, he has linked his arguments with time. But when one cultivates the Path, one obtains nirvāṇa and its wondrous qualities, the concentrations (sammādhi) and wisdom (prajñā); these do not depend on time.

385 These two kinds of negative emotions are mentioned above, p. 211F, 213F.
386 For example, the Buddha authorized the use of five kinds of medicines “at the suitable time if they have been accepted at the appropriate time” (anujānāmi bhikkhave pañc bhesajjāni kāle pariggahetva kāle paribhuñitum): cf. Vinaya, I, p.200. Similarly, he carefully distinguished meals at the proper time (kālabhojana) from meals outside the proper time (vikālabhojana): cf. Samyutta, V, p. 470.
The rules of the heretics all depend on time; the Dharma of the Buddha demands only that the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) be fulfilled. As long as [the three elements of the Path], morality (śīla), samadhi and wisdom (prajñā) are not perfected (sampanna), one does not obtain bodhi. When morality, samadhi and wisdom are perfected, the fruit is attained and does not depend on time.

Moreover, we speak of time when a long time is necessary to obtain the fruit, but once the fruit is obtained, there is no further question of time. Thus, when a good dye (rañjana) has penetrated [the cloth], it is fixed; it is the same for a person whose mind is pure: as soon as he has heard the Dharma, he is tinged with it and he obtains the purity of the Dharma eye (dharmacakṣurviśuddhi). Therefore the Dharma is ‘independent of time’ (akālika).

5. Dharma leading to the good place

The Dharma leads to the good place (aupanayika). The thirty-seven pure auxiliaries of Bodhi (saptatrimśad anāsrava bodhipāṣikadharmaḥ) lead (upanayanti) a person to nirvāṇa. Thus, when one sets sail on the Ganges, one necessarily reaches the great ocean.387

The outside heretical systems (anyatūrthika) which the Omniscient One (sarvajñā) did not preach that are full of wrong views (mithyadṛṣṭi) lead to the bad places or, if they sometimes lead to the heavens (svarga), one falls back from them and suffers. Not being eternal, these heavens are not ‘the good place’.

Question. – If the leader (upanetṛ) does not exist, how ‘to lead’ to the good place?

Answer. – It is true that the leader does not exist. Only dharmas can lead other dharmas. The pure and good abandonment (anāsrvakusālaprahāna) of the five aggregates of existence (pañcaskandha) – aggregates to which is given the power of the name of being (sattva) – lead to nirvāṇa in the same way that the wind (vāyu) blows the dust (rajas) or the water (vāri) carries away straw (trṭa). Even without a leader, there can be progress (gamana).

Moreover, in the complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī), there is neither agent (kāraka) nor leader (upanetṛ) who exercises control (vaśita) over the causes and conditions on which the retribution depends.

6. Dharma of unhindered penetration

The Dharma is of unhindered penetration. Utilizing the seals of the Dharma (dharmamudrā) of the Buddha,388 his penetration is unhindered in the same way that the holder of the royal seal (rājamudrā) is never delayed or restricted [in his movements].

---

388 By dharmamudrā, the Traité means three fundamental characteristics of things preached by the Buddha: Sarvasamskārá anityāḥ, sarvadharma anātmānaḥ, sāntaṁ nirvāṇam, “All formations (i.e., all dharmas coming from causes) are impermanent; all dharmas are without self, peaceful is nirvāṇa”: cf. K. 15, p. 170a2-4 (above, p. 912F); k. 22, p. 222a28-b1; k. 26, p. 253c13-15; k. 32, p. 297c23-24. As we are about to see, such statements are frequent in the canonical texts but, as far as I [Lamotte] know, the expression dharmamudrā does not appear in the Pāli Nikāya. On the other hand, in the Sanskrit Samyuktāgama translated into Chinese by Guṇabhadra (436-443), there is an Āryadharmamudrāsūtra, T 99, no. 80, k. 3, p. 20a25-b28. Before that, Dharmarakṣa had given a separate translation under the name Cheng fa yin king, T 103, p. 500a-b: it was published the 5th day of the 12th month of the 4th yuan-k’ang year, i.e., January 7, 295 (cf. Li-tai, T 2034, k. 6, p. 63c22-23). This sūtra was authoritative for the Sarvāstivādins as well as the Mādhyamikas: it is cited in the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 10, p. 541c10; T 1546, k. 46, p. 359a23), the Che tchou p’i p’o cha louen (T 1521, k. 1, p. 25a17; k. 10, p. 73b23), the Maitreyaparipṛcchopedesa (T 1525, k. 2, p. 240b15) and the Satyasiddhiśāstra (T 1546, k. 6, p. 281c2; k. 12, p. 332c15; k. 15, p. 363b23, 365a26).

Whether it is used in the doctrines of the Lesser or the Greater Vehicle, the term dharmamudrā appears frequently in the Mahāyānasūtras: cf. Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 28, l. 8, 92, l. 13; Avatāṃsaka, T 279, k. 5, p. 22c1; k. 18, p. 97a17-18; Ratnokādhāraṇī, T 299, k. 2, p. 891a24; Ratnakūṭa, T 310, k. 6, p. 35a11; k. 6, p. 36a1; k. 25, p. 141a; k. 116, p. 656c12; T 355, k. 1, p. 237a3.

The phrases used to express the nature of things permit many variations:

A. TWO STATEMENTS. – Sabbe sankhāra anicca, sabbe dhammā anattā: cf. Saṃyutta, III, p. 132, l. 26; 133, l. 1 and 31; 134, l. 3.


The postcanonical Pāli sources call Tilakkhaṇa ‘Three Natures’ impermanence, suffering and non-self mentioned in this phrase: cf. Comm. on Jātaka, I, p. 48, l. 28; 275, l. 23; III, p. 377, l. 5.

C. THREE STATEMENTS. – Sarvasamskārā anityāḥ, sarvadharma anātmānaḥ, śaṁtaṁ nirvāṇam: cf. Saṃyukta, T 99, k. 10, p. 66b14; 66c7 and 21; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 9, p. 45a21; Northern Mahāparinirvāṇa, T 374, k. 13, p. 443a2-3.

D. The same statements, but with the name Sa fa yin ‘Three Dharmamudrās’: – Sarvasamskārā anityāḥ, sarvadharma anātmānaḥ, śaṁtaṁ nirvāṇam: cf. Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1442, k. 9, p. 670c2-3; Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 1, p. 243c17-18; Lien houa mien king, T 386, k. 2, p. 1077a23-24 and 26-27; Mahāyānāvatārā, T 1634, k. 1, p. 38c23.

As we have seen at the beginning of this note, this is the formula adopted by the Traité.

E. FOUR STATEMENTS, entitled Sseu fa pen or Sseu fa pen mo ‘Fourfold beginning and end of dharmas’ which may be reconstructed in Sanskrit as Dharmapūrṇāparānta: Sarvasamskārā anityāḥ,
Question. – What are the seals of the Buddha’s Dharma?

Answer. – There are three kinds of seals of the Buddha’s Dharma: i) All conditioned dharmas (samskr̥tradharma) arising and perishing from moment to moment are impermanent (anitya); ii) All dharmas are without self (anatman); [222b] iii) Peaceful is nirvana (sāntam nirvāṇam).

[1. Sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ]. – The yogin knows that the threefold world (traiḍhātū) is entirely composed of arisings and ceasings governed by causes (samskr̥tr̥ utpādanirodhāḥ). The formations (samskr̥tr̥) that previously existed no longer exist; those that exist now will not exist later. These instantaneous arisings and cessations (kṣaṇikā utpādanirodhāḥ) coming forth like a series (saṃtānasāḍrśya) may be seen and cognized in the way that one cognizes and sees a series of similar [moments] (sadr̥sasaṃtāna) in the water of a river (nadiḍala), the flame of a lamp (dipajvāla) or a storm. This is why people consider them to be a living being (sattva) and, by a mistake consisting of taking what is impermanent to be permanent (anitye iti viparyāṣaḥ), people speak about a changeable (gantr) [entity] lasting forever. 389 That is the seal confirming the impermanence of all formations (samskārāniyatā).

[2. Sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ]. – All dharmas are without self. In dharmas there is neither lord (Īśvara, svāmin), nor agent (kāraka), knower (jānaka), seeing subject (paśyaka), living object (jīva), or doer of actions. All dharmas depend on causes and conditions (hetupratyayāpekaṇa); depending on causes and conditions, they are not autonomous (svatantrya); since they are not autonomous, they are not self, and the nature of self is non-existent (ātmalakṣaṇam napalabhya), as is said in the P’o-wo-p’in sarvasaṃskārā dukkhaḥ, sarvasaṃskārā anātmānaḥ, sāntam nirvāṇam: cf. Ekottara, T 125, k. 18, p. 640b13-18; k. 36, p. 749a7-11.

This formula is evidently faulty for it is not just the samskāras but also all dharmas that are anatman.

F. FOUR STATEMENTS. – Sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ, sarvasaṃskārā dukkhaḥ, sarvadharma anātmānaḥ, sāntam nirvāṇam (cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 149, l. 1-3), or the variant Anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, dukkhaḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, anātmānaḥ sarvadharmaḥ, sāntam nirvāṇam (cf. Bodh. bhūmi, p. 277, l. 5-10).

These four statements are variously named:

1) Sseu fa pen ‘Fourfold root of dharmas’: cf. Ekottara, T 35, k. 23, p. 668c3-8;
2) Fourfold dharmamudrā: cf. Tathāgatagujasūtra, T 312, k. 17, p. 741b7-12;
3) Fourfold dharmadāna ‘Summary of dharmas’ (in Chinese, Sseu fa yeou t’o na): cf. Vimalakirtinirdesa, T 476, k. 6, p. 586c14; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 17, l. 3; 55, l. 6; 73, l. 22; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 277, l. 5 (T 1579, k. 46, p. 544a6).


389 This is fully explained in Kośa, IX, p. 279-281.
(Ātmapratiṣedhapraṇaṇa) ‘Chapter on the refutation of the self’.390 This is the seal of non-self (anātmamudrā).

390 Tenth chapter (prakaraṇa) of the Catuḥśataka ‘The Four Hundreds’ by Āryadeva. As its name indicates, this work consisted of 400 stanzas (kārikā) divided up into 16 chapters of 25 stanzas each.

The work exists completely only in Tibetan translation:

1) Bstan bcos bṛj bya ga pa ēs bahi lehur byas pa (Catuḥśatakāsāstrakārikā), translated by Sūkṣmājāna in India and revised by Sūryakṛti of the Pa-tshab: cf. Tib. Trip., vol. 95, no. 5246, p. 131-1-1 to 139-5-3.

2) Byan chub sems dpaḥi ḥbyor spy od bṛj pa paḥi rgya cher Ḥgrel pa (Bodhisattvavogacaryācatuḥśatakāṣṭi), commentary by Candrakārti, also translated by Sūkṣmājāna and Sūryakṛti: cf. Tib. Trip., vol. 98, no. 5266, p. 183-4-4 to end.


The Chinese also translated just the last chapters of the Catuḥśataka:

1) Kouang po louen pen, T 1570. Translation of kārikā no. 291-400 made by Huan-tsang at Ta ts’eu ngen sseu, the 10th day of the 6th month of the 1st yong-houei year, i.e., July 13, 650 (cf. K’ai-yuan, T 2154, k. 8, p. 556b21).

2) Ta tch’eng kouang po louen che louen, T 1571. Translation of the same kārikās with commentary by Dharmapāla, begun on the 27th day of the same year, January 20, 651 (cf. K’ai-yuan, T 2154, k. 8, p. 556b22).

The tenth chapter to which the Traité refers here is part of the chapter conserved in the three languages. It is dedicated to refutation of the ātman and entitled Yogācārayogacaryācatuḥśataka ātmaśuddhyapāyasaṃdarśanaṃ nāma daśamaṃ prakaraṇam in the Sanskrit fragments (cf. Vaidya, o.c., p. 89), Bdag dgag pa bsgom pa pstan pa (Ātmapratiṣedhabhāvanāsaṃdarśana) in the Tibetan versions (Tib. Trip., vol. 95, no. 5246, p. 137-1-5; vol. 98, no. 5266, p. 241-2-6), P’o wo p’in (Ātmapratiṣedhakaraṇaṇa) in the Chinese versions (T 1570, k. 1, p. 182c18; T 1571, k. 2, p. 194a27). It is also by the name P’o wo p’ in that the Traité cites it here.

In the Madh. vṛtti on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Candrakārti refers to the Catuḥśataka by Āryadeva in various ways: Uktam Āryadevena (p. 16, 199), Uktam Āryadevapādīḥ (p. 220, 359, 376), Uktam Śatakā (p. 173, 351, 372, 378, 396, 505), Śatakasāstra (p. 506), Śatakasāstra cāryadevapādair (p. 552). All these references have been identified by L. de La Vallée Poussin in his edition of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with comm. by Candrakārti, 1903 and foll. This is indeed the Catuḥśataka. But the fact of having omitted the numeral catuḥ might lead to confusion because, besides
the Catuḥṣataka ‘Four Hundreds’, Āryadeva also composed a Śatakāṣṭra ‘Treatise in a hundred [kārikās]’, totally unknown in the Sanskrit and Tibetan traditions but which was authorized in China in the school of the Three Treatises.

This Śatakāṣṭra by Āryadeva, with a commentary by Vasu-bodhisattva, was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva under the title of Po louen: T 1569. The translation was done at Tch’ang-ngan in the 6th hong-che year, i.e., in 404 (cf. Tch’ou, T 2145, k. 2, p. 11a21; Li-tai, T 2134, K. 8, p. 79a5). The work has been fully translated into English by G. Tucci, Pre-Dīnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, vol. 49), 1929, and partially into French by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Le Nirvāṇa d’après Āryadeva, MCB, I, 1931-2, p. 128-130. Kumārajīva’s translation is introduced by a preface T 1569, k. 1, p. 167c-168a; Tch’ou, T 2145, k. 11, p. 77b-c) by his disciple and collaborator Seng-tchao (384-414): “Eight hundred and some years after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa, a great monastic scholar named T’i-p’o (Deva) composed a treatise in a hundred stanzas, the Śatakāṣṭra. This treatise consisted of twenty chapters (prakarṇa) of five stanzas each. It was commented on by P’o-seou k’ai-che (Vasu, the bodhisattva), a scholar who was the authority of his time: “What he says cannot be disputed, what he refutes cannot be re-established.” Kumārajīva, the Indian śramaṇa, translated the last ten chapters of this treatise (i.e., stanzas 51-100).”

It may be noted that the ten chapters of the Śatakāṣṭra translated by Kumārajīva deal with the same subject as the eight chapters of the Catuḥṣataka translated by Hiuan-tsang and often carry the same titles. Thus the second chapter of the Śatakāṣṭra, entitled P’o chen p’in (T 1569, k. 1, p. 170c11-174b21) correspond to the second chapter of the Catuḥṣataka entitled P’o wo p’in (T 1570, k. 1, p. 182c18-183b10). But although the subject is the same, the explanation is quite different.

In citing the P’o wo p’in, the Traité does not refer to a chapter of the Prajñāpāramitā as I [Lamotte] first thought, for no chapter of this name appears in the Tables Comparatives des versions des Prajñāpāramitā prepared by Hikata and added to his edition of the Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā. Neither does the Traité refer here to a chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (or Madhyamāṣṭra) of Nāgārjuna, for chapter XVIII which deals with the ātman is entitled ‘Examination of the ātman’ (Ātmapiṛkṣā in Sanskrit, Bdag brtag pa in Tibetan, Kouan-wo in Chinese). The only chapter that enters into consideration here is the Ātmapiṛṣṭedha-praṇakaraṇa of the Catuḥṣataka by Āryadeva.

This citation is of importance because it proves that the first Madhyamika authors (Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Rāhulabhadra) were known to the author of the Traité and consequently the latter is later than them:

1) The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (or Madhyamāṣṭra) of Nāgārjuna are, with the Prajñāpāramitā, the main source of inspiration for the Traité. Sometimes the latter cites entire passages without referring to it by name (e.g., p.1204F seq.), sometimes it gives the title: Madhyamakāṣṭra; cf. k. 1, p. 64b11 (above, p. 69F); k. 19, p. 198a5 (above p. 1142F); k. 25, p. 245c7-8; k. 38, p. 338b29.

2) We have seen that it refers to Āryadeva’s Catuḥṣataka by designating it simply with the title of a chapter, a strange method of reference but to which it is accustomed.

3) Above (p. 1060-1065F), it has reproduced in its entirety Rahulabhadra’s Prajñāpāramitāṣṭra.
Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rāhulabhadra represent the first lineage of Madhyamika scholars. Their biographies are legendary and their dates uncertain. Not content with giving us contradictory information on them, the sources confuse them with the siddhas of the same name who were present at Nalanda several centuries later (see above, Vol. I, p. XIX, notes 8 and 9).

In the introduction to *Vimalakīrti*, p. 70-71, I [Lamotte] have tried to interpret the facts given in the 5th century by Kumārajīva, his disciples Seng-tchao and Seng-juoei and his illustrious friend Houei-yuan. It seems indeed that the eminent individuals place Nāgārjuna between 243 and 300 C.E.

The Indians, Chinese and Tibetans agree in making Āryadeva the pupil of Nāgārjuna. Here it will suffice to refer the reader to the note on Āryadeva published in *Ceylon Encyclopedia*, vol. II, p. 109-115. At the beginning of his commentary on the *Catuḥśataka*, Candrakīrti (c. 600-650 C.E.) tells us:

“Āryadeva was born in the island of Śiṃhala (Ceylon) and was the son of the king of the land. After having been crown prince, he renounced the world, went to Dakṣina (Dekkan), became a disciple of Nāgārjuna and followed his teachings.”

The Ceylonese chronicles of the Dīpavaṃsa (XXII, v. 41 and 50) and the Mahāvaṃsa (XXXVI, v. 29) make mention of a mahāthera Deva who lived in Ceylon at the time of the heresy of the Vetullavāda, i.e., of the Mahāyāna which spread in the island. Deva attracted the good graces of kings Vohārikatissa (260-282 C.E.) and Samghatissa (293-297 C.E.). This detail allows us to place Deva in Ceylon in the second half of the 3rd century.

From Ceylon, Deva, alias Āryadeva, went to southern India and traveled over the entire continent. In the 7th century, Hiuan-tsang found traces of his passage from Śrughna near the sources of the Ganges (Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 4, p. 891b) to Prayāga at the junction of the Yamunā and the Ganges (k. 5, p. 897b), at Pāṭaliputra (k. 8, p. 912c), at Dakṣinakosala (k. 10, p. 929a-c) and in the land of Cola (k. 10, p. 931b). The meeting between Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna “who was already old and weak” took place at Pāṭaliputra, capital of Magadha. The Ceylonese monk embraced the ideas of the old man and became a convinced Mādhyamikan. His many adventures and his physical traits explain the large number of nicknames that serve to designate him: Kāṇadeva, Niṅlaneta, Piṅgalanetra, Piṅgalacakṣus, Karṇatipa, etc. Among his works that he published, apparently after his teacher’s death in the first years of the 4th century C.E, the Madhyamakāśāstra (T 1564), commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās of Nāgārjuna, and the ‘Hundreds’ (*Catuḥśataka* and Śatakaśāstra), polemical works discussed above.

Rāhulabhadra was certainly associated with the Madhyamaka propaganda from the beginning, but we do not know where to place him exactly.

In a series of fourteen stanzas the original Sanskrit of which was found by G. Tucci and published in *Oriens Extremus*, IX, 1962, p. 49-51, Candrakīrti summarizes the activity of the early Mādhyamikans in the following way:

*Sspaśṭaṃ Rāhulabhadrapādasahito Nāgārjuno tanmatam
Devedāpy anugamyamāna vacanacālaṃ ciraṃ diṣṭavān /
tacchāstra pravivekamīcit adhiyaṃ thirthyās vijityākhilāṁs
tacchisyā api śaśanaṃ munivarasyādiṣṭavantaś ciraṃ // 6//

1123
“In the presence of the Venerable Rāhulabhadra, Nāgārjuna, whose words were followed also by Deva, has explained clearly and fully the mind of this [Buddha]. The disciples of this [Nāgārjuna] also, having their opinions determined by examination of the treatise by this [Nāgārjuna] and having vanquished all the heretics, have fully explained the doctrine of the best of Munis, [i.e., the Buddha].”

The term Rāhulabhadrapādasahita, in Tibetan, Sgra gcan ḍzin ni bzan poḥi ēal sna dan bcos, literally means ‘endowed with the feet of Rāhulabhadra’, but after a proper name, pāda is a title of respect; this is why I [Lamotte] have translated it as in the presence of the ‘Venerable’ Rāhulabhadra. Nevertheless, pāda has other meanings than that of ‘feet’, mainly that of ‘verse, line with a 4-strophe’. Candrakīrti, by a play of words of which the Indians are so fond, perhaps chose the expression to suggest to the minds of his readers the famous ‘strophes’ of which Rāhulabhadra was the author, namely the twenty strophes of the Prajñāpāramitāstotra appearing as the heading to the Sanskrit manuscripts of the Prajñāpāramita (Aṣṭasāhasrikā, ed. R. Mitra; Pañcaviṃśatisākā, ed. N. Dutt; Suvikrātavikrāmin, ed. R. Hikata) and cited fully by the Traité (p. 1969-1965F).

In any hypothesis, it seems that to Candrakīrti’s eyes Rāhulabhadra was Nāgārjuna’s inspiration and preceded him in time.

But the problem is not that simple. Information equally as old in date but coming, it is true, from the Chinese, make Rāhulabhadra a contemporary of Nāgārjuna and a commentator of his works.

Ki tsang (549-623) of the San louen sect says: “The dharmācārya Rāhula was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna and explained the eight negations” (Tchong kouan louan chou, T 1824, k. 3, p. 40c16-17.

Tchan jan (711-782) of the T’ien t’ai sect, mentions four basic works in regard to Nāgārjuna: “There is the commentary of Piṅgalanetra called Madhyamakaśāstra which was translated by Kumārajīva of the Heou Ts’in (T 1564). Secondly, the commentary of Asaṅga called Chouen tchong louen which was translated by Bodhiruci of the Heou Wei (T 1565): there are only two rolls of it. The others have not been published. Thirdly, the commentary of the dharmācārya Rāhula, also called Madhyamakaśāstra; Paramārtha of the Leang translated it but we have only one chapter on the hetupratyaya. Fourthly, the commentary of the bodhisattva Bhāviveka, called Prajñāpraīpaśāstra; the Tripiṭaka master Po p’o (Prabhāmitra) of the T’ang translated it (T 1566); it is in sixteen rolls” (Tche kouan fou hing tchouan hong kiue, T 1912, k. 1, p. 140c1-5).

Rāhulabhadra appears here in appropriate place but it is especially his stotras that made him famous. In the words of Mochizuki, Encyclopaedia, p. 1953, E. Kawaguchi has brought from Tibet a manuscript of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka with twenty stanzas of homage written by Rāhulabhadra in honor of this text. Other stanzas attributed to Rāhula or Rāhulabhadra are also cited by Sāramati in his Mahāyānāvatāraśāstra (T 1634, k. 2, p. 48a15 and 48c12) and by Asaṅga in the Chouen tchong louen (T 1565, k. 1, p. 40b18).

Like the other famous Mādhyamikas, Rāhulabhadra was drawn by the Chinese into the cycle of the patriarchs where he occupies the 15th or 16th place, after Nāgārjuna and Kāṇadeva: cf. Fou fa tsang yin yuan tchouan, T 2058, k. 6, p. 319c1-329a1; Fou tsou t’ong ki, T 2035, k. 5, p. 175b2-17; Fou tsou tai t’ong tsi, T 2036, k. 4, p. 504c8-505b2). He appears again in the lists of siddhas (cf. G. Tucci, A Sanskrit Biography of the Siddhas and some questions connected with Nāgārjuna, Jour. and Proc. of the
Question. – How is it that only the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma or saṃskāra) are impermanent (anitya) whereas ‘all’ dharmas are non-self (anātman)?

Answer. – Unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛtadharma), being without causes (ahetuka) or conditions (apratyaya), do not arise and do not cease. As they do not arise and do not cease, they are not said to be impermanent.

Furthermore, one cannot produce attachment of mind (cittābhiniveśa) or error (viparyasa) toward unconditioned dharmas; this is why they are not said to be impermanent (anitya) but they can be said to be non-self (anātman). People say that the ātman is eternal (nitya), universally extended (vyāpin) and endowed with knowledge (jñānin); this is why [the sūtra] speaks of non-self in regard to ‘all’ dharmas.

[3. Śāntam nirvāṇam]. - Peacefulness is nirvāṇa because the fire of the three poisons (triviṣa) and the threefold degeneration is destroyed in it. This is the seal of peace (śāntamudrā).

Question. – Why does the seal of peace apply to only one dharma [namely, nirvāṇa] and not to several?

Answer. – In the first seal, it is a matter of the five aggregates (pañcaskandha); in the second seal, it is a question of all dharmas, qualified as non-self; in the third seal it is a question of the fruit (phala) of the first two, [namely, nirvāṇa]: it is called the seal of peace.

[By saying] that all the formations are impermanent (sarvasaṃskāra anityāḥ), the five outer objects of enjoyment (bāhyakāmaguna) considered as belonging to a self (ātmīya) are destroyed. [By saying] that all dharmas are without self (sarvadharma anātmānaḥ), the inner self (adhyaṭman) is destroyed. The ‘I’ and the ‘mine’ being destroyed, there is śāntam nirvāṇam.

Considering the impermanence of the formations (saṃskārānityatā), the yogin experiences disgust (nirveda) for the suffering of the world but, while knowing this disgust and this suffering, he remains attached to the view of the svāmin, the sovereign entity “capable”, he says, ”of having this thought”. – This is why there is a second seal of the Dharma (dharmamudrā): the yogin knows that all dharmas are without

Asiatic Soc. of Bengal, XXVI, 1930, p. 138-155). In turn, the Tibetan historians introduce him into the Nālandā cycle: Bu-ston (II, p. 123, 135) and make him the teacher of Nāgārjuna, whereas Tāranātha (p. 85-86) gives him as student of and successor to Āryadeva.

It is not impossible that Nāgārjuna would have cited him, but death prevented him from referring to the works of his close or distant successors such as Āryadeva or Rāhulabhadra. The first was certainly his disciple and the Śātakas of which he was the author, while remaining in the lineage of the teacher, show a style and concerns that are quite different.

The Traité, which loosely quotes Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakārikās, Āryadeva’s Śātaka, and Rāhulabhadra’s Stotra, is not therefore the work of Nāgārjuna but, as has already been suspected by P. Demiéville, “the work of Sarvāśtvādins adepts of the Lesser Vehicle converted to the Greater Vehicle of the Mādhyamika school” (JA, 1951, p. 282).

Otherwise, if the chronology presented here is correct, if the activity of Nāgārjuna is placed in the middle of the 3rd century and that of Āryadeva between the end of the 3rd and the beginning of the 4th centuries, the compilation of the Traité should cover the first decades of the 4th century of our era.
self (sarvadharmā anāmānāḥ). Analyzing the five aggregates (skandha), the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatana), the eighteen elements (dhātu) and the twelve causes (nidāna) inwardly and outwardly (adyātmabahirdhā) to look for a svāmin, he does not find any. And as the latter does not exist, all dharmas are without self and are inactive. – Recognizing this, the yogin stops his futile proliferation (prapañca) and, having no other refuge (niśraya), he takes refuge only in cessation (nirodha): hence the seal of sāntam nirvāṇam.

Question. – In the Mahāyāna it is said: “Dharmas do not arise, are not destroyed and have but one single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), viz., the absence of nature (alakṣaṇa).” Why is it said here that all conditioned dharmas are impermanent and that that is a seal of the Dharma? Are these two teachings not contradictory (virodha)? [222c]

Answer. - To consider impermanence (anityatā) is to consider emptiness (śūnyatā). If one considers form (rūpa) as momentary (kṣaṇika) and impermanent (anitya), one knows that it is empty (śūnya). The past substance (atītāṃ rūpam), being destroyed, it is invisible (adṛṣya) and thus without the nature of substance. The future substance (anāgataṃ rūpam), not yet being born, is without activity, without function and invisible, thus without the nature of substance. The present substance (pratyutpanna rūpam) also is without duration, invisible and non-discernible, thus without the nature of substance. Absence of substance is emptiness; emptiness is non-arising and non-cessation. Non-arising (anutpāda) and non-cessation (anirodha), arising (utpāda) and cessation (nirodha) are in reality (tattvena) one and the same thing. The explanation can be both developed (vistara) and summarized (samksepa).

Question. – We accept that past and future substances, being invisible, do not have the nature of substance. But present substance is visible as long as it lasts. Why do you say that it does not have the nature of substance?

Answer. – Present substance also does not have any duration (sthiti). As I have said in regard to the four smṛtyupasthānas (p. 1163F), every dharma, the nature of cessation of which we see after the event (paścāt), must clearly possess this nature of cessation from its birth (utpāda) but, as it is subtle (sūkṣma), we do not recognize it.

[If the duration of conditioned dharmas were a stable duration, there would never be cessation.] Let us suppose there is a man who is wearing sandals (pādukā): if these were new from the very first day, they would never wear out; afterwards (paśca), they would always be new and there would be no ageing. Having no ageing, they would be eternal (nitya). From the fact of this eternity, there would be no sin (āpatti) and no merit (punya): and, as there would be no more sin or merit, the usual rules of the Buddhist Path (mārga) would be overturned (vikṣipta).

391 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 164, l. 8-9 (T 223, k. 4, p. 242c2-4; k. 8, p. 278c1-2): Sarva ete dharmā...

ekalakṣaṇaṃ yadutālakṣaṇānāḥ.

392 Cf. Madh. vr̥tti, p. 324: If action did not exist in itself (svabhāvata), it would certainly be eternal because existence in itself is not susceptible to modification. Thus action would never be accomplished. Action is what necessarily requires the activity of a free agent. But [if you presuppose eternity], it is not
Furthermore, since the natures of arising and cessation (utpādabhāṅgalakṣaṇa) always go along with the formations (sāṃskāra), there is no period of duration. If there were a period of duration, there would be neither arising nor cessation.

This is why present substance has no duration and, in duration, there is no arising or cessation, for duration reduced to a single moment (ekākāṅe sthitiḥ) is characteristic of the formations (sāṃskāra).

This is the Dharma ‘of unhindered penetration’. This is how the Dharma is to be recollected.

7. Other qualities of the Buddhist Dharma

Furthermore, there are two kinds of Dharma:393 i) the Buddha’s speech (buddhavacana), namely, the Three Baskets (tripiṭaka), the twelve-membered Buddha’s words (dvādaśāṅgabuddhavacana) and the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma (caturaśṭī dharmaṃkandhasahasrāṇi); ii) the meaning of the Dharma (dharmārtha) preached by the Buddha, namely the eightfold noble Path (āryāṣṭāṅgamārga) with [its three elements], discipline (śīla), concentration (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā) and the fruit of deliverance (vimuktiphala) of nirvāṇa.

The yogin should first recollect the speech of the Buddha and then recollect the meaning of the Dharma.

1) Recollecting the speech of the Buddha. –

The Buddha’s speech is beautiful, marvelous, truthful and of great usefulness. The Buddha’s speech is both profound (gambhīra) and not very profound; profound because it has in view the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa); not very profound because it is skillfully formulated. His repetitions are faultless because each has its significance.

The speech of the Buddha rests on four bases and is adorned with four qualities: i) wisdom (prajñā), ii) truth (satya), iii) equanimity (upekṣā), iv) cessation (nirōdha).

It is irrefutable because it uses four ways of responding to questions (praśnavyākaraṇa):394 i) responding in a categorical way (ekāṃśena vyākaraṇam), ii) responding by distinguishing (vibhajya vyākaraṇam), iii) responding by means of a question (paripṛcchāvyākaraṇam), iv) responding by not answering (sthāpanīya vyākaraṇam).

explained. Why? Because an eternal entity cannot be accomplished (yasmāt kriyate na hi śāśvatam).

That which possesses a real existence is ‘eternal’. That which is real eludes accomplishment (karaṇa) and consequently does not depend on a cause. Even without having accomplished good or bad action, every person would be rewarded.

393 See above, p. 1074F seq.
394 See references above, p. 158F, n. 2.
The words of the Buddha are either permissions followed by prohibitions, or prohibitions followed by permissions, or permissions not followed by prohibitions, or prohibitions not followed by permissions. These four methods are in harmony and are not contradictory.

The speech of the Buddha, which has the [true] nature of things, is free of futile proliferation (prapañca); being expressed rationally, it suppresses any commentary on existence and non-existence.

The speech of the Buddha is in accord with the absolute (paramārtha) and, [223a] even when it speaks about conventional things (saṃvyrtidharma), it is faultless, for it is not in contradiction with the twofold truth [absolute truth and conventional truth].

The speech of the Buddha aims at the good (hita): to the pure man, it addresses gentle words; to the impure man, harsh words. But whether they are gentle or harsh, they are alike without fault (nirdoṣa).

The speech of the Buddha is in accord with the holy Dharma (saddharmam anuvartate), but is not attached to it (saddharma nābhinniśate). It is the foe of impure laws but experiences no haughtiness toward them. It criticizes many things but does not blame anything. It praises the Dharma in multiple ways but remains without any support (apratīṣṭhāna).

There is nothing to be added to and nothing to be removed (anūnānadhiṣka) from the speech of the Buddha: whether it is summarized (saṃkṣipta) or developed (vistīrṇa), it is good at the beginning (ādau kalyāṇa) and good throughout.

The speech of the Buddha is abundant, but the flavor of the meaning (artha-rasa) is not abated: It attracts people’s hearts but does not allow them to get attached (saṅga); its sublimities are varied but they inspire no fear in anyone. It has its extensions everywhere but fools (bāla) cannot understand it.

The speech of the Buddha has different extraordinary (adbhuta) effects; it can make men’s hair stand on end (romaharṣa) so that they sweat, become breathless and are terrified; it can also make the gods become angry so that their cries fill the ten directions and they shake the earth in six ways. It can make people attached to the world forever to leave it and others who are not attached to it, rejoice.

Wrong-doers who hear the speech of the Buddha become sad and tormented by their wrong-doings; good people, mindful (smṛtimat) and energetic (ātāpin), enter the Path. For those who hear it, it is as if they were tasting ambrosia (amṛtarasa), ‘good at the beginning, good in the middle and good at the end’ (ādau kalyāṇa, madhye kalyāṇa, paryavasāne kalyāṇa).

Furthermore, in the great assemblies, each person wants to hear something, and the Buddha answers him with a single sound (ekasvarena). Each makes sense out of it and each thinks the Buddha has spoken for

395 Cf. the Kolopamasūtra cited above, p. 64F, n. 1 to which the Traité will return later (k. 31, p. 290c22, 295b29; k. 85, p. 657a2.

396 On the Dharma without any support, see Vimalakīrti, p. 270-271; Śūramgamasamādhi, p. 187-188.

397 A belief characteristic of Indian Buddhism that has its extension into China. The subject has been masterfully explained by P. Demiéville in Hobogirin (Butsugo, p. 207-209; Button, p. 215-217). The Traité makes only a brief allusion to it here, but will return to it later (k. 30, p. 284a-b).
him alone. In the great assemblies, whether the listener is far or near, the sound reaches him with the same intensity; it fills the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu and reaches innumerable universe in the ten directions. The beings who are to be converted (vainyasattva) hear it, those who are not to be converted do not hear it. It is as if a thunderbolt (asani) struck the earth: the deaf (badhira) do not hear it but those who hear it understand what it is.

The Buddha preached the Dharma in various ways (cf. Vimalakīrti, p. 109-110) and notably by a single sound (ekaswareṇa) or by vocal emission in a single moment (ekakṣanavāgudāhārena). This sound expresses the Dharma in its entirety, reaches all the universes of the ten directions, rejoices the minds of all beings and destroys the negative emotions. Each hearer, according to his level and capability, understands it and believes that the Buddha preached it for him alone.

The doctrine of the single sound was already formulated in some sects of the Lesser Vehicle. The Vibhajayavādins produced a stanza of praise of the Buddha (tsan fo song) cited in the Vibhāṣa (T 1545, p. 410a16; T 1546, k. 41, 306c24; T 1547, k. 9, p. 482c16): “The Buddha uses a single sound to enunciate the Dharma and then beings, each according to his category, understand it. All say: The Bhagavat uses the same language as I do, that is why he enunciates a certain meaning for me alone.” – For the Mahāsāṃghikas as well, the Buddha enunciates all dharmas by means of a single sound (cf. Bareau, Sectes, p. 58, thesis 4).

But the Sarvāstivādins (Bareau, ibid., p. 145, thesis 54) rejected this doctrine and the Vibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 79, p. 410b25) comments that the previously cited stanza does not belong to the Tripiṭaka and gives (p. 410c8-9) a toned-down interpretation of it: “Even though the sounds of the Buddha are numerous and varied, they are equally useful, and that is why they are said to be one single sound.”

The Mahāyānasūtras enthusiastically adopted the doctrine of one single sound.

The Prajñāpāramitā considers the single sound to be a secondary characteristic of the 18th lakṣaṇa, ‘the brahmic voice’, and places it in its list of anuvyājanas: cf. Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 24, p. 396b5; T 220, vol. VI, k. 381, p. 968c26-27; Cheng t’ien wang, T 231, k. 7, p. 723c1; Jen wang jou kouo, T 246, k. 2, p. 842c29

Avatamsaka, T 278, k. 60, p. 787a27; T 279, k. 30, p. 164b18-19; k. 34, p. 182b4-5; k. 52, p. 275c23-24; k. 73, p. 401a11; k. 80, p. 443c28; Daśabhūmika, p. 79, l. 27-29; Bhadradariprajñādhāna, v. 30 (= T 293, k. 39, p. 843b11).

Ratnakuṭa, T 310, k. 62, p. 361b8-10; K. 100, p. 593b18; k. 102, p. 573b17-18;
Bodhisattvapiṭaka, T 316, k. 16, p. 819a2. In the same collection, Pitāputrasamāgama, T 320, k. 3, p. 928a8-15: “Each one sees the Buddha face-to-face, that is an exclusive quality (āvenikaguna) difficult to conceive. The pure Dharma is preached by a single sound, sometimes fully, sometimes abbreviated, and each one according to his mental aspirations, understands it…; each according to his destiny and his category makes sense of it…”

Great Parinirvāṇa, T 374, k. 10, p. 423c10-14; T 375, k. 9, p. 665a2.
Vimalakīrti, p. 108-110; 342.

398 Allusion to the passage of the Pañcaviṃśati commented on above, p. 525F.
These are the various ways of recollecting the speech of the Buddha.

2) Recollection of the meaning of the Dharma.

What is the meaning of the Dharma (dharmārtha)? It is faith (śraddhā), morality (śīla), generosity (tyāga), learning (śruta), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā) constituting the Path, all the good dharmas, and also the three seals of the Dharma (dharmamudrā) already discussed above (p. 1368F) in regard to penetration (prativedha): “All conditioned dharmas are impermanent; all dharmas are without self; peaceful is nirvāṇa.” This is the meaning of the Buddha’s Dharma.

These three seals cannot be attacked by any scholar (upadeśacārya) and, no matter how many the tirades, no one can transform this nature of things (dharmatā), not even if one transforms cold (sīla) into heat (uṣṇa).

The nature of things (dharmatā) is irrefutable. And, supposing that one could harm space (ākāsa), these seals of the Dharma cannot be assailed. The saint (ārya) who knows this threefold nature of dharmas eludes controversial [223b] subjects (vivādasasthāna) that all rest on wrong views (miṭṭhādrṣṭi). In the same way, the person endowed with sight (cakṣumat), seeing blind men (andha) arguing about various colors, has pity on them and smiles but does not argue with them.

Question. – In the system of the śrāvakas, the Buddha spoke about four truths, [the four noble Truths]; in the Mahāyāna, there is only one truth, [absence of nature]. Why now speak of three truths, [the three seals of the Dharma]?

Answer. – The Buddha spoke of three realities (tattva), the seals of the Dharma (dharmamudrā), but when one understands them, they make four, and when one summarizes them, they make one:

a. Impermanence (anītva) is the account of the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya), the truth of the origin (samudayasatya) and the truth of the Path (pratipatsatya).

b. Non-self (anātman) is the account valid for every dharma.

c. Peace-nirvāṇa (sāntam nirvāṇam) is the truth of the cessation of suffering (niruddhasatya).

Furthermore, conditioned dharmas are impermanent because they arise and perish from moment to moment. Depending on causes and conditions (hetupratyāpeka), they have no independence (asvatantra). Being without autonomy, they are non-self (anātman). Since they are impermanent, non-self and without nature (alakṣaṇa), the mind does not become attached to them. As there is no nature or attachment, there is sāntam nirvāṇam. Thus, although it is said in the Mahāyāna that “dharmas do not arise, do not perish and have but a single nature, namely, the absence of nature”399, this absence of nature (alakṣaṇa) is precisely Śāntaṃ nirvāṇam. It is the object of the concentration recollecting the Dharma (dharmamunīsāṃdpadhāni), the object of knowledge (jñānālambana) that exhausts all the qualities of the bodhisattvas and pratyekabuddhas.

399 See above, p. 1376F, n. 1.
Question. Why does the recollection of the Buddha (buddhānusmṛti) have as object (ālambate) only the qualities of āsaiṅśa present in the Buddha’s body? Why does the concentration of the recollection of the Community (saṃghānusmṛtisamādhī) have as object the dharmas of the śaikṣa and āsaiṅśa present in the bodies of the Buddha’s disciples (buddhaśrāvakas)? And why are all the other good pure dharmas (kuśalāṇārvadharma) the object (ālambana) of the concentration on the recollection of the Dharma (dharmānusmṛtisamādhī)?

Answer. – It was Kīa-tchen-yen-ni-tseu (Kāṭyāyanīputra) who said that, but [we others], the Mahāyānists, say this:

i) The object of buddhānusmṛtisamādhī is the qualities (guṇa) and magical powers (ṛddhibala) used by the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions, and all the Buddhas in general during the period from their first production of the mind of bodhi (prathamacittoṭpāda) until the disappearance of their holy Dharma (dharmaṇivipralopa).

ii) The object of dharmānusmṛtisamādhī is: a. the words of the Buddha (buddhavacana); b. the meaning of the Dharma (dharmaṁrtha) preached by the Buddha. [The words of the Buddha] form a single metre (pāda), a single stanza (gāthā) up to the eighty-four thousand articles of the Dharma (caturśīti dharmaskandhasahasrāṇi). [The meaning of the Dharma preached by the Buddha] is the good dharmas (kuśaladharma), faith (śraddhā), morality (śīla), generosity (tyāga), study (śruta), concentration (samadhi), wisdom (prajñā), etc., up to and including nirvāṇa-without-residue (nirupādiśeṣanirvāṇa).

iii) The object of saṃghānusmṛtisamādhī is the Community of bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas, the Communities and qualities (guṇa) of all the other saints (ārya) excluding the Buddha.

III. RECOLLECTION OF THE COMMUNITY

The objector puts forth here the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika theories on the threefold taking of refuge. One takes refuge in the dharmas of the āsaiṅśa or the arhat which constitute a Buddha and not in the material body (rūpakāya) of the Buddha which remains that of a bodhisattva. One takes refuge in all the Buddhas and not in one single Buddha. One takes refuge in the dharmas of the śaikṣa and the āsaiṅśa which constitute the Saṃgha, the latter including among its members non-arhats and arhats. One takes refuge in the Dharma, i.e., in pratisaṃkhyaśirodha or nirvāṇa. These theories are explained in Vibhāṣā. T 1545, k. 34, p. 177a seq.; Kośa, IV, p. 76-79; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 38, p. 555c seq.; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 125-127.

Kośakārikā, IV, v. 32 says: Buddhasaṃghakarān dharmān āsaiṅśaṇubhayāṃś ca saḥ / nirvāṇaṃ caiti śaraṇaṃ yo yāti karaṇatrayam:

“He who takes the triple refuge takes refuge in the dharmas of the āsaiṅśa which make up the Buddhas, in the dharmas of the two kinds [dharma of the āsaiṅśa and of the śaikṣa] which make up the Saṃgha, and in nirvāṇa.”

The Buddha does not appear in the recollection of the Saṃgha because he is recollected separately.
Recollection of the Community (saṃgānusmṛti). – “The Community of disciples of the Buddha (śrāvakasamgha) is completely endowed with the discipline element (śīlaskandhasampanna), is completely endowed with the concentration element (samādhiskandha), the wisdom element (prajñāskandha), the deliverance element (vimuktiskandha), and the ‘knowledge and vision of deliverance’ element (vimuktijñānadarśanaskandha). It includes the four pairs of individuals (catvāri puruṣayugāni) or the eight individuals (aṣṭau puruṣapudgalāh). It is worthy of alms (dakṣīṇa), worthy of homage (pūjana), worthy of veneration (arcīna). It is the supreme field of merit for the world (anuttaraṃ punyakustraṃ lokasya).”

The yogin should recollect the Community celebrated by the Buddha in these words and meditate on the qualities (guna) of the śrāvakasamgha, the pratyekabuddhasamgha and the bodhisattvasamgha making up the Holy Community (āryasamgha).

1. Community endowed with the five pure skandhas

The perfection of these five elements (skandhasampad) has already been discussed above (p. 1349F).

Question. – These five elements have already been used to praise the Buddha. Why use them again here to praise the Community? [223c]

Answer. – Here the praise of this perfection is about the five pure elements (anāsravaskandha) insofar as they are possessed by the disciples.

The perfection is of two kinds: i) real perfection (bhūtasampad); ii) nominal perfection (nāmasampad). If one praises the perfection to be obtained or already obtained by the disciples of the Buddha, this is nominal perfection. If one has in mind the perfection of the Buddha, this is real perfection.

Furthermore, here the praise [of the Community of disciples] is made in order to distinguish it from the heretic (tīrthika) communities, wandering monks (pravrajita) and lay people (grhastra).

The communities of heretics and lay people boast of their prosperity, their nobility or their power. The communities of wandering monks boast about their wrong views (mithyādṛśti), their asceticism (duṣkacaryā), their ties (sāṅga), their wisdom (prajñā), their teachings (upadeśa) and their critics (vivāda). Here, in recollecting the community of monks, speaking about discipline (śīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā) would not be enough. This is why the Buddha himself celebrates all the qualities (guna) of the śrāvakasamgha, its origins (maula), its establishment (āvastha), the perfection of its discipline (śīlaskandhasampad) and so on up to the perfection in knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśanaskandhasampad).

---

402 These five anāsravaskandhas are not mentioned in the canonical formulation of the saṃghānusmṛti.
403 The Samgha actually includes both śaikṣas and aśaikṣas in its ranks.
Based on the discipline element (śīlaskandhāśrita), the Samgha is unshakeable (acala). – It bends the bow of concentration (samādhiḥhanus). – It lets fly the arrow of wisdom (prajñēśu). – It destroys the enemies, the disturbing emotions (klesāmitra) and obtains deliverance (vimukti). – It produces knowledge (jñāna) and vision (darśana) in regard to this deliverance.

In the same way, a strong man (balavān puruṣah) first makes his feet steady, bends his bow, lets fly the arrow and destroys his enemy. He frees himself thus from a twofold fear: he avoids offending the king and he escapes from the dangers of battle. Knowing and seeing precisely that his enemies have been destroyed, he experiences joy (muditā).

This is why we use the five [pure] elements to praise the Community.

2. Community worthy of offerings, etc.

The Community is ‘worthy of offerings’ (dakṣiṇīya) thanks to the perfection of the qualities (guṇasampad) represented by these five [pure] elements.

Just as a rich, noble and powerful person is extolled by the people, so the Community of the disciples of the Buddha, who hold the power of discipline (śīla), concentration (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā) wealth (ādhyatā),404 deliverance (vimukti), knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadāraśana), this Community, I say, is ‘worthy of offerings’ (dakṣiṇīya), ‘worthy of homage’ (pūjanīya), ‘worthy of salutation’ (aṅjaliṅkaraniyā), ‘worthy of veneration’ (arcanīya).

3. Community, the best field of merit

The Community is ‘the best field of merit for the world’ (anuttaraṃ punyakṣetram lokasya).

There are two types of patrons (dānapati): the poor (daridra) and the rich (ādhyā). The poor dānapati is rewarded for his homage (vandana), his signs of respect (satkāra) and his eagerness (pratyutḍāgamaṇa) toward the Community. The rich dānapati is rewarded, not only for his homage, his signs of respect and his eagerness toward the Community, but also for his gifts in kind (āmiśadāna). This is why he Community is ‘the best field of merit of the world.”

Worked, plowed, planted at the proper time, watered and freely irrigated, a good field (sukṣetra) necessarily gives an abundant crop. It is the same for this field of merit, the Community. The plow of wisdom (prajñāhala) is used to plow up the roots of the fetters (samyojanamūla); the four immeasurables (apramāṇacittā) are taken to break it up and soften it; the dānapati sows the seeds of faith (śraddhā) and of generosity (dāna); he waters it with the water of the recollection of generosity (tyāgānusmṛti), respect

404 This mention of wealth is completely misplaced.
(śatkāra) and pure mind (viśuddhacitta). In the present lifetime (īkajanma) or in the next lifetime (parajanamani), he obtains an immense worldly happiness (apramāṇaṃalaukikasikha) and obtains the fruits of the three Vehicles (vānatrayaphala).

[Avadāna of Bakkula]. – Thus, at the time of the Buddha Pi-p’o-che (Vipaśyin), the bhikṣu Po-kiu-lo (Bakkula) offered a a-li-lō (harītaki) fruit to the Community. For ninety-one kalpas he enjoyed happiness among gods and men. He was never sick. And today, having met the Buddha Śākyamuni, he went forth from [224a] home (pravrajita), destroyed his impurities (kśīṇāsrava) and became arhat.405

405 Anavatapagāthṭha, ed. Bechert, p. 144-145; tr. Hofinger, p. 227-229; Fo wou po ti tseu, T 199,p. 194b16-c11; Mūlasarv. Vin., Gilgit Man., III, part 1, p. 192-193, and T 1448, k. 17, p. 82c5-28: Bandumatyāṃ rājadhyānyāṃ gāndhiko ‘hām ... glānam abhijnanāmi tāvatālikam apy aham. Transl. – In the capital of Bandhumati, I was once the owner of a hardware shop and, at the time of Vipaśyin, I invited the community of monks. During the Rains, the Community was invited, but nobody asked anything of me, except for one monk who begged for a single myrobalan (harītaki). For ninety-one kalpas, I had not a single bad destiny. See how useful was the reward for this gift of medicine! I have enjoyed much happiness for having done this small meritorious action. Having given this single myrobalan, I rejoiced for a long time in the heavens. Then, by virtue of the residue of my action, I have obtained a human birth, and I do not remember having accepted, while I was śaikṣa, the least offering in the kingdom. My life-span [was one hundred and sixty years] during that existence and, in all that time, I do not remember having suffered any illness.

The Traité will return later to this bhikṣu: cf. k. 24, p. 238a5; k. 29, p. 271b18; k. 38, p. 341c3. This is a well-known monk called Bakkula, Vakula and Vākula in Sanskrit; Bakkula, Bākula and Vakkula in Pāli. The name means ‘Two families’ (dvakkula, dvikkula): actually, during his last lifetime, Bakkula had taken birth in a wealthy family in Kauśambī, but when his nurse was bathing him in the Yamunā, he was swallowed by a fish. The animal was sold to the wife of a merchant in Benares and when she opened the fish, she found the baby alive. She wanted to adopt him but the true parents of the child reclaimed him. The king cut through the dispute by declaring that the child henceforth belonged to the ‘two families’. At the age of eighty, Bakkula met the Buddha, entered into the monastic order and, after seven days, attained the state of arhat. He lived for eighty more years, clothed in rags and tatters, declining any offering of food and refusing to preach even a stanza of two pādas. The Buddha designated him as the foremost of those free of sickness and with few desires. After his death, a stūpa was built for him. Later, during his well-known pilgrimage of holy places, the emperor Aśoka, contrary to his well-known generosity, placed a single piece of gold on the funerary monument of the arhat, but the latter had had so little desire that the protector spirit of the stūpa refused the gold piece.

The sources on Bakkula are very numerous, and here are the main ones:

Avadāna of Koṭiviṃśa. – Thus, at the time of the Buddha Vipaśyin, the śramaṇa Eul-che-yi (Koṭiviṃśa) built a house (layana), covered the floor with rugs (dūṣya) and offered it to the Community. For ninety-one kalpas he enjoyed happiness among the gods and among men. His feet did not tread on the ground. When he was born, on the soles of his feet (pādatāla) he had hair two inches long, soft and fine (romāṇi dvāṅgulāni mṛdusāmsparśāni śubhāni). Seeing this, his father rejoiced and gave him twenty koṭi ounces of gold. Koṭiviṃśa saw the Buddha, heard the Dharma and became arhat. Of the disciples, he was foremost in exertion (ārabdhāryāṇām agryāḥ).

Sanskrit sources. – Mahākarmavibhaṅga, p. 75 (where Bakkula is given as the son of Dharmayaśas, king of Kaśmir); Divyāvadāna, p. 396.

Chinese sources. – Hien yu king, T 202, k. 5, p. 385b5-386a4; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, K. 181, p. 906c-907a; Fen pie kong tō louen, T 1507, k. 4, p. 45c17-46a28; Tchouwei mo kie king, T 1775, k. 3, p. 359b10; King liu yi siang, T 2121, k. 37, p. 201a1-9 (transl. Chavannes, Contes, III, p. 229-230).


Cāturdiśasya samadhasya mayaikam layanaṃ krtam ... arhattvaṃ ca mayā práptaṃ sīthbhūto 'smi nirvṛtaḥ.

Transl. – I built a single house for the community in the capital of Bandhumati, at the time of Vipaśyin. I spread out scattered carpets over the floor of this house and then, with joyous mind and happy spirit, I uttered the following vow: May I serve the perfect Buddha and receive ordination! May I reach nirvāṇa, supremely peaceful and unageing! By virtue of this merit, I have transmigrated for ninety-one kalpas; as god or as man, by the strength of my merit, I was well known. Then, thanks to the residue of my action, in the course of my last lifetime I was born at Campā, the only son of a high nobleman. When he learned of my birth, my father uttered the following: “I will give this child a fortune of twenty koṭis.” On the soles of my feet I had hair four inches long, fine, soft to touch, beautiful, like cotton-down. For the ninety-one kalpas that passed, I do not remember having set my bare foot on the ground. I have served the Leader of the caravan, the perfect supreme Buddha. I have attained arhathood; I am cool and at peace.

The Traité will return three times (k. 26, p. 253b8-9; k. 29, p. 271b20-21; k. 32, p. 301b13) to this śramaṇa Koṭiviṃśa, whose full name was Śrōṇa-koṭi-viṃśa, in Pāli Soṇa-kolivīsa. He came from a rich family in Campā, capital of Bengal. Summoned to Rājagṛha by king Bimbāsāra, he met the Buddha there and having heard the preaching of the Teacher, he asked for and received ordination as a monk. He retreated to the Sītavana to meditate but did not succeed in concentrating himself. Restless and tormented, he walked to and fro so long and so hard that the especially tender soles of his feet became lacerated and bled profusely. The Buddha came to find him and preached the Vinuṭāpamovādastātra to teach him to moderate his ardor and temper his exertion. On this occasion he authorized Koṭiviṃśa to wear furred boots and soon extended this favor to all the bhikṣus. This anecdote is told in all the Vinayas: Pāli Vin, I, p. 179-185 (cf. Anguttara, III, p. 374-379); Mahāśāsaka Vin. T 1421, k. 21, p. 1135.
Since gifts as small as those of Bakkula and Koṭṭīviṃśa produce such great fruits of retribution (vipākaphala), the Community is called ‘the best field of merit for the world’.

4. Community consisting of four pairs and eight classes of individuals

“In the Community, there are four pairs of individuals (catvāri puruṣayugāṇi) or eight classes of individuals (aṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ).”

407


The Buddha proclaimed Koṭṭīviṃśa the foremost of those who practice exertion (Anguttara, I, p. 24). According to the Si yu ki (T 2087, k. 11, p. 934c-935a), this śramaṇa made a statue of Maitreya in sandalwood, worked miracles and conversions in Koñkan where Aśoka dedicated a stupa to him.

Śroṇa-koṭi-viṃśa should not be confused with the arhat Śroṇa KoṭiKarṇa, in Pāli Soṇa Koṭikaṇa, the foremost of the fine orators (aggaṃ kalyāṇavākkaraṇāṇam), disciple of Mahākātyāyana and apostle of Avanti.

407 In contrast to the prthagjana ‘the worldly’, the āryas who have entered onto the Path and who make up the holy Community, are arranged into various groups:

A. TWO GROUPS: the śaikṣa ‘those who are still in training’ and the aśaikṣa ‘those who no longer train’, i.e., the arhat ‘saints’.

B. EIGHT GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS (aṣṭau puruṣapudgalāḥ), namely:
1. Prathamaphalapratipannaka, candidate for the first fruit of the religious life.
2. Srotāpañña.
3. Dvitīyaphalapratipannaka, candidate for the second fruit.
4. Sakṣyāgamin.
5. Trīyaphalapratipannaka, candidate for the third fruit.
6. Anāgamin.
7. Arhattvaphalapratipannaka, candidate for the fruit of arhat.
8. Arhat.

C. FOUR PAIRS OF INDIVIDUALS (catvāri puruṣayugāṇi) formed by the eight preceding groups taken in pairs.

D. TWENTY-SEVEN INDIVIDUALS, made up of eighteen types of śaikṣa (aṣṭādaśa śaikṣāḥ) and nine types of aśaikṣa (navāśaikṣāḥ).

The eighteen types of śaikṣa are:
1. Prathamaphalapratipanna, candidate for the first fruit.
2. Srotāpañña.
3. Dvitīyaphalapratipanna, candidate for the second fruit.
4. Sakṛdāgamin.
5. Trīṭīyaphalapratipanna.
6. Anāgamin.
7. Arhattvaphalapratipanna, candidate for the fruit of arhat.
8. Śraddhāṇusārin, pursuing [the truth] because of faith.
9. Dharmāṇusārin, pursuing [the truth] by means of dharmas, i.e., the twelve-membered Scripture.
10. Śraddhādhimukta, convinced by faith.
11. Dṛṣṭiprapta, in possession of the speculative view.
12. Kulaṃkula (Pāli: koḷāṅkola), passing from family to family [among gods and men and attaining nirvāṇa after two or three rebirths].
13. Ekavicīka (in Pāli ekabīja; in Chinese yi tchong for Kuārajīva, yi kien for Hiuan-tsang), separated from nirvāṇa [by one rebirth].
15. Upapadyaprinirvāyin, [anāgāmin obtaining] nirvāṇa as soon as he is reborn.
18. Ūrdhvasrotas, [anāgāmin] with upward movement. [Not obtaining nirvāṇa in the place where he is reborn on leaving Kāmadhātu, but moving upward to the Akanīṣṭha or in Bhavāgra].

The nine kinds of aśāikṣa are:
19. Parihāṇadharmar, [arhat] likely to fall
20. Cetanādharmar, [arhat] likely to end his existence
21. Amuraṅaṇadharmar, [arhat] likely to keep [what he has acquired]
22. Sihitākampya, [arhat] likely to remain [in the fruit] and not moving
23. Prativedhamābhavya, [Arhat] likely to penetrate effortlessly into the Unshakeables.
24. Akopyadharmar, unshakeable [arhat not likely to fall]
25. Cetovimukta, [arhat] possessing deliverance of mind
26. Prajñāvimukta, [arhat] delivered by wisdom
27. Ubhayatobhāgavimukta (kong kiai t’o for Kumārajīva; kiu kiai t’o for Hiuan-tsang), [arhat] doubly delivered [from the obstacle of the disturbing emotions (kleśāvaraṇa) and the obstacle opposing the eight liberations (vimokṣāvaraṇa)].

The Pāli sources did not fix the number of individuals at twenty-seven, but they were aware of them and have given definitions for them.

For nos. 1 to 7, see, e.g., Samyutta, V, p. 202. – For nos. 8 to 11, see Dīgha, III, p. 105; Majjhima, I, p. 478-479; Anguttara, I, p. 64. – For nos. 12 and 13, see Samyutta, V, p. 205; Anguttara, I, p. 233;IV, p. 380-381; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 189. – For nos. 14 to 18 (five types of anāgāmin), see Dīgha, iii, p. 237; Samyutta,V, p. 70, 237, 285, 314, 378; Anguttara, IV, p. 14, 15, 146, 380; V, p. 120. – For nos. 26 and 27, see Dīgha, II, p. 71; Majjhima, I, p. 439, 477; Samyutta, I, p. 191; Anguttara, I, p. 73; IV, p. 10. 77. For the group, cf. Puggalapaññatti, p. 14-16; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 189-190.
It is due to these eight noble individuals (aṣṭāv āryapudgalāḥ) that the Buddha speaks of it as the ‘best field of merit for the world’.

Question. – [In the Dakṣinīyasūtra] the Buddha said to the vaiśya Ki-kou-tou (Anāthapiṇḍada): “In the world there are two fields of merit (punyakṣetra), the śaikṣas and the āśaikṣas.”408 [According to this same sūtra, “the śaikṣas are eighteen in number and the āśaikṣas are nine in number.”]409 Why then does the Buddha, in the present passage speak only of eight [noble individuals]?

Answer. – In the place where the Buddha was explaining at length (vistareṇa), he spoke of ‘eighteen plus nine’; but here, where he is summarizing (saṃkṣepena), he mentions only eight. However, these twenty-seven are included (saṃgrhīta) in these eight:

1-2) The śraddhānusārin and the dharmānusārin are included in the srotāpaññipralapratipannaka, or in the sakṛdāgāmipralapratipannaka, or in the anāgāmipralapratipannaka.

3) The kulaṃkula is included in the sakṛdāgāmipralapratipannaka.

4) The ekavīcika is included in the anāgāmipralapratipannaka.

5-9) The five kinds of anāgāmin, [namely, i) antarāparinirvāyin, ii) upapadyaparinirvāyin, iii) sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin, iv) anabhisamāskāraparinirvāyin, v) ārdhasrotas] are included in the arhattvapralapratipannaka.

The list of the twenty-seven individuals is one of the masterpieces of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma which, with the help of the canonical sources, has located them precisely along the Path to nirvāṇa: Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 77, p. 397a; k. 53, p. 274c-277b; Saṃyuktābhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 910c-914a; Abhidharmāṁṛta, T 1553, k. 1, p. 973a27-c26 (reconstr. By Sastri, p. 85-88); Kośa, VI, p. 193-217, 2541-255, 277.

The Prajñāparamitās have used the preceding sources broadly to establish their twenty categories of saints, but - and this is essential – the end-pont of the career is no longer the entry into nirvāṇa but the arrival at the state of Buddha by the conquest of anuttarasaṃyaksaṃbodhi.

The description of this career may be found in the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 60-73 (transl. Conze, p. 33-41) and the Śatasāhasrikā, p. 266-281; a short description is in Abhisamayālaṃkāra, I, v. 23-24 (transl. Conze, p. 11-13); clear and precise definitions in Āloka,p. 35-36 (transl. Obermiller, Analysis, I, p. 51-56).

Later (k. 54, p. 447a), the Traité will return to these categories of saints.

The Viśnūvādins also had a list of the traditional twenty-seven types of individuals: Abhidharmasamuccaya, ed. Pradhan, p. 88-91 (T 1605, k. 6, p. 689a10-c24; T 1616, k. 13, p. 754b10-755c28).

408 Dakṣinīyasūtra in the Tchongan (T 26, k. 30, p. 616a8-11) corresponding to Anguttara, I, p. 62-63.

10-11) When they pass into the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), the śraddhānusārin and the dharmaṁsusārin are given the names of śraddhādhimuktika and drṣṭiprāpta. This śraddhādhimuktika and drṣṭiprāpta are included in the [first] fifteen classes of Śaikṣas.

The nine fields of merit [of the aśaikṣa] are included in the arhattva.

5. Other qualities of the Community

1) Moreover, the yogin should recollect the Community [by saying]: the Community are my true companions (sahāyaka) on the way to nirvāṇa. Joined with it in the same discipline and the same vision, I should be joyful, respect it wholeheartedly, follow it and not be in opposition to it. Previously I had bad people as my companions, women, sons, slaves, etc.: they accompanied me in the three bad destinies (durgati). Now that I have noble people (āryapudgalas) as companions, I go in safety to nirvāṇa. The Buddha is like the king of physicians (vaidyarāja), the Dharma is like good medicine (bhaisajya) and the Community is like a nurse (glānopasthāyaka). I must obtain pure discipline (viśuddhaśīla) and right thought (yoniśo mansikāra). I must undergo the medication prescribed by the Buddha. The Community is the sole means for me to cut through the sickness of the bonds (bandhanavyādhi): it is my nurse. This is why it is necessary to recollect the Community.

2) Furthermore, the Community has immense perfections of discipline, concentration and wisdom (śīlasamādhīprajñāsampad) and the depth of its virtues cannot be plumbed (durvīghāya).

THE DĀNAPATI WHO EXCLUDED THE ŠRĀMANERAS FROM HIS INVITATION

410 Classical comparison which will be repeated below, p. 1407F. Later (k. 85, p. 657b12-14), the Traité explains: “The sick man should seek the good physician and the medicinal herb. The Buddha is the good physician; the good roots (kuśalamūla) are the medicinal herb; the good friend (kalyānmitra) is the nurse. Furnished with these three things, the sick man is quickly cured.”

Kośa, VI, p. 294 and Kośavyākhya, p. 606: Vaidyabhūto Bhagavān anuttaro biṣak śalyaharteti sortāt, dharmaḥbhaisajyadāśikatvāc. bhaisajyabhūto dharmah kleśavyādhibhaisajyatvāt. nirvānārogyaṃprasāpatvatvāc copasthāyakahūtauḥ samgho nirvānārogyavaprāptaye parasparopasthānāt: “The Blessed One is physician, for the sūtra (Tsa a han, T 99, k.15, p. 105a-b; Kośavyākhya, p. 514) calls him ‘the supreme physician who pulls out the arrows’ and because he preaches the medicine of the Dharma. The Dharma is medicine because it remedies the sicknesses of the passions. Finally, because it brings about the peace of nirvāṇa, the Community is the nurse, for its members support one another in order to obtain the peace of nirvāṇa.”

411 We have already noted several times a certain number of borrowings by the Traité from the Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā by Kumāralāta or from its Chinese recension, the Ta chouang yen loun king (T201),
Thus a noble wealthy banker (śreṣṭhin) who had faith in the Community (saṃgha prasannabh) said to the steward (vaiyāvṛtyakara)\(^{412}\) of the Saṃgha: “I invite the monks in order [of seniority] to dine with me.” Day after day, he invited them in order; but when the day came for the turn of the novices (śrāmaṇera), the steward did not allow them to accept the invitation. The śrāmaṇeras said: “Why do you not allow us to accept the invitation?” He replied: “Because the patron [\textit{224b}] (dānapati) does not like to invite the young monks.” Then he spoke this stanza:

Bearded men with hair white as snow
Whose teeth have fallen out and whose faces are wrinkled,
Who walk bent over with decrepit bodies:
Those are whom the dānapati likes to invite.

Now these śrāmaṇeras were all great arhats. Like lions struck on the head, they leaped up from their seats and spoke these stanzas:

This dānapati is a stupid man:
He sees forms and does not see virtues.
He neglects the young
And receives only decrepit ancient men.

Moreover, the Buddha has uttered these gāthās:

The one who is called Venerable
Is not necessarily old.
There are old men, decrepit, bearded and with white hair,

---

\(^{412}\) \textit{Vaiyāvṛtyakara}, or also \textit{vaiyāpṛtyakara, vaiyāpattyakara}; in Pāli \textit{veyyāvaccakara}: see Edgerton, \textit{Dictionary}, p. 511; Mochizuki, \textit{Enc.}, p. 2254b.
Who have ‘grown old in vain’ (mohajīraṇa) and inwardly are without virtue.413

He who, abandoning the fruits of wrongdoing and of merit,

Energetically practices continence

And renounces everything,

He is truly called Venerable.414

Then the śrāmaṇeras had this thought: “We should not passively look at this dānapati who measures good and evil in the Saṃgha.” And they again spoke these stanzas:

Our hearts remain unchanged

Under praise and blame;

But this man denigrates the Buddha and the Dharma:

We cannot help but instruct him.

Let us go quickly to his dwelling-place

To teach him the Dharma.

It would truly be a great pity

If we did not save him.

Then all the śrāmaṇeras changed their bodies and became transformed into old men. Their beards and hair were white as enow; their heavy eyebrows covered their eyes (bhrūlamabhir avagunṭhitākṣa); their skin was wrinkled like waves; their spine was bent like a bow (dhanur iva vakrapṛṣṭha) and they walked leaning on a stick (yaṣṭivīṣaktapāṇi).According to their turn (anukramaṇa), they received their invitation and started out, all faltering with unsteady pace: one would have said they were white poplars shaken by the wind.415

Seeing them coming, the dānapati rejoiced, went to meet them, greeted them and made them sit down. When they were seated, they resumed their youthful forms. Startled, the dānapati said to them:

These distinguished old men

Have recovered their youth

---

415 Cf. the fragment of the Kalpanāmaṇḍikā, p. 138: Te sarve palitāvidyottāsīrogaṃḍapāṃśvabhruṃḍabhir avagunṭhitāksi... dhanurvakrapṛṣṭivamsā yaṣṭivīṣaktapāṇayaḥ pavanabalapracalitā supuspitāḥ sindhuvāritagulmāḥ.
As if they had drunk the elixir of youth;\textsuperscript{416}

How does such a miracle come about?

The śrāmaṇeras said to him: “Do not feel any fear or doubt; we are not demons (amānuṣa). You wanted to measure (pramāṇikartum) the Saṃgha, and that is very dangerous. Out of pity for you, we have manifested these transformations. The noble Saṃgha which you claim to know deeply is immeasurable (apramāṇa) for, as it is said:

\[224c\] Then it would be possible to sound the depth of the sea

With the fine proboscis of a mosquito;

But among gods and men

There is no one who is able to measure the Saṃgha.\textsuperscript{417}

The Saṃgha cannot even be singled out
According to its qualities and its nobility,
And you claim to be able
To measure the great virtuous ones according to their age.

Great and small alike produce knowledge:
It is not found [exclusively] among the old or among the young.
If he is wise, brave and energetic
Even a young man is an Elder (sthavira).
If he is lazy and without wisdom
Even the old man is but a child.

In wanting to measure the Saṃgha today, you have committed a great fault. If somebody wanted to sound the depth of the great ocean (mahāṇavam avagāhitum) with his finger-tip (aṅgulyagra), he would be the laughing-stock of the sages.

[Daharasūtra]. – Have you not heard the Buddha say: “There are four things that, small as they are, cannot be mistaken (catvāro daharā iti nāvajñeyāḥ): \textit{i}) the crown prince (kumāra), young as he may be, will be king of the country and cannot be despised; \textit{ii}) the snake (uraga), small as it may be, kills people with its

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{416} Ibid., p. 139: Rasāyanam iva prāśya punar bālatvam āgatāḥ.
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid., p. 139: Apy eva gādhaṃ varaṇālayasya svatupāsūcyā maṣako labheta na tv eva lokaḥ sacarācāro ‘yam saṃghāḥ... “ Perhaps a mosquito could reach the bottom of the sea with its proboscis; but the entire universe with its beings, mobile and immobile, [can never sound] the Saṃgha.”
\end{flushright}
venom and cannot be despised. iii) a small fire, if it is badly tended, is able to burn down the forest and
cannot be despised; iv) the śramaṇera, young as he is, is able to attain the noble supernatural powers
(āryābhijñā) and absolutely cannot be despised.”

[Amaśūra]. — The Buddha also said: “There are four kinds of individuals like the mango (catvāra ima
āmopamāḥ purusāḥ): i) a mango that is green but seems to be ripe (ānam pākavarnaḥ), ii) a ripe mango
that seems to be green (pākva āmavarnaḥ); iii) a green mango that seems to be green (ānam āmavarnaḥ), iv)
a ripe mango that seems to be ripe (pākvaṃ pākvarṇaḥ).”

It is the same for the disciples of the Buddha (buddhāśrāvaka): i) some are endowed with noble qualities
(āryaguṇasamāvanāgata), but by their postures (īryāpatha) and their speech (vacana) do not seem to be
good people; ii) others seem to be good people by their postures and their speech, but they are not endowed
with good qualities; iii) still others do not seem to be good people by their postures and their speech and
they are not endowed with noble qualities; and finally, iv) others seem to be good people by their postures
and speech and are endowed with noble qualities.

Why do you not remember these words and want to measure the Saṃgha? By wanting to hurt the Saṃgha,
you hurt yourself. You have committed a great fault; it is a thing of the past and it cannot be blamed in
retrospect. Therefore return to wholesome thoughts, send away doubts (saṃśaya) and regrets (kaukṛtya)
and listen to these stanzas that we address to you:

The noble Saṃgha is immeasurable,
Difficult to understand in its positions (īryapatha).
It cannot be measured either on the basis of its background (kula)
Or on the basis of learning (bahuśruta),
Or on the basis of majesty (anubhāva)
Or on the basis of age (vayāsa)
Or on the basis of its bearing
Or on the basis of eloquence (vagviśuddhi).
The noble Saṃgha is a great ocean

---

418 Daharasutta in Samyutta, I, p. 68-70 (cf. Tsa a han, T 99, no. 1226, k. 46, p. 334c13-334b8; Pie tsa
a han, T 1000, no. 53, k. 3, p. 391c2-392a25; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 25, p. 683b26-c6).
419 Ambānisutta in Anguttara, II, p. 106-107 (cf. Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 17, p. 634a17-b17).
420 The Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, p. 139 is slightly different: Kṣanyate pudgalaḥ pudgalasya pramāṇam
udgrhnan: “The person who takes the measure of another person hurts himself.” This is a canonical
dictum: cf. Anguttara, III, p. 350, l. 6; 351, l. 14; V, p. 140, l. 20; 143, l. 17: Khāññati h’ Ānanda
puggalo puggalesu pamāṇam gañhanto.
421 Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, p. 139: Neryāpthena na kulena na ca śrūtena na... na vayāsa na ca
vāgviśuddhyā sākyam pramātum iha kenacid āryasaṅghaḥ.
The qualities of which are very deep.

The Buddha has praised this Saṃgha in hundreds of ways. Whatever little one gives, it produces abundant fruit. This third jewel enjoys wide renown; This is why one should venerate the Saṃgha. 422

[225a] There should no distinction made between old and young

Learned or unlearned, light or shadow,
In the same way that a man seeing a forest does not distinguish Between the campaka, the eraṇḍa or the śāla trees. When you meditate on the Saṃgha Avoid making distinctions between fools and saints.

When Mahākāśyapa went forth from home His garment was worth a hundred thousand gold pieces; Wishing to wear the lowly garb of a beggar, He sought for rags and tatters but found none. 423

422 Ibid., p. 139: Tuṣṭuve padaśatataḥ svayam eva buddho yatṛāpam apy upakṛtam bahutām upaiṭi. Ratnaṃ triyam iti yat prathitaṃ prthivyāṃ arcyah sa Śākyamuniśisyaganaḥ samagraḥ: “The Buddha himself praised this Saṃgha in hundreds of phrases. Even a small service given to it increases. Known on earth by the name of the Third Jewel, this entire group of disciples of Śākyamuni is worthy of being honored.”

423 In the Cīvarasutta in Samyutta (II, p. 219-222), Mahākāśyapa says that in order to become a monk, he had a paṭapilotikāṃ saṅghāṭi made, ‘an undergarment made of pieces of cloth’. According to the Commentary of Samyutta (II, p. 180), Kāśyapa meant the saṃghati which was made by cutting up his garments of great value (Iti mahārahaṇi vatthāni chinditvā katām saṅghāṭiṃ sandhāya paṭapilotikānāṁ saṅghāṭin ti vuttaṁ). The Buddha admired the quality of the material: Mudukā kho tyāyaṃ Kassapa paṭapilotikānāṁ saṅghāṭi. “That is why”, continues Kasāyapa, “I made a gift to the Blessed One of my undergarment made of pieces of cloth, and I replaced them with the hempen rags use by the Blessed One” (So khv āham paṭapilotkānaṁ saṅghāṭiṃ Bhagavato pādāsi, āham pana Bhabavato sāṇāni paṃsukūlāni nibbasaṇāno paṭipajjītī).
It is the same for the noble Saṃgha:
If one looked there for the lowliest field of merit,
The donor would still be rewarded a hundred thousand times.
What is more, the search would fail, for it cannot be found there.

The Saṃgha is a great sea
Whose moral discipline is the shore.
If an immoral (duḥśīla) monk were to be found there
He would end up by not being counted in the number of the monks
For the Saṃgha is like the great ocean
Which refuses the company of corpses.↵

Hearing these words and seeing the magical power (ṛddhibala) of the śramaṇeras, the dānapati became frightened and his hair stood on end. Joining his palms together, he said to the śramaṇeras: “Holy ones, I confess my sin (āpattiṃ pratideśayāmi): I am but a common man (prthagjana) and my mind is always following after sin. I have a small doubt and would like to question you.” And he spoke this stanza:

The great virtuous ones have broken through doubt
And I have met them today.
If I did not consult them
I would be the fool among fools.
The śramaṇeras said: “If you wish to ask, then ask; we will answer according to what we have learned.”
The dānapati asked: “Which is more meritorious, pure faith (prasannacitta) toward the Jewel of the Buddha or pure faith toward the Jewel of the Saṃgha?”

In the corresponding sūtra in the Saṃyuktāgama (Tsa, T 99, k. 41, p. 303b22; Pie tsa, T 100, k. 6, p. 418b6), it is stated that Kāśyapa’s saṃghāṭi was worth one hundred thousand ounces of gold.
According to the legend related above (p. 190-196F), Kāśyapa actually remains at Rājagṛha within the Gr dh rıkūṭaparvata. He is clothed in the robes of the Buddha and must hand them over to the future buddha, Maitreya.

424 The great ocean has eight wonderful extraordinary qualities, one of which is not being able to cohabit with corpses: Mahāsamuddo na matena kunapena saṅvasati; yaṃ hoti mahāsamudde matam kunapam, taṃ khippam ṭeva tiṟam vāheti thalaṃ uṣṣāreti: cf. Vinaya, II, p. 237; Anguttara, IV, p. 198, 201; Udāna, p. 53,55. See also Daśabhūmika, p. 97, l. 9-10.
The śramaṇeras answered: “We see no difference between the Jewel of the Saṃgha and the Jewel of the Buddha. Why?”

[Udaya and Sundarikasutta].426 – The Buddha was begging his food one day in Śrāvastī. There was a brahmin from the P’o-lo-to-che clan (Bhāradvāja) who lived there. Several times the Buddha went to his him to beg alms. The brahmin had the following thought: “Why does this śramaṇa come repeatedly as if he were a creditor (ṛṇa)?”

Then the Buddha spoke these stanzas:

The seasonal rains always fall anew,
The five grains always grow anew.
The fields are cultivated always anew,
The harvest is reaped always anew.

One takes rebirth always anew,
And one dies always anew.

425 A scholastic problem to which there are three theses:

1) The gift to the Buddha and the gift to the Saṃgha each give a great fruit of retribution: Theses 170 and 171 of the Theravādins (Bareau, Sectes, p. 233; Kathāvatthu, XVII, 9-10, p. 553-556.

2) The gift to the Buddha does not give a great fruit of retribution because, having entered nirvāṇa a long time ago, the Buddha cannot enjoy the gift made to him and because the Buddha, in the passage in which we are interested here, has defined the Saṃgha as ‘the best field of merit for the world’: Thesis 5 of the Vetullakas (Bareau, Sectes, p. 255; Kathāvatthu, XVII, 10, p. 555-556); Thesis 21 of the Mahīśāsakas (Bareau, ibid., p. 185).

3) The gift to the Saṃgha does not give a great fruit of retribution because the Saṃgha is lower in merit than the Buddha and because the Sūtra (Majjhima, III, p. 254) gives the Buddha as the best field of merit: Thesis 4 of the Vetullakas (Bareau, ibid., p. 255; Kathāvatthu, XVII, 9, p. 553); Thesis 1 of the Dharmaguptakas (Bareau, ibid., p. 192).

See also Koṣa, IV, p. 283, note; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 38, p. 558c. For the Traité, both kinds of gifts are equally fruitful.

426 Here the Traité is apparently combining two sutras from the Saṃyutta: 1) the Udayasutta of the Saṃyutta, I, p. 173-174 (Tsa, T 99, no. 1157, k. 42, p. 308a3-b18; Pie tsa, T 100, no. 80, k. 4, p. 401b11-c19) and 2) the Sundarikasutta of the Saṃyutta, I, p. 167-170 (Tsa, T 99, no. 1184, k. 44, p. 320b21-321a23; Pie tsa, T 99, no. 98, k. 5, p. 408b25-c26.

But since the noble Dharma is realized always anew,
Who therefore would be born or die always anew?  

Having heard these stanzas, the brahmin thought: “The Buddha is a great saint who has completely understands my mind.” Shamefully, he took the alms-bowl (pātra), went back into his house, filled the bowl with excellent food and offered it to the Buddha. [225b] The Buddha did not accept it and said: “I am being given this food for having spoken a stanza. I will not eat it.”

The brahmin asked: “To whom should I give this food?”

The Buddha said: “I see nobody among gods and men who can digest this food. Take it and throw it on the ground somewhere where there are few plants (alpaharite) or in the water where there are no insects (aprāṇaka udake).”

The brahmin followed the Buddha’s orders, took the food and threw it in the water where there were no insects. Immediately the water boiled; smoke and fire came out as though red-hot iron had been plunged into it.

Seeing this, the brahmin was frightened and said: “It is extraordinary (adbhuta) that the magical power (ṛddhibala) contained in this food should be so great.” He returned to the Buddha, bowed down before the Buddha’s feet, confessed his sin (āpattiṃ pratypātāś), asked for the going-forth (pravrajya) and received the precepts (śīla). The Buddha said to him: “Good! Come!” At that moment, the brahmin’s beard and hair fell off by themselves and he became a śramaṇa. Gradually he cut through his fetters (saṃyojana) and attained the Bodhi of the arhats.

429 Samyutta, I, p. 168, where the Buddha answered thus: Transl. – “I cannot profit from the fact that I have chanted a stanza. The Buddhas refuse what is offered to them for having chanted a stanza. This rule is in force, O brahmin, wherever it is a question of the Dharma.”

This stanza is also cited in Samyutta, I, p. 173; Suttanipāta, p. 14, 85. – For gāthābhīṣiga, see Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 50.
432 In contradiction to the sources that it uses, the Traité has the brahmin being ordained by means of ehibhikṣukā upasampadā, one of the four kinds of ordination mentioned in the Mahāvastu, I, p. 2, l. 15. This is a quick ordination and undoubtedly the oldest form. The texts render it by the well-known formula: Sa Bhagavatā ehibhikṣukayā ābhāṣitaḥ, shi bhikṣo cara brahmacaryam iti. Bhagavato vācāvasānaṃ eva munḍaḥ saṃvyttāh samghātiṃ právṛtyāh pātrakaravyagrahastāh saptāhāvāropitakeśasmaśrat varṣaśatopasampannasya bhikṣor ēryāpathenāvasthitah: “He was summoned with the phrase Ehi bhikṣukā by the Blessed One who said to him: ‘Come, O monk, practice
There was also Mo-ho-kiao-t'an-mi (Mahāgautami) who offered upper and lower precious robes, golden in color to the Buddha. Knowing that the Saṅgha could use them, the Buddha said to Gautamī: “Give these upper and lower robes to the Saṅgha”. This is why we know that [the gift] to the Buddha Jewel and [the gift] to the Saṅgha Jewel are equally meritorious.

The dānapati asked: "If the Saṅgha can direct and receive the gifts made to the Buddha, why did the Buddha not permit the Saṅgha to eat the food of the brahmin Bhāradvaja?"

As soon as the Bhagavat finished speaking, the neophyte found himself with his head shaved, clothed in the monastic robe, a begging-bowl and a flask in his hand, with hair and beard that would have grown in seven days, similar in his posture to a monk ordained for a hundred years.” Cf. Divyāvadāna, p. 48, 281, 341, 558.

Beginning of the Dakkhīṇāvibhaṅgasūtra in Majjhima, III, p. 253: Ekaṃ samayam Bhagavā akkesu viharatī Kapilavattusmiṃ Nogrodhāra āme. Atha kho Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī navam dussayugaṃ ...

This is Mahāpajāpatī Gautamī, born to Devadaha, of the Śākya Añjana. Her brothers were Daṇḍapāṇi and Suprabuddha and her sister was Mahāmāyā, mother of the Buddha. The latter had died eight days after the birth and Mahāpajāpatī took the place of mother to the Buddha. Like her sister, she was the wife of Śuddhodana to whom she had born a son, the handsome Nanda. The Buddha accepted his aunt into the Buddhist order with her five hundred companions. Her entry into nirvāṇa, particularly glorious, has been noted above (p. 587-588F). According to some sources, Mahāpajāpatī presented only one robe to the Buddha, a yellow robe with gold thread (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 47, p. 721c23-722a4); a robe of tie, i.e., linen (Fen pie pou che, T 84, p. 903b23-c10); fine linen cloth, golden in color (Hien yu king, T 202, k. 12, p. 434a6-15); a vassikasāṭikā, i.e., a rain-cloak (Milindapañha, p. 240). On the other hand, the passage from the Majjhima cited at the beginning of the present note speaks of a pair of robes (dussayuga), and the Mahīṣāsaka Vin. (T1421, k. 29, p. 185b17-23) also speaks of two new robes offered to the Buddha by Mahāpajāpatī. The Buddha said to the latter: “You may give them to the Saṅgha and you will obtain a great fruit of retribution. I too count among the Saṅgha.” Finally, at his aunt’s insisting, the Buddha decided to share: “I accept one robe and I give the other to the Saṅgha.”

This variation among the sources is probably explained away by scholastic reasons, for we have seen above (p. 1400F, n. 1) that the sects differed in opinion about the respective value of a gift to the Buddha and a gift to the Saṅgha, and the Buddha’s attitude to his aunt’s offering bears directly on this problem (cf. Kathāvatthu, p. 553, l. 29-31; Nyāyānusmara, T 1562, k. 38, p. 558c6-7, 19).
The śrāmaṇeras answered: “It was in order to bring to light the great power (mahābala) of the Saṅgha. If [the brahmin] had not seen that this food, put into the water, had such great magical power (mahāṛddhibala), he would not have known how great is the power of the Saṅgha, but since the Saṅgha is able to accept things offered to the Buddha, we know that the power of the Saṅgha is great. Thus, when a master physician (bhaiṣajyaguru) wants to try out a poisoned drug (viṣauṣadhi), he gives it first to a chicken (kukkuṭa); then, when the chicken has died, he swallows the poison himself so that we know how great is the power (anubhāva) of the master physician. Know then, O dānapati:

    The person who loves and honors the Buddha
    Must also love and honor the Saṅgha
    There can be no distinction
    For both are equally ‘Jewels’.

Then, hearing these words spoken, the dānapati rejoiced and said: “From today on, I, so-and-so, will honor with an equal mind the young and the old who have entered into the ranks of the Saṅgha and I will avoid making distinctions.”

The śrāmaṇeras said: “Since you honor the best field of merit (anuttara buddhakṣetra) with faith, you will before long attain Bodhi. Why?”

    The learned (bahuśruta), the virtuous (śīlavat).
    The sages (prajñā) and the ecstatics (dhyāyin)
    All enter into the ranks of the Saṅgha
    Like the ten thousand rivers flowing into the sea.

    Just as all the plants and the medicinal herbs
    Grow on the Snowy Mountain (himālaya),
    Just as the hundred grains and all the bushes
    Grow on the earth,

[225e] So all good people

    Are found in the ranks of the Saṅgha.

[Gośrīgasūtra]. – Finally, have you not heard that one day the Buddha, apering to Tch’ang (Dīrgha), the general of the Yakṣas (yakṣasānī), praised the three good disciples A-ni-lou-t’o (Aniruddha), Nan-t’i-kia (Nandika) and Tch’e-mi-lo (Kimbila)? The Buddha said [to Dīrgha]: ‘If the entire world with its gods and
men thinks about these three sons of noble family (etān trīṇ kulapurṭān prasannacittenānumaṁ) with faith, it will obtain immense benefits during the long night (dīgharātram).”

It seems that it would be better still to honor the Saṅgha, for these three men did not constitute a Saṅgha, and if the Buddha attributes such fruits to recollecting these three men, then how much more fruitful still to recollect he whole Saṅgha with pure faith. This is why, O dānapati, one should recollect the Saṅgha with all of one’s strength. A stanza says:

This group of holy people
Is a formidable army:
It destroys king Māra, our enemy;
It is our companion on the way to nirvāṇa.

434 Cūḷagosīṅgasutta in Majjhima, I, p. 205-211 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 48, p. 729b-731a). Being in Nādikā in the Giñjakāvasatha, the Buddha paid a visit to three of his disciples, Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila, who were meditating in the Gosiṅgālavama. He congratulated these three monks for living together on the best of terms like a mixture of milk and water, looking after one another fondly. The friendly words between the Teacher and his disciples were interrupted by the arrival of the yakṣa Dīgha Parajana who had come to greet the Buddha and who said: “Truly, it is a great benefit for the Vaijji people (in Sanskrit (Vṛji) that the Tathāgata stays among them and that these three venerable disciples are also present.” It is then that the Buddha answered Dīgha with the phrase alluded to here by the Traité: Sadevako ce pi Dīgha loko samārako sabhāmako sassamaṇabrāhmaṇī pajā ... sadevamanussaṁya dīgha-rattām hiitāya suchāya. “If the world with its devas, māras and Brahmās, if the population with its monks and brahmans, with its gods and men, thought of these three sons of noble family with faith, that would contribute to the good and welfare of this world and this population during the long night [of sāmśāra].”

Sections of the Gosiṅgasutta occur in Majjhima III, p. 155-157 and the perfect harmony (sāmaggi) between Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila is also noted in other places in the Canon: cf. Majjhima, I, p. 62; Vinaya, I, p. 350-352; II, p. 182. As for Dīgha Parajana, the yakṣa general, he appears in the list of gods and semi-gods favorable to Buddhism: Ājānātiya-suttanta (Dīgha, III, p. 205, l. 7).

435 Indeed, they were only three, and there must be four in order to constitute a saṅgha according to the disciplinary rule: Tayo janā sambahulā i tuvuccanti, tato paraṁ saṅgho: “Three people are said to be ‘many’; more is a ‘saṅgha’ ” (Comm. of the Udāna, p. 102). The Vinaya (I, p. 319-320) distinguishes three kinds of saṅgha according to whether it is composed of four, five, twenty, or more than twenty bhikṣus. For the proper procedure of ordination, the Saṅgha must be composed of a minimum of ten members (dasavagga bhikkhusaṁgha). But the Buddha made exception for the frontier regions such as Avanti where monks were less numerous: in this district, five monks were enough to confer ordination (Vinaya, I, p. 197, l. 17-20).
Thus the śrāmaṇeras explained the holy qualities of the Saṅgha to the dānapati in many ways. Having heard them, the dānapati and his entire family, great and small, saw the four noble Truths (āryasatya) and attained the fruit of srotāpanna,

This is why the samgha should be recollected wholeheartedly.

IV. RECOLLECTION OF THE MORALITIES

1. The various kinds of morality

There are two kinds of morality (śīla): i) impure morality (sāsravaśīla); ii) pure morality (anāsravaśīla).

Firstly, impure morality is of two kinds: i) the morality of discipline (saṃvaraśīla); ii) the morality connected with the meditative stabilizations (samādhisahāgataśīla).

During his early practices, the yogin recollects these three kinds of morality. Having practiced all three, then he recollects only the pure morality (anāsravaśīla).

The morality of discipline (saṃvaraśīla) prevents the sins (pāpa) and corruption from gaining power. The morality of trance and concentration dissipates all the negative emotions (kleśa). Why?

When one has attained the inner happiness (adhyātmasukha) [of the meditative stabilizations], one no longer seeks worldly happiness (lokasukha). Pure morality (anāsravaśīla) uproots the roots of sins (pāpa) and negative emotions (kleśa).

Question. – Why recollect the moralities?

Answer. – As I have said above (p. 1393F) in regard the recollection of the Saṅgha, the Buddha is like the king of physicians (vaidyarāja), the Dharma is like good medicine (bhaiṣajya), the Community is like the nurse (glanopasthāyaka) and morality is like submitting to the medical regime. The yogin says to himself: “If I do not fall in line with this obligation, the Three Jewels (triratna) will be of no use to me. If the guide (nāyaka) shows the good path but the traveler does not use it, that is not the fault of the guide.”

This is why I should recollect morality (śīla).“

Furthermore, morality is the support (adhiṣṭhāna) of all good dharmas. Just as the hundred grains and the medicinal plants grow depending on the earth, in the same way, observing pure morality produces great profound concentrations and the knowledge of the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa). It is also the foremost gate

436 Cf. Kośakārikā, IV, 13:

Avijñaptis tridhā jñeyā saṃvarāsāṃvaretarā /
saṃvarah prātimoksākhyo dhyānajo ‘nāsravas tathā //

437 The guide is simply the one who indicates the path (mārgakhyāvin): it is not up to him whether one follows his advice or not. Comparison already used by the Majjhima, III, p. 5-6.
(prathamadvāra) for monastics (pravrajita), the stick (daṇḍa) on which all monastics lean, the primary cause and condition (hetupratyaya) of reaching nirvāṇa (nirvāṇadhigama). As it is said: “Thanks to keeping morality, the mind is free of regret (kaukṛtya), and finally deliverance (vimukta), nirvāṇa, is attained.”

2. Qualities of the Moralities to be recollected

The yogin recollects pure morality (viśuddhaśīla).

[According to the sūtras]: “The faultless moralities (śīlānī akhaṇḍāni), the moralities without cracks (acchidrāni), the moralities without rifts (aśabalāni), the unvarying moralities (akalamāṣāni), the liberating moralities (bhujiṣyāni), the [226a] moralities without careless attachment (aparāṃṣṭāni), the moralities praised by the sages (vijñapraśastāni) and without defects (agarhitāni) are pure morality.”

[1-2] Śīlānī akhaṇḍāni acchidrāni. – What are the faultless (akhaṇḍa) moralities?

a. If, with the exception of the four grave offenses formulated in the fivefold discipline (pañcaśīla), one violates all the other serious precepts, this is a violation ‘with faults’ (khaṇḍa). The other wrongdoings are ‘cracks’ (chidra).

b. Moreover, the physical wrongdoings (kāyikāpatti) are called ‘defects’ and the vocal wrongdoings are called ‘rifts’.

c. Finally, the great sins are called ‘defects’ (defeats?) and the small wrongdoings are called ‘cracks’.

[3] Śīlānī aśabalāni. – If the good mind (kuśalacitta) is turned toward nirvāṇa and prevents the fetters (saṃyojana) and the various faulty examinations (vitarka) and subtle analyses (vicāra) from gaining access, there is morality ‘without rifts’ (aśabala).

[4] Śīlānī akalmāṣāni. – If the mind goes [alternately] in two directions, sometimes toward nirvāṇa and sometimes toward saṃsāra, there is ‘varying’ morality (kalmāsa). [If the mind goes exclusively toward nirvāṇa, there is ‘unvarying’ morality (akalmāsa)].

[5] Śīlānī bhujiṣyāni. – Following morality, not following after external conditions (bāhyapratyaya), like the independent (svatantra) unfettered man, observing pure morality without being enslaved by desire (trṣṇādaśya), this is ‘liberating morality’ (bhujiṣya).

[6] Śīlānī aparāṃṣṭāni. - In the face of morality, the yogin does not undergo the fetter of lust (rāga), pride (māna), etc. He knows the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of morality (śīlaninittani nodgrhiṇāti). If he grasps the characteristics of morality, he would be like a prisoner held by manacles who, even after having been pardoned, remains attached to his golden manacles. The person attached [to his own morality] by the

438 See the preliminary note to the present chapter, p. 1332F. Here Kumārajīva translates the canonical terms rather freely. The latter are explained literally in Visuddimagga, ed. Warren, p. 182-183.
passion of love is as if in prison: even if he manages to escape, he remains attached (sakta) to the morality like golden fetters. But the yogin who knows that morality is cause and condition for purity (anāsravahetupratyaya) does not experience this attachment [to morality itself] and is liberated, free of fetters: this is what is called morality ‘without thoughtless attachment’ (aparamṛṣṭā).439

[7] Śīlāni vijñapraṣastāni. – These are the moralities praised by the Buddhas, the bodhisattvas, the pratyekabuddhas and the śrāvakas. If the yogin practices such morality, uses such morality, these are the moralities ‘praised by the sages’ (vijñapraṣasta).

The moralities of the heretics (tīrthika śīla) are the moralities of the bull (gośīla), the deer (mrgaśīla), the dog (kukku rasīla), the flesh-eating demons (rākṣasaśīla), the mute (mūkaśīla), the deaf (badhiraśīla): these moralities are not praised by the sages; they are cruel and do not bring any good retribution (vipāka).

Furthermore, among the three kinds of morality, pure morality (anāsravaśīla) is praised by the sages. It is indestructible, unchanging and, by depending on this morality, one obtains true wisdom: therefore it is the morality ‘praised by the sages’.

Pure morality is of three kinds: it is, as the Buddha said, right speech (samyagvāc), right action (samyakkarmānta) and right livelihood (samyagjīva).441 The meaning of this threefold activity has been explained (p. 1182F) in regard to the eightfold noble Path (āryaśāṅgika mārga). It is necessary to continue this explanation fully here.

3. The position of morality among the Path members

Question. – If morality is cause and condition for meditative stability (samādhi) and if meditative stability is cause and condition for wisdom (prajñā), why is wisdom placed at the beginning (ādaṃ) of [the list] of the eightfold noble Path, morality at the middle (madhye) and meditative stability at the end (paryavasāne)?442

Answer. - When one is starting out on a trip, it is the rule to first consider the path to travel with one’s eyes and then to travel. When one is traveling, one must be careful. While walking energetically, one always

439 The Buddha several times has condemned the unjustified trust in the efficacy of rituals and vows (śīlavrataparamaśa): cf. Vinaya, I, p. 184; Majjhima, I, p. 433; Anguttara, III, p. 377; IV, p. 144.
440 Heretics having taken the vow of living in the manner of a given animal. Majjhima, I, p. 387 mentions a Puṇḍa who was a govatika, a Seniya who was a kukku vatika, etc. See also Dīgha, III, p. 6-7; Comm. On the Majjhima, III, p. 100; Nettipakarana, p. 99.
441 Majjhima, I, p. 301: Ya c’āvuso Visakha sammāvācā yo ca sammākammanto yo ca sammā ājīvo, ime dhammadī sālakkhandhe saṅgahītā.
442 This question has already been asked above, p. 838F. In the list of the eight members of the path, the first two constitute prajñāskandha, the next three śīlaskandha and the last three samādhiskandha.
recalls the advice of the guide. If these are remembered, one attentively follows one’s route without going off on false paths. It is the same for right view (samyagdrṣṭi).

1) First, with right wisdom, one considers the five aggregates of attachment (upadānakandha) which are always painful: this is what is called [the truth] of suffering (duḥkha). Suffering is the result of a group of fetters (samyojana), affection (anunaya), etc.: this is what is called the origin (samudaya). The cessation of the fetters (samyojananirrodha), affection, etc., is called nirvāṇa. Considering the eight members (aṣṭāṅga) in this way is called Path. All of that is [226b] right view (samyagdrṣṭi).

From that moment, the yogin whose mind is firm knows that saṃsāra is false and should be abandoned, that nirvāṇa is true and should be followed. This clear seeing of things (read kiue-ting = vyavasāya, nirṇaya) is called right view (samyagdrṣṭi).

2) The yogin knows and sees these things, but the strength of his mind is not great and he is not yet able to start out on his journey. He reflects, calculates and stimulates the right view so that it may gain power. This is called right intention (samyaksamkalpa).

3-5) His wisdom being fervent, he wants to express it in words. This is why he then practices right speech (samyagvāc), right action (samyakkarmānta) and right livelihood (samyagājīva).

6) At the time when he practices morality, he is energetic, without laziness, and never stops in the meditative stabilizations with form and without form (rūpāryasamādhi). This is called right exertion (samyagvyāyāma).

7) Using right view, he contemplates the four Truths (catuḥsatya). He never forgets that all the disturbing emotions (kleśa) are enemies (amitra) to be destroyed, that right view, etc., are friends to follow. This is called right mindfulness (samyaksmṛti).

8) He concentrates his mind on the four Truths without being distracted. He prevents it from being led toward the form and formless meditative stabilizations (rūpāryasamādhi) but wholeheartedly moves toward nirvāṇa. This is called right meditation (samyaksamādhi).

At the beginning [during the preparatory Path], the yogin obtains the good-impure (kuśalāsrava) good roots called heat (uṣmagata), summits (mūrdhan) and patience (kṣānti), which are developed in beginning, intermediate and final minds.

When he penetrates into the pure mind (anāsrvacitta) [constituting the first moment of the Path of seeing], he is perfected quickly in one instant. Here there is no distinction between initial, intermediate and final minds.

443 Uṣmagata, mūrdhan, kṣānti and laukikāgradharma are the four auxiliaries of the stage of penetration (nirvedhaḥgaṇḍa) of the Buddhist Truths and are practiced during the preparatory Path (prayogamārga) immediately preceding the Path of seeing the truths (darśanamārga): see above, p. 395F, n. 1154
Right view (ṣamyagdṛṣṭi) is associated with right conceptualizing (ṣamyakṣaṅkalpa), right effort (ṣamyagvyāyāna), right mindfulness (ṣamyaksmṛti), right concentration (ṣamyaksamādhi); and the threefold morality [consisting of ṣamyagvāc, ṣamyakkarmānta and ṣamyagājīva] functions in concomitance with these five members (read wou fen):

1) Right view (ṣamyagdṛṣṭi) distinguishes the beautiful and the ugly and deals with the good (ḥita).

2) Right intention (ṣamyaksmānta) deals with encouraging right view.

3-5) Right speech (ṣamyagvāc), etc., [namely, ṣamyakkarmānta and ṣamyagājīva] maintains all the qualities (guṇa) of this wisdom so that they are not lost.

6) Right effort (ṣamyagvyāyāma) encourages wisdom so that it advances rapidly and does not stop.

7) Right mindfulness (ṣamyaksmṛti) recalls and never forgets the seven things to be done.

8) Right concentration (ṣamyaksamādhi) makes the mind pure, free from stains (kaśāyu) and distraction (vikṣepa). It assures the success (ṣiddhi) of right view and the seven [preceding] members. It is like a lamp (dīpa) inside a house sheltered from the wind that burns brightly.

In this way pure morality (anāsravaśīla) occurs in the eightfold noble Path and is praised by the sages (vijāprāśasta).

4. Impure morality

Question. – We accept that pure morality (anāsravaśīla) must be praised by the sages; but why praise impure morality (sāsravaśīla)?

Answer. – Impure morality is similar to pure morality and, in harmony with it, implements causes and conditions [for salvation]. This is why the sages praise it jointly. Suppose that, in a band of brigands, someone rebels and comes to confide in me. Brigand though he was, now he is coming to me and I must welcome him. I am able to use him to destroy the thieves. Why should one not remember that these thieves that are the negative emotions (kleśa) are in the ramparts of the threefold world (traidhāṅkakanagara)?

These roots of good (kuśalamūla) constituting impure morality (sāsravaśīla) that are called heat (uṣmagata), summits (mūrdhan), patience (kṣánti) and supreme worldly dharmanas (laukīgradharman) are indeed superior to other [good]-impure (kuśalasāsrava) dharmanas. This is why the yogin uses them: it is thanks to them that he can destroy the brigands that are the disturbing emotions (kleśa) and that he can obtain the precious pure dharma (anāsravadharma) that is the duḥkhe dhammajñānakṣánti. That is why [this impure morality] is praised by the sages.
This is the recollection of morality (śīlānusmṛti).

V. RECOLLECTION OF ABANDONMENT

In regard to the recollection of abandonment (tyāgānusmṛti), there are two kinds of abandonment (tyāga): i) abandonment consisting of generosity (dānatyāga); ii) abandonment of all the disturbing emotions (sarvakleśatyāga). Abandonment consisting of generosity is of two kinds: i) material gifts (āmiṣadāna); ii) gift of the Dharma (dharmaṁdaṇā) or preaching. Altogether these three kinds of abandonment (trividhatyāgasāmagrī) make up abandonment (tyāga).

1. Material generosity

Material generosity (āmiṣadāna) is the root (mūla) of all good dharmas.

The yogin has the following thought: It is thanks to the first four recollections (anusmṛti) that I will succeed in curing the sicknesses of the disturbing emotions (kleśavādhi). How am I going to get these four recollections? Now, in previous existences and in this present lifetime, the occasions of making gifts to the Three Jewels are rare. Why? In this beginningless universe (anādiko lokadhātu), beings are ignorant of generosity to the Three Jewels: this is why their merits (punya) become exhausted and disappear. But the Three Jewels have immense qualities: this is why gifts made to them are inexhaustible and necessarily lead to nirvāṇa. Furthermore, if the Buddhas of the past have first produced the mind, this was as a result of their numerous or less numerous gifts. And so the Buddha said that generosity is the first aid to Bodhi.

Furthermore, human life is impermanent (anitya) and wealth (dhana) slips by like a flash of lightning. If they should be given even when people do not ask anything of you, then why would you not give them when they beg of you to give them? It is necessary to give in order to create conditions favorable to Bodhi.

Furthermore, wealth is cause and condition for all kinds of disturbing emotions (kleśa) and misdeeds (āpatti), whereas morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā) and the various good dharmas are cause and condition for nirvāṇa. Consequently, if one must rid oneself of one’s wealth [because it is dangerous], why not make a gift of it to the excellent field of merit (punyakṣetra)?

[The two brothers who got rid of their gold]. – Thus, there were two brothers, older and younger who, without companions, went on a voyage, each carrying ten pounds of gold. The older said to himself: “Why should I not kill my younger brother and take his gold? On this deserted path, nobody would know.” The younger, in turn, said to himself: “I should kill my older brother and take his gold.” The two brothers each had evil plans; their words and their looks differed.

445 These kinds of generosity have been mentioned above, p. 700F.
But the two brothers came to themselves and felt remorse \( (kaukṛtya) \): “How would we be any different from demons \( (amanuṣya) \) and beasts \( (tiryagoni) \)? We are brothers born of the same parents and, for the sake of a little bit of gold, we are having such bad feelings for each other.”

Together they came to the shore of a deep lake. The older brother took his gold and threw it into the water. The younger brother said: “Good, good!!” and, in his turn, threw his gold into the water. The older brother, too, said: “Good, good!”

The two brothers asked each other why they had said it was good and each answered the other: “Because of this gold, we had bad feelings and wanted to kill one another. Now that we are rid of our gold, we say that it is good and we both agree.”

This is why we know that it is always necessary to renounce one’s wealth, the cause of bad feelings. Why then not give it away when, by giving it, one gains great merit \( (mahāpunya) \)? Thus it is said:

- Generosity is a precious treasure
- It is also a good friend \( (kalyāṇamitra) \).
- It is beneficial from one end to the other,
- There is nobody who can destroy it.

[227a] Generosity is an umbrella of wondrous secrets:

- It can keep off the rain of hunger and thirst.
- Generosity is a solid vessel;
- It can cross the ocean of poverty.

\[ Avarice \ (mātsarya) \] is a calamity:

- Because of it, one experiences sadness and fear.
- Bathing it with the water of generosity
- At once brings good fortune and happiness.

- The miser deprives himself of clothing and food;
- At the end of his life he has neither joy nor happiness.
- Although he is reputed to be rich,
- He is no different from the poor person.
The miser’s home
Is like a burial mound or a tomb;
The beggars keep far away from it
And finally nobody comes near it.

This is why the miser
Is rejected by the sages.
Even if the breath of life is not exhausted
He is no different from a dead man.

The miser has neither merit nor wisdom:
He is not firmly resolved to give.
About to fall into the pit of death,
His love of saving changes into suffering and hate;
Only his tears will depart with him,
The fire of sadness and regret will burn his body.

The good donor is happy
And, after death, has no suffering.
The person who practices generosity,
His renown fills the ten directions.

He is loved by the sages,
Entering into their assemblies, he is not afraid.
When his life over he is reborn among the gods
And in time he will certainly gain nirvāṇa.446

446 The last two stanzas are to be compared with Anguttara, III, p. 40: Dadam piyo bhajanti nam bahū …devānāṃ sahavyagātāramanī te.

Their Sanskrit correspondent is in the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 189-190: Dadat priyo bhavati bhajanti tam janāḥ …devānāṃ svabhāvagātāramanī te.
Condemning avarice (mātsarya) in many ways and praising generosity (dāna) is called ‘recollection of material generosity’ (āmīṣadānānusmṛtī).

2. Generosity of the Dharma

How is generosity of the Dharma (dharmadāna) recollected?

The yogin has the following thought: The benefits of generosity of the Dharma are very great: it is because of generosity of the Dharma that all the disciples (śrāvaka) of the Buddha have found the Path.

Moreover, the Buddha said: “Of the two kinds of generosity, generosity of the Dharma is foremost.”

Why?

The retribution (vipāka) for material generosity (āmīṣadāna) is limited whereas the retribution of generosity of the Dharma is immense. Material generosity is rewarded in the desire realm (kāmadhātu) whereas generosity of the Dharma is rewarded in the threefold world (traidhātuka) and also beyond the threefold world.

If the ascetic does not seek glory (śloka), profit (lābha) or power (prabhāva), if he exerts himself solely in the Path of the Buddhas and develops great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and great compassion (mahākarunā), if he saves beings from the suffering of birth, old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhi) and death (maraṇa), then this is ‘pure generosity of the Dharma’ (viśuddhadharmadāna). Otherwise, it is only a business deal or a barter.

Moreover, when material generosity is practiced widely, wealth is exhausted; on the other hand, when generosity of the Dharma is practiced widely, the Dharma grows. Material generosity that has existed for countless generations is an old habit; on the other hand, generosity of the Dharma which did not exist before the blossoming of the holy Dharma (saddharma) is something new.

Material generosity remedies only hunger and thirst (kṣutpipāsā), sicknesses (vyādhi) of cold, heat (śītosṇa), etc.; generosity of the Dharma can drive away the sicknesses of the ninety-eight defilements (kleśa).

Transl.: The donor is precious; people love him; he wins renown and his glory increases. He enters the assembly undisturbed, for the man who is without miserliness is fearless. This is why the wise give gifts, having effaced the stain of avarice and seeking happiness. Established for a long time in the heavens, they enjoy themselves in the company of the gods.

448 This consideration has already been developed above, p. 699-700F.
For all these reasons, a distinction is made between material generosity and generosity of the Dharma. The yogin should reollect the generosity of the Dharma.

Question. – What is generosity of the Dharma (dharmañāna)?

Answer. – Generosity of the Dharma is the fact of teaching others the twelve classes of texts preached by the Buddha (dvādasāṅgabuddhayacana) with a pure mind and in view of merit (puṇya).

Furthermore, generosity of the Dharma is also the fact of using magical power (ṛddhibala) so that people may find the Path. Thus it is said in the Wang-ming p’ou-sa king (Jālinprabhabodhisattvasūtra or Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā): “People who see the brilliance of the Buddha find the path and are reborn among the gods.”

Therefore if, without saying anything vocally, one brings others to find the Dharma, that is generosity of the Dharma.

In this gift of the Dharma, the mental nature (cittasvabhāva) of beings, the greater or lesser number of their defilements (kleśa), the sharpness (tīkṣnatā) or dullness (mṛdutā) of their wisdom (prajñā) must be taken into consideration; it is necessary to be based on what can be useful to them in order to preach the Dharma to them. In the same way, the medicine (bhaṣajya) is regulated for the sickness (vyādhi) for which it is efficacious.

There are people who are especially lustful (rāgabahula), especially hateful (dveṣabahula), especially stupid (mohabahula), combining two of these tendencies, or mixing all three. For the lustful, contemplation of the horrible (aśubhabhāvanā) is preached. For the hateful, loving-kindness (maitrīcitta) is preached; for the stupid, the profound co-dependent production of phenomena (gamabhīrapratītyasamutpāda) is preached; for those who combine two of these tendencies, both of these practices are preached; for those who mix all three, all three practices are preached. If one does not know the nature of the sickness and one errs in the medicine, the sickness gets worse.

Those who believe in the existence of beings (sattva) are taught that only the five aggregates (pañcaskandha) exist, and that there is no atman in them. Those who deny the existence of beings are taught the renewing of the five skandhas serially (pañcaskandhasamantāna) so that they do not fall into [the wrong view] of nihilism (uccchedavāda). To those who seek wealth, generosity is preached. To those who wish to be reborn among the gods, morality (śīla) is preached. To those who are afflicted, the things of the gods are preached. To unfortunate lay people (grhasta), the regulations of the monks (pravrajita) are

450 For a detailed description, see above, p. 692-693F.

451 Viśeṣacintin, T 585, k. 1, p. 1b20-22; T 586, K. 1, p. 33c14-15; T 587, k. 1, p. 62c24-26. In this last version, we read: “The Tathāgata has a brilliance called tchou-yi ‘stable profit’. When the Buddha walks to and fro, the soles of his feet shine and beings are touched by this light. Those who encounter this light are reborn after their death among the gods.”

For the Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā, see above, p. 1268F, n. 2.

452 In this first series of cases, the sermon is from the therapeutic point of view (prātipāṣika siddhānta): see above, p. 33-35F.
preached. To lay people who love money, the fivefold discipline (*pañcaśīla*) of the upāsaka is preached. To those who hate saṃsāra, the three seals of the Dharma (*dharmamudrā*), impermanence (*anītya*), non-self (*anātman*), nirvāṇa, are preached.\(^{453}\)

Being based on the doctrine of the sūtras, the preacher himself shows the meaning (*artha*) and the logic (*nyāya*) and adorns the gift of the Dharma with comparisons (*avadāna*) in order to preach it to beings.

3. Abandonment of the afflicting emotions

To destroy, to reject all [the afflicting emotions] from the three fetters (*saṃyojana*)\(^{454}\) up to the ninety-eight latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) is called ‘abandonment’ (*tyāga*). By recollecting the rejection of these things as one rejects venomous snakes (*āṣīviṣa*)\(^{455}\) or like shackles, one acquires salvation (*yogakṣema*) and joy (*prāmodya*).

Furthermore, recollection of the abandoning of the disturbing emotions (*kleśatyāgānusmṛti*) also enters into recollection of the Dharma (*dharmānusmṛti*).

Question. – If it enters into the recollection of the Dharma, why speak of it again here?

Answer. – Abandonment of the disturbing emotions is something splendid (*cāru*), difficult to acquire (*durlabha*), peerless (*anuttara*) and immense (*paramāṇa*); this is why it is mentioned separately.

Furthermore, there is a difference between recollection of the Dharma and recollection of abandonment. To recollect the Dharma is to recollect the Dharma of the Buddha, the foremost of all good dharmas. To recollect abandonment is to recollect the disturbing emotions (*āpatti*) and sins (*āpatti*) insofar as they are quickly rejected. Since their aspects (*ākāra*) are distinct, the two recollections are different. [227c]

For these many reasons, the yogin should recollect abandonment [of the disturbing emotions]. This recollection of abandonment constitutes the first practice of knowledge as dhyāna where there is a risk of experiencing pride (*abhimāna*).\(^{456}\)

VI. RECOLLECTION OF THE DEITIES

1. Recollection of the gods–by-birth

---

\(^{453}\) In this second series of cases, the sermon is from the individual point of view (*prātipauruṣika siddhānta*): see above, p. 31-32F.

\(^{454}\) *Satkāyādṛṣṭi, śīlavrataparāmāśa* and *vicikitsā*: cf. Kośa, V, p. 85; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 79, l. 8-9.

\(^{455}\) See the apologue of the four venomous snakes in the *Āṣīviṣopamasūtra*: see above, p. 702-707F; *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, p. 136-137, note.

\(^{456}\) See Kośa, V, p. 27.
In this recollection of the gods (devatānusmṛtī), it is a question [of the six classes of gods of kāmadhātu], from the Cāturmahārājakāyikas up to the Paranirmitavaśavartidevas.

Question. – The disciples (śrāvakā) of the Buddha should recollect the Buddha and the Dharma of the Buddha exclusively; why [still] recollect the gods?

Answer. – As a reward for their actions, people receive the happiness of the heavens (svargasukha); this is why the deities [who live there] are recollected.

Furthermore, the Buddha himself gave the reasons for practicing the eight recollections and declared:

“The noble disciple who recollects the deities should have the following thought: ‘The Cāturmahārājakāyadevas are born in their paradise as a result of five good qualities (kuśaladharma), namely, faith (śraddhā) in [the retribution] of sin (āpatti) and merit (puṇya), the observance of morality (śīla), hearing the holy Dharma (saddharma), the practice of generosity (tyāga) and the practice of wisdom (prajñā). I too possess these five qualities and I rejoice, for it is said that the deities, as a result of these five qualities, have taken birth in the blessed abodes. I too who possess these qualities could be reborn there if that is what I wanted. But as the happiness of the paradises is transitory, I will not do so.’ And the disciple will reason in the same way [for the other five groups of deities] up to and including the Paranirmitavaśavartidevas.”457

Question. – In the threefold world (traidhātuka), there are many pure deities [occupying rūpadhātu and ārūpyādātātu]. Why recollect only the gods of the desire realm (kāmadhātu)?

Answer. – It is in the śrāvaka system that it is a matter of just recollecting [only the deities of kāmadhātu; but in the Māhāyāna it is forbidden to recollect the deities of the threefold world.

The yogin who has not yet attained the Path very often is still attached in mind to the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguna) belonging to the world of men. This is why the Buddha recommends recollecting the deities. If the yogin has been able to cut through lust (rāga), he will be reborn among the gods of the two higher realms [rūpadhātu and ārūpyadhātu]. If he has not been able to cut through lust, he will be reborn among the six classes of gods of the desire realm [kāmadhātu] where the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguna) are excellent (praṇīta), subtle (sūkṣma) and pure (vīṣuddha).

The Buddha does not want people to be reborn again and enjoy the five objects of enjoyment; but there are beings who are unable to enter into nirvāṇa, and it is these beings that the Buddha tells to recollect the deities.

457 According to the Sanskrit Āgamas faithfully quoted here, recollection of the deities brings a rebirth solely among the six classes of gods of kāmadhātu. According to the Pāli Nikāyas, it can bring a rebirth, not only among the six classes of gods of kāmadhātu, but also among the Brahmakāyirika gods of rūpadhātu and the gods higher than the latter. See the citations and references in the initial note to the present chapter, p. 1333F.
Thus, one day the son of a king (rājaputra) was standing in a high and dangerous place: it was impossible to get him down and he was about to fall to the ground. The king sent someone to spread a thick mattress on the ground so that when the prince fell he would not be killed by being crushed on the ground.

2. Recollection of gods of native purity

Furthermore, there are four kinds of gods:1) metaphorical gods (sammatideva), ii) gods by birth (upapattideva), iii) pure gods (visuddhadeva), iv) gods of native purity (upapattivisuddhadeva):

i) The actual god called T’ien-tseu “Son of a god or Devaputra”, for example, is a metaphorical god.

ii) [All the deities of the threefold world] from the Āturmahārājikas up to the neither-discriminating-nor-non-discriminating gods (naivasamjñanāsamsjñā deva) are gods by birth (upapattideva).

iii) All the holy individuals āryapudgala born among humans are gods by purity (visuddhadeva).

iv) All the holy individuals born among the gods of the threefold world (traiḍhātuka) are gods by native purity (upapattivisuddhadeva), namely:

a. The srotaāpanna called kulaṃkula and the sakṛdgāmin called ekavīcika who, in the paradises, sometimes attain the state of anāgāmin or arhat are the upapattivisuddhadeva.

b. In the form realm (rūpadhātu), there are five kinds of anāgāmin who are no longer reborn in this realm [i.e., kāmadhātu] but attain the state of arhat in rūpadhātu.

c. In the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu), there is a kind of anāgāmin who, being detached from the form realm (rūpadhātu), is reborn in the formless realm (ārūpyadhatu), cultivates the pure path there, becomes arhat and enters into nirvāṇa. [228a]

Therefore we call recollection of the deities (devatānusmṛti) the fact of recollecting two kinds of deities: i) the deities by birth (upapattideva) and ii) the deities of native purity (upapattivisuddhadeva).

VII. RECOLLECTION OF BREATHING

On recollection of inhalation and exhalation (ānāpānusmṛti) see what is said in the Tch’ān king (Dhyānasūtra).2

VIII. RECOLLECTION OF DEATH

458 See above, p. 331F and note 2.

459 Dhyānasūtra, already cited above, p. 1024F. See below, k. 24, p. 239b8; k. 28, p. 264c25; k. 91, p. 705b6.
In regard to recollection of death (marapāṇusmṛti), there are two kinds of death: i) death by oneself (ātmanā maraṇam), ii) death by another (pareṇa maraṇam).

The yogin always recollects these two types of death. If nobody kills it, this body will die necessarily by itself. Not even for the time of a finger-snap (acchtāsāmghitamātraṃ) can one believe that this conditioned dharma (samskradhṛti) which is the body will not die. At all times within this body, death is present without even waiting for old age (jarā). One cannot be based on this mass of sorrows (śoka), sufferings (upāyāsa) and decrepitude (parijūnya). The desire for life makes us hope for safety (yogakṣema) and immortality (amṛta), but this hope arises only in fools (mohapuruṣa). In the body, the four great elements are all destroyed. As long as a person carries the chest containing the [four venomous snakes (āśīviṣa)], how can the wise think of safety?

That exhalation (praśvāsa) should be followed by inhalation (āśvasa), that inhalation should be followed by exhalation, that awakening (nidrā) should follow sleep (prabodha), all these things are difficult to guarantee. Why? Because internally as well as externally, the body has many enemies (vairin), Thus it is said:

Some die in the womb,
Some die at birth,
Some die at a ripe age,
Some die during old age.
In the same way, when the fruit is ripe
It falls for all kinds of reasons.

460 According to the sūtra, there are four ways of taking on a new existence (ātmabhāvapratilamba): 1) that in which one’s own volition (ātmasaṃcetanā) is acting and not that of another (parasaṃcetana); 2) that in which the volition of others is acting and not one’s own, etc.: cf. Dīgha, III, p. 231; Anguttara, II, p. 159; Kośa, II, p. 219.

According to the Visuddhimagga, p. 189, it is necessary to recollect death at the normal time (kālamarāṇa) resulting from exhaustion of merit (puññakkhaya), from exhaustion of the lifespan (āyukkhaya) or both, and death at abnormal time (akālamarāṇa) resulting from an action putting an end to the action producing life.

461 For “the end of life is death” (maranantam hi jīvitam): Dhammapada, v. 148.
462 See the apologue of the four venomous snakes in the Āśīṣopamasūtra, above, p. 702-707F; Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, p. 136-137, note.
463 Cf. Suttanipāta, v. 576, p. 113:

Phalānām iva pakkānām pāto papatanā bhayaḥ //
evam jatānām maccānām niccāṃ marañato bhayaṃ //
People always seek to avoid
Death, the cruel and wicked thief.
But it is hard to believe
That one can ever escape this thief and find safety.\textsuperscript{464}

Imagine a great and wise man
Of unsurpassable power and strength:
Neither before nor after
Nor at present will he escape death.\textsuperscript{465}

There are no skillful words,
There are no supplications that can free one.
Thee is no fortified place
Where one can hide from it.\textsuperscript{466}

Neither by observing pure morality
Nor by exertion can one elude it.
Death is a pitiless thief.

\begin{quote}
\textit{“When the fruits are ripe, it is to be feared that they may fall in the morning; in the same way, when mortals are born, they risk death perpetually.”}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{464} In the Visuddhimagga, p. 190, death appears as a butcher (vadhaka) who threatens all beings and, as soon as they are born, holds a knife at their throats.

\textsuperscript{465} If people of great fame, great merit, great strength, great supernatural powers, great intelligence, if the pratyekabuddhas and the samyaksambuddhas themselves do not escape death, how could a man like me do so (mādisēṣu kathā va kā)? Cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 192-193.

\textsuperscript{466} Cf. Dhammapada, v. 128:
\begin{flushright}
Na antalikkhe, na samuddamajjhe
na pabbatānaṃ vivarāṃ pavissa /
na vijāti so jagatipadeso
yattraḥhitam nappasahetha maccu //
\end{flushright}

\textit{“Neither in the sky, nor in the middle of the sea, nor by crawling into mountain caves can one find any place in this world where death cannot vanquish us.”}
When it comes, there is no place to escape from it.

This is why, in the course of transitory and dangerous existence, the yogin should not think of or hope to live.

[Marasymritsūtra].467 – One day when the Buddha was speaking to the bhikṣus on the meaning of death (saraṇasamjñārtha), a certain bhikṣu, having arranged his upper robe over his left shoulder (ekāṃsam uttarāsāṅgaṃ kṛtvā), said to the Buddha: “I can meditate on the meaning of death.”

The Buddha asked him: “How do you meditate?”

The bhikṣu said: “I do not hope to live longer than seven years.”

The Buddha said: “That is an unmindful way to meditate on the meaning of death.”

Another bhikṣu said: “I do not hope to live longer than seven months.” Another bhikṣu said seven days, and yet others said six, five, four, three, two or one day. The Buddha said to them: “All of you are meditating unmindfully on the meaning of death (marasamjñā).”

467 A slightly different version of the Maraṇasutta I of the Anguttara, III, p. 303-306, or IV, p. 316-319, partially quoted in the Visuddimagga, ed. Warren, p. 196 which has its correspondent in the Ekottarāgama (Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 35, p. 741c27-742b2). The Pāli sources place this sūtra at Nāndika in Giṇjakāvasatha; the Sanskrit sources place it at Śrāvastī in the Jetavana in the garden of Anāthapiṇḍada.

Here are translations of a few extracts from the Maraṇasatisutta: Maraṇasati bhikkhave bhāvitā bahukulīkatā mahapphalā ... aham bhante bhāventi maraṇasatin ti.

This first monk who wished or hoped to live for one night and one day in order to meditate on the Buddha’s teaching on death was followed by three others who wished to live for one day (divasam), for the time of one meal (ekam piṇḍapātam), or for the time of eating and swallowing four or five morsels (cattāro pañca ālope), respectively.

The Buddha declared that these four monks live unmindfully (pamattā viharanti) and practice a lazy ‘recollection of death’ for destroying impurities (dandham maraṇasatiṁ bhāventi āsavānaṁ khayāya).

Finally, two other monks came who wished to live the time of eating and swallowing a single morsel (ekam ālopam) or even the time between an inbreath and an outbreath, or the time of a single inhalation (yadantaraṁ assaśīvā vā passasāmi passasīvā vā assasāmi) in order to meditate on the Buddha’s teaching on death.

The Buddha declared that these two monks lived without unmindfulness (appamattā viharanti) and practiced a ‘recollection of death’ effective in destroying the impurities (tikkhaṁ maraṇasatiṁ bhāventi khayāya).

According to the Ekottarāgama (l.c., p. 742a23), the monk who was certain of living only the time of one inbreath or outbreath was Vakkhali, well known by his suicide (Samyutta, III, p. 119-124).
One bhikṣu said [that he did not hope to live longer than one morning], from morning until mealtime. Yet another, that he did not hope to live longer than a single meal (eka pīṇḍapāta). The Buddha declared: “You also are meditating unmindfully on the meaning of death.”

Finally a bhikṣu, having arranged his upper robe over his left shoulder, said to the Buddha: “[I hope to live only as long as the time needed] for an outbreath (yāvat prāśasāmi) without waiting for the next inbreath, or the time required for an inbreath (yāvad āśvasāmi) without waiting for the next outbreath.” The Buddha declared: “That is true meditation on the meaning of death, without unmindfulness. O bhikṣus, all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) arise and perish from moment to moment. Their time of duration (sthitikāla) is very brief. They are like a magic show (māyopama), deceiving the ignorant yogins.”

It is for these many reasons that one recollects death.

IX. LOGICAL ORDER OF THE EIGHT RECOLLECTIONS

Question. – The Dharma is the teacher (ācārya) of all the Buddhas of the three times. Why then recollect the Buddha first? What is the order (anukrama) of the eight recollections?

Answer. – 1-3) Although the Dharma is the teacher of the Buddhas of the three times (tryadhvan) and the ten directions, it is the Buddha who preached the Dharma because his skill is great.

[The king who built a ladder to facilitate the ascent of a mountain.] – In the Himavat there was a precious mountain (ratnagiri) at the summit of which there was a precious wish-fulfilling stone (cintāmaṇiratna) and all kinds of precious substances. People wanted to climb up there: some, having climbed halfway, turned back; others turned back from near the summit.

There was a very virtuous king who, out of compassion for beings, had a huge ladder built (mahāsopāna). The entire population, great and small down to children of seven years, succeeded thus in climbing the mountain and gathered the wish-fulfilling jewel and all kinds of precious substances as they pleased (yatheṣṭam).

It is the same for the Buddha. The ‘precious mountain’ is the true nature of all dharmas of the world. The ninety-six kinds of heretics cannot reach it; even Brahmā Devarāja who seeks the true nature of dharmas...
cannot find it. What then could be said for other people? In his great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and
great compassion (mahākaruṇā), the Buddha has pity on beings. Endowed with the six perfections
(pāramitā) and possessing omniscience (sarvajñāna), wisdom (prajñā) and skillful means (upāya), he
preaches the ‘ladder’ of the twelve classes of texts (dvādāśiṣṭhabuddhavacana) and the eighty-four
thousand articles of the Dharma (caturāśiṣṭhakandhasahasra). A-jo-kiao-tch’en-jou
(Ājñātakauṇḍinya), 471 Chō-li-fo (Śāriputra), Mou-k’ien-lien (Maudgalyāyana), Mo-ho-kia-chō
(Mahākāśyapa) and even śrāmaṇeras of seven years, Sou-mo 472 (Sumana), all obtained the pure dharmas
(anāsravadharma), the faculties (indriya), the powers (bala), the [factors] of enlightenment
(sambodhyāga) and the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa). Although this pure nature is wondrous, all beings
who receive the kindness of the Buddha obtain it. This is why recollection of the Buddha comes first.

Next comes recollection of the Dharma and recollection of the Saṃgha Since the Saṃgha is based on the
word of the Buddha to explain the Dharma, it comes third. On the other hand, other men cannot explain the
Dharma, whereas the Saṅgha can: this is why it is described as a Jewel (ratna).

The Buddha is the Jewel among men; the Jewel among the ninety-six heretical systems is the Dharma of
the Buddha; the Jewel among all the communities is the Saṃgha.

Finally, it is because of the Buddha that the Dharma appeared in the world and it is because of the Dharma
that there is a Saṅgha.

4) The yogin wonders how to obtain the Jewel of the Dharma. By including himself in the ranks of the
Saṅgha, he will avoid all misdeeds (duṣkṛta), gross (audārika) or subtle (sūkṣma) of body (kāya) or speech
(vāc). This is why morality (śīla) is listed next. [228c]

471 One of the first five disciples of Śākyamuni who witnessed the austerities of the Buddha and
benefited from the Sermon at Benares: Vinaya, I, p. 12; Catuspāriṣad, p. 152. The Traité has mentioned
him above, p. 102F.

472 Below, k. 20, p. 271b27-c2, the Traité will return to this Sumana, also called Sumanas or
Karṇasumana: “The bhikṣu Karṇasumana, in a previous lifetime, saw the stūpa of the Buddha Vipaśyin
and gave it the sumanā flower that he was wearing behind his ear. As a result of this, for eighty-one
kalpas he enjoyed happiness among gods and men and, in his last lifetime, he had behind his ear a
sumanā flower the perfume of which filled the whole house; this is why he was called Karṇasumana.
Then, disgusted with the world, he went forth from home and obtained the Bodhi of the Arhats.”

For this legend and others connected to him, see the Anavataptaṅgāthā, ed. Bechert, p. 109-115;
transl. Hofinger, p. 205-207; Fo wou po ti tseu, T 199, p. 191b23-191c22; Mulasarv. Vin., Gilgit Man.,
III, part 1, p. 180-181, and T 1448, k. 16, p. 79c1-29; Pāli Apaḍāna, p. 117; Therāgāthā, p. 38, 46;
Mahākarmavibhaṅga, p. 101; Avadānaśataka, II, p. 67-71 (200, k. 9, p. 245a3-b2); Commentary of the
Dhammapada, IV, p. 120-137; Milindhapañha, p. 115, 291, 350.

When he was but seven years of age, Sumana was ordained by Aniruddha (Comment. on
Dhammapada, IV, p. 136, l. 12). He may be identified, perhaps, with the Sumana who represented the
monks from Pāvā at the second Council at Vaiśālī (Vinaya,II, p. 305; Dīpavaṃsa, IV, v. 51; Mahāvaṃsa,
IV, v. 49, 59).
5) How does the yogin [who practices these first four recollections] differ from the seven categories [of disciples of the Buddha]?473

Possessing morality (śīla), the yogin wants to avoid the sins of mind (cittadūṣkṛta), [namely, covetousness (abhidhyā), malice (vyāpāda) and wrong view (mithyaḍṛṣṭi)].

a. Recollecting generosity (no. 5), he destroys greed (abhidhyā).

b. Wanting the recipients of generosity (pratigrāhaka) to find happiness, he destroys malice (vyāpāda).

c. Thinking of merit (puṇya) and its fruit of retribution (vipākaphala), he destroys wrong view (mithyaḍṛṣṭi).

Dwelling thus in the rules of morality (no. 4) and of generosity (no. 5), the yogin becomes established in the ten good paths of action (daśakuśalakarmapatha)474 and escapes from the ten bad paths of action (daśakuśalakarmapatha).

6) The ten good paths of action have two kinds of fruits (phala):

a. those who practice them in a superior way are reborn among the pure gods (viśuddhadeva) [of rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu].

b. those who practice them in a medium way are reborn among the gods [of kāmadhātu].

This is why the yogin recollects the deities (no. 6) after morality (no. 4) and generosity (no. 5).

By practicing the dhyānas and the samāpattis, he has access to the deities of the two higher realms, he destroys the bad investigations (vitarka), gathers only the good dharmas and concentrates his mind one-pointedly.

This is why he recollects the deities (devatānusmṛti).

7) Next the yogin recollects inhalation and exhalation (ānāpāna). By recollecting the in-and outbreath, he is able to destroy bad investigations (vitarka) like the rain dampens the dust.475

---

473 The yogin who practices the recollections of the Buddha, the Dharma, the Saṅgha and śīla who is being considered here seems to be confused with the seven categories of the Buddha’s disciples who, inspired with perfect faith (āvetyaprasāda), recollect the same subjects daily (cf. Dīgha, II, p. 93-94; III, p. 227; Samyutta, II, p. 69-70; V, p. 343. 365, 386-387; Anguttara, IV, p. 406-407; V, p. 183-184.).

The seven categories of disciples of the Buddha have been enumerated by the Traité above, p. 577F. These are the bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, śikṣamāṇa, śrāmaṇa, śrāmaṇerikā, upāsaka and upāsikā (for details, see Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 123, p. 643c).

What distinguishes the yogin from these seven categories of disciples is that he does not limit himself to recollecting the Buddha, the Dharma, the Saṅgha and śīla, but also abandoning (tyāga). The first four recollections destroy only the first seven akuśalakarmapathas, namely, the sins of body and speech, whereas recollection of abandonment destroys also the last three akuśalakarmapathas, namely, the sins of mind.

474 Listed above, p. 501F.
Seeing the breath coming in and going out, he understands the dangers that menace the body; it is because of the inbreath and the outbreath that the body is maintained alive.

This is why he recollects the inhalation and the exhalation (ānāpānāsmṛti).

8) Finally, the yogin recollects death (marāṇa). It may happen actually that, conscious of possessing the first seven recollections and basing himself on their virtues (guṇa), the yogin becomes lazy (kausāhya). It is at this moment that he should recollect death for, if the work of death is constantly present, how could he be lazy and be content with the qualities he has acquired?

Thus, at the Buddha’s death, A-ni-liu (Aniruddha) said:

Conditioned dharmas are like clouds:

The wise man should not be proud of them.

When the thunderbolt of impermanence (anityatāvajra) strikes

It destroys the king of mountains that was the Holy Master (ārṣa).476

This is the order of the eight recollections.

**Third Section THE RECOLLECTIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA**

Question. – You have just set forth the eight recollections practiced by the śrāvakas. How do the eight recollections practiced by the bodhisattva differ?

Answer. – The śrāvakas practice for themselves whereas the bodhisattvas practice for all beings.

In the śrāvakas, they free only from old age (jarā), sickness (vyāḍhi) and death (marāṇa), whereas in the bodhisattvas they perfect the qualities (guṇa) of omniscience (sarvajñāna). These are the differences (viśeṣa).

Furthermore, here in the Prajñāpāramitasūtra (above, p. 650F), the Buddha said to Śāriputra: “The bodhisattva-mahāsattva who abides in the Prajñāpāramitā by the method of non-abiding (asthānayogena) should fulfill the perfection of generosity (dānapāramitā) and the other qualities up to the eight recollections (anusmṛti) by basing himself on their non-existence (anupalabdhitām upādāya).”

475 Ņāpānasmṛti is the antidote to vitarka: see Kośa, VI, p. 153.

476 The recensions of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, Sanskrit (ed. Waldschmidt, p. 400) as well as Pāli (Dīgha, II, p. 157) attribute rather different stanzas to Aniruddha.

For the expression Cheng-tchou ‘Holy Master’ used to render the Sanskrit ārṣa, see below, p. 1592F, n. 1.
First there is non-abiding (asthāna) and then non-existence (anupalabdhitā): these are the two seals (mudrā) by means of which [the anusmṛti of the bodhisattvas] differ. For the meaning of this non-abiding and this non-existence, see what has been said above (p. 656-657F).

(A note in red says that the eight recollections are finished.)
CHAPTER XXXVII: THE TEN CONCEPTS

PRELIMINARY NOTE (p. 1431F)

Various partially overlapping lists of samjñā have already been mentioned above, p. 1311F.

1. In the Pāli Nikāyas, there are two different lists of ten saññās: the first, in Dīgha, III, p. 291; Saṃyutta, V, p. 132-133; Anguttara, V, p. 105, 309; the second in Anguttara, V, p.109.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st list</th>
<th>2nd list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. asubha-</td>
<td>1. anicca-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. maraṇa</td>
<td>2. anatta-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. āhāre paṭikkūla-</td>
<td>3. asubha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. sabbaloke anabhirati-</td>
<td>4. ādīnava-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. anicca-</td>
<td>5. pahāna-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. anicce dukkha-</td>
<td>6. virāga-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. dukkhe anatta-</td>
<td>7. nirodha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. pahāna-</td>
<td>8. sabbaloke anabhirati-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. virāga-</td>
<td>9. sabbasankhāresu anicca-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. nirodha-saṅnā.</td>
<td>10. ānāpānasati-saṅnā.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The saṅnās 1-7 of the first list are defined in Anguttara, IV, p. 46-53; the second list is explained in Anguttara, V, p. 109-112.

2. In the Prajñāpāramitā, the Sanskrit list in Pañcaviṃśati (ed. Dutt, p. 20, l. 5-8) mentions ten samjñās; on the other hand, the Sanskrit list in the Śatasāsrikā (ed. Ghosa, p. 60, l. 15-61, l. 6) mentions only six:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pañcaviṃśati</th>
<th>Śatasāsrikā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. anitya-</td>
<td>1. anitya-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. duḥkha-</td>
<td>2. duḥkha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. anātma-</td>
<td>3. anātma-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kumārajīva</th>
<th>Hiuan-tsang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. amitya-</td>
<td>1. amitya-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. duhkha-</td>
<td>2. duhkha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. anātma-</td>
<td>3. anātma-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. āhāre pratikūla-</td>
<td>4. aśuci-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. sarvaloke ‘nabhirati-</td>
<td>5. maraṇa-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. maraṇa-</td>
<td>6. sarvaloke ‘nabhirati-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. aśuci</td>
<td>7. āhāre pratikūla-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. prahāṇa-</td>
<td>8. prahāṇa-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. virāga-</td>
<td>9. virāga-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. nirodha-samjñā.</td>
<td>10. nirodha-samjñā.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. It is probable that, from their divergence from the original Sanskrit of the Prajñāpāramitās, the Chinese versions were modeled on the list of ten *samjñās* appearing in the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāsika Abhidharmas (Jñanaprasthāna, T 1543, k. 27, p. 894b27-29; T 1013, k. 18, p. 1013c18-20; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 166, p. 836c20-22):

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. amityā-</td>
<td>2. anitya duhkha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. duḥkhe ‘nātma-</td>
<td>4. aśuci-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. āhāre pratikūla-</td>
<td>6. sarvaloke ‘nabhirati-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. maraṇa-</td>
<td>8. prahāṇa-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. THE CONCEPT OF IMPERMANENCE

Question. – Why are all the practices sometimes called knowledges (jñāna), sometimes recollections (anusmṛti) and sometimes concepts (saṃjñā)?

Answer. – When one begins to practice the good dharmas so as not to lose them, they are called recollections (anusmṛti); when one develops the object (nimitta) and develops the mind (citta), they are called concepts (saṃjñā); when one understands precisely (niyata) without feeling any doubts (vicikitsā), they are called knowledges (jñāna).

The concept associated with the wisdom (prajñāsamprayuktasaṃjñā) that considers all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) to be impermanent (anitya) is called the concept of impermanence (anityasaṃjñā).477

All conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) are impermanent because they arise and perish incessantly, because they depend on causes and conditions (hetupratyayāpeka) and because they do not entail any

---

accumulation (upacaya). Furthermore, at the moment of their arising, they come from nowhere and, at the moment of their cessation, do not go anywhere: this is why they are said to be impermanent.

Furthermore, they are said to be impermanent because the two kinds of worlds (loka) are impermanent: beings (sattva) are impermanent and the universe (lokadhātu) is impermanent. Thus it is said:

The great earth and its plants and trees disappear.
Mount Sumeru crumbles and the ocean dries up,
The abodes of the gods are entirely consumed:
Is there anything then in the universe that is eternal?

The Venerable One with the ten strengths had physical splendor,
The light of his wisdom was immense;
He saved all beings,
His renown filled the ten directions.
But today when he has been wiped out, where is he?
Who is the sage who would not be grieved by it?478

In the same way, Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Subhuti and other holy individuals (āryapudgala), noble cakravartin kings, sovereigns of nations, the kings of the ever-happy gods, the deities, saints, great virtuous people, noblemen, they too all perish. The flame and the brilliance of the great fire479 disappears suddenly and the world is reduced to nothing, like a lamp exposed to the wind, like the tree growing on a dangerous shore, like the filter filled with water that empties immediately. Therefore there is ‘impermanence’, because all beings and all the abodes of beings are transitory.

Question. – Why does the bodhisattva practice this concept of impermanence?

Answer. – Because beings who are victim to the mistake of taking what is impermanent to be eternal (aniye nitya iti viparyāśaḥ) undergo the mass of suffering and do not succeed in escaping from saṃsāra.

[229b]

478 Variations on the stanzas of lamentation uttered by the disciples at the death of the Buddha (above, p. 88-89F, Cf. the stanza of Brahmā in the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 400:

Sarvakāyani loke ‘smin
nikśepsyanti samucchrayam /
evaṃvidho yatra sāstā
lokeśv apratipudgah /
tathāgatabalaprāptah
caksuṣmān parinivṛtah //

479 The fire at the end of the kalpa.
The yogin who possesses this concept of impermanence converts (paripācayati) beings, saying to them: “All dharmas are impermanent; do not become attached to the notion of eternalism; you will then lose the opportunity to practice the Path.”

The four noble Truths (āryasatya) are the supreme and wondrous teaching of the Buddha; of these Truths, the first is the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya), and the aspect of impermanence (anityākāra) is the first aspect [of the truth of suffering]. This is why the bodhisattva practices the notion of impermanence.

Question. – But there are people who still feel attached to impermanent things when they are present.

[The king who was attached to his wife because old age would make her ugly]. – There was a king who had a wonderful wife who had been born from the womb of the earth. In the form of a ten-headed rākṣasa, she was about to cross the great ocean. The king was very sad. A wise minister consoled him: “The king is endowed with the power of knowledge (jñānabala) and he [knows well] that the queen will return very soon. Why does he feel sad?” The king replied: “What saddens me is not to think that my wife cannot return; I am only afraid [that on her return] her youth will already have passed.”

In the same way, seeing beautiful flowers or lovely fruits about to fade, people are even more attached to them. Thus, when one knows that things are impermanent, one develops even more fetters (saṃyojana). How can you say that impermanence calls forth disgust (udvega) and breaks the fetters?

Answer. – Seeing impermanence in that way is to understand only a small part of it (kaṃcid eva pradeśam) and not to realize it completely. You will be no different than the animals that see impermanence in this way. This is why, [here in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra], the Buddha tells Śāriputra that ‘the concept of impermanence must be completely perfected’ (anityasamjñā paripūrayitavyā).

Question. – Then what is this ‘perfect’ concept of impermanence?

Answer. – It is observing that conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma) arise and perish from moment to moment like dust blown by the wind, like water rushing down from the mountain, like the flame that is extinguished. Conditioned dharmas are without solidity or vigor; they cannot be grasped or retained; like magical fabrications (nirmāna), they deceive worldlings (prthagjana).

Thanks to this impermanence, the yogin succeeds in breaking through the threshold of emptiness (śūnya) and, since no dharma exists in emptiness, it too is nonexistent. How is that? Birth (utpāda), duration (sthiti) and destruction (bhaṅga) do not co-exist in one and the same moment (kṣana); at the moment of birth, duration and destruction cannot exist; at the moment of duration, birth and destruction cannot exist; at the moment of destruction, birth and duration cannot exist. Birth, duration and destruction are mutually opposed (virodha) to one another in their characteristics (lakṣāna) and their nature (svadbhāva); they do not exist together. Since they do not exist, neither does impermanence (anitya) exist.

Question. – If there is no impermanence, why did the Buddha speak of impermanence in regard to the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya)?

480 Anitya is the first of the sixteen aspects (ākāra) characterizing the noble truths: see above, p., 641F.

481 Reasoning borrowed from Madh. kārikā, VIII, 2, p. 146; see above, p. 37F and note.
Answer. – Worldly people (prthagjana) who produce wrong views (mithyāдрṣṭी) have claimed that the world is eternal (nīya). The Buddha spoke of impermanence in order to destroy this eternalistic view (sāsvatadṛṣṭii) and not because he considered impermanence to be real (bhūta).

Furthermore, before the Buddha appeared in the world, ordinary people used only conventional means to remove the disturbing emotions (kleṣa). But today, when it is a question of uprooting the roots of the disturbing emotions (kleśamūla), the Buddha speaks of impermanence.

Furthermore, heretical systems (tīrthikadharma) speak of deliverance (vimukti) when one is only apparently liberated from the five objects of enjoyment (pañcaka kāmaguṇa), but the Buddha has said: “It is on account of wrong concepts that one is bound up, and it is by considering the correct concept of impermanence that one is liberated (vimukta).”

Furthermore, there are two ways of thinking about the notion of [229c] impermanence: i) that which entails a residue, ii) that which does not entail a residue. Thus the Buddha said: “When all the beings and all the things have disappeared and only their names remain, impermanence ‘involves a residue’; when all the beings and all the things have disappeared and their names have also disappeared, impermanence ‘does not involve a residue’.

There are also two other ways of thinking about impermanence: i) the death of the body and its destruction; ii) births and deaths without continual renewal.

Furthermore, some say that morality (śīla) is the most important. Why? Because in dependence on morality one obtains the cessation of the impurities (āsravakṣaṇa). – Others say that learning (bahuśruta) is the most important. Why? Because in dependence on wisdom (prajñā) the result is obtained. – Others say that meditative stabilization (samādhi) is the most important, for the Buddha said: “Concentration can attain Bodhi.”

There are also two other ways of thinking about impermanence: i) that which entails a residue, ii) that which does not entail a residue. Thus the Buddha said: “When all the beings and all the things have disappeared and only their names remain, impermanence ‘involves a residue’; when all the beings and all the things have disappeared and their names have also disappeared, impermanence ‘does not involve a residue’.

Furthermore, heretical systems (tīrthikadharma) speak of deliverance (vimukti) when one is only apparently liberated from the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakā maguṇa), but the Buddha has said: “It is on account of wrong concepts that one is bound up, and it is by considering the correct concept of impermanence that one is liberated (vimukta).”

For all these reasons and even though dharmas are empty, the Buddha preached the concept of impermanence.

Finally, the concept of impermanence is synonymous with the noble Path (āryamārga). The Buddha designated the Path by all kinds of different names: sometimes he called it the four foundations of

482 Cf. Anguttara, II, p. 45: Samādhibhāvanā bhāvitā bahulikatā diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārārya…

483 Twelve dhūtaguṇa according to the Sanskrit sources (Mahāvyut., no. 1127-1139); thirteen dhūtanga according to the Pāli sources (Vinaya, V, p. 131, 193; Visuddhimagga, p. 48-67).

484 Cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 46: Satt’ imā saṁñā bhāvitā bahulikatā mahapphalā honti mahānisaṁsā amatogadhā amatapariyosānā.

1177
mindfulness (catvari smṛtyupasthānāni), sometimes he called it the four Truths (catvāri satyāni), sometimes the notion of impermanence.

[Anityatāsūtra]. – This is what is said in a sūtra:

“If the notion of impermanence is properly cultivated, it destroys all attachment to desire (kāmarāga), all attachment to subtle matter (rūparāga), all attachment to the formless (ārūpyarāga), all pride (asmimāna) and all ignorance (avidyā).”

Thus it eliminates the fetters of the threefold world (traidhātukasamāyojana). This is why it is synonymous with Path.

This concept of impermanence is sometimes impure (sāsrava) and sometimes pure (anāsrava). When it understands impermanence correctly, it is pure; when it begins to study impermanence, it is impure.

In the Mahāyāna, the bodhisattvas with vast mind convert beings in many ways: this is why their notion of impermanence is both impure and pure.

If it is pure, it occurs in nine levels (bhūmi); if it is impure, it occurs in eleven levels.

It has as object (ālambate) the five aggregates of attachment (upādānaskandha) of the threefold world. It is associated with four dominant organs (indriya), except that of unpleasantness (duḥkendriya).

For all the reasons given here, worldly people (prthagjana) and the saints (ārya) extol the qualities (guna) of the concept of impermanence.

II. THE CONCEPT OF SUFFERING

In regard to the concept of suffering (duḥkhasamjñā), the yogin says to himself that all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma), being impermanent (anitya), are painful (duḥkha).

485 Literal citation from a sūtra in Saṃyukta (T 99, no. 270, k. 10, p. 70c6-7) entitled Chou king ‘Sūtra of the Tree’. Its correspondent is the Aniccatāsutta of Saṃyutta, III, p. 156, the wording of which is only slightly different: Aniccasaṁnā bhikkhave bhāvita bahuliṅkātā sabbaṃ kāmarāgam pariṇādīyati sabbaṃ rūparāgam pariṇādīyati sabbaṃ bhavarāgam pariṇādīyati sabbaṃ avijjam pariṇādīyati sabbaṃ asmimānam pariṇādīyati samāhanti.

486 The term kāma-, rūpa- and ārūpya-rāga designates attachment in regard to the threefold world. According to Kośa, V, p. 8, kāmarāga means attachment to kāmadhātu; bhavarāga, attachment to the two higher realms, rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu.


488 The notion of suffering must bear upon all formations without distinction (saṃbhasaṅkhāresu anodhim karītvā): Anguttara, III, p. 443.
Question. – If conditioned dharmas, as impermanent, are painful, are the dharmas of holy persons (āryapudgala), conditioned but pure (sanskṛtānāsravadharma), also painful?

Answer. – Although dharmas are impermanent, only those who become attached to them experience suffering; those who are not attached to them are without suffering.

Question. – There are saints who, without being attached to them, nevertheless undergo suffering. Thus Chō-li-fou (Śāriputra) suffered from sicknesses of wind and heat, Pi-ling-k'ie-p'o-ts'o (Pilindavatsa) suffered from eye disease, and Lo-p'o-na-po-t'i (Lavaṇabhadrika) [Note by Kumārajīva: ‘the foremost of the children who bawl a lot’: Rāvaṇabhadrika?] suffered from hemorrhoids. Why do you say that they have no suffering?

489 According to the Vinayas, Śāriputra suffered from kāṭyaḍāha ‘fever’ (Pāli Vin., I, p. 214), a wind sickness (Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 42, p. 867b29-c19) of hot blood (Sarv. Vin., T 1435, k. 26, p. 190c24-191a8), of dhātuvaśayam ‘unbalanced humors’ (Mūlasarv. Vin., Gilgit Man., III, part 1, p. 239, l. 18-240, l. 22), of wind and hot blood (Mūlasarv. Vin, T 1440, k. 4, p. 528c18-23). He was cured by fibers and roots (bisa) of the lotus plant (muḷālikā), lotus sap (bisakṣīra) or also by wheat broth and wheat juice. Another time when he was suffering from stomach wind (udaravāta), he was cured by garlic (laśuna): cf. Pāli Vin., II, p. 140.

490 Pilindavatsa’s eye disease has already been noted above, p. 121F, but actually this arhat also suffered from migraines (śīsabhiṭā), a wind ailment (vātābhāda), rheumatism of the legs (aṅgavāta), articular rheumatism (pabbavāta), etc: Cf. Pāli Vin., I, p. 204-206.

491 The Turfan manuscripts, confirmed by the Mahāvyut., no. 1061, have transmitted to us the correct name of this arhat: Lavaṇabhadrika and not Lāvaṇaṇabhaddiya as Hofinger proposes. The previous lives and last lifetime of this disciple are summarized in the Anavataptagāthā (ed. Bechert, p. 184-187; transl. Hofinger, p. 272-274; Fo wou po ti tseu, T 199, p. 200a22-b21; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1448, k. 17, p. 89c11-90a11). The similarity of the stories of the previous lives of this arhat found in the Anavataptagāthā and in the Apadāna, II, p. 489-491 allow the identification of the Lavaṇabhadrika of the Sanskrit sources with the Lakuṇṭhuddiya ‘the good dwarf’ of the Pāli sources; Saṃyutta, I, p. 279; Anguttara, I, p. 23 (where the Buddha proclaimed him to be foremost among those with gentle voices (aggaṁ mañjussarānāṁ); Udana, p. 76; Theragātha, p. 49, v. 466-472.

According to the Commentary of the Dhammapada, III, 453-454, the Buddha spoke two well-known stanzas in regard to Lakuṇṭhaka (Dhammapada, v. 294-295; Gāndhāri Dhammapada, p. 120, v. 12; Udānavarga, p. 377, v. 24; p. 494-495, v. 61-62; Nettippakarana, p. 165):

Mātaram pitaraṁ hantvā rājāno dve ca khattiye /
raṭṭhāṁ sānucarāṁ hantvā anīgho yāti brāhmaṇo //
Mātaram pitaraṁ hantvā rājāno dve ca sottihye
veyyaghaṅpaṅcamaṁ hantvā anīgho yāti brāhmaṇo //

Transl. – Having killed his mother (disturbing emotions) and his father (pride) and the two warriors (the view of eternalism and the view of nihilism), having destroyed the kingdom (the twelve
Answer. – There are two kinds of suffering: i) bodily suffering (kāyika [230a] duḥkha), ii) mental suffering (caitasika duḥkha). By the power of their wisdom (prajñābala), the holy individuals (āryapudgalā) have no further mental suffering like sadness (daurmanasaya), jealousy (ṛṣyā), malice (vyāpāda), etc. On the other hand, because they have received a body composed of the four great elements (mahābhūtāmaya) as a result of actions in their previous existences (pūrva-janmakarman), they still have bodily sufferings such as old age (jarā) and sickness (vyādhi), hunger and thirst (kṣutīṣṭa), cold and heat (śītōṣṭa), etc., but these bodily sufferings are slight and quite rare.

The saint may be compared to a man who, knowing himself to be burdened with a debt (ṛṇa) with regard to a third party, does not consider it to be painful to discharge the debt. By contrast, the man who does not remember his debt and from whom the creditor demands it forcibly is furious, angry and full of suffering.

Question. – Painful sensation (duḥkhavedanā) is a mental event (caitasika dharma) co-existing with the mind (citta). The body, like grass or wood, is disjunct from the mind and without reasoning (vitarka). How can you say that the holy person feels (vedayati) only bodily suffering?

Answer. – When the worldly person (prthagjana) feels suffering (duḥkham vedayati), his mind creates a pang of grief (daurmanasaya) stimulated by the anuṣaya (negative propensity) of hostility (pratigha); his mind is turned only toward the five objects of enjoyment (pāṇca-kāmaguṇa). As the Buddha said:

[Śalyatvena sūtra]. – Worldly people do not know that, outside of the five objects of enjoyment, there is another way of getting out of suffering (na hi prajñātī prthagjano nyatra pāṇca-kāmaguṇebhyo duḥkhasya niḥśaranam). In pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā), he is stimulated by the propensity of lust (rāgānuṣaya); in unpleasant feeling (duḥkhavedanā), he is stimulated by the propensity of hatred (pratighānuṣaya); in the feeling that is neither unpleasant nor pleasant (aduḥkhāsukhavedanā), he is stimulated by the propensity of ignorance (avidhyānuṣaya). When the worldly person feels suffering,

bases of consciousness) along with its inhabitants (joy and desire), the brahmin proceeds without confusion.

Having killed his mother and father, two learned kings and a tiger, (the five obstacles to dhyāna, the fifth of which, the tiger, is doubt), without confusion the brahmin goes forth.


In an appendix Sur le moine Lo-siun-yu, Lin Li-kouang (L’Aide-Mémoire de la Vraie Loi, 1949, p. 278-290) has grouped, under the general theme of a deformed monk, a whole series of arhats of various names among whom Lavanabhadraka appears as well as the bhikṣu Lo p’in tchou or Lo p’in tcheou mentioned above (p. 931-932F and note) by the Traité.

492 The bad propensities of lust (rāga), hatred (pratigha) and ignorance (avidyā) often form a separate group (cf. Majjhima, III, p. 285; Saṁyutta, IV, p. 205), but also appear in the lists of six (Koṣa, V, p. 2) or seven anuṣaya (Dīgha, III, p. 254, 282; Saṁyutta, V, p. 60; Anguttara, IV, p. 9).
inwardly (adhyātman) he undergoes the suffering of the threefold poison (trīṣaduḥkha) – [namely, desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha) -], and outwardly (bahīrdhā) he suffers cold and heat (śītosya), the whip and the stick, etc., just as an inwardly feverish man also is burning externally. “

The [same] sūtra says: “When the worldly person loses a loved object, both his body and his mind suffer from it: it is as if he was being pierced by two arrows (tadyathaināṃ dvābhīyāṃsalyābhīyāṃ vidheyuh). The saints, however, do not have the suffering of pangs of grief (daurmanasya): they have only the bodily suffering (kāyikaduḥkha) and no other suffering.”

Extracts from the Sallattena sutta of the Samyutta, IV, p. 207-210 (Tsa a han, T 99, no. 470, k. 17, p. 119c28-120b14): Assutavā bhikkhave puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuttho samāno socati kilamati ... dutiyena sallena amuviṃjheyuṃ, evaṃ hi so bhikkhave puuriso ekaṃ sallena vedanāṃ vediyati.

Transl. – When the ignorant worldly person, O monks, is touched by an unpleasant feeling, he is upset, he is troubled, he laments, he beats his breast and becomes confused. Thus he is feeling two sensations, one bodily and the other mental. It is as if a man were pierced with one arrow and then pierced with a second arrow: this man feels the pain of both arrows.

Thus, O monks, the ignorant worldly person, being touched by an unpleasant feeling, is upset, troubled, laments, beats his breast and becomes confused. Then he feels two sensations, one physical and the other mental. Being touched by an unpleasant feeling, he is full of hatred. As he is full of hatred for the unpleasant sensation, the propensity of hatred for the unpleasant feeling lies within him. And this man, being touched by the unpleasant feeling, wishes for the happiness of pleasure. Why? Because the ignorant worldly person does not know that the exit from unpleasant feeling can be other than in the happiness of the pleasures. .

Since he wishes for the happiness of the pleasures, the propensity of the lust for pleasant feeling lies within him, He does not properly know the origin and cessation of these feelings, their flavors, their disadvantages and the way to exit from them. .

Since he does not correctly know the origin and cessation of feelings, their flavors, their disadvantages or the way of exit from them, the propensity of ignorance toward the feeling that is neither unpleasant nor pleasant lies within him.

If he experiences a pleasant feeling, he feels it like an obedient slave; if he experiences an unpleasant feeling, he feels it like an obedient slave; if he experiences a feeling neither pleasant nor unpleasant, he feels it like an obedient slave. This means, O monks, that the ignorant worldly person is subjugated by birth, death, sorrows, lamentations, sufferings, sadness, torments: I say that he is subjugated by suffering.

But the noble learned disciple, being touched by an unpleasant feeling, is not grieved, is not troubled, does not lament, does not beat his breast and does not fall into trouble. He experiences only one feeling, namely, bodily sensation and not mental sensation. It is as if a man were pierced by one arrow but not pierced by a second arrow: this man feel the pain of just one arrow.

The same reasoning is taken up again by the Milindapañha, p. 44 (transl. Horner, I, p. 61). See also P. Demiéville, Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha, p. 120-121.
Furthermore, suffering is associated with the five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānaprayukta), and the sufferings of the whip and the stick, of cold and heat, etc., due to external causes, are bodily sufferings. The others are mental sufferings.

Furthermore, I have said that pure conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtāsravadharma) are not suffering because [the saints] are not attached to them. But the body of holy individuals is impure (āsrava). Since impure dharmas (āsravadharma) are painful, what is the mistake [in asserting that the saints feel bodily suffering]? But in fact, these sufferings felt by their bodies are faint and rare.

Question. – If all that is impermanent is suffering, the Path (mārga) too is suffering. How can you drive suffering away with suffering?

Answer. – The aphorism “All that is impermanent is suffering” applies to the five aggregates of attachment (upādānaskandha), but the Path, although impermanent insofar as it is formation (saṃskāra), is not called suffering. Why? Because it destroys suffering and does not create attachment (abhinivesā). United with the wisdoms of emptiness (śūnya) and non-self (anātman), it is impermanent but it is not suffering.

This is why the arhats, at the moment they obtain the Path, say the following stanza:

We do not rejoice in being reborn,

Neither do we rejoice in dying;

With mindfulness and awareness

We are waiting to leave when the time comes.

When the Buddha entered nirvāṇa, Ānanda and the disciples not yet detached from passion (avītarāga), who had not yet cultivated the eightfold noble Path (āryaśāṅgamārga), wept and lamented; the anāgāmins, detached from desire (vītarāga) were all frightened; the arhats whose impurities were destroyed (kṣīnāsrava) remained impassive and only said: “The Eye of the world has disappeared too soon” (atikṣipram cakṣur lokasyāntarhitam).

494 In the hypothesis imagined, how could one drive away the suffering of saṃsāra by the suffering of the Path?

495 A well-known stanza:

Nābhīnandāmi maraṇāṃ, nābhīsandāni jīvitaṃ /
kālaṁ ca paṭikaṁkhāmi sampajāno patissato ti //

It is frequently repeated with the variant nibbisam bhatako yathā at the end. The Therāgathā, v. 1002, the Milinda, p. 45 and the Comm. on the Dīgha put it in the mouth of Sāriputta, but it was also pronounced by the theras Nisabhā (Therāgathā, v. 196), Saṃkicca (v. 607), Revata (v. 655) and Aṇṇākoḍañña (v. 686).

It is because they possessed the power of the Path that these arhats who had received great favors from the Buddha and appreciated his immense qualities (apramāṇaguhna) did not experience any suffering. This is why we know that the Path, although impermanent, is not a cause of suffering and therefore it is not called suffering. Only the five aggregates of attachment (upadānakandha) are suffering. Why? Because one clings to them, because they are impermanent and insecure.

Here in regard to the meaning of suffering (duḥkhaṛtha), what has been said above (p. 1158F) concerning vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna should be fully repeated.

Furthermore, those who possess a body (dehin) are always suffering (sadā duḥkhitā), but out of stupidity (moha), they do not take it into account. Thus it is said:

Since it is very tiring to ride a horse,
One looks for a place to stand up.
Since standing up is very tiring,
One seeks a place to sit down.

Transl. – On the death of the Blessed One, of the monks who were not yet free from desire, some raised their arms to the heavens uttering cries, others threw themselves down on the ground, turning to and fro, thinking: “The Blessed One has died too soon! The Blessed One has entered nirvāṇa too soon! Too soon has the Eye of the world disappeared from the world!” But the monks who were free from desire endured their grief with contemplation and lucidity, saying: “Impermanent are the formations. How could they not disappear?”

The version of the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 400-402, 406-408, differs slightly:
Tatraikatā bhikṣavāḥ prthivyām āvarṣante parivartante. ekatāyā bāhūn pragrhyā prakroṣante. evaṃ cāhūḥ: atikṣipraṃ bhagavān parinivṛtaḥ. atikṣipraṃ sugataḥ parinivṛtaḥ. atikṣipraṃ caṣṭur lokasyānarhitāḥ. ekatāyā cetodhiḥkhasarāmipitāṁ tiṣṭhati. ekatāyā dharmatām eva pratis̄maranti: prāg evāṃmāṃ bhagavatākhyātām sarvair iṣṭaiḥ kāntaiḥ priyair manāpāir nānābhāvo bhaviṣyati vinābhāvo viprayogo visamyoṣaḥ. kuta etal labhyaṃ yat taj jatam bhūtam kṛtam sanskratam vedayitaṃ pratītyasamutpannaṃ kṣayadharmaṃ vyayadharmaṃ vibhavadharmāṃ virodhdharmāṃ pralokadharmāṃ na prarūyātāt na sthānāt vidyate.

Transl. – Then some monks rolled about on the ground; others raised their arms to the heavens, uttering cries: “The Blessed One has died too soon! The Blessed One has entered nirvāṇa too soon! Too soon has the Eye of the world disappeared!” Others, filled with mental anguish, stood about and others yet recalled the nature of things and said: “Previously the Blessed One spoke to us about all these things that are hoped for, loved, cherished, pleasant but destined to division, to separation, to disjunction. How could it be that what is born, fabricated, conditioned, felt, resulting from causes, destructible, transitory, insecure, inconsistent, perishable, not be broken up? This possibility does not exist.”

497 See above, p. 584F.
Since sitting down too long is very tiring,
One looks for a place to lie down in peace.
Much fatigue results from these activities,
What at first was pleasant then becomes painful.

To look straight ahead or to the side, to breathe in and out
To bend down, to stretch out, to sit down, to get up,
To walk or to stand still, to go or to come:
Nothing can be done without suffering.

Question. – “The five aggregates of attachment are suffering” (*pañcopādānaskandhā dukkham*), but it is as a result of a [subjective] notion of suffering (*dukkhasamjñā*) that they are suffering. Actually, if everything is suffering, why did the Buddha say: “There are three kinds of feeling: pleasant feeling (*sukhavedanā*), unpleasant feeling (*dukkhavedanā*) and feeling that is neither unpleasant nor pleasant (*adukkhāsukhavedanā*)” And if suffering comes from a [subjective] notion of suffering, how can you say that the [holy] truth of suffering (*dukkhasatya*) concerns a real suffering?

Answer. – Yes, the five aggregates of attachment are suffering, but ordinary people (*prthagjana*), under the influence of the fourfold error (*viparyāsa*) and urged on by desire (*kāmapidita*), consider the five objects of enjoyment as happiness (*sukha*). It is as though someone smeared ointment onto a man’s ulcer (*ganda*) and when his suffering has stopped, he thinks this ulcer, which itself is not happiness, is happiness.

The Buddha spoke of three kinds of feelings in accordance with the views of the world (*loka*), but in reality (*tattvena*) there is no happiness there. If there were truly happiness in the five aggregates of attachment

---

500 In the Rahogatatasutta of Saṁyutta, IV, p. 216-217 (tsa a han, T 99, no. 476, k. 17, p. 121c), the Buddha explain to a bhikṣu: *Tisso imā bhikkho vedanā vutta mayā sukha vedanā dukkha vedanā adukkhamasukhā vedanā, imā tisso vedanāvuttā mayā. Vuttaṃ kho pantaṃ bhikkho mayā: Yaṃ kiñci vedayitam taṃ dukkhasmin ti. Taṃ kho panetaṃ bhikkhu mayā sankhārānaṃ yeva aniccataṃ sandhāya bhāsitam: Yaṃ kiñci vedayitam taṃ dukkhasmin ti.*
(upādānaskandha), why did the Buddha say: “The destruction of the five aggregates of attachment is happiness” (pañcopādānaskandhanirodhā sukham)? 501

Furthermore, since the mind of happiness (sukhacitta) arises in relation to the loved object, happiness is not assured definitively (niyata). If happiness were assured, it would not depend on attachment of the mind (cittābhiniveśa) in the same way that if fire (agni) were really hot, it would not depend on kindling to heat up. But as happiness is not assured, here it is called suffering.

Furthermore, what the world wrongly considers to be happiness can create innumerable fruits of suffering (apramāṇaduhkhahala) in the present lifetime and in the future lifetime (ihaparatra): this is why it is called suffering. Just as a little bit of poison (viśa) poured into the water of a big river cannot change the water, 502 so the poisonous plant that the world wrongly thinks [is happiness] is no longer visible in the great waters of suffering. Thus it is said:

When a being falls from the paradises and is reborn in hell

He remembers the former bliss of paradise:

The palace courtesans showed themselves to him in a crowd,

The parks and pools rejoiced his heart.

[230c] Now he sees the fires of hell coming to burn him

Like a great fire consuming a bamboo forest.

Then, while still seeing the pleasures of paradise,

Transl. – I have spoken, O monk, of three feelings: pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling, neither unpleasant nor pleasant feeling. Yes, I have spoken of these three feelings. But also, O monk, I said: All that is felt is felt in suffering.” It is in view of impermanence that I said ”All that is felt is felt in suffering.”

An extract of the corresponding Sanskrit sūtra is cited in Kośavyākhya, p. 519, l. 18-20: Saṃskārāṇīyatām Ānanda saṃdhā mayā bhāṣitam saṃskaravipāṇīyatām. Yat kiṃcid veditam idam atra duḥkhasyeti: O Ānanda, it is in view of impermanence, it is in view of transformation of the formations, that I said: “All that is felt, there is suffering in it.”

The Kośa (VI, p. 129-130) concludes that all feeling, including pleasant feeling, is suffering. Pleasant feeling has as object not a real pleasure but sometimes a remedy for suffering (duḥkhapratiśrava), sometimes a modification of the suffering (duḥkhavikalpa).

501 Upādānānirdhā... sukparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā nirujjanti: Pāli Vin, I, p. 1; Samyutta, II, p. 7; III, p. 14; Anguttara, I, p. 177.

He is alarmed in vain: that is useless.

The concept of suffering (duḥkhasamjñā) concerns the same objects as the concept of impermanence (anityasamjñā). Analysis of suffering in these many different ways is called the concept of suffering.

III. THE CONCEPT OF NON-SELF

Concept of non-self (anātmansamjñā). – “That which is suffering is non-self” (yad duḥkham tad anātma). Why? The five aggregates of attachment (pañcopādānakṣanda) are all suffering and have no independence (aśvarya, vibhitba). If they have no independence, they are non-self (anātman). If they had an independent self, “it would be impossible for the body to feel suffering” (na kāyo vyābādhāya saṃvarteta).

Thus it is said:

There are fools

Who consider their body or their mind as their self.

Gradually they become strongly attached to them:

They do not understand the law of impermanence.

There is no agent (kāraka) in this body

Neither is there any perceiver (vedaka).

This body is without a master,

And, nevertheless, it does all kinds of things.

From the six organs (indriya) and the six objects (viṣaya)

Arise the six kinds of consciousnesses (vijñāna);

503 Namely, the five upāsānakṣanda.
504 The entire explanation that follows turns upon the canonical formula: Yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkham, yam dukkham tad anattā, yad anattā taṃ netaṃ mama neso haṃ asmi na meso attātī: “That which is impermanent is suffering; that which is suffering is non-self; that which is non-self is not mine, I am not that and that is not me.” Cf. Samyutta, II, p. 22, 82, 84; IV, p. 1.
505 Implicit reference to the Sūtra on the non-self which follows the sūtra on the four noble Truths (cf. Pāli Vin, I, p. 13-14; Samyutta, III, p. 66-68; Catusparīṣad, p. 162-164; Mahāvastu, III, p. 335-337; Rūpaṇ ced ātīmahāviṣayad rūpaṃ na vyābādhāya duḥkhāya saṃvarteta, labhyeta ca rūpasya: evaṃ me rūpaṃ bhavate evaṃ mā bhād itī.
506 Adopting the variant tchou in place of cheng.
From the coming together of the three \textit{(trikasaṃnipāta)}

Contact \textit{(sparśa)} arises.  507

From contact as condition
There arise feeling, memory and action,
In the same way as fire arises
When the lens, kindling and the sun come together.

Organs, objects and consciousnesses having come together,
The action to be accomplished is realized.
There is continuity \textit{(saṃtanasāḍṛṣya)}
As in the seed, the sprout and the stem.  508

Furthermore, there is no ātman because the characteristics \textit{(lakṣaṇa)} of the ātman do not exist. Dharmas must have a characteristic so that we may know that they exist. Thus, if we see smoke \textit{(dhūma)} and we feel heat \textit{(uṣṇa)}, we know there is a fire \textit{(vahni)}. Because there are differences [in characteristics] between the five sense objects \textit{(viṣaya)}, we know they exist. Because beings of various sorts conceive and compute things in different ways, we know that there are minds \textit{(citta)} and mental events \textit{(caitasikadharma)}. But since the ātman has no characteristic, we know it does not exist.

Question. – However, there is breathing \textit{(ānāpāna)} which is a characteristic of the ātman, and also the looking straight ahead and sideways \textit{(ālokītavilokita)}, life \textit{(āyus)}, mind \textit{(citta)}, suffering or happiness \textit{(duḥkhasukha)}, affection or aversion \textit{(icchādeṣa)}, the will \textit{(prayatna)}, etc., which are characteristics of the ātman. If there were no ātman, then who would have this breathing, this looking straight ahead or sideways, this life, this mind, this suffering or this happiness, this affection or this aversion, this will, etc.? Thus we know that there is an ātman moving internally and that the life \textit{(āyus)} and mind \textit{(citta)} are properties of the ātman.  509

If there were no ātman, one would be like an ox \textit{(go)} without an oxherd \textit{(sārthvāha)}. But since there is an ātman, it can govern the mind, penetrate things without any loss of attentiveness \textit{(pramāda)}.

\begin{footnotes}
507 According to the Pāli Abhidhamma (Atthaśālinī, p. 109) and the Sarvāstivādins (Kośa, III, p. 96), contact \textit{(sparśa)}, the sixth link in the \textit{pratītyasamutpāda} chain (above, p. 350F), are six in number and arise from the coming together of the three \textit{(trikasaṃnipāta)}, namely, organ, object and consciousness. For the Sautrāntikas, \textit{sparśa} is only the meeting itself (Kośa, III, p. 96-97).

508 Cf. Kośa, IX, p. 296-299.

509 The objector here is the spokesman for the Vaiśeṣikas who assume nine substances \textit{(dravya)}, including the ātman, endowed with qualities \textit{(guṇa)}: cf. Vaiśeṣikasūtra (I, I, 5-6).
\end{footnotes}
If there were no ātman, who would direct the mind and experience unhappiness or happiness? If there were no ātman, one would be like a piece of wood (kāṣṭha), unable to distinguish between suffering and happiness, and it would be the same for affection or aversion, effort, etc.

Nevertheless, since the ātman is subtle (sūkṣma), it cannot be cognized by the five sense organs (indriya), and it is by these characteristics that we know it exists. [231a]

Answer. – But all these characteristics are characteristics of the consciousness (vijñānalakṣaṇa)! It is because there is consciousness that there is breathing, looking straight ahead or sideways, life, etc., and when the consciousness leaves the body, all of that disappears.510 According to your concept of an eternal (anītya) and omnipresent (vyāpin) ātman, the corpse (kuṇapa) itself should still possess respiration, the ability to look straight ahead and sideways, life, etc.

Furthermore, breathing (ānāpāna), etc., are material dharmas (rūpidharma) moving on the wind of the mind: these are characteristics of consciousness (vijñāna) and not characteristics of the ātman. As for life (āyus) which is a formation dissociated from mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra), this also is a characteristic of consciousness.

Question. – When one enters into the absorption without mind (acittakasamāpatti)511 and possibly one sleeps without dreaming, the breathing (ānāpāna) continues and life (āyus) continues. How can you say that [breathing and life] are characteristics of consciousness?

Answer. - Although consciousness is temporarily suspended in the absorption without mind, shortly thereafter it must necessarily recur, for it does not leave the body; the time of duration of consciousness is long; the time when it disappears is short. This is why [breathing and life] are characteristics of consciousness. When a man goes out for a walk, we cannot say that his house is without an owner!

Sadness and happiness (duḥkhasukha), affection and aversion (icchādveṣa), will (prayatna), etc., are associated with the mind (cittasaṃprayukta), mutual conditions (sahabhūprataya) and accompanying the mind (cittānuparivartin): when mind exists, they exist; when mind does not exist, they do not exist. This is why these are characteristics of consciousness and not characteristics of the ātman.

Furthermore, supposing the ātman did exist, it would be either eternal (nītya) or non-eternal (anītya). But, as is said:

510 The Buddha indeed said:

Āyur uṣmātha vijñanāṁ yadā kāyaṁ jahaty amī /
apaviddhahaṁ tadā śete yathā kāṣṭham acetanaḥ //

“When life, heat and consciousness leave the body, the body lies abandoned, like a piece of wood, without any feeling.”

For this stanza, which shows variations, see Kośavyākhya, p. 668, l. 16-17, and for the canonical sources, Majjhima, I, p. 206, l. 9-11; Saṃyutta, III, p. 13=43, l. 4-5.

511 Absorption without mind, also called absorption of non-discrimination (asamjñīsamañāpatti), during which mind and mental events are arrested: see Kośa, II, p. 201.
If the ātman were eternal
There would be no new existence (punarbhava).
Eternal and without birth,
It would also be without deliverance.

It would also be infallible and inactive:
This is why we should know
That there would be neither sinner nor saint
Nor any object to be sensed (vedaka).

To abandon the ‘me’ (ātman) and the ‘mine’ (ātmīya)
Is then to attain nirvāṇa.
But if there really were an ātman,
We would be unable to reject the idea of ‘me’.

If the ātman were non-eternal
It ought to perish with the body,
Like water rushing down from a high cliff.
There would no longer be either sin or merit.512

512 In an inaugural dissertation at Munich, M. Saigura has identified these three stanzas as Mūlamadhyamakārikā VIII, 12; XVIII, 2: XVIII, 4, of which here are the text and translation:

Evāṃ vidyād upādām vutsargād iti karmanah /
kartus ca karmaketbpheyam seṣān bhāvān vibhāvayet //
Ātmany asati cāmīyaṃ kuta eva bhaviṣyatī /
nirmamo nirahamāraḥ samād ātmātmānīnayoh //
Mamety ahām iti kuṣiṇe bahirdhādhyātman eva ca /
Nirudhyata upādānāṃ tatkusayāj janmanah kṣayaḥ //

Transl.- One should understand appropriation as the ‘rejection’ of action and agent. By means of action and agent, one will be able to recognize the other essences.

As the ‘me’ does not exist, how could the ‘mine’ exist? The [yogin] is freed from [the idea] of ‘me’ and [the idea] of ‘mine’ by means of the suppression of ‘me’ and what is profitable to the ‘me.’
See [above, p. 735F] what has been said in the chapter on Dānapāramitā about the ātman, the cognizing (jānaka) or non-cognizing subject, and the active (kāraka) or non-active subject.

Since we cannot discover the characteristics of the ātman, we know that the ātman is absent in all dharmas. Since we know that there is no ātman in the dharmas, we cannot conceive the idea of ātman. Since there is no ātman, there cannot be an idea of ātmiya, ‘the idea of things belonging to the ātman’. When the ātman and the ātmiya have disappeared, there is no longer any bondage, and when there is no longer any bondage, that is nirvāṇa. This is why the yogin should cultivate the concept of non-self (anātmasaṃjñā).

IV. LINKS BETWEEN IMPERMANENCE, SUFFERING AND NON-SELF

Question. – Impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha) and non-self (anātman) are one single thing or they are three things. If they are only one thing, we should not speak of three. If they are three things, why did the Buddha [identify them] be saying: “That which is impermanent is suffering; that which is suffering is non-self” (yad anityam tad duḥkham, yad duḥkham tad anātma)? [231b]

Answer. – It is just one and the same thing, namely, the correct grasping of impure dharmas (sāsravadharmapratigraha) but, since the points of view differ, there are three distinct [terms]:

1) Anityasaṃjñā is associated with the aspect of impermanence (anityākārasamprayukta). – Duḥkhasaṃjñā is associated with the aspect of suffering (duḥkhākārāsamprayukta). – Anātmasaṃjñā is associated with the non-self aspect (anātmaṃkārāsamprayukta).

2) Anityā does not penetrate into the threefold world (traidhātuka). – Duḥkha makes known the defects (doṣa) of the threefold world. – Anātman is rejection of the world (lokaparityāga).

3) Anitya produces the mind of disgust (udvegacitta). – Duḥkha produces fear (bhaya). – Anātman tears up in order to liberate.

4) Concerning anitya, the Buddha said: “The five aggregates of attachment are impermanent” (pañcopādānakandhā anityāḥ). – Concerning duḥkha, the Buddha said: “That which is impermanent is suffering” (yad anityaṃ tad duḥkham). – Concerning anātman, the Buddha said: “That which is suffering is non-self” (yad duḥkham tad anātmā).

What is called ‘me’ and ‘mine’ being suppressed both externally as well as internally, the appropriation is destroyed and the destruction of the latter [results] in the destruction of birth.

These kārikās have nothing in common with the stanzas presented here by the Traité. Many other fanciful comparisons may also be found in the dissertation in question.

513 Anitya, duḥkha and anātmaṃka along with emptiness (śūnya) comprise the four aspects of the first noble Truth: above, p. 641F.
5) Concerning anitya, the Buddha spoke of the destruction of the five aggregates of attachment. – Concerning duḥkha, the Buddha said that it pierces the heart like an arrow (śalya). – Concerning anātman, the Buddha spoke of rejection (utsarjana).

6) Concerning anitya, he said that it destroys desire (tṛṣṇā). – Concerning duḥkha, he said that it destroys pride of self (asmināna). - Concerning anātman, he said that it destroys wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi).

7) Anitya dispels the view of eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭī). – Duḥkha dispels the view in which there is the happiness of nirvāṇa in the present lifetime. – Anātman dispels any possibility of attachment (abhiniveśasthāna).

8) Anityā is addressed to those who are attached to permanent things. – Duḥkha is addressed to those who imagine a possibility of happiness. – Anātman is addressed to those who imagine a stable Self.

[Anitya, duḥkha and anātman] are one notion with three different aspects.

The notion of non-self (anātmasamjñā) takes as its object (ālambate) the multiplicity of things (nānātva): see what was said with regard to the notion of suffering (duhkhasamjñā).

V. THE CONCEPT OF REVULSION TOWARD FOOD

When one notices that food arises from disgusting causes and conditions (aśubhahetuprathyāya), this is the notion of revulsion toward food (āhāre pratikūlasamjñā).515

Thus, meat (māmsa) comes from sperm (bīja), blood (śoṇīta) and urine (mūtra); it is the seat of pus (pūya) and worms (kṛmi). Ghee (ghṛta), milk (kṣīra) and curdled milk (dadhi), products of a transformation of blood, are nothing but rottenness.

The cook also adds to it his sweat and all kinds of dirt. When food is put into the mouth, the throat (mastaka) secretes disgusting saliva (singhāṇaka) that runs down from two channels, joins with the mucus

514 Saṃyutta, IV, p. 147-148, expresses itself in an analogous manner: Understanding and seeing the six senses, the six objects, the six consciousnesses and the six contacts as aniccato suppresses wrong views (micchādiṭṭhi); seeing them as dukkhato suppresses the belief in the ‘I’ (sakkāyadiṭṭhi); seeing them as anatta suppresses all speculation on the self (attānudiṭṭhi).

515 Cf. Anguttara, IV, p. 49: Āhāre paṭikūlasaṃṇānaparicitena bhikkuno cetasā bahulaṁ viharato rasataṇhāya cittaṁ paṭṭiyati paṭṭiṣṭati paṭṭivaṭṭati na sampasāriyati, upekkhā vā paṭikkulyatā vā saṃjhāti: “When a monk devotes himself deeply to reflection filled with disgust towards food, his mind escapes from desire for flavors, withdraws, shrivels up and is not released; indifference or repugnance is established.”
and then produces flavor (rasa). The food is thus formed like vomit (udara) where it is solidified by the earth [element] (prthivī), moistened by the water (ap), stirred by the wind (vāyu) and cooked by the fire (tejas). In the same way, when boiled rice (yavāgū) is cooked in a pot (sthālī), the dirt sinks to the bottom and the clean part stays at the surface. By means of a process similar to wine-brewing, the impurities are changed into excrement (viṣ) and the cleanliness into urine (mūtra).

The kidneys have three orifices. By means of the [internal] wind, the fatty juice spreads throughout the hundred veins (asirā), joins with the blood, coagulates and is changed into flesh (māṃsa).

From this new flesh arise fat (meda), bone (asthi) and marrow (majjam).

From that comes the organ of touch (kāyendriya). From the union of the recent flesh and the new flesh arise the five sense organs (pañcendriya). From the five sense organs arise the five consciousnesses (pañcavijñāna). From the five consciousnesses arises the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) which analyzes and grasps characteristics (nimittāny udgrhañāti) and distinguishes the beautiful from the ugly.

Next there arise the ideas of ‘me’ (ātman) and ‘mine’ (ātmīya), negative emotions (kleśa) and bad actions (nigha).

This is how the yogin meditates on food, the first and last causes of which involve many impurities (aśubha). He knows that his internal (ādhyātmika) four great elements (mahābhūta) are not different from the external (bāhya) four great elements, and it is only from the wrong view of the self (ātmadṛṣṭi) that the existence of the ‘I’ is created.

Furthermore, the yogin says to himself: “In order to make this food, somebody has worked very hard; he had to clear the land, plant, hoe, harvest, beat, grind, wash and cook. For a single bowl of cooked rice (odana), the laborers have combined oceans of sweat (sveda). If they are compared, the food is just a small amount but the sweat [poured forth to make it] is a huge amount. And this food that has required such great labor is nothing but bitter suffering. As soon as it is put into the mouth, it becomes dirt and is worth nothing. In the space of one night, it is changed into excrement and urine. At the beginning, it was a pleasant taste loved by people; changed into dirt, it is a disgusting thing that nobody wants.”

The yogin also says to himself: “If I am attached to this bad food, I will fall into hell (niraya) where I will have to swallow red-hot iron balls (ayogudā ādīptāh). Having come out of hell, I will become an animal

---

516 Salivary secretion influenced by the vegetative nervous system. The parotid or salivary glands are meant here, the excretory channel of which is called the Stenon channel, opening by a distinct orifice on either side (note by Dr. C. Harvengt).
517 The internal four great elements give the body solidity, liquidity, movement and warmth, respectively.
518 Rather than kidneys, what is meant here is the bladder which has three orifices, two upper orifices, the ureters which bring in the urine excreted by the kidneys, and a lower orifice, the urethra, by means of which it expels this urine outside at intervals at greater or lesser intervals (note by Dr. C. Harvengt).
519 Punishment reserved for a particular hell described above, p. 963F and note.
(tīryagyonyī), a cow (go), a sheep (edaka) or a camel (uṣṭra), and I will be acquitted of my former debt. Or else, I will be a pig (sūkara), a dog (kakkura) and I will always eat excrement.”

Thinking of food in this way engenders the notion of disgust (udvegasamīrṇā) and, by means of this disgust for food, one becomes disgusted with the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakārāmagunā).

[The brahmin who unwittingly ate disgusting cakes.] – There was a brahmin who practiced the rules of [alimentary] purity. Having to go to some unclean land on business, he thought: “How will I manage to avoid all this uncleanliness? It will be necessary for me to eat dry food and so I will be able to maintain my purity.”

He saw an old woman who was selling cakes of white marrow (meal, flour??) and said to her: “I have reason to stay here for about a hundred days. Make me these cakes regularly and bring them to me, I will pay you well.” Each day the old woman made the cakes and brought them to him. The brahmin liked their taste and was happy with this plentiful food.

At the beginning, the cakes made by the old woman were white, but later, little by little they lost their color (rūpa) and their taste. The brahmin asked the old woman what was the reason for this. She replied: “It is because the canker (gāṇḍa) is healed.” The brahmin asked her what she meant by this and the old woman answered: “At my house, a prostitute contracted a canker on her privy parts and we applied flour (saktu), ghee (ghṛta) and sweet herbs (yaśīmadhu) to it. The canker ripened, the pus (puyā) came out and mixed with the poultice. This happened every day and I made the cakes that I gave you with this: that is why they were so good. Now that the woman’s canker has healed, where am I going to find [the wherewithal to make them]?”

Having heard this, the brahmin struck his head with his fists, beat his breast, vomited and shouted: “How can I say how much I have violated the rules of [alimentary] purity? But now my business is settled.” Leaving all his affairs, he returned in haste to his native land.

It is the same for the yogin. He is attached to food and drink, is joyful and loves to eat. Seeing the beautiful colors of the food, its softness, its aroma and its taste, he does not think about the impurities (asūbha). Later when he has to undergo the painful retribution (duḥkhavipāka), how great will be his repentance (kaucṛtya)! If he can see the beginning and the end (pūrvāparānta) of food, he produces a mind of disgust (udvegacitta) and, eliminating the desire for food (āhāratṛṣṇā), he rejects the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakārāmagunā). Completely detached (vīrakta) from the happiness of the world of desire (kāmadhātu), he cuts through these five objects and is also free from the five fetters of lower rank (pañcāvarabhāgīyasanyojana).522

520 Mahāvyut., no. 5802.
521 Adopting the variant wou in place of sseu.
522 The five fetters favorable to “the lower part”, i.e., to kāmadhātu, either prevent one from leaving of this world or make one return to it. These are belief in the self (satkāyadrṣṭi), unjustified trust in the efficacy of rituals and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa), doubt (viciktis), love of pleasure (kāmacchanda) and
For all these reasons and these disadvantages [of food], the yogin no longer loves it and is no longer attached to it: This is what is called the notion of repugnance toward food (āhāre pratikūlasamjñā).

VI. LOGICAL ORDER OF THE TEN CONCEPTS

Question. – Anityasamjñā, duhkhasamjñā, anātmasamjñā are associated with a pure wisdom (anāśravaprajñā) whereas the four following concepts, āhāre pratikūlasamjñā, [sarvaloke ‘nabhiritasamjñā, maranāsamjñā and aśucisamjñā] are [232a] associated with an impure wisdom (sāśravaprajñā). Why does [the sūtra] speak of them secondly?

Answer. – The Buddhist doctrine consists of a twofold path: i) the path of seeing the Truths (darśanamārga) and ii) the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga).

In the path of seeing the Truths, by using the three notions [of anitya, duhkha and anāman], the yogin destroys wrong views (mithyādyṛṣṭi), obtains the quality of ārya, but is not yet detached from desire (virakta).

It is with this detachment (vairāgya) in mind that, after having spoken of the first three notions, the sūtra now speaks of the four intermediate notions: āhāre pratikūlasamjñā, [sarvaloke ‘nabhiritasamjñā, maranāsamjñā and aśucisamjñā] by means of which the yogin succeeds in freeing himself from the afflictions, lust, etc. (rāgādikleśa).

Thus the first three notions are features of the path of seeing the Truths (satyadarśanamārga), the four intermediate notions are features of the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga) and the last three notions [prahānasamjñā, vairāgyasamjñā and nirodhasamjñā] are features of the path of the saints who have nothing more to train in (asaikṣamārga).

In starting to practice the foundation of mindfulness of the body (kāyasmṛtyupasthāna), the yogin still has some notion of revulsion toward food but, as he rarely uses it, the Buddha did not speak of it. Here, so that the sotāpāpanna and sakṛdāgamin can escape from desire, the Buddha, having spoken about anātmasamjñā [the third notion on the list], now speaks of the four [intermediate] notions beginning with āhāre pratikūlasamjñā.

VII. THE CONCEPT OF DISSATISFACTION TOWARD THE ENTIRE WORLD


523 An allusion to the Satipaṭṭhānasutta of Majjhima, I, p. 55-63, which is silent about revulsion toward food.
Notion of dissatisfaction toward the entire world (sarvaloke ‘nabhirati). – If one thinks about the world, its sense pleasures (kāmaguṇa), sweet tastes (rasa), chariots, fine garments, warm rooms, gardens, houses and all kinds of pleasant things, one has a notion of contentment (abhiratisャṃjñā). If one thinks of the misfortunes and misdeeds of the world, the mind has a notion of dislike (udvegasamjñā). What are the ills of the world?

The ills of the world are of two types 1) beings (sattva); ii) lands (pradeśa).

1. Evils and wickedness of beings

a. Beings have eight kinds of evils and torments: 1) birth (jāti), 2) old age (jāra), 3) sickness (vyādhi), 4) death (marana), 5) being separated from what one loves (priyaviprayoga), 6) gaining what one does not love (apriyasaṃprayoga), 7) not getting what one wants (yad apīcchan paryesamāno na labhate), 8) in short, the five aggregates of attachment are suffering (samksiptena pañcopādanaskandhā dukkham).

b. As for the wickedness of beings:

Out of excessive lust (rāgabāhulyāt), they do not differentiate between beauty and ugliness; they do not follow the teachings of their parents and teachers; they have no shame (hrī) or modesty (apatrāpya) and are not different from the animals.

Out of excessive hatred (dvesabāhulyāt), they do not differentiate between the light (laghu) and the heavy (guru); enraged by the poison of anger (krodhaviṣa), they go so far as to refuse the Buddha’s word; they do not want to hear the Dharma; they are not afraid of the bad destinies (durgati); they inflict violent beatings; they do not care about others’ sufferings and, entering into the great shadows (mahātamas), they see nothing more.

Out of excessive ignorance (mohabāhulyāt), they do not find the means of realizing what they are looking for; they do not understand the causes of things, as if they were trying to get milk (kṣīra) from a horn (viśāna).

Enveloped by ignorance (avidhyāvṛta), even if they are in the light of the sun, they will never see anything.

Out of excessive greed (mātsaryabāhulyāt), their house is like a tomb which nobody comes near.

---

524 Excerpt from the Sermon of Benares: Pāli Vinaya. I, p. 10; Catuspāriṣad, p. 158; Mahāvastu, III, p. 332; Lalitavistara, p. 417; Mahāvyut., no. 2223-2240.

525 Rejection of the holy Dharma (saddharmapratikṣeṇa) is a particularly serious fault: cf. Sarvadharmavapulaśaṃgrahasūtra cited in Śīkṣāsamuccaya, p. 95, and Pañjikā, p.147.

526 Canonical comparison (Majjhima, III, p. 141: Seyyathāpi puriso kūrattiko kūragavesī khūraparīyasaṇaḥ caramāno gāvīm taruvaccham visūṇato avinjeyya... abhabho kūṛassa adhigamanīya.
Out of excessive pride and haughtiness (mānastambha), they do not honor the saints (ārya) and do not venerate their parents.

Careless (pramatta), they ruin themselves and have no honesty.

Out of excessive wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭibhūḥ), they do not believe in the present existence (ihajanman) or in the future existence (parajanman), they do not believe in sin (āpatti) or merit (punya), and it is impossible to live with them.

All these afflictions abounding in them, these wretched people have no uprightness. Their sins are numerous, they commit the five heinous crimes of immediate retribution (pañcānantarya): sometimes they kill their father and mother; sometimes they wound the saints; sometimes they demand special honors, they slander faithful and celibate people and they are an offense to their kinsmen.

Furthermore, of the beings inhabiting the world, honest people (sādhu) are rare and evil people (durjana) are numerous.

It may be that people of good conduct are poor, lowly and ugly, and it may be that rich good-looking people are of bad conduct. It may be that those who love to give are poor and without resources, and it may be that rich [232b] fortunate people are miserly, greedy and unwilling to give.

If people see a thoughtful man silent and not speaking, they say that he is proud, haughty and does not want to serve. If they see an obliging man, benevolent and charitable, they say he is deceitful and a toady. If they see an eloquent orator, they accuse him of being dependent on inadequate knowledge and consider him to be proud.

If they see a simple straightforward honest man, they all join up to deceive him, subjugate him, direct him and tyrannize him. If they see an easy gentle man, they join up to despise him, trample him underfoot and treat him impolitely. If they see a man observing pure morality, they accuse him of hypocritical behavior, scorn him and do not respect him.

Such people are perverts and unlovable.

2. Wretchedness of lands

Wretchedness of lands. – All lands are filled with calamities and disadvantages: heat and cold (śītosna), hunger and thirst (ksutipīḍa), sickness, epidemics, malaria, suffering, old age, sickness, death, fears; there is no country free of them. Anywhere you go, all these evils follow you and there is no place where you can avoid them. Although there are wealthy peaceful lands, many are tormented by the defilements (kleśa) and do not deserve the name of happy lands. All involve the two kinds of suffering, bodily suffering (kāyika duḥkha) and mental suffering (caitasika duḥkha); no land is free of them. Thus it is said:

There are lands that are too cold,
There are lands that are too hot,
There are lands without safety and protection,
There are lands where the miseries abound.

There are lands perpetually in famine (durbiṣka),
There are lands where sicknesses are abundant,
There are lands where merit is not cultivated.

Thus there is no happy place.

As beings and lands have all these troubles, it is said that there is no happiness in the world (loka).

The ills of the desire realm (kāmadhātu) are such [as we have spoken of], but when one dies in the two higher realms [rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu] and falls back down here, one suffers even greater humiliation than in this lower world: thus, when one falls from a very high place, one is smashed to pieces and crushed.

Question. – What are the differences between anitya, duḥkha and anātmasaṃjñā on the one hand and sarvaloke ‘nabhiratisaṃjñā on the other hand, and why speak of them separately?

Answer. – There are two kinds of consideration (anupaśyanā): i) a general consideration (samastānupaśyanā), ii) a specific consideration (bhinnānupaśyanā). The first three concepts are of the general order whereas [the concept of the world] is of specific order.527

Furthermore, there are two kinds of consideration: i) consideration about things (dharmaṃupaśyanā), and ii) consideration about beings (sattvānupaśyanā). The first three concepts are a consideration consisting of disapproval of all things, whereas here, the concept of the world is considering the wickedness and the troubles of beings: it is not the same.

Furthermore, the first three notions are the pure path (anāsravamarga),528 whereas the concept of the world belongs to the impure path (sāsravamārga).

Finally, the first three notions are of the path of seeing the Truths (satyadarśanamārga) whereas the concept of the world is of the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga).

Thus there are many differences. The concept of dissatisfaction in regard to the entire world (sarvaloke ‘nabhiratisaṃjñā) is included in all the levels (sarvabhūmisamgrhita) and bears upon the dharmas of the threefold world.

VIII. THE CONCEPTS OF DEATH AND IMPURITY

527 The concepts of anitya and duḥkha include all conditioned dharmas (samskṛta) and the concept of anātma includes all dharmas without exception: they therefore have as object all dharmas inclusively.

The concept of sarvaloke ‘nabhirati is concerned only with beings (sattva) and lands (pradeśa).

528 Because they involve detachment in regard to the threefold world.
On the concept of death (maranāsamjñā), see what has been said above (p. 1422F) about maraṇānusmrī.

On the concept of impurity (aśucisamjñā), see what has been said above (p. 1151F) about kāyasmṛtyupasthāna.

IX. THE CONCEPTS OF RENUNCIATION, DETACHMENT AND CESSATION

[232c] The concepts of renunciation (prahāṇasamjñā), detachment (virāgasamjñā) and cessation (nirodhasamjñā) have the characteristics (nimitta) of nirvāṇa as object (ālambante).529 Because the latter cuts through the fetters (saṃyojana), there is the notion of renunciation; because it renounces the fetters, there is the notion of detachment; because it suppresses the fetters, there is the notion of cessation.

Question. – If that is so, one single notion would suffice; why then mention three?

Answer. – It is again a matter of one and the same thing spoken of in three different ways as was the case above (p. 1452F), where it was said: That which is impermanent is suffering and that which is suffering is impermanent.” It is the same here where the wickedness and the miseries of the entire world are so heavy that they are condemned in three ways. When a huge tree is being cut down, it is impossible to cut it down using just one saw. Since nirvāṇa is an excellent (pranīta) dharma not yet attained previously (apūrvaprāpta), it is praised in diverse ways: hence the notions of renunciation (prahāṇasamjñā), detachment (virāgasamjñā) and cessation (nirodhasamjñā).

Furthermore, as nirvāṇa cuts through the three poisons (triviṣa), it is called abandonment (prahāṇa); as it abandons desire (rāga), it is called detachment (virāga), and as it suppresses all suffering to the point that it no longer arises, it is called cessation (nirodha).

Furthermore, during the preparatory path (prayogamārga) consisting of heat (usmagata), summits (mūrdhan), patience (kṣānti) and the supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma),530 the yogin who has

529 Anguttara, V, p. 110-111, defines these three concepts in the following way: Idh’ Ānanda bhikkhu uppannaṃ kāma-vitakko nādhivāseti pajahati vinodeti vyantīkaroti ...taṃhakkhayo nirodho nibbānan ti. Ayaṃ vucat’ Ānanda nirodhasanāṃ. Transl. – Here, O Ānanda, the monk refuses, abandons, removes, destroys and suppresses the thoughts of desire, malice, harm and wicked bad dharmas when they arise: this is the concept of abandonment.

Then the monk, withdrawn into the forest, under a tree or in an empty house, reflects and says to himself: The pacification of all the formations, the rejection of all conditionings, the destruction of desire, cessation, nirvāṇa, is a good thing, is an excellent thing: this is detachment.

Finally, the monk, withdrawn into the forest, etc. … : this is the concept of cessation.

Note that this sūtra defines detachment and cessation in the same terms. These concepts are synonyms of nirvāṇa.

530 The four aids to insight (nirvedhabhāgīya) discussed above, p. 495F, 1067F, 1411F.
The vision of the correct knowledge (samyagjñāna), moves away from the defilements (kleśa): that is the notion of detachment (virāgasamjñā). – Obtaining the pure path (anāsravamārga), he cuts the fetters (samyojana): that is the notion of renunciation (prahāṇasamjñā). – When he enters into nirvāṇa, he suppresses the five aggregates of attachment (pañcopādānaskandha) that will be continued no longer: that is the notion of cessation (nirodhasamjñā).

The notion of renunciation is nirvāṇa-with-residue (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa); the notion of cessation is nirvāṇa-without-residue (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa); the notion of detachment is the means (upāya), the door, to both nirvāṇas.

These three concepts, sometimes impure (sāsrava) and sometimes pure (anāsrava), are included (sāngṛhīta) in all the stages (bhūmi).
CHAPTER XXXVIII: THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES, THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS AND THE THREE FACULTIES (p. 1465F)

First Section THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES

PRELIMINARY NOTE

According to the oldest sources, the Buddhist texts call for a number of knowledges (Sanskrit, jñāna; Pāli, ṇāna) which the scholastics will do their utmost to classify and define.

I. THE TEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE SŪTRAPITAKA

Attempts at classification are relatively rare:

1. The suttas of the Nānassa vaṭṭhūṇi of the Samyutta, II, p. 56-60 (Tsa a han, T 99, no. 356-357, k. 14, p. 99c19-100a11) propose two classes of ṇāna, one of 44 and the other of 77 units. The first results from attributing to each of the eleven members of the causal chain – from jarāmarana to saṅkhāra – four knowledges relating to suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path to its cessation, which gives a total of 4 x 11 = 44. The second class results from attributing seven more knowledges to each of the same members, so 7 x 11 = 77.

2. Other more important groupings are also given by the Sūtrapitaka:

a. Four knowledges concerning: i) things (dhamme ṇānam), ii) consequences (anvaye ṇānam), iii) analysis of another’s mind (paricchede ṇānam = paresaṃ cittaparicchede ṇānaṃ), iv) conventions (sammutiṅānam), respectively: cf. Dīgha, III, p. 226, 277; Vibhaṅga, p. 315, 330.

b. Four other knowledges, altogether constituting right view (sammādiṭṭhi) and concerning i) suffering (duḥkhe ṇānam), ii) its origin (samudaye ṇānam), iii) its cessation (nirodhe ṇānam), iv) the path to its cessation (mārge or nirodhayāniyā paiṭipadāya ṇānam): cf. Dīgha, II, p. 312; III, p. 227; Majjhima, III, p. 251; Samyutta, V, p. 8-9, 430: Paṭisambhidā, I, p. 41, 118, 133; Vibhaṅga, p. 104, 235, 293, 315, 328; Dhammasaṅgaṇī, p. 189.

c. Two knowledges, belonging to the arhat, concerning cessation of the impurities (khaye ṇānam) and their non-rearising in the future (anuppāde ṇānam) respectively: cf. Dīgha, III, p. 214, 274.

Later scholasticism, adding the three groups together, will posit the category of ten knowledges.
II. THE TEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE SANSKRIT ABHIDHARMA

Working with the canonical sources that have been presented above, the Sanskrit Abhidharma established a list of ten knowledges, one of the masterpieces of the Sarvāstvādīn-Vaihāsīka school. These are:

1) dharmajñāna,
2) anvayajñāna,
3) paracittajñāna,
4) samvṛtiṃjñāna,
5) duḥkhajñāna,
6) samudayajñāna,
7) nirodhajñāna,
8) mārgajñāna,
9) kṣayajñāna,
10) anutpādajñāna.

This list, the order of which is sometimes slightly modified, appears on the following texts:

1. Vasumitra’s Abhidharmaprakaraṇapāda, T 1541, k. 1, p. 628b7-c6; T 1542, k. 1, p. 693c22-694a14. Extracts of the original Sanskrit are cited by the Kośavyākhyā, p. 616, l. 29-617, l. 27.
2. Kātyāyanīputra’s Abhidharmajñānaprathāna, T 1543, K. 12, p. 829c; T 1544, k. 9, p. 963c.
3. Dharmatrāta’s Saṃyuktabhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 817a11-b5.
4. Ghoṣaka’s Abhidharmāṛtarasa, T 1553, k. 1, p. 974a5-6 (reconstr. Sastri, p. 89, l. 3-4).
9. Samghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 73, p. 735c8-10.
10. Abhidharmadīpa, p. 374.

In these texts there are precise definitions of these ten jñāna: those of the Abhidharmaprakaraṇapāda (T 1542, p. 693c23-694a15) partially cited in the Kośavyākhyā, p. 616, l. 29-617, l. 27 are presented here:
1. Dhamrajñānaṃ katamat. kāmapratisyukteṣu saṃskāreṣu yad amāsravam ... 8. ... jñānam idam icyate 'nvayajñānam.


Transl. from the Chinese. – 1. What is the knowledge of things (dharmajñāna)? The knowledge of things is: i) the pure knowledge concerning the formations associated with the desire realm; ii) the pure knowledge concerning the cause of the formations associated with the desire realm; iii) the pure knowledge concerned with the cessation of the formations associated with the desire realm; iv) the pure knowledge concerned with the path leading to the cessation of the formations associated with the desire realm; v) the knowledge concerned with the knowledge of things and the stage {Fr. terre} of the knowledge of things is also called knowledge of things.

2. What is subsequent knowledge (anvayajñāna)? Subsequent knowledge is: i) the pure knowledge concerning the formations associated with the form realm and the formless realm; ii) the pure knowledge concerning the cause of the formations associated with the form realm and the formless realm; iii) the pure knowledge concerning the cessation of the formations associated with the form realm and the formless realm; iv) the pure knowledge concerning the paths leading to the cessation of the formations associated with the form realm and the formless realm; v) the pure knowledge concerning the subsequent knowledge and the stage of subsequent knowledge is also called consecutive knowledge.

3. What is the knowledge of another’s mind (paracittajñāna)? Realized by cultivation of the knowledges (jñānabhāvanā), it is the support (niraya) of the fruit of this cultivation. Obtained by this cultivation, it is an unimpeded knowledge (apratihatajñāna) concerning another’s mind (citta) and mental events (caitta) associated with the desire realm and also in part with the pure (anaāsrava) mind and mental events of another.

4. What is conventional knowledge (saṃvṛtijñāna)? It is all the impure knowledges (sarvasāsravajñāna).

5. What is the knowledge of suffering (duḥkhajñāna)? It is the pure knowledge produced when the five aggregates of attachment are considered to be impermanent, painful, empty and without self.

6. What is the knowledge of the origin of suffering (samudayajñāna)? It is the pure knowledge produced when the cause of impure things is considered as cause, origin, production and condition.

7. What is the knowledge of the cessation of suffering (nirodhajñāna)? It is the pure knowledge produced when this cessation is considered as cessation, peace, excellent and bringing salvation.

8. What is the knowledge of the path of cessation of suffering (mārgajñāna)? It is the pure knowledge produced when the path is considered as path, logical, the definitive attainment and exit.

9. What is the knowledge of the suppression of the impurities (kṣayajñāna)? It is the pure knowledge produced when one thinks: “Suffering has been completely known by me; the origin has been abandoned by me; the cessation has been realized by me; the path has been practiced by me”: it is a knowledge, a seeing, a science, an intelligence, a light, an understanding.
10. What is the knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities (anutpāda-jñāna)? It is the pure knowledge produced when one thinks: “The suffering perfectly known by me is no longer to be known; the origin abandoned by me is no longer to be abandoned; the cessation realized by me is no longer to be realized; the path practiced by me is no longer to be practiced”: it is a knowledge, a seeing, a science, an intelligence, a light, an understanding.

**III THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES IN THE MAHĀYĀNA**

The Mahāyāna retains the list of ten knowledges established by the Sanskrit Abhidharma but gives it a very different interpretation and adds an eleventh knowledge at the end.

1. Lists of Eleven Knowledges in the Prajñāpāramitās in Sanskrit

List A appears in the Pañcaviṃśati, ed. N. Dutt, p. 208, l. 23—209, l. 1. It should also be on p. 20 of the same editions but the text is corrupt.

List B appears in the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā, ed. E. Conze, p. 193, l. 18-23, and the Śatasāhasrikā, ed. P. Ghosa, p. 61, l. 6-62, l. 16; p. 1440, l. 10-13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List A</th>
<th>List B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. duḥka-</td>
<td>1. duḥkha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. samudaya-</td>
<td>2. samudaya-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. nirodha-</td>
<td>3. nirodha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. mārga-</td>
<td>4. mārga-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. kṣaya-</td>
<td>5. kṣaya-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. anutpāda-</td>
<td>6. anutpāda-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. dharma-</td>
<td>7. dharma-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. anvaya-</td>
<td>8. anvaya-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. saṃvyṛti-</td>
<td>9. saṃvyṛti-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. parijaya-</td>
<td>10. paricaya-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. yathārūta-jñāna</td>
<td>11. yāthārūta-jñāna.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last two numbers are problematic:
Paricaya- or parijaya-jñāna. – For the meaning of the word, see Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 322; Conze, Materials, p. 245. The Pañcaviṃśati defines it as pratipatparijayajñāna ‘cognition of the mastery of the path’ according to Conze. The Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1441, l. 20, defines it as pratipaksajñāna ‘knowledge of the antidote’. Neither of these definitions is satisfactory. But if we proceed by elimination, it is clear that in the list of the ten knowledges paricaya or parajayajñāna, whichever the orthography of the word, can here only designate the paracittajñāna ‘knowledge of another’s mind’ rendered in the Pāli sources given above by the terms paricchede ṇānaṃ or cittaparicchede ṇānaṃ.

Yathārutajñāna. – Taken out of context, the expression can only mean ‘knowledge that conforms to the expression’. But the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 209, l. 9 and the Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1441, l. 21, defines it as tathāgatasya sarvakārānātājñānam ‘knowledge of all aspects of the consciousness belonging to the Tathāgata’. If this explanation is valid, then I [Lamotte] think the reading yathārutajñāna should be corrected to yathābhūtaajñāna ‘consciousness conforming to reality’, the variant attested by some Chinese versions.

2. Lists of the eleven knowledges in the Chinese Prajñāpāramitās


It should be noted that Kumārajīva calls the eleventh knowledge yathābhūtaajñāna whereas Hiuan-tsang always give it the reading yathārutajñāna.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List A</th>
<th>List B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. dharma-</td>
<td>1. duḥkha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. anvaya-</td>
<td>2. samudaya-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. paracitta-</td>
<td>3. nirodha-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. saṃvṛti-</td>
<td>4. mārga-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. duḥkha-</td>
<td>5. kṣaya-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. samudaya-</td>
<td>6. anutpāda-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. nirodha-</td>
<td>7. dharma-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. mārga-</td>
<td>8. anvaya-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. Definition of the eleven knowledges in the Prajñāpāramitās

This will be found in the following recensions:

3. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1440, l. 13-1441, l. 22.

Here I [Lamotte] limit myself to restoring the Pañcaviṃśati translated by Kumārajīva, T 223, k. 5, p. 254c21-255a4, into Sanskrit:

1. Tatra katamad duḥkhajñānam. yad duḥkhasya-anutpādajñānam idam ucyate ... 11. ... tathāgatasya sarvakāraṣṭaṇājñānam idam ucyate yathābhūtajñānam.

Transl. – 1. What is the knowledge of suffering? It is the knowledge of the non-production of suffering.

2. What is the knowledge of the origin of suffering? It is the knowledge of the abandonment of this origin.

3. What is the knowledge of the cessation of suffering? It is the knowledge of the original cessation of this suffering.

4. What is the knowledge of the path of cessation of suffering? It is the awareness of the noble eightfold Path.

5. What is the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities? It is the knowledge of cessation of lust, hatred and ignorance.

6. What is the knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities? It is the knowledge of the non-production of these impurities in the Blessed One.

7. What is the knowledge of things? It is the knowledge consisting of the discerning of [the characteristics, impermanence, etc.] of these things.

8. What is subsequent knowledge? It is the knowledge consisting of saying: “The eye is impermanent” and so on up to “Mind, contact, co-dependent production and feeling are impermanent.”

9. What is conventional knowledge? It is the knowledge of the name of causes and conditions.

10. What is the knowledge of another’s mind? It is to know the minds of other beings and other individuals by means of the mind.
11. What is knowledge conforming to reality? It is the knowledge, belonging to the Tathāgata, of the consciousness of all the aspects.

These explanations are exactly opposite to the definitions given above by the Sanskrit Abhidharma: they represent the Mahāyānist point of view and are commented on by the Traité in turn: below, p. 1483F and later, k. 27, p. 257c14-16; k. 48, p. 406b-c; k. 84, p. 650c9-15; k. 99, p. 749a14.

[k. 23, p. 232c]

Sūtra (cf. Śatasāhasrikā, p. 61, l. 6-62, l. 16). – [The bodhisattva-mahāsattva must fulfill completely] the eleven knowledges (ekādaśa jñānāni):

1. the knowledge of things (dharma-jñāna),
2. subsequent knowledge (anvaya-jñāna),
3. the knowledge of another’s mind (paracittajñāna),
4. conventional knowledge (samvrtijñāna),
5. the knowledge of suffering (duḥkhajñāna),
6. the knowledge of the origin of suffering (samudajñāna),
7. the knowledge of the cessation of suffering (nirodhajñāna),
8. the knowledge of the path of the cessation of suffering (mārgajñāna),
9. the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (ksayajñāna),
10. the knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities (anupādajñāna),
11. the knowledge conforming to reality (yathabhūtajñāna).

Śāstra. – I. DEFINITION OF THE ELEVEN KNOWLEDGES

1. The knowledge of things (dharma-jñāna) is:

a. the pure knowledge concerning things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusamprayukteṣu dharmeṣu yad anāsravam jñānam).

b. the pure knowledge concerning the cause of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusamprayuktānām darmacetaḥ hetau yad anāsravam jñānam).

c. the pure knowledge concerning the cessation of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusamprayuktānām dharmānām nirode yad anāsravam jñānam).

d. the pure knowledge concerning the path leading to the cessation of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhātusamprayuktānāh dharmānām prahānāya mārgaḥ yad anāsravam jñānam).
e. also the pure knowledge concerning the knowledge of the things themselves and its stage (api khalu dharmañjña ne dharmañjña nabhamau ca yad anśravam jñānam).

2. It is the same for the subsequent knowledge (anvayajñāna) concerning [things associated] with the form realm and the formless realm (rūpārūpyasahāt usesaprayukta dharmeṣu).

3. The knowledge of another’s mind (paracittajñāna) cognizes:

a. the mind (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharmā) relating to the desire realm and the form realm (kāmārūpadhānusprayukta) presently belonging to others,

b. also a small part of their pure minds and mental events (anśravacittacaitta).

4. Conventional knowledge (samyuktajñāna) is all of the impure knowledges (sarvasaśravajñāna).

5. The knowledge of suffering (dukkhajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced when the five aggregates of attachment are considered as impermanent, suffering, empty and without self (pañcopādānakandhān anityato dukkhataḥ śūnyato ānāmataḥ ca manasikurvato yad anśravam jñānam).

6. The knowledge of the origin of suffering (samudayaṁ ānām) is the pure knowledge produced when the cause of impure dharma is considered as cause, origin, successive and associated causation (sāravahetukaḥ hetutab samudayaṁ prabhavataḥ pratyayataḥ ca manasikurvato yad anśravam jñānam).

7. The knowledge of the cessation of suffering (nirodhajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced by considering this cessation as cessation, peaceful, excellent and bringing salvation (nirodham nirodhataḥ śāntataḥ pranītataḥ niḥsaranataḥ ca manasikurvato yad anśravam jñānam).

8. The knowledge of the path of cessation (mārgajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced by considering this path as path, logical, attainment and ultimate exit (mārgam mārgaḥ nyāyataḥ pratipattito nairṛṇikataḥ ca manasikurvato yad anśravam jñānam).

9. The knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (kṣayajñāna = āśravakṣaya-jñāna) is the pure knowledge produced by thinking: “Suffering is completely known by me (dukkham me pariṣṭānaṁ); the origin has been abandoned by me (samudayo mārgaṁ); cessation has been realized by me (nirodho mārgaṁ sāksātkṛtaṁ); the path has been practiced by me (mārgo me bhāvitaṁ)”; it [223a] is a wisdom (prajñā), a seeing (darśana), a knowing (vidyā), an understanding (buddhi).

10. The knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities (anupādajñāna) is the pure knowledge produced by thinking: “The suffering completely known by me is no longer to be known (dukkham me pariṣṭānaṁ na pariṣṭātavyam); the origin abandoned by me is no longer to be abandoned (samudayo mārgaṁ na prabhātavayam); the cessation realized by me is no longer to be realized (nirodho mārgaṁ sāksātānte na sāksātākātyayam); the path practiced by me is no longer to be practiced (mārgo me bhāvitaṁ nabhāvitavyam)”; it is a wisdom (prajñā), a seeing (darśana), a knowing (vidyā), an understanding (buddhi).
11. The wisdom conforming to reality (yathābhūtajñāna) is a knowledge conforming exactly to reality and free of obstacles (apratihata) concerning the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) of all dharmas.

B. The Ten Knowledges According to the Abhidharam

1. Objects of the ten knowledges

1) Dharmajñāna has as object (ālamabate): a. things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhūtusamprayuktā dharmāḥ); b. the cause of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhūtusamprayuktānām dharmāṇāḥ hetuḥ); c. the cessation of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhūtusamprayuktānām dharmāṇām nirodhāḥ); d. the path leading to the cessation of things associated with the desire realm (kāmadhūtusamprayuktānām dharmāṇām prahāṇāya mārgaḥ).

2) Anvayajñāna is similar, [with the difference that it concerns the things of rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu, their cause, their cessation and the path to their cessation].

3) Saṃvritijñāna has as object all the dharmas.

4) Paracittajñāna has as object the mind (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharmā), impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), occurring in the mind of another.

5-6) Duḥkhajñāna and samudayajñāna have as object the five aggregates of attachment (upādānakandha).

7) Nirodhajñāna has as object the cessation (niruddha) [of suffering].

8) Mārgajñāna has as object the five pure elements (pāñcāsraisonaskandha).

9-10) Kṣayajñāna and annutpādajñāna together have as object the four truths (catusatya).

2. Pure and impure knowledges

Of the ten knowledges, one is impure (sāsrava), [namely, saṃvritijñāna], eight are pure (anāsrava) and one, namely, paracittajñāna, should be set apart since it is impure when it has an impure mind as object and pure when it has a pure mind as object.

3. Mutual inclusion of the ten knowledges

1) Dharmajñāna contains (saṃgrhaṇī): a. dharmajñāna [properly called],

531 Compare Prakaraṇapāda, T 1542, k. 1, p. 694b4-c4; Kośa, VII, p. 5seq.; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 377, l. 1-378, l. 6.
533 Cf. Prakaraṇapāda, T 1542, k. 1, p. 694c5-19; Kośa, vii, p. 11-12.
b. a small part, [namely, the part relating to kāmadhātu] of the paracittajñāna, of the duḥkhajñāna, of the samudayajñāna, of the nirodhajñāna, of the mārgajñāna, of the kṣayajñāna and of the anutpādajñāna.

2) Anvayajñāna, the same [replacing ‘the part relating to kāmadhātu’ with ‘the part relating to rūpa- and ārūpyadhātu’].

3) Saṃvṛtijñāna contains:
   a. saṃvṛtijñāna [properly called],
   b. a small part of paracittajñāna, [namely, the impure part (sāsrava) of paracittajñāna].

4) Paracittajñāna contains:
   a. paracittajñāna [properly called],
   b. a small part [namely, that found in the mind of another] of dharmajñāna, of anvayajñāna, of saṃvṛtijñāna, of mārgajñāna, of kṣayajñāna and of anutpādajñāna.

5) Duḥkajñāna contains:
   a. suhkhajñāna [properly called],
   b. a small part, [that which has as object the truth of suffering], of dharmajñāna, of anvayajñāna, of kṣayajñāna, and of anutpādajñāna.

6-7) Samudayajñāna and nirodhajñāna are explained on the same principle.

8) Mārgajñāna contains:
   a. mārgajñāna [properly called],
   b. a small part, [that which has the truth of the path as object], of dharmajñāna, of anvayajñāna, of paracittajñāna, of kṣayajñāna, and of anutpādajñāna.

9) Kṣayajñāna contains:
   a. kṣayajñāna [properly called],
   b. a small part, [that having as object the suppression of the impurities], of dharmajñāna, of anvayajñāna, of paracittajñāna, of duḥkhajñāna, and of mārgajñāna.

10) Anutpādajñāna is explained according to the same principle.

4. The associates of the ten knowledges
   [a. The faculties (indriya).]
i) Nine knowledges are associated (śāntīprayukta) with eight faculties (indriya), excluding the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya), the faculty of dissatisfaction (daurmanasyendriya) and the faculty of displeasure (duḥkhendriya).534

ii) Samvrtijñāna is associated with ten faculties, excluding the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya).

[b. The concentrations (samādhi).]

i) Dharmajñāna, anvayajñāna and duḥkhajñāna are associated with the samadhi of emptiness (śānyatāsamādhi).

ii) Dharmajñāna, anvayajñāna, nirodhajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are associated with the samādhi of signlessness (ānimittasamādhi).

iii) Dharmajñāna, anvayajñāna, paracittajñāna, duḥkkhajñāna, samudayajñāna, mārgajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are associated with the samadhi of wishlessness (apranihitasamādhi).

[c. The concepts (saṃjñā).]

i) Dharmajñāna, anvayajñāna, samvrtijñāna, duḥkhajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are associated [with three concepts from the group of the ten concepts mentioned on p. 1433F]: the concept of impermanence (ānityasamājñā), the concept of suffering (duḥkhasamajñā) and the concept of non-self (anatmatasamajñā).

ii) Samvrtijñāna is associated with the four intermediate concepts [of the same group, namely, the concept of the repugnant nature of food (āhāre pratikālasamajñā), the concept of displeasure in respect to the whole world (sarvaloke ‘nabhiratsamajñā), the concept of death (marāṇasamajñā) and the concept of impurity (āsucisamajñā)].

iii) Dharmajñāna, anutpādajñāna, nirodhajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna are associated with the three final concepts [of the same group, namely, the concept of abandonment (prahāṇasamajñā), the concept of detachment (virāgasamajñā) and the concept of cessation (niruddhasamajñā)].

Some say that samvrtijñāna is sometimes associated with the concept of detachment (virāgasamajñā).

5. Mutual consciousness of the ten knowledges.535

Dharmajñāna has as object (ālambate) nine knowledges, excluding anvayajñāna. The same for anvayajñāna, [excluding dharmajñāna].

Samvrtijñāna, paracittajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna have as object the ten knowledges. [233b]

Duḥkhajñāna and samudayajñāna have as object samvrtijñāna and the impure (sāsrava) paracittajñāna.

---


535 Cf. Saṃyuktābhidharma, T 1552, k. 6, p. 920b10-25; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 974c8-12 (reconstr by Sastri, p. 92, l. 9-14); Kośa, VII, p. 43; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 377, l. 1-9.
Nirodhajñāna does not bear upon any knowledge.

Mārgajñāna has as object nine knowledges, excluding āsmṛtijñāna.

6. Aspects of the ten knowledges

Dharmajñāna and anvayajñāna have the sixteen aspects (śoḍaśakāra) [of the four noble Truths (p. 641F)].

Paracitajñāna has four aspects: [those of the truth of the Path (mārgasatya)].

Duḥkha-, samudaya-, nirodha- and mārgajñāna have each of the four aspects [of their respective truths].

Kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna both have fourteen aspects, excluding the empty aspect (śūnyākāra) and the non-self aspect (anātmakāra).

Samvṛtijñāna, when it occurs in heat (uṣmagata), summits (mūrdhan) and patience (kṣānti), has sixteen aspects. When it occurs in supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma), samvṛtijñāna has four aspects, [those of the truth of the path (mārgasatya)].

7. Acquisition of the ten knowledges in the darśana- and aśaikṣamārga

A. In the darśanamārga.

1) Entering into the first pure mind (prathame ‘nāsravacitte), [i.e., duḥkhe darmajñānakṣānti], the saint (ārya) acquires one single knowledge, the samvṛtijñāna.

2-3) In the second mind [i.e., duḥkhe dharmajñāna], he adds duḥkhajñāna and dharmajñāna.

4) In the fourth mind [i.e., duḥkhe ‘nvayajñāna], he adds anvayajñāna.

5) In the sixth mind [i.e., samudaye dharmajñāna], he adds samudayajñāna.

6) In the tenth mind [i.e., nirodhe dharmajñāna], he adds nirodhajñāna.


537  This is a matter of the samvṛtijñāna practiced in the preparatory path (prayogamārga) during the four nirvedhabhāgiyas: heat, etc. See above, p. 395F, n. 1.

538  To follow this explanation and the next section easily, one must remember the great stages in the Path of nirvāṇa: 1) Path of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga) with its 16 moments of mind; 2) Path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga) with its 162 moments of mind; 3) Path of the saint at the end of his career (arhat or aśaiṣa). For a brief summary, see Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, p. 677-686, or references in the Introduction of L. de La Vallée Poussin in vol. V of the Kośa.

In regard to the precise subject of the acquisition of the ten knowledges in the darśana- and the aśaiṣamārga, cf. Samyuktābhidharma, T 1552, k. 6, p. 918c-16-27; Kośa, VII, p. 47-48; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 378, l. 7-17.

1211
7-8) In the fourteenth mind [i.e., mārga dharmañāna], he adds mārgañāna.

But if he is already free of desire (vītarāga), [i.e., if, before entering into the supramundane path (lokottaramārga) of the dārśanamārga, he has already been freed from desire by means of the worldly path (laukikamārga) of detachment], then the saint (ārya) also adds paracittajñāna.

B. In the aśaikṣamārga.

9) In the path of the one of no further training (aśaikṣamārga), the arhat adds kṣayamārga.
10) If he has attained unshakeable deliverance (akopyā vimukti), he adds also anutpādajñāna.

8. Development of the ten knowledges in the threefold Path

A. In the dārśanamārga.

1) In the first pure mind (anāsravacitta), [i.e. duḥkhe dharmañānakṣānti], the yogin does not develop (nabhāvayati) knowledge.

2) In the second mind, [i.e., duḥke dharmañāna], he develops two knowledges, present (pratyutpanna) and future (anāgata).

3) In the fourth moment, [i.e., duḥkhē 'nvayajñāna], he develops two present knowledges and three future knowledges.

4) In the sixth moment, [i.e., samudaye dharmañāna], he develops two present and future knowledges.

5) In the eighth mind, [i.e., samudaye 'nvayajñāna], he develops two present knowledges and three future knowledges.

6) In the tenth mind, [i.e., nirodhe 'nvayajñāna], he develops two knowledges, present and future.

7) In the twelfth mind, [i.e., nirodhe 'nvayajñāna], he develops two present knowledges and three future knowledges.

8) In the fourteenth mind, [i.e., mārga dharmañāna], he develops two knowledges, present and future.

---

539 Cf. Saṃyuktābhidharma, T 1552, k. 6, p. 918c28-919c27; Abhidhāmāra, T 1553, k. 2, p. 974b5-c8 (reconstr. Sastri, p. 90, l. 18-92; l. 8: in line 18 of p. 90, the word asamāpattimadhyāyānābhāvanāḥ should be corrected to anāgamyadhyānāntarabhāvanah; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 107, p. 552a6-554b23; Kośa, VII, p. 48-50 and 54-59; Abhidharmadipā, p. 379-381.

540 Cf. Kośavyākhyā, p. 632, l. 14-15: Iha dvividha bhāvanādhiṣṭā pratiṣṭhābhāvanā nīveṣaṇabhāvanā; pratiṣṭhābhāvanā prāptitaḥ, nīveṣaṇabhāvanā saṃnekabhāvataḥ: “This is a twofold development here: a development of obtaining as acquisition, and a development of assistance from the fact of having preceded”. This is why the ascetic can simultaneously develop present (pratyutpanna) and future (anāgata) knowledges.
9) In the sixteenth mind, [i.e., mārge 'anvayajñāna], he develops two present knowledges [mārgajñāna and anvayajñāna], and develops six future knowledges [dharmaṁyajñāna, anvayajñāna, duḥkhajñāna, samudayajñāna, nirodhajñāna and mārgajñāna]. If he is detached (vītarāga), he develops seven knowledges [by adding paracittajñāna to the preceding six].

B. In the bhāvanāmārga.

10) The srotāpanna who wishes to becomes detached from the fetters (saṃyojana) of kāmadhātu develops seven knowledges, excluding paracittajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna, in the seventeenth mind.

11) In the ninth deliverance (vimuktī = vimuktimārga), [when the saint becomes anāgāmin by destruction of the ninth category of passions of kāmadhātu], he develops four knowledges, excluding kṣayajñāna nad anutpādajñāna.

When, [by cessation of the fifth category of passions of kāmadhātu], the person inspired by faith (śraddhādhimukta) becomes informed by possession of the view (dṛṣṭipratpa), he develops six knowledges in the twofold path, excluding paracittajñāna, saṃvrtijñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna.


It is at the sixteenth mind-moment of the darśanamārga, which is also the first moment of the bhāvanāmārga, that the saint (ārya) takes possession of the first fruit of the religious life and becomes srotāpanna.

542 See Kośabhāṣya, p. 408:

Sarāgabhāvanāmārga tadūrdhvaṃ saptabhāvanā // śodāsāt kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ bhāvanāmārga yāvan na vītarāgaḥ bhāvati tāvat sarvesu prayogānantlyayavimuktivīśaṃrāgeseṣaṃrāgeseṣaṃrāgeseṣaṃrāgeṣu sapta jñānāni bhāvyante: dharmānvavadhākhasumudayanirodhamārgasamvrtijñānāni. laukika ca bhāvanāmārgaḥ saṃvrtijñānānaḥ prayutpannam. lokottaraḥ cec catuṇāṁ dharmaṁjñānāṁ anyatamat.

Transl. – “Above, in the Path of meditation associated with desire, there is the development of seven knowledges.” - Beyond the sixteenth moment, in the Path of meditation, as long as one is not liberated from desire, in the preparatory paths, irresistible, freeing and excellent, seven knowledges are cultivated: dharma-, anvaya-, duḥkha-, samudaya-, nirodha-, mārga- and saṃvṛti-jñāna. If the path of meditation is mundane, saṃvṛti-jñāna is developed; if the path of meditation is supramundane, another of the four dharma-jñāna is cultivated.

543 One becomes anāgāmin by cessation of the ninth and last category of passions of kāmadhātu: one is never again reborn in kāmadhātu.

544 By cessation of the fifth category of passions of kāmadhātu, one becomes śraddhādhimukta or dṛṣṭiprāpta according to whether one is of weak faculties or strong faculties: Āloka, p. 35, l. 20-21:
12) When the saint is detached from the passions belonging to seven stages (bhūmi), [namely, the four dhyānas of rūpadhātu, and the first three samāpattis of ārūpyadhātu], the following should be distinguished:

a. in the uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga, also called prahāṇamārga), he develops seven knowledges, excluding paracittajñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna.

b. in the paths of deliverance (vimuktimārga), he develops eight knowledges, excluding kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna.546

13) When the saint is detached from the passions of the summit of existence (bhavāgra or the fourth samāpatti of ārūpyadhātu), the following should be distinguished:

a. in the [nine] uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga or prahāṇamārga of this sphere), he develops six knowledges, excluding paracittajñāna, saṃvṛtijñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna.

b. in the [first] eight paths of deliverance (vimuktimārga), he develops seven knowledges, excluding saṃvṛtijñāna, kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna.547

---

Kāmavacarapañcaprakārklesaprahāṇena dvitiyaphalapratinannako mṛdutikṣṇendriya evaikaḥ śraddhādrṣṭipṛāptaḥ.

545 In the unstoppable paths (ānantaryamārga or prahāṇamārga) and in the paths of deliverance (vimuktimārga). Nine of each are needed in order to conquer the passions of a single given level.

546 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 408:

*Saptabhāmijayābhijñākopyāptyākīrṇabhāvīte/
ānantaryapatheśūrdhvamuktimāṛṣṭake ‘pi ca //

sapta ṣuḥni bhāvyante iti ... anvayajñānāṇāṃ dvavoś ca dharmajñānānanayor anyatamat.*

Transl. – “In the uninterrupted paths of conquest over the seven levels, of acquisition of the supernatural powers and unshakeable quality, of mixed meditation, [seven knowledges are developed] and also in the eight paths of delivery of the above.”

Fill in: ‘seven knowledges are developed’. The seven levels are the four dhyānas and the [first] three ārūpyas. Victory over these seven levels is detachment. During this detachment from the seven levels, in the five supernatural powers, in the quality of unshakeability and in the mixed meditation, all the unstoppable paths practiced by the śaikṣa entail the development of seven knowledges, the same as the preceding. If the path of meditation is worldly, saṃvṛtijñāna is cultivated. If the path is supramundane, one of the four anvayajñānas and one of the two dharmajñānas are developed. But in the quality of unshakeability, saṃvṛtijñāna is not developed because it is not opposed to Bhavāgra. Here kṣayajñāna is the seventh knowledge.

Above the detachment from the seven levels, in the detachment from bhavāgra, during the [first] eight paths of deliverance, seven knowledges also are developed: dharma-, anvaya-, duḥkha-, samudaya-, nirodha- mārga- and paracittajñāna. Saṃvṛtijñāna is not developed because it is not opposed to bhavāgra. But one of the four anvayajñānas and one of the two dharmajñānas are actually cultivated

547 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 408-409:

*Saṅkṣottāpanamuktau và saṣaṇātvānabhāvānā /
C. In the ašaikṣamārga.

14) In the first mind of ‘the one who has nothing further to practice’ (ašaikṣasya prathamacitta), a mind coinciding with the ninth and last deliverance (vimukti) of bhavāgra,

a. the arhat who is unconditionally liberated (asamayavimukta) develops the ten knowledges and all the impure and pure roots of good (sarvāstavanāsravakaśalāmāla).

b. the arhat who is conditionally liberated (samayavimukta) develops nine knowledges [excluding anutpādajñāna], and all the impure and pure roots of good.548

All of these distinctions are fully explained in the A-p’i-t’an-men (Abhidharmamukha?).

C. The Eleven Knowledges According to the Mahāyāna

1. Knowledge conforming to reality

The knowledge conforming to reality (yathābhūtajñāna) has a special characteristic (viśeṣalakṣaṇa): it will be fully explained in the following chapters of [233c] the Prajñāpāramitā.549

ānataryapathe śaṇṇām.
Śaikṣasyendriyottāpanāyāṁ vimuktimārgge sarāgasya śaṇṇāṃ bhāvanā: ...
sarvānantaryamārgapratiṣiddhatvāt. kim arthaṃ pratiṣṭidyate. apratipakṣatvāt.

Transl. “For the śaikṣa, in the path of deliverance of perfecting the faculties, there is the development of six or seven knowledges; in the uninterrupted path, development of six knowledges.”

In the path of deliverance, during the devopment of the faculties, the śaikṣa who still has the defilements develops six knowledges: dharma-, anvaya-, samudaya-, nirodha- and mārgajñāna. If he is detached from desire, he develops seven, adding paracittajñāna to the previous ones.

Whether or not he is detached from desire, in the uninterrupted path of perfecting the qualities, he develops the six knowledges mentioned above, but not saṃvyrtijñāna, because [perfecting the faculties] is like the path of seeing; not paracittajñāna because this knowledge is excluded from any path of seeing. Why is this knowledge excluded? Because it does not counteract [the passions].

548 Cf. Kośabhāṣa, p. 409:

Akopyasya daśabhāvanā, tatsaṃcāre ‘nantyamuktau ca /
yas tv akopyadharma bhavati tasya ... vimuktimārgge daśāṇāṃ bhāvanā.

Transl. – “In the Unshakeable, ten knowledges are developed, and also during the passing into the quality of the unshakeable in the last path of deliverance.”

The person who has the quality of unshakeability develops the ten knowledges, and also the person who passes into the state of unshakeability develops the ten knowledges in [the ninth] and last path of deliverance [of bhavāgra].

The saint whom the Traité speaks of as definitively delivered (asamayavimukta) corresponds to the Unshakakeable one of whom the Kośa speaks.
2. The eleven knowledges

Some say:

1) The knowledge of things (dhammajñāna) cognizes the five aggregates of attachment (pañcappadānakandha) as impermanent (anītya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and without self (anātmaka). It knows that dharmas are all the result of a complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasaṅgacoṭṭhānā) in the sense that ‘actions have ignorance as condition’ (avidyāpratijñānaṁ saṁskāraṁ) and so on up to ‘old age and death have birth as condition’ (jātipratijñānaṁ jāyamānaṁ).

Thus the Buddha said to the brahma-cārin Siu-che-mo (Susīma): “First it is necessary to use the knowledge [of the causality] of things in order to analyze dharmas, then to use the knowledge concerning nirvāṇa.”

2) Subsequent knowledge (anvayajñāna). – Knowing that the present five aggregates of attachment (pratyutpannañcaḥāṅgāṅkandha) are impermanent (anītya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and non-self (anātmaka), one deduces that, in the past (atīta) and the future (anāgata) and in the form realm (rūpadhātu) and the formless realm (ārūpyadhetū) as well, the five aggregates of attachment are likewise impermanent, suffering, empty and without self.

Thus, if we notice that presently fire (agni) warms and burns, we know by induction (anumāna) that fires past and future or fires in other places likewise [warm and burn].

3) The knowledge of another’s mind (paracitajñāna) cognizes the mind (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharma) of other beings.

Question. – If it cognizes the mind and mental events of others, why is it called simply the knowledge of another’s mind [and not the knowledge of the mind and mental events of others]?

Answer. – The mind being sovereign, it is sufficient to call it the knowledge of another’s mind: by saying mind, we know that the mental events are understood as well.

4) Conventional knowledge (saṁvrtijñāna) is a purely knowledge of designation (prajñāpatti-jñāna). The saint knows that, in regard to reality (tattva), worldly people (prthagjana) know it only verbally (prajñāpatti-titaḥ). This is why this knowledge is called knowledge of designation (prajñāpatti-jñāna). In the same way, those for whom a house (grha) is just a word-list of boards (phalaka), posts (sthūṇa), pillars (stambha) and walls (bhitti) only understand these materials and do not understand the real meaning (bhūtārtha) of a house. That is conventional knowledge (saṁvrtijñāna).

5) The knowledge of suffering (duḥkhajñāna) brings into play a knowledge about suffering in order to reprimand the five aggregates of attachment (pañcappadānakandha).

---

549 Pañcaviṃśati. T 223, k. 5, p. 255a2; k. 21, p. 376b19. The Traité will comment on these passages: T 1509, k. 48, p. 406c7; k. 84, p. 647b14; 650c21-23; k. 99, p. 749a14. The yathābhūtajñāna summing up the entire knowledge of the Mahāyāna coincides with the sarvākāra-jñāna discussed above, p. 640-642F.

Question. – The five aggregates of attachment are both impermanent (anīya), painful (duḥkha), empty (śūnya) and non-self (anātmaka). Why speak only of the knowledge of suffering (duḥkha) and not speak of a knowledge of impermanence, emptiness and non-self?551

Answer. – We speak of the knowledge of suffering in regard to the truth of suffering, the knowledge of the origin in regard to the truth of the origin, the knowledge of cessation in regard the truth of cessation, and the knowledge of the path in regard to the truth of the path.

Question. – But the five aggregates of attachment have all kinds of evils; why proclaim only one truth on suffering and not proclaim truths on impermanence, emptiness and non-self as well?

Answer. – If truths on impermanence, emptiness and non-self were proclaimed, this would not offend the meaning of the [Buddhist] doctrine. But as beings are, above all, lovers of happiness (sukhakāma) and enemies of suffering (duḥkhapratikūla), the Buddha’s lament that everything in the world is suffering (loke sarvam duḥkham) was intended to lead beings to become detached from it.

On the other hand, being faced with impermanence, emptiness and non-self, beings are not very frightened; this is why the Buddha did not speak of them [as distinct truths].

Furthermore, in the Dharma proclaimed by the Buddha, the five aggregates of attachment carry different names, but all meaning ‘suffering’. This is why the Buddha spoke only of the knowledge of suffering.

This duḥkhajñāna is sometimes impure (sāsrava), sometimes pure (anāsrava):

a. It is impure [in the preparatory Path], when it is in heat (uṣmagata), summits (mūrdhan), patience (ksanti) and supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma).552

b. It is pure when the ascetic penetrates into the Path of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga).

Why is that? From there on up to the supreme worldly dharmas, the yogin considers suffering in four ways.

6-8) It is the same for the knowledge of the origin, the knowledge of cessation and the knowledge of the Path.

Furthermore, the knowledge of suffering (duḥkhajñāna) cognizes that suffering nature (duḥkhākāra) does not really arise. – The knowledge of the origin [234a] (samudayajñāna) cognizes that dharmas are disjunctive and without conjunction. – The knowledge of cessation (nirodhajñāna) cognizes that dharmas are forever peaceful (ādiśānta) and like nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasama). – The knowledge of the path (mārgajñāna) cognizes that dharmas are forever pure (nityaśuddha), without rectitude or evil.553

---

551 In other words, since everything is impermanent, suffering, empty and non-self, why did the Buddha who proclaimed a truth of suffering not proclaim a truth of impermanence, emptiness and non-self?

552 The four aids to penetration (nirvedhahāgāya) developed in the preparatory Path (prayogamārga): see above, p. 395F, n., and Kośa, VI, p. 163-168.

553 This paragraph condenses the Mahāyānist interpretation of the four holy Truths into a few words.
9) The knowledge of the elimination of the impurities (kṣayajñāna) cognizes that all dharmas are non-existent (anupalabdha).

10) The knowledge of the non-rearising of the impurities (anutpādajñāna) cognizes that dharmas, being unreal (abhūta) and indeterminate (aniyata), do not arise (anuppana).

11) The knowledge conforming to reality (yathābhūtajñāna) is that which can be cognized by the ten preceding knowledges. By means of this knowledge in accordance with reality, the characteristics (nimitta), conditions (pratyaya), special features (prabheda) and considerations (anupaśyanā) belonging to each of the ten knowledges are cognized, but in this knowledge conforming to reality, there is no characteristic, condition, or special feature; it destroys all considerations of things and itself has none.

In the first ten knowledges, there is the eye of the Dharma (dharmacaksus) and the eye of wisdom (prajñācaksus); in the knowledge conforming to reality, there is only the eye of the Buddha (buddhackaksus).

The first ten knowledges are shared by the arhats, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas; the Buddha alone possesses the knowledge conforming to reality. Why? Only the Buddha possesses the Dharma which does not deceive (aśāthyadharma); this is how we know that he alone possesses the knowledge conforming to reality.

Finally, when the ten knowledges enter into the knowledge in accordance with reality, they lose their original names and then there is only one true knowledge. Similarly, when all the rivers of the ten directions enter into the great sea (mahāsamudra), they lose their original names and are just called great sea.

These various explanations of the meaning of the eleven knowledges are given here in brief (saṃkṣiptena). A note in red says that the eleven knowledges are finished here.

**Second section THE THREE MEDITATIVE STABILIZATIONS**

Sūtra (cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 20, l. 9-11; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 62, l. 17-63, l. 4). – [The Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva must fulfill completely the three meditative stabilizations (samādhi):

1. the concentration with both conceptualization and analysis (savītarkaḥ savicāraḥ samādhiḥ).
2. the concentration without conceptualization and with analysis only (avitarko vicāramātraḥ samādhiḥ).
3. the concentration with neither conceptualization or analysis (avitarko ‘vicāraḥ samādhiḥ).

Śāstra. –

554 The five eyes (māṃsa-, divya-, prajñā-, dharma-, buddhacaksus) are defined in Pañcaviṃśati, p. 77-83: Śatasāhasrikā, p. 290-301).
I. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

1. The three kinds of concentration

All the trances (dhyāna) and all the absorptions (samāpatti) that concentrate the mind are called concentration (samādhi), ‘sphere of action of right thought’ in language of the Ts’in. During this beginningless universe (anādikāliko lokadhātu), the mind is always wandering (kuṭila) and without uprightness; but when these spheres of action of right thought are obtained, the mind is straightened out. Thus the progress of the snake (sarpagati) is always sinuous, but when it enters into a bamboo tube, it is corrected.

This concentration is of three types:

1) In the desire realm (kāmadhātu), the preparatory concentration (anāgamyā) of the first trance and the first trance (dhyāna), the concentration is associated with conceptualization (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra) and consequently is called ‘furnished with conceptuality and analysis’ (savitarakah savicārah).

2) In the dhyānāntara, a variety of the first trance, the concentration is associated with analysis alone and is consequently called ‘without conceptuality but with analysis only’ (avitarko vicārammatrah).

3) From the second trance (dvitīyadhyāna) up to the level of the summit of existence (bhavāgra, or the fourth ārūpyasamāpatti), the concentration is associated with neither conceptuality nor analysis and consequently is called ‘without conceptuality or analysis’ (avitarko ‘vicārah).

2. Vitarka and Vicāra.

Question. - The mind (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharma) associated with concentration (samādhisaṃprayukta) are as many as twenty. Why mention only two here, namely, conceptualization (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra)?

Answer. – Vitarka and vicāra cause disturbance (vicakṣubkarana) in concentration: this is why we limit ourselves to mentioning two here. Even if they are good (kuśala), they are enemies to meditative stabilization and it is difficult to escape from them. Some even say that a mind furnished with vitarka and


556 Two mental events already defined above, p. 1028-1029F. See also Kośa, I, p. 59; II, p. 173-175.

vitāra is not concentrated. This is why the Buddha stated that the concentration with vitarka and vicāra lacks solidity.558

When the power of vitarka and vicāra is minimal, it is possible to obtain concentration. Vitarka and vicāra are able to produce concentration and are also able to destroy it. They are like the wind (vāyu) which is able to bring rain [234b] (varṣa) and also able to destroy it. Good vitarka and vicāra, which are of three types, can produce the first dhyāna; but when the first dhyāna has been obtained, as a result of the vitarka and vicāra that have caused great joy (mahāpriti), the mind is distracted (viśipta) and loses concentration. That is why only vitarka and vicāra are mentioned here.

Question. – What are the differences between vitarka and vicāra?

Answer. – Vitarka is the coarseness of mind (cittaudārikatā) and vicāra is the subtlety of mind (cittasūkṣmatā).559 Vitarka is the first movement of the mind toward its objects (prathamam svālambane cittasyohanam); the vicāra that follows is an analysis (vibhaṅga), a judgment on the beautiful and the ugly (suvarṇadurvarṇa).

There are three kinds of coarse (audārika) vitarka: i) the mind of lust (kāmavitarka), ii) the mind of malice (vyāpādavitarka), iii) the mind of harmfulness (vihimsāvitarka).560

There are three kinds of good (kuśala) vitarka: i) the mind of renunciation of desire (naishkramyavitarka), ii) the mind of non-malice (avyāpādavitarka), iii) the mind of non-harmfulness (avihimsāvitarka).561

There are three kinds of subtle (sūkṣma) vitarka: i) thinking of one’s relatives (jnātavitarka), ii) thinking of one’s country (janapadavitarka), iii) thinking of not dying (amaraṇavitarka).562

---

558 Laṭukikopamasutta of Majjhima, I, p. 454 (Tchomg a han, T 26, k. 50. p. 743b2-3): Idaṃ kho ahaṃ. Udāyi iñjitasmiṃ vadāmi. kim ca tattha iñjitasmiṃ. yad eva tattha vitakkavicārā aniruddhā honti idaṃ tattha iñjitasmiṃ: “Wherever vitarka and vicāra have not been destroyed, there is agitation.”

Kośabhāṣya, p. 227, l. 14-15: Nanu ca triṇi dhyānāni señjītyān uktāni bhagavatā. yad atra vitarkaṃ vicāravitam atrāryā iñjitaṃ ity āḥuḥ: “Did not the Bhagavat say that the [first] three dhyānas are agitated? And the Āryas have said that [the first dhyāna] where there is vitarkita and vicārita is agitated.”

559 Atthasālinī, p. 114: Vitakkanam vā vitakko āhanam ti vuttaṃ hoti. svāyaṃ ārāmmane cittasa abhiniropanalakkhaṇo, so hi ārāmmano cittam āropeti.

561 In regard to these two classes of vitarka, cf. Majjhima, I, p. 114 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 25, p. 589a14-18) where the Buddha said: Yan nūnāhaṃ dvidhā katvā dvidhākarvā vitakke vihareyyan ti. So kho ahaṃ bhikkhave yo cāyaṃ kāmavitakko yo ca byāpādavitakkaco ca vihimśāvitakko imaṃ ekabhāgaṃ akāsīṃ, yo cāyaṃ nekkhamavitakko yo ca abyāpādavitakko yo ca avihimsāvitakko imaṃ bhāgaṃ akāsīṃ.

This classification appears frequently in the canonical texts, e.g., Anguttara, I, p. 275; II, p. 76; III, p. 429.
Six kinds of *vitarka* prevent *samādhi*. The three kinds of good *vitarka* can open the gate to *samādhi*, but if the *vitarka* and *vicāra* are too prominent, they lead to the loss of *samadhi*. It is like the wind (*vayu*) that propels ships (*nau*); beyond certain limits, it destroys the ship.

These are the many distinctions to make in regard to *vitarka* and *vicāra*.  

3. Dharmas with *vitarka*, etc.

**Question.** – The sūtras speak of three kinds of dharmas: i) with both *vitarka* and *vicāra*, ii) without *vitarka* and with *vicāra*, iii) with neither *vitarka* or *vicāra*.563

They also speak of the levels (*bhūmi*) with *vitarka* and with *vicāra*, without *vitarka* and with *vicāra*, with neither *vitarka* nor *vicāra*.564 Why speak here of the concentrations with *vitarka*, etc., only?  

**Answer.** – Because here we note only what is most useful.

1) The dharmas with *vitarka* and with *vicāra* are dharmas associated with *vitarka* and *vicāra* and occur in kāmadhātu (desire realm), in the anāgamya (preparatory concentration of the first dhyāna), and in the first dhyāna. These dharmas are good (*kusala*), bad (*akuśala*) and indeterminate (*avyākṛta*).

2) The dharmas without *vitarka* but with *vicāra* are dharmas associated with *vicāra* alone and are found in the dhyānāntara (type of the first dhyāna). These dharmas are good, bad or indeterminate.

3) The dharmas with neither *vitarka* or *vicāra* are deprived of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, namely: a. all matter (*sarvam rūpaṁ*), b. formations dissociated from the mind (*cittaprayuktasaṃskāra*), c. unconditioned dharmas (*asaṃskṛtadharma*).

4. Levels with *vitarka*, etc.

562 These three *vitarkas* are taken from Samyutta, T 99, k. 16, p. 109c4-6. They appear in the Pāli sources also: *nāṭīvitakka*, *janapadavitakka* and *amaravitakka* (Mahānidesa, p. 501, 1. 21-22; Vibhaṅga, p. 346, 1. 18-20, but the last one is sometimes replaced by *anavaññapaṭisāmyutta vitakka* ‘the worry of not being mistaken’ (Anguttara, I, p. 254). On this last word, see also Itivuttaka, p. 72; Vibhaṅga, p. 356.

563 Vibhaṅga, p. 434-435 gives the complete list.

564 The *samādhis* should not be confused with their respective levels. Whether it is a question of *dhyāna* or *samāpatti*, the *samādhis* are of two types: i) the *samādhi* proper, namely, the concentrations raising the ascetic momentarily to certain psychic planes of rūpa-or ārūpyadhātu; ii) the *samadhi* spheres of existence where the gods of rūpa- or ārūpyadhātu have taken birth for a determined lifespan. The first are called cause-*samādhi* (*kāraṇasaṃmādhi*), the second are called existence-*samādhi* (*upapattisamādhi*) or effect-*samādhi* (*kāryasaṃmādhi*). See Kośa, VIII, p. 128.
1) The levels \( (bhūmi) \) with both vitarka and vicāra are: a. kāmadhātu, b. anāgāmya (preparatory concentration of the first dhyāna), c. part of the brahmaloka (namely, the first two stages of the first dhyāna inhabited by the Brahmakāyikas and the Brahmapurohitas respectively.

2) The level without vitarka but with vicāra is the dhyānāntara (higher stage of the first dhyāna). Those who develop this level thoroughly are the Mahābrāhmarañjas.

3) The levels with neither vitarka nor vicāra are the levels [inhabited by the following gods]:
   a. All the Ābhāsvaras, (namely, the Parittābhās, the Apramāṇābhās and the Ābhāsvaras occupying the three stages of the second dhyāna),
   b. all the Śubhakṛtsnas, (namely, the Parīttaśubhas, the Apramāṇaśubhas and the Śubhakṛtsnas occupying the three stages of the third dhyāna),
   c. all the Bṛhatphalas, (namely the Anabhrakas, the Puṇyaprasavas and the Bṛhatphalas occupying the first three stages of the fourth dhyāna),
   d. all the formless gods: Ārūpya (belonging to the four dhyānas of ārūpyadhātu: ākāśānantyāyatana, vijñānānantatyāyatana, ākiṃcanyāyatana and naivasamjñāsamjñā āyatana, also called bhavāgra).

II. THE THREE CONCENTRATIONS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Here [in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra], it is a matter of much higher things, namely, the meditative stabilizations (samādhi):

What are these concentrations?

1) The concentrations of the arhats and pratyekabuddhas, from the three concentrations of emptiness, etc. (śūnyatāsamādhi) up to the diamond concentration (vajrasamādhi).

2) The concentrations of the Buddhas, from the concentration contemplating the Buddhas of the ten directions (daśadigbudhasamādhi) up to the concentration of the hero’s progress (śūraṃgamasamādhi),

---

565 The first three dhyānas each entail three stages or levels \( (bhūmi) \), the fourth entails eight. Each stage is inhabited by a class of gods. Here, out of concern for conciseness, the Traité designates the group of deities of a dhyāna by giving the name of their highest category.

566 The fourth dhyāna is inhabited by eight categories of gods: 1) Anabhraka, 2) Puṇyaprasava, 3) Bṛhatphala, the only ones mentioned here, plus five categories of Śuddhāvāsikas: 1) Avṛha, 2) Atapa, 3) Sudṛṣa, 4) Sudarsana, 5) Akanistha. See Kośa, III, p. 2.

567 The meditative stabilizations of emptiness (śūnyatā), signlessness (ānimitta) and wishlessness (apraṇihiita), also called the three vimokṣaṃukhas, have been studied above, p. 1209-1232F. The vajrasamādhi or more correctly the vajropamasamādhi, is the path of abandonment \( (praḥaṇamārga) \) by means of which the ascetic abandons the ninth category (weak-weak) of the kleśas that attach him to the highest sphere of existence – the fourth samāpatti or bhavāgra
from the concentration eliminating all doubts (saṃsaṃśayasyasamucchadasamādhi) up to the king of concentrations (saṃādhirājasamādhi).\textsuperscript{568}

These explanations briefly outline (samkṣiptena) the meaning of the three concentrations. It is finished!

**Third section THE THREE FACULTIES OF UNDERSTANDING**

**PRELIMINARY NOTE**

**I. THE THREE FACULTIES OF UNDERSTANDING**

This is a group of three dominant faculties (indriya), pure (anāsrava) and supramundane (lokottara), assuring complete understanding (ājñā) of the four truths at different stages. They are:

1. The faculty signifying “I will understand [the holy truths] which I do not yet understand” (anājñātasmāsyāmādriya).

2. The faulty of understanding assuring the understanding of these truths (ājñendriya).

3. The faculty belonging to the saint who has understood the truths (ājñātvīndriya).

These three faculties which form a homogeneous group have already been mentioned in the canonical sources: Dīgha, III, p. 219; Saṃyutta, V, p. 204; Itivuttaka, p. 53; Tch’ang a han, T 1, k. 8, p. 50b13; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 26, p. 182a12-13.

They are defined in the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 209 and the Śatasahasrikā, p. 1442:

\textit{Anājñātāmājñāsyāmādriyaṃ yac chaikṣāṇāṃ pudgalānāṃ anabhisamitānāṃ ... pudgalānāṃ arhatāṃ pratyekabuddhānāṃ bodhisattvānāṃ tathāgatānāṃ arhatāṃ samyaksaṃbuddhānāṃ śraddhendriyaṃ, etc., up to prajñendriyam.}

Translation. – The \textit{anājñātāmājñāsyāmādriya} is the faculty of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom in individuals who are still practicing and who have not yet understood [the truths]. The \textit{ājñendriya} are the same faculties in individuals who are still practicing but who already possess the understanding of the truths. The \textit{ājñātvīndriya} are the same faculties in individuals who have nothing further to practice, namely the arhats, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas and the Tathāgatas, saints, fully and completely enlightened ones.

\textsuperscript{568} These are the 108 or 120 samādhis belonging to the bodhisattvas and the Buddhas. A list accompanied by brief explanations of them is given by Pañcaviṃśati, p. 142-144, 198-203, and Śatasahasrikā, p. 825-835, 1412-1426. See also Mahāvyut., no. 505-623.
These are definitions analogous to those found in the treatises of the Vijñānavādin school: Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 156, l. 6-14; Abhidharmasamuccaya, rec. Pradhan, p. 75, l. 25-76, l. 4; Siddhi, p. 449-452.

II. THE TWENTY-TWO FACULTIES (INDRIYA)

In the Abhidharma treatises, Pāli as well as Sanskrit, the three faculties of understanding are included in a numbered list of twenty-two also described as faculties (indriya).

So far as I [Lamotte] know, this list of twenty-two indriyas does not appear in the Pāli Nikāyas or the Sanskrit Āgamas. However, according to the Kośa, I, p. 101 and the Abhidharmadīpa, p. 44, the Buddha taught it “in a sūtra”: Dvāvimśatīr indriyāṇi. katāni dvāvimśatīh. caksurindriyam… According to Vibhaśā, T 1545, k. 142, p. 729a3; 730a7, the Buddha was speaking on that occasion to the brahmin Cheng-wen, i.e., to the brahmin Jātiśroṇa according to the Kośavyākhyā, p. 90, l. 25 and 28. We may, however, note that the Chinese characters Cheng-wen are often known in Pāli under the name of Jāṇussoṇī (cf. Akanuma, p. 240).

The list of twenty-two indriyas, cited here in the order most often adopted, appear in all the Abhidharmas which devote long explanations to them: Paṭisambhidā of the Khuddakanikāya, I, p. 7, l. 23-24; Vibhāṅga, p. 122; Kathāvatthu, p. 13; Visuddhimagga, p. 417; Prakaraṇapāda, T 1542, k. 15, p. 753c9; Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 14, p. 991b23-26; Vibhaśā, T 1645, k. 152, p. 728c7-10; Abhidharmadīpa, T 1553, k. 1, p. 871b28-c1 (rec. Sastri, p. 77); Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 14, p. 991b23-26; Abhidharmadīpa, T 1553, k. 1, p. 871b28-c1 (rec. Sastri, p. 77); Satyasiddhiśāstra, T 1646, k. 1, p. 251b2-18; Kośa, p. 101; Kośavyākhyā, p. 90-91Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 8, p. 377a14-17; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 44.

These twenty-two indriyas are constituted by the organs, the sensations or the faculties as follows:

1. sight (cakṣus), 2. hearing (śrotra), 3. smell (ghrāṇa), 4. taste (jīvā), 5. touch (kāya), 6. mind (manas), 7. male organ (puruṣendriya), 8. female organ (strīndriya), 9. vital organ (jīvitendriya), 10. sensation of pleasure (sukha), 11. sensation of displeasure (duḥkha), 12. sensation of satisfaction (saumanasya), 13. sensation of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya), 15. faculty of faith (śraddhā), 16. faculty of energy (vīrya), 17. faculty of mindfulness (smṛti), 18. faculty of concentration (samadhi), 19. faculty of wisdom (prajñā), 20-22, the three faculties of understanding the truths defined above.

Among so many others, why are these twenty-two dharmas the only ones to be indriyas? The word indriya, derived from the root id or ind, is synonymous with great power (paramaiśvarya), with control (ādhipatya). The twenty-two dharmas in question have the characteristic of being dominant in regard to the living being (sattva) in that which concerns: 1. his primary constitution (mauladravya), 2. his distinctiveness (vikalpa), 3. his duration (sthiti), 4. his moral defilement (saṃkleśa), 5. his purification (vyavadāna). Indeed:

1. The point of support of the mind (cittāśraya) is made up of the six organs of consciousness, from the organ of sight to the mental organ (indriyas no. 1-6).
2. This point of support is distinguished by the two sexual organs (indriyas no. 7-8).
3. It lasts for a given time due to the vital organ (indriya no. 8).
4. It is defiled as a result of the five sensations (indriyas no. 10-14).

5. Its purification is prepared by the five moral faculties, faith, etc. (indriyas no. 15-19).

6. This purification is definitively assured by the three faculties of understanding (indriyas no. 20-22).

This nature of dominant-faculty is absent in other dharmas. This is why the indriyas are twenty-two in number, no more and no less.

All of this is explained in Kośa, II, p. 110-111.

Conforming to its custom, the Traité will explain in turn the viewpoint of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and the view-point of the Mahāyāna concerning the three faculties of understanding, the only ones that are absolutely pure (anāśrava) and supramundane (lokottara). The difference between the two systems resides in the fact that, for the Abhidharma, understanding concerns the four noble Truths (suḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga), whereas for the Mahāyāna, it concerns the true nature of all dharmas.

Sūtra (cf. Pañcavimirṣati, p. 20, l. 11-12; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 63, l. 4-6). – [The bodhisattva-mahāsattva must completely fulfill] three faculties (trīṇīndriyāni):

1) the faculty signifying: I will understand that which I do not understand (anājñātamājñāsyāmāndriya)

2) the faculty of understanding (ājñendriya)

3) the faculty of that which has been understood (ājñātāvāndriya).

1. The Three Faculties of Understanding According to the Abhidharma

A. Definition

1. The faculty signifying “I will understand that which I do not understand” (anājñātamājñāsyāmāndriya) is a group of nine pure faculties (navānāsravendriyasamagrī).

In the individual who follows the truth as a result of faith (śraddhānusārin) or who follows the truth as a result of scripture (dharmānusārin)569 and who is on the Path of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga), this group is called anājñātamājñāsyamāndriya and includes [the following nine indriyas]:

1-5) the five faculties, namely, faculty of faith (śraddhendriya), [faculty of energy (vīryendriya), faculty of mindfulness (smṛtiṇḍriya), faculty of concentration (samādhindriya) and faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya)].

6) the sensation of satisfaction (saumansayendriya).

7) the sensation of pleasure (sukhendriya).

8) the sensation of indifference (upekṣendriya).

569 These terms have been defined above, p. 1390F.
9) the mental organ (manasindriya).570

2. In the person liberated by faith (śraddhādhimukta) or in the view-attainer (dṛṣṭiprāpta)571 who is on the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), this [group] of nine indriyas changes its name and is called faculty of understanding (ājñendriya). [234c]

3. In the path of those of no more learning (āsaikṣamārga), this [group] of nine indriyas is called the faculty of those who have understood (ājñatāvīndriya).

B. Excellence of the three faculties of understanding

Question. – Of all the twenty-two indriyas, why does [the Prajñāpaññāsūtra] choose these three indriyas [of understanding]?

Answer. – We call indriya [from the root ind] that which has a penetrating and obvious nature of dominance (ādhipatya).572 But this characteristic of dominance is not completely perfected (paripūrṇa) in the other nineteen indriyas. This is why [the Prajñāpaññāsūtra] does not mention them here. On the other hand, the three indriyas [of understanding] are sharp (tīkṣṇa) and lead directly to nirvāṇa.573 Dominant (ādhipati) among all the conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛtadharma), they hold sovereignty (ādhipatya, aśvarya) and surpass all the other indriyas.

570 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 42: Manahsukhasaumanasyopekṣāḥ śraddhādhīrdhi ca pañca tāni navendriyāṇi triṣu mārgesu tuṇḍrīndriyāṇy api ucyante: darśanamārge anājñatāmājñāsyamāndriyāṃ, bhāvanāmārga ājñendriyāṃ, āsaikṣamārga ājñatāvīndriyāṃ: “In the three paths, these nine indriyas, the mental organ, the sensations of pleasure, satisfaction and indifference and the five faculties, faith, etc., are also called the three faculties [of understanding]: in the path of seeing, they constitute the anājñatāmājñāsyamāndriya; in the path of meditation, the ājñendriya; in the path of the aśaikṣas, the ājñatāvīndriya.”

But it should be noted that the three indriyas of understanding made up in theory of these nine indriyas actually consist of seven because the sensations of pleasure, satisfaction and indifference never co-exist: the sensation of satisfaction is present in the first two dhyānas; the sensation of pleasure, in the third dhyāna; the sensation of indifference in the anāgamya, the dhyānantarā, the fourth dhyāna and the first three ārūpyasamāpattis.

571 Terms defined above, p. 1390F.

572 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 38: Kaḥ punar indriyārthaḥ. ida paramaiśvare. tasya indantī indriyāṇi. atha ādhipatyartha. See also Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 142, p.730c6-10; Abhidharmāmṛta, rec. Sastri, p. 75, l. 3; Visuddhimagga, p. 417-418.

573 The three faculties of understanding are dominant as to the ascending acquisitions (uttarottarasamprāpti), to nirvāṇa, etc.: cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 40; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 49, l. 1-2.
Furthermore, [among the other nineteen indriyas], ten are exclusively impure (sāsrava) and therefore are of no benefit.574 [These are: 1) the eye organ (cakusurindriya), 2) the ear organ (śrotnindriya), 3) the nose organ (ghrānindriya), 4) the tongue organ (jihvendriya), 5) the body organ (puruçendriya), 6) the female organ (stṛīndriya), 7) the male organ (puruçendriya), 8) the vital organ (jīvitendriya), 9) the sensation of displeasure (dukhendriya), 10) the sensation of dissatisfaction (daurmansayendriya)].

[Further, among the other nineteen indriyas], nine are morally indeterminate (aniyata), sometimes impure (sāsrava) and sometimes pure (anāsrava). [These are: 1) the mental organ (manaindriya), 2) the sensation of pleasure (sukhendriya), 3) the sensation of satisfaction (saumanasyendriya), 4) the sensation of indifference (upeksendriya), 5) the faculty of faith (śraddhenendriya), 6) the faculty of energy (vīryendriya), 7) the faculty of mindfulness (smṛīndriya), 8) the faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya), 9) the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya).]

[Since, of these other nineteen indriyas, some are always impure and others are sometimes impure and sometimes pure], the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra is careful not to say that the bodhisattva should fulfill them completely.

Question. – But the ten concepts (daśasamjña) examined above (p.1433F) were also sometimes impure and sometimes pure. Why did the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra say there that the bodhisattva should fulfill them completely?

Answer. – Because these ten concepts are auxiliaries to the Path and the pursuit of nirvāṇa. But here the ten faculties, faith, etc., (śraddhenendriya), although good (kuśala), do not seek nirvāṇa exclusively.575

As is said in the Abhidharma: “Who is endowed with the five faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhindriyasamanvagata)? The person who has not cut the roots of good (samaucchinnakūśalamāla).”576

Furthermore, when these five faculties become clear and pure (anāsrava), they are included in the three faculties [of understanding].

In the three faculties of understanding, there is inevitably the mental organ (manaindriya), and of the three sensations (vedanā) – [pleasure (sukha), satisfaction (saumanasya) and indifference (upekṣā)] – there is one

574 On the division of the twenty-two indriyas into three moral categories, see Kośabhāṣya, p. 42, commenting on the kārikā, II, 8: Amalaṃ trayam, rūpīṇī jīvitaṃ duḥkhe sāsravaṇī, dvīdhā nava: “The three faculties of understanding are pure (amala = anāsrava); the seven material organs, the vital organ, the two sensations (pleasure and dissatisfaction) are impure; the remaining nine organs are of two types, sometimes impure, sometimes pure).

575 Actually, although they are always good (kuśala), the ten faculties, faith, etc., are sometimes impure and sometimes pure. They are perfected in the ārya to the extent that the latter conquers the various fruits of the religious life, but they are perfectly pure only in the arhat. On this subject, see Ekabhiññasutta in Saṃyutta, V, p. 204-205, the Sanskrit recension of which is in Kośavyākhya, p. 103, l. 1-9.

576 As a result, the person who retains some roots of good, absence of desire (alobha), absence of hatred (adveṣa) and absence of error (amoha), has so far not entered onto the Path of nirvāṇa.
inevitably.\footnote{577} This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra speaks here only of the three faculties [of understanding].

Finally, among the twenty-two indriyas, there are good ones (kusala), bad ones (akusala) and indeterminate ones (avyākṛta).\footnote{578} This is why the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra does not say that all of them should be fulfilled perfectly.

\section*{C. Levels, objects, associates and causality of the three faculties}

1) The three faculties [of understanding] are contained (samgrhi) in the aggregate of feeling (vedanāskanda), the aggregate of volition (saṃskāraskanda) and the aggregate of consciousness (vijñānaskanda).

2) The anājñātaṁājñāsyāṃśvāndriya occurs in six levels (bhūmi, [namely, the four dhyanas, the anāgamyas and the dhyanantaratas]. – The ājñātāvāndriya occurs in nine levels [adding the first three ārūpyasamāpattis to the preceding levels].\footnote{579}

3) The three faculties [of understanding] take as object (ālambante) the four noble Truths (cattuḥṣatya).

4) The three faculties [of understanding] are associated (saṃprayukta) with six concepts: i) the concept of impermanence (anityasamjñā), ii) the concept of suffering (duḥkhasamjñā), iii) the concept of non-self (anātmasamjñā), iv) the concept of abandonment (prahānasamjñā), v) the concept of detachment (virāgasamjñā), vi) the concept of cessation (nirodhasamjñā).

5) The anājñātaṁājñāsyāṃśvāndriya is cause (hetu) of three indriyas: [itself and the two following ones].\footnote{580}

The ājñāndriya is cause of two indriyas, [itself and the following one].

The ājñātāvāndriya is cause of ājñātāvāndriya only.

\footnotetext{577}{See above, p. 1495F, note.}
\footnotetext{578}{Eight indriyas, the five faculties, faith, etc., and the three faculties of understanding are alone good (kusala). Dissatisfaction (daurmanasya) is good or bad. The mental organ (manaindriya) and four sensations (sukha, duḥkha, saumanasya and upeksa) are good (kusala), bad (akusala) or indeterminate (avyākṛta). The five material organs, sight, etc., the vital organ and the sexual organs are indeterminate (avyākṛta): cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 46; Abhidhmāṁrta, rec. Sastrī, p. 75, l. 20-24; Vibhaṅga, p. 125 (differs).}
\footnotetext{579}{Cf. Abhidharmaṇīpa, p. 53: Anājñātaṁājñāsyāṃśvāndriyaṃ śatsu bhūmiṣu: catārṣu dhyāneṣv anāgamyas dhyānantarikāyāṃ ca... Ājñāndriyaṃ ājñātāvāndriyaṃ ca navasu bhūmiṣu: āsv eva śatsu triṣu cādyāsvv ārūpyabhūmiṣu.}
\footnotetext{580}{Here, by cause we should understand ‘dominant condition’ (adhipatipratyaya). The three faculties of understanding are dominant with regard to their own ascending acquisitions (uttarottarasamprāpti) and dominant among them in the sense that the first is dominant in regard to acquisition of the second, the second in regard to acquisition of the third, and the third in regard to acquisition of nirvāṇa: cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 40, l. 3-4.}
6) The anājñātamāsyāmīndriya in its turn produces two indriyas.

The ājñendriya produces in its turn either an impure (sāsrava) indriya or the ājñendsriya or the ājñātavindriya.

The ājñātavindriya produces either an impure indriya or the ājñātavindriya.

This is fully explain'd in detail in the Abhidharma.

2. The Three Faculties of Understanding According to the Mahāyāna

A. In the Darśanamārga

The faculty signifying “I will understand that which I do not understand” (anājñātamājñasyāmīndriya) concerns the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of dharmas. Wishing to understand that which he has not yet understood, [the yogin] produces the five faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhāindriya) and by the power of these five faculties, he is able to discover the true nature of dharmas.

Thus, when a person enters the womb (garbha), he acquires two organs: i) the bodily organ (kāyendriya) and ii) the vital organ (jīventindriya). At that time, he is like a piece of shapeless meat and his organs are unable to discern anything. But when these five organs, [eye, ear, nose, tongue and body] are completed (sampāna), he will be able to cognize the five objects [color, sound, smell, taste and touch].

It is the same for the bodhisattva. From his first production of the Bodhi mind (prathamacittotpāda) he wants to become Buddha but he has not yet perfected (na paripūrayati) the five moral faculties [faith, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom]. Although he has the aspiration (pranidhāna) for it and wants to know the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of dharmas, he has not yet come to the cognition of it. But when the bodhisattva produces these five faculties, fath, etc., he will be able to cognize the true nature of dharmas.

It is like the eye (cakṣus). What we call ‘eye’ is an assemblage of the four great elements (mahābhūta) and a [subtle] matter derived from the four great elements (mahābhautikarūpa). But at the beginning, although he already possesses the four great elements, the [subtle] matter derived from these four great elements has not yet crystallized. This is why this eye is not yet [a real] visual organ (cakṣurindriya).

Similarly, every person who has not broken the roots of good (asamuccinnakṣalamūla) possesses faith (śraddhā), but as the latter is not clear, it is not yet [a real] faculty of faith (śraddhendriya).

581 On the distinction between the four great elements (mahābhūta) and the subtle matter derived from the four great elements (upādāya rūpa, bhautika, rūpaprasāda), see Kośa, I, p. 22, 63-66.
582 Here the Traité will repeat, point by point but interpreting them from the Mahāyāna perspective, the nine indriyas taking place in the constitution of the three faculties of understanding above, (p. 1496F).
1) If the bodhisattva acquires the five moral faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhendriya), he will then be able to believe in the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. This nature is unborn (anutpanna) and unceasing (aniruddha), neither defiled (asaṃkliṣta) nor purified (avyavadāta), neither existent nor non-existent (naivasan nāsat), neither accepted (anupātta) nor rejected (aparātyakta), always at peace (sānta), perfectly pure, like space (ākāśasama), ineffable (anirdeśya), inexpressible (anabhilāpya); it is the cessation of all ways of speech (sarvavādamārgagoccheda), it surpasses the realm of all the minds and mental events (sarvacittacaitasikadharma-gocarasamatikrāṇa); it is like nirvāṇa; it is the Dharma of the Buddhas.583

2) Using the power of the faculty of faith (śraddhendriya), the bodhisattva acquires the faculty of energy (vīryendriya); he progresses energetically without regressing or straying.

3) By the power of the faculty of mindfulness (smṛtiṇḍriya), he prevents bad dharmas from entering and gathers all the good dharmas.

4) By the power of the faculty of concentration (samādhiṇḍriya), when his mind is distracted (vikṣipyate) by the five objects of enjoyment (pañcākāmaguṇa), he concentrates it on the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa).

5) By the power of the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya), he obtains a greater or lesser participation in the wisdom of the Buddhas, the taste (rasa) of which cannot be destroyed.

6-9) The support of these five faculties (pañcendriyāśraya), his mental faculty (manaindriya) is inevitably joined with the sensations (vedanā): sensation of satisfaction (saumansaya), pleasure (sukha) or indifference (upekṣā).

Being supported by these [nine] indriyas, the bodhisattva will enter into the assurance of the ultimate attainment of enlightenment of the bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniyāma).584 But as long as he has not obtained

583 Compare the definitions of ‘the true nature of all dharmas’ in Pañcavimsati, T 223, k. 2, p. 231b13-14; k. 3, p. 234c12; k. 4, p. 244a1-2; k. 6, p. 257b13-14; k. 23, p. 392a19-24; k. 27, p. 416c8-11.

584 In other words, the bodhisattva will enter into the eighth bodhisattva bhūmi, the Acalā, the ‘Unshakeable One’. According to most sources, the Acalā marks an important turning point in the bodhisattva’s career:

1) It is at this point that he enters into definitive possession (pratilābha, pratilambha, pratilambhatā) of the conviction or the certainty that dharmas do not arise (anupattikadharma-kṣānti): Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 122, l. 2; 131, l. 17; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 105, l. 11; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 350, l. 27; 351, l. 13-14.

2) The possession of this kṣānti is accompanied by the Great Prophecy (mahāvyākaraṇa) regarding the final triumph of the Bodhisattva: Lalitavistara, p. 35, l. 21; Daśabhūmika, p. 71, l. 24; Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 266, l. 1-2; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 20, l. 15; 141, l. 27; 165, l. 12; Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 190, l. 18; 192, l. 1.

3) From that time on, the Bodhisattva’s destiny is assured (niyāma: see below, k. 27, p. 262a18-b2). He is determined as to his future buddhahood: nīyato bhavatī anuttarāyāṃ samyaksambodhau (Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 83, l. 24); tṛṣāṇiyatipatipatito bhavati (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367, l. 12).
the fruit resulting from the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anuttpattikadharmakṣānti), it is not yet a matter of the anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya, the faculty signifying “I will understand that which I do not yet understand”.

B. In the bhāvanāmārga

Here the Bodhisattva cognizes the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas and, because he understands it well, it is a matter of the ājñātājñātsānti, the faculty signifying “I will understand that which I do not yet understand”.

From the time when he has obtained the fruit attached to the conviction that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharmakṣāntiphala), when he is installed in the irreversible level (avaivartikabhūmi), when he has received the prophecy (vyākaraṇa), up to the time when he completes the ten levels (daśabhūmi), when he is seated on the seat of enlightenment (bodhināḍa) and when he obtains the diamond concentration (vajrasamādhi), all of this is included in the interval called ājñendriya.

C. In the Aśaikṣamārga

Finally, the bodhisattva cuts through all the habitual propensities (sarvakleśavāsanā) and obtains supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarasamyakṣambodhi). Because he has understood and completely fulfilled everything to be known (sarvajñeyadharma), this is called ājñātāvīndriya ‘faculty of that which has been understood’.

In other words, he is a non-regressing (avaivartika) bodhisattva having non-regressing conviction (avaivartikakṣāntipratilabdha): Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 259, l. 13). As well, the eighth bhūmi is also called Niyatabhūmi ‘Determined Level’ (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367, l. 11); Avivartyabhūmi, avinivartanāvīśabhūmi, avaivartikabhūmi “Level without regression” (Daśabhūmika, p. 71, l. 12; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 176, l. 22; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 235, l. 18). It marks the beginning of the non-reversible career (abandhyacaryā) which will be followed in the last three bhūmis (Mahāvastu, I, p. 1, l. 3; 63, l. 13-14; Bodh. Bhūmi, p. 290, l. 21).

4) Finally and in particular in the eighth bhūmi, the Bodhisattva’s activity is practiced spontaneously, without action (abhisamāskāra) or mental changing (ābhoga), for it is unaffected by objects or notions: this is why it is called anabhisamskārābhogavihāra or anābhoganirnittavihāra: Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 105, l. 18-21; Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 178, l. 3; Bodh. Bhūmi, p. 367, l. 11; Samgraha, p. 202.

585 The functioning of the ājñendriya extends from the eighth to the tenth bhūmi. The latter is called Dharmamegha ‘Cloud of Dharma’ (Samgraha, p. 202-203), Paramavihāra ‘Ultimate abode’ (Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367, l. 13), Sarvajñānābhisekabhūmi ‘Level of consecration into omniscience’ (Daśabhūmika, p. 82, l. 8) or Abhiṣekavasthā ‘State of consecration’ (Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 190, l. 24). According to the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 225, l. 8 and Āloka, p. 104, l. 8-9: Bodhisattvo daśamyān sūttitaḥ sans Tathāgataeveti vaktavyo na tu Samyakṣambuddhaḥ: “The Bodhisattva who is on the tenth level ahould be called simply tathāgata, but not yet the completely and fully Enlightened One.
CHAPTER XXXIX: THE TEN POWERS OF THE BUDDHA
ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

PRELIMINARY NOTE

In chapter XVII to chapter XXX, the six perfections (pāramitā) to be fulfilled completely (paripūrayitavya) by the bodhisattva were discussed. They constitute the essentials of his career provided that he fulfills them by ‘the method of non-dwelling’ (āsthaṇayogena), without grasping the characteristics (na nimittodgraheṇa).

Chapters XXXI to XXXVIII dealt with the Path of nirvāṇa, its auxiliaries and its aids. The dharmas of the Path belong to adepts of both Vehicles but under different headings. The śrāvakas aspire to nirvāṇa, whereas the bodhisattvas delay their nirvāṇa in order to dedicate themselves to the welfare and happiness of all beings. The result is that the dharmas of the Path ‘must be realized’ (sākṣātkartavya) by the śrāvakas but merely completely ‘fulfilled’ (paripūrayitavya) or ‘cultivated’ (bhāvitavya) by the bodhisattvas. The intention of the bodhisattva is to convert beings and introduce them into the Greater Vehicle, the Vehicle of the Buddhas. They consider the dharmas of the Path as inefficacious or even non-existent (anupalabdha) and propose a new method of liberation. But how can they divert the śrāvakas from the dharmas of the Path if they have not themselves cultivated them? Someone will certainly say to them: “You criticize the old method because you are unable to use it!” It is, therefore, important for the bodhisattvas to be aware of both the theory and practice of things of the Path in order that they can discuss them in a valid manner.

In chapter XXXIX to the beginning of chapter XLII, it will be a matter not only of the perfections of the bodhisattva or the dharmas of the Path but also of the great attributes of the Buddhas. Since the bodhisattva does not yet possess them, it is not a matter of his completely fulfilling them or developing them; he can simply formulate the ‘desire to know them’ (jñatukāma), the ‘desire to attain them’ (prāptukāma).

In the present chapter, the Traité limits itself to presenting the Abhidharmic theories concerning the ten powers of the Buddha; it is in the next chapter that it will present the Mahāyāna point of view.

I. THE DAŚABALASŪTRA


Dasa yimāni bhikkhave tathāgathassa tathāgatabalāni yehi balehi samannāgato tathāgato āsabhaḥ ṭhānaṃ ... sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati ... yam pi bhikkhave tathāgato ...

Daśemāni bhikṣavas tathāgatasya balāṇi vaiḥ samanvāgatas tathāgato ‘rhan samyaksambuddha udāram ārṣabhaṃ ...karaṇīyaṃ nāparam asmād bhāvaṃ prajñānānīti. yat tathāgah ...

Translation of the Sanskrit. – These, O monks, are the ten powers of the Tathāgata, endowed with which the holy One, the fully and completely enlightened One who claims the noble place, the place of the bull, turns the wheel of Brahmā and utters the true Lion’s Roar in the assembly. What are these ten?

1. First, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the possible as possible and the impossible as impossible.

That the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the possible as possible and the impossible as impossible is the first power of the Buddha, endowed with which, the Tathāgata, the holy One, the fully and completely enlightened One who claims the noble place, the place of the bull, turns the wheel of Brahmā and utters the true Lion’s Roar in the assembly.

2. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, actions of the past, future and present according to their place, their cause, their object and their retribution. That the Tathāgata…

3. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the defilement, the purification, the types and the purity of the trances, liberations, concentrations and absorptions. That the Tathāgata…

4. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the degree of the moral faculties of other beings, other individuals. That the Tathāgata…

5. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the diverse aspirations of other beings, other individuals. That the Tathāgata…

6. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the world with its various acquired dispositions, with its many acquired dispositions. That the Tathāgata…

7. Furthermore, the Tathāgata cognizes, in accordance with reality, the route that leads to the various destinies. That the Tathāgata…

8. Furthermore, the Tathāgata remembers many previous abodes, for example, one lifetime, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty lifetimes, one hundred lifetimes, one thousand lifetimes, one million lifetimes, one hundred million lifetimes, several hundred lifetimes, several thousand lifetimes, several hundreds of thousands of lifetimes, one period of disappearance, one period of creation, one period of disappearance-creation, several periods of disappearance, several periods of creation, several periods of disappearance-creation, several periods of creation, several periods of disappearance-creation. He thinks: “I had such and such a name, such and such a family, such and such a clan, such and such food among beings
at that time; I experienced such and such happiness and such and such pain. I had such and such longevity, such and such a duration, such and such a life-span. When I left that place, I was reborn in that other place. And from that other place I was born here.” Thus the Tathāgata remembers his many previous abodes with their aspects, their origins and their details. That the Tathāgata…

9. Furthermore, the Tathāgata, with his divine eye, purified, surpassing that of men, sees beings dying and being born and recognizes them in reality as beautiful, ugly, lowly or excellent, going towards a good or a bad destiny, according to the results of their actions. He thinks: “These beings laden with bodily misdeeds, laden with misdeeds of speech and mind, slandering the saints, having false views, acting wrongly out of their wrong views, for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death are born in a miserable state, in a bad destiny, in the hells. On the other hand, these beings endowed with good bodily actions, endowed with good actions of speech and mind, not slandering the saints, having right views, acting well due to their right views, for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death are born in a good destiny, the heavens, among the gods.” That the Tathāgata…

10. Furthermore, the Tathāgata, by the cessation of the impurities, having realized in the present existence by means of his own wisdom the pure liberation of mind and the pure liberation by wisdom, takes his stand and knows: “Birth is exhausted by me, the religious life has been practiced, that which had to be accomplished has been accomplished, I see no further existence for myself.” That the Tathāgata…

II. LISTS OF JÑĀNABALAS

Lists of the ten jñanabalas ‘powers consisting of wisdoms’ have been prepared on the basis of this sūtra. They do not all follow the same order and numerous variations may be found. Here I [Lamotte] mention only a few:

1. Mahāvastu, I, p. 159, l. 10-160, l. 5: verse list (see notes by É. Senart, p. 502-505.
2. Lalitavistara, p. 433.
3. Vibhaṅga, p. 335-3444 (with a long commentary).
4. Kathāvatthu, p. 228-238.
5. Mahāvībhāṣā, T 1545, k. 30, p. 156c seq.
7. Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 746a seq.
8. Abhidharmadīpa, p. 382 seq.
9. Pañcavimśati, p. 210, l. 11-23; Satasāhasrikā, p. 1446, l. 16-1448-l. 5.
10. Āloka, p. 455, l. 15-19.
14. Mahāvyut. no. 120-129.


[k. 24, p. 235b]

Sūtra. – Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wishes to know completely the ten powers of the Buddha, the four fearlessnesses, the four infallible knowledges, the eighteen special attributes, great loving-kindness and great compassion, must exert himself in the Perfection of Wisdom (punar aparāṃ Śāriputra bodhisattvena mahāsattvenā daśa tathāgalāni catvāri vaiśāradīni catasraḥ pratisaṃvīdo рослдаśāvenikān buddhadharmān mahāmaitrīṃ mahākarunāṃ pariṇātukāmena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śīkṣitavyam).

Śāstra.–

First Section GENERAL QUESTIONS

I. ATTRIBUTES OF THE ŚRĀVAKA AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA

[235b] Question. – The ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya), etc., are the peerless attributes reserved for the Buddhas. They should therefore be treated first. Why does [the Prajñāpāramitā] speak first of the nine concepts (navasamjñā) [in chapter XXXV], the eight recollections (aṣṭārumṣrmatayah) [in chapter XXXVI], etc.?

Answer. – The Prajñāpāramitā first spoke [in chapters XVII to XXX] of the six perfections (pāramitā) to be practiced by the bodhisattva. The thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (saptatrimśad bodhipāksikadharmāḥ) and the other qualities including the three pure faculties (anāsravendriya) [which were the object of chapters XXXI to XXXVIII] are the qualities of the śrāvaka. By practicing the six perfections, the bodhisattva has acquired power (bala): he then wants to bypass the levels (bhūmi) of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, convert people engaged in [the Vehicles] of the śrāvaka and
pratyekabuddha and introduce them into the Vehicle of the Buddhas. This is why he criticizes these dharmas of the Lesser Vehicle (hīnayāna) of abandoning all beings and being of no benefit.

The śrāvakas say to the bodhisattva: “You are a worldly person (prthagjana) who has not yet destroyed the impurities (aṇiśīnārava) and, because you are unable to practice these qualities, you criticize them rashly.” That is why [here, in the Prajñāpāramitā], the Buddha said: “The thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipāksikadharma) and the other qualities of the śrāvakas should be completely fulfilled by the bodhisattva, but only by basing himself on their non-existence (anupalabdhitām upādāya).”586

Although the bodhisattva practices these qualities, he considers them to be non-existent (anupalabdha): it is for beings devoted to bad practices (duṣkarita) that the bodhisattva practices these good practices of the śrāvaka and never rejects these qualities, non-existent and empty though they are. Neither does he hasten to realize his own nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasāksātikāra).

If the bodhisattva did not understand, did not practice, this Lesser Vehicle and limited himself to criticizing it, who would want to believe him? If the Buddha Śākyamuni had not previously carried out the practices of austerity (duṣkaracaryā) for six years and had limited himself to criticizing them by saying that they were not the Path, nobody would have believed him. This is why he exerted himself in practices of austerity more than anyone else; then, when he had realized the Bodhi of the Buddhas, he criticized this path of austerities and everyone believed him.587 This is why, following the six perfections, the bodhisattva practices the qualities of the śrāvaka.

Furthermore, these [qualities of the śrāvaka] are not just śrāvaka qualities. The bodhisattva who practices them in conjunction with the Dharma, without abandoning the mind of beings, ‘fulfills completely’ (paripūrayati) all the Buddha qualities. As he uses the knowledge of the emptiness of non-existence (anupalambhaśūnyatā)588 [for this purpose], these śrāvaka qualities are also called bodhisattva qualities.

586 See above, p. 1137F.
587 Described, among other sources, in the Duṣkaracaryāparivarta of the Lalitavistara, p. 243-260. The comments made by A. Foucher, La Vie du Bouddha, p. 134, on the mortifications of Śākyamuni connect up rather oddly with the considerations developed here by the Traité. The Buddha had to submit freely to the excesses of asceticism in order to be able, in the Sermon at Benares, to criticize from an awareness of the cause: “There are two extremes which the person who is leading a spiritual life should avoid. The one is a life of pleasure, devoted to pleasures and enjoyment (kāmeṣu kāmasukhātāyānā): it is base, ignoble, contrary to the spirit, unworthy, vain. The other is a life of mortification (ātmaklamathāyānā): this is sad, unworthy, vain…The flawless one has found the middle way (madhyamā partipad)…” (cf. Vinaya, I, p. 10; Catusparisaṣā, p. 140; Mahāvastu, III, p. 331; Lalitavistara, p. 416).
588 Knowledge about the fifteenth of the eighteen śūnyatās postulated by the Prajñāpāramitā: Pañcaviṃśati, p. 197, l. 15; Śatasahasrikā, p. 1473, l. 1-2. This is the fact that dharmas past, future and present do not exist (nopalabhyanat). The translation ‘unascertainable emptiness’ is guilty of timidity.
Question. – If the bodhisattva completely fulfills the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipākṣikadharma), why does he not enter into the predestination of the śrāvakas (śrāvakaniyāma)?

Answer. – When we say that he ‘fulfills completely’ (paripūrayati), we mean that he sees them and knows them completely but without taking on their realization (sāksātkāram nopagrhṇāti). By seeing and knowing them clearly, he ‘fulfills them completely’.

Let us take, for example, this saying of the Buddha:

Everyone fears the stick and the rod.

There is no one who does not protect his own life.

Inspired by the indulgence one has for oneself,

One does not inflict the stick on anyone.

Although the Buddha says that everyone fears the stick and the rod, [this does not hold true] for beings of the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu) who have no body. Neither does it hold true for the realm of subtle form (rūpadhātu) where, there are bodies but no whip or rod. In the desire realm (kāmadhātu), it is not valid for the Buddhas, the noble cakravartin kings, the Yāma gods and other higher deities who have nothing to fear from a beating. It is in reference to those [235c] who do have reasons to fear the rod that the Buddha said “Everyone fears being beaten by the rod.”

It is the same here when we speak of ‘fulfilling completely’ [the śrāvaka qualities]: ‘fulfilling them completely’ is not to seek to realize them (sāksātkāra) or to be attached to them.

Furthermore, as has been said above, the bodhisattva does not abandon beings and [although he fulfills completely the śrāvaka qualities], it is by joining them with the knowledge bearing upon the emptiness of non-existence (anupalambhaśūnyatā). This is why he does not fall into the class of the śrāvakas.

---

589 The śrāvakaniyāma is the assurance of the śrāvaka as to his future attainment of nirvāṇa, The śrāvaka is called samyaktvaniyāvakrānta (samyaktva = nirvāṇa); as soon as he has this guarantee, he is an ārya. In a similar way, bodhisattvaniyāma is the certainty for the bodhisattva of some day reaching supreme perfect enlightenment which makes him a Buddha. See Kośa,VI, p. 180-182 and notes.

590 Udānavarga, V, v, 19 (p. 144):

Sarve daṇḍasya bibhyanti, saveśāṃ jīvitaṃ priyam /
ātmānam upamāṁ kṛtvā, naiva hanyāṁ na ghātayet //

“Everyone fears the rod; life is precious to everyone. By taking oneself as the point of comparison, one avoids killing or making another kill.”

Cf. Dhammapada, v. 130:

Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa, sabbesam jīvitaṃ piyam /
attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā, na haneyya na gātaye //

The same stanza will be cited later, k. 30, p. 278b23-24.

591 See above, p. 153F, n.
II. ATTRIBUTES TO BE FULFILLED AND ATTRIBUTES TO BE COGNIZED

From the six perfections up to the three pure faculties [i.e., from chapter XVII to chapter XXXVIII], the Prajñāpāramitā spoke only [of the qualities] ‘to be completed fully’ (paripūrayitavya); why will it speak from now on of qualities which the bodhisattva is ‘desirous of obtaining’ (prāptukāma) or ‘desirous of knowing’ (jñātukāma) and in view of which ‘he must practice the perfection of wisdom’ (prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣitavyam)?

Answer. – The śrāvakā qualities [that are the object of chapters XXXI to XXXVIII] are measured and limited and this is why Prajñāpāramitā spoke of the qualities ‘to be completely fulfilled’ (paripūrayitva). But from now on in what follows, it will be a matter of profound (gambhīra) and immeasurable (apramāṇa) Buddha qualities which the bodhisattva has not yet attained; this is why the Prajñāpāramitā will speak of qualities that the bodhisattva is ‘desirous of attaining’ (prāptukāma) or ‘desirous of knowing’ (jñātukāma), and in view of which he must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom.

Furthermore, as the śrāvakā qualities are easily penetrated, easily understood, the Prajñāpāramitā calls them ‘to be completely fulfilled’ (paripūrayitavya). But as the bodhisattva qualities and Buddha qualities are difficult to penetrate, difficult to understand, it now says that ‘he must exert himself in them’.

Finally, the śrāvakā qualities [concern] the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of things. The śrāvakas understand suffering (duḥkha), the origin of suffering (duḥkhasamudaya), the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodha) and the path leading to the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodhagāminī pratipad) only.

For example, take two physicians (bhiṣaj). The first understands only the sickness (ābādha), the cause of the sickness (ābāḍhasamutthāna), the cure for the sickness (ābāḍhaprahāṇa) and the remedy (bheṣaja) that cures the sickness;592 but he does not know every sickness, nor does he know all the causes of sickness or all the cures for sickness or all the remedies curing the sicknesses. It may be also that he knows how to treat the sicknesses of men but he does not know how to treat the sickness of animals; it may be that he can cure one country but cannot cure other countries. It may also be that he can treat ten kinds of sicknesses but he does not know how to treat completely the four hundred and four kinds of sicknesses. And it is the same in regard to the causes of the sicknesses, the cures for the sicknesses and the remedies curing the sicknesses. The second physician knows the four things completely: he knows all the remedies, he knows all the sicknesses.

592 Compare the Vyāhāyādisūtra in Saṃyukta (T 99, k. 15, p. 105a-b, the original Sanskrit of which is cited by Kośavyākyā, p. 514: Caturbhīr aṅgaiḥ samavāgato bhiṣak śalyapahartā rājārāś ca bhavati tājāyogyaś rājāṅgatve ca samkhāyam gacchati. katamaśi caturbhiḥ. ābāḍhakuṣalo bhavati, ābāḍhasamutthānakuṣalo bhavati, ābāḍhaprahāṇakuṣalah prahīnasya cābāḍhasyāyatayām anupādakusalah.

For the comparison of the physician, see also P. Demiéville in Hobogirin, Byō, III, p. 230-231.
The śrāvaka is like the lesser physician and does not know everything; the bodhisattva-mahāsattva, however, is like the greater physician; there is no illness that he does not know; there is no remedy that he does not find. This is why the śrāvaka qualities should be ‘completely fulfilled’ (parpūrayitavya), whereas those of the bodhisattva should be ‘practiced’.

III. DEFINITION OF THE TEN POWERS ACCORDING TO THE DAŚABALASŪTRA

The Buddha has ten powers (bala):

1) He knows, in accordance with reality, that which is possible (sthāna) and impossible (asthāna): this is the first power.

2) He knows the actions (karmasamādāna), past, future and present, of beings and he knows them according to place (sthānatas), cause (hetutas) and retribution (vipākatas): this is the second power.

3) He knows, in accordance with reality, the defilements (saṃkleśa), the purity (vyāvadāna) and the modalities (vyavasthāna) of the trances (dhyāna), liberations (vimokṣa), concentrations (samādhi) and absorptions (samāpatti): this is the third power.

4) He knows, in accordance with reality, the degree of the moral faculties (indriyaparāparatā) of other individuals: this is the fourth power.

5) He knows the diverse aspirations (nāṇādhimukti) of other beings: this is the fifth power.

6) He knows the world (loka) with its diverse and numerous acquired dispositions (dhātu): this is the sixth power.

7) He knows the route (pratipad) that leads to the different destinies (sarvatragagāmin): this is the seventh power.

8) He remembers his many previous abodes (pūrvanivāsa) with their aspects (ākāra) and their causes (nidāna), namely, one existence (jāti), two existences and so on up to a hundred thousand existences and many periods of [236a] creation (vivarta) and disappearance (saṃvarta) of the world: There, among those beings, I had such and such a family (gotra), such and such a name (nāman), such and such food (āhāra), such and such suffering (duḥkha), such and such happiness (sukha), such and such longevity (dīrghāyus). When I died in this place, I was reborn in that place and when I died there, I came to be born here where I have such and such a name, such and such a family, such and such food, such and such suffering, such and such happiness and such and such a longevity: this is the eighth power.

593 Here the Traité quotes the Daśabalaśūtra, taking some liberties, the text of which was given above, p. 1506-1508F.
9) With the divine eye (divyacakṣus), purified, surpassing that of gods and men, the Buddha sees beings dying and being born and knows them to be handsome (suvarṇa) or ugly (durvarṇa), great or small, falling into a bad destiny (durgati) or falling into a good destiny (sugati) and, as a result of the actions they have committed (yathākarmapaga), suffering the appropriate retribution (vipāka). As a result, these beings, burdened with misdeeds of body (kāyadaścarita), burdened with misdeeds of speech (vāguṇḍaścarita), burdened with misdeeds of mind (manodaścarita), slandering the saints (āryāṇām apavādaka), having wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi), acting badly because of these wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭikarmasamādāna), for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death enter into a bad destiny (durgati) and are born in hell (niraya). On the other hand, these other beings endowed with good bodily actions, endowed with good actions of speech, endowed with good actions of mind, do not slander the saints, having right view, acting well from the fact of their right view, for this cause and this reason, at the dissolution of the body after death enter into a good destiny (sugati) and are reborn in heaven (svarga): this is the ninth power.

10) By the cessation of the impurities (āsravāṇāṃ kṣayā), having realized, in the present existence (dṛṣṭa eva dharme) by his own knowledge (svayam abhiññāya), the pure liberation by wisdom (prajñāvimuktā), the Buddha cognizes in accordance with reality: Birth is exhausted for me (kṣīṇā me jātiḥ), the religious life has been practiced (uṣītaṃ brahmacaryam), that which had to be done has been done (kṛtam karanīya), I see no other existence for myself (nāparam asmād bhāvam iti): this is the tenth power.

IV. WHY TEACH THE TEN POWERS?

Question. – The bodhisattvas have not yet obtained the ten powers and the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are unable to obtain them; why speak of them here?

Answer. – 1) It is true that the śrāvakas are unable to obtain them but if they hear about the qualities of these ten powers, they tell themselves that the Buddha himself has these great qualities and they rejoice saying: “We have obtained great gains (lābhā nah sulabdhhāḥ) and have received an unlimited benefit.” Thanks to the purity of their faith (śraddhācittaviśuddhi), they enter into the path of cessation of suffering (duḥkhakṣayamārga).

As for the bodhisattvas who hear about these powers, they diligently cultivate the bodhisattva path and will obtain these great fruits that are the ten powers, etc.

Furthermore, there are śrāvakas and bodhisattvas who, practicing the concentration of recollection of the Buddha (buddhānusmrīsādhūh), do not recollect merely the Dharmakāya with its many Buddha qualities. They must make the following reflections:

The Buddha is able to explain all dharmas in all their aspects (ākāra): this is why he is called ‘Omniscient’ (sarvajña).
In accordance with reality, he analyzes and skillfully preaches all dharmas: this is why he is called ‘Seeing everything’ (sarvadarśin).

By direct perception (pratyakṣam), he cognizes all dharmas: this is why he is called ‘the One whose knowledge and vision are unhindered’ (apratihatajñānadarśana).

He loves all beings impartially: this is why he is called ‘the Being of great loving-kindness and great compassion’ (mahāmaitrīmahākaruṇā).

He possesses great loving-kindness and great compassion: this is why he is called ‘Savior of the world’ (lokarājñā).

He comes by a path that is in accord with the truth (yathābhūtamārgena gacchati): this is why he is called ‘Tathāgata’.

He has the right (arhati) to receive the worship (pūjā) of the entire world this is why he is called ‘Arhat’.

He is endowed with a wisdom free of error (aviparītāraja): this is why he is called ‘Samyaksambuddha’.

His morality (śīla), his concentration (samādhi) and his wisdom (prajñā) are complete (sampanna): this is why he is called ‘Vidyācaranāsampanna, endowed with sciences and practices’.

He does not turn back: this is why he is called ‘Sugata’.

He cognizes the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) of the world: this is why he is called ‘Lokavid, knower of the world’.

[234b] He skillfully preaches the path of supramundane salvation (lokottarakṣemamārga): this is why he is called ‘Anuttarapuruşadamyārathī, supreme leader of beings to be converted’.

He saves beings by the threefold teaching (śāsana): this is why he is called ‘Śāstā devamanuṣyaṇām, master of gods and men’.

He can awaken himself and awaken people from the sleep of all the afflictions (kleśa) of the world: this is why he is called ‘Buddha’.

He is endowed with all the aspirations (sarvapraṇidhanopeta): this is why he is called ‘Bhagavat, endowed with qualities’.

He is endowed with the ten powers (daśabalaśampanna): this is why he is called ‘Dhīra, strong’.

He has obtained the four fearlessnesses (caturvaiśāradhyāprāpta): this is why he is called ‘Puruṣasimha, man-lion’.

He has obtained immense profound knowledge (jñāna): this is why he is called ‘Mahāguṇaśāgara, great ocean of qualities’.

---

594 Mahāvyut., no. 35.
595 Ibid., no. 36.
All these statements are without obstacles \textit{(apratihata):} this is why he is said to be like the wind (vāyusama).

He has neither aversion \textit{(pratigha)} nor fondness \textit{(amunaya)} for all that is beautiful \textit{(suvarṇa)} or ugly \textit{(durvarṇa):} this is why he is said to be like the earth \textit{(prthivīśama)}.

He burns the kindling of all the fetters \textit{(sarvasaṃyojanendhana):} this is why he is said to be like fire \textit{(tejaḥsama)}.

He has skillfully destroyed all the lingering traces of the afflictions \textit{(sarvakleśavāsanā):} this is why he is said to be fully liberated \textit{(vimukta)}.

His abode being supreme \textit{(uttarāvasatha)}, he is called ‘Bhagavat’.

Since the Buddha possesses such qualities, one should recollect the Buddha. This is why the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who wants to attain the ten powers \textit{(bala)}, the four fearlessnesses \textit{(vaisāradya)} and the eighteen special attributes \textit{(āvenīkadhrama) of the Buddhas should practice the Prajñāpāramitā.

3) Furthermore, at Rājañgrha on the Grdhraḵutaparvata, when the Buddha was preaching the Prajñāpāramitā, the four communities \textit{(catusparīṣad)} and a great crowd of heretics \textit{(tīrthika)}, lay people \textit{(grhaṣṭha)}, monastics \textit{(pravrajīta)}, devas, yakṣas, etc., gathered together. The Buddha entered into the concentration of the King of Samādhis and emitted great rays of light \textit{(raśmi)} that illumined universes as numerous as the sands of the Ganges \textit{(gaṅgānadiśvālokopama lokadhātu)}; the earth trembled in six ways \textit{(prthivī śadvikāram akampata)}, then the Buddha preached the Prajñāpāramitā from the six perfections up to the three faculties, \textit{[i.e., chapter XVII to chapter XXXVIII]. At this moment, some beings experienced doubts \textit{(saṃśaya)}} and wondered by means of what powers and by means of how many strengths the Buddha could be of such inconceivable \textit{(acintya)} and such moving service \textit{(upakāra). Knowing that these beings had such doubts, the Buddha said to them: “I possess the power of knowledge \textit{(jñānabala)} of the true nature \textit{(bhūtalakṣaṇa)} of all dhammas. This power has ten kinds of applications and thanks to these ten kinds of knowledges, I am able to carry out these moving miracles \textit{(prāthīrāya)} and even surpass those that have been done.” This is why it is said \textit{[in the Prajñāpāramitā]} that the bodhisattva who wants to attain the ten powers must exert himself in the perfection of wisdom.

4) Furthermore, some disciples of the Buddha \textit{(buddhaśrāvaka)} who have planted the roots of good \textit{(avaropitakāśalamūla)} lifetime after lifetime can, out of some fault, fall into heresy. Now heretics \textit{(tīrthika)} often say: “The Buddha does not really have the power of the qualities \textit{(gunabala):} it is by magical powers \textit{(māyabala)} that he seduces \textit{(āvartayati)} the minds of beings.”\footnote{A spiteful insinuation often found in the mouths of heretics (Majjima, I, p. 375, 381; Anguttara, II, p. 190, 193): \textit{Samañho hi bhante Gotamo māyāvī, āvaṭṭaṇiniḥ māyaṁ jānāti yāya aṁñattithīyaṁṇaṁ sāvake āvaṭṭeti.}} And the disciples of the Buddha who have fallen into heresy have doubts and wonder if indeed the Buddha is not the Great Man \textit{(mahāpuruṣa). Wanting to counteract this insult \textit{(abhyāhhyāna)}, the Buddha said: “I truly possess the ten powers \textit{(bala)} and the four fearlessnesses \textit{(vaisāradya)} with which I save beings: it is not magic \textit{(māya)}.”

\footnote{596 Events described and commented on above, p. 431F seq.}

\footnote{597 A spiteful insinuation often found in the mouths of heretics (Majjima, I, p. 375, 381; Anguttara, II, p. 190, 193): \textit{Samañho hi bhante Gotamo māyāvī, āvaṭṭaṇiniḥ māyaṁ jānāti yāya aṁñattithīyaṁṇaṁ sāvake āvaṭṭeti.}}
5) Finally, for the bodhisattvas who cultivate the bodhisattva path, the practice of austerities (duṣkaracaracari) is difficult to observe and difficult to realize and they have the tendency to laziness (kausīḍya). This is why the Buddha says to them: “Practice the ten powers and you will obtain an immense fruit of retribution (vipākaphala).”

[236c] It is like the leader of a caravan (sārthavāka) who encourages his merchants by saying: “Be careful and avoid fatigue (klamatha): by means of energy, diligence effort and strength, you will arrive at the jewel mountain (ratnagiri) and there you will find the seven jewels (saptaratna) and the wish-fulfilling gem (cintāmani).” In the same way, the Buddha encourages the bodhisattvas and says to them: “Do not be lazy; cultivate the bodhisattva path diligently and with energy; practice the ten powers and you will obtain an immense fruit of retribution.”

It is because of these many benefits that [the Prajñāpāramitā] deals with the ten powers, etc., here.

V. WHY ARE THERE ONLY TEN POWERS?

Question. – The Buddha possesses innumerable powers; why speak of only ten here?

Answer. – It is true that the Buddha possesses innumerable powers but in order to save beings, to speak of ten powers is sufficient to settle the question:

1) By the power of the knowledge of what is possible and what is impossible (sthānasthānajñānabala), the Buddha distinguishes (vibhanakti) and evaluates (tulayati) those beings who can be converted (vaineyasattva) and those who cannot be converted (avaineya).

2) By the power of the knowledge of retribution of actions (karmavipākajñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates in one given person the obstacle consisting of action (karmāvaraṇa), in another person the obstacle consisting of retribution (vipākāvaraṇa), in yet another person the absence of obstacles.598

3) By the power of the knowledge of the dhyānas, vimokṣas, samādhis and samāpattis, he distinguishes and evaluates those who are attached to the flavors of trance (rasaraka) and those who are not attached to them.

4) By the power of the knowledge of the moral faculties (indriyaparāparajñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates the degree of peoples’ strength of knowledge.

598 By āvaraṇa is meant that which is an obstacle to the Path and to the roots of good preparatory to the Path (nirvedhabhāgīya). The Buddha said that there are three obstacles: i) the obstacle constituted by action (karmāvaraṇa), namely, the five sins of immediate (ānantarya) retribution; ii) the obstacle constituted by the conflicting emotions (kleśāvaraṇa), chronic (abhiśaṅkika) and violent (tīkṣṇa) passion; iii) the obstacle consisting of retribution (vipākāvaraṇa): the three bad destinies and some good destinies: cf. Anguttara, III, p. 436; Kośa, IV, p. 201-203 and notes; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 79.
5) By the power of the knowledge of the various aspirations of beings (nānādhimuktijñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates what is loved by beings.

6. By the power of the knowledge of the various dispositions acquired by beings (nānādhātuṇījñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates the progression of profound thoughts (gambhīracitā) of beings.

7. By the power of the knowledge of the route leading to the various destinies (sarvatragāminīpratipajñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates the doors to deliverance (vimokṣaṇamukha) among beings.

8. By the power of the knowledge of previous abodes (pūrvanivāsajñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates the earlier comings and goings of beings.

9. By the power of the knowledge of birth and death (cyutypapādajñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates the places of birth of beings (upapattisthāna), beautiful (suvarṇa) or ugly (durvarṇa),

10. By the power of the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñānabala), he distinguishes and evaluates the attaining of nirvāṇa by beings.

By using these ten types of powers, the Buddha saves beings. True and free of error, all are perfected (saṃpanna). This is why, although the Buddha possesses innumerable powers, we speak only of these ten powers.

VI. WHY THE FIRST POWER INCLUDES THE OTHER NINE

1) Furthermore, by the power of the possible and the impossible, he knows exactly from what cause a certain fruit of retribution comes. This power includes the nine others to save beings. Nine different modalities occur in this first power. How is that?

2) Beings in the world see the grain grow from the seed with their eyes (pratykaṣam), but they do not know it. How then would they know the fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) caused by the mind and mental events (cātāsikadharma)? The Buddha, however, knows clearly and fully the fruit of retribution in its inner and outer causes (adhyātmabāhyahetupratyaya): thus this is a ‘power’.599

The Buddha knows the beings who are bound (buddhā) by actions (karman) and defilements (kleśa) and the beings who are freed (mukta) by the pure dhyaṇas, samāpattis, samādhis and vimokṣas. He knows fully and completely the three kinds of actions of all beings, past, future and present, the lightness or gravity, the depth or superficiality, the coarseness or subtlety of their afflictions: thus this is a ‘power’.

3. He knows fully and completely the depth or the shallowness of the dhyaṇas, samāpattis, samādhis and vimokṣas of all beings and the causes for their liberation (vimuktī): this is thus a ‘power’. [237a]

599  Power (bala) here being taken in the sense of jñānabala ‘power consisting of knowledge’.
4. In view of the future lifetime (punarjanman), beings of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) carry out shameful or meritorious actions; in view of not being reborn, people of keen faculties (tīkṣṇendriya) accumulate actions (upacinvanti). The Buddha knows fully and completely the beauty or ugliness of these superior or inferior faculties: thus this is a ‘power’.

5. The Buddha knows the two kinds of aspirations (adhimukti) in all beings that are the determining causes of their higher or lower faculties (indriya); he knows fully and completely the kindness, the malice and the various modalities of these two kinds of aspirations: thus this is a ‘power’.

6. These two kinds of aspirations (adhimukti) being cause and condition for the two kinds of acquired dispositions (dhātu), the Buddha knows fully and completely the progress of the profound thoughts (gambhīracitta) of beings: thus this is a ‘power’.

7. By reason of their various acquired dispositions (dhātu), beings follow two types of paths (pratipad), the good path and the bad path. The Buddha knows fully and completely the many gates and destinations: thus this is a ‘power’.

8-9. The unhindered knowledge of [the mechanism] of causes and results in past and future existences is called the power of the knowledge of previous abodes (pūrvanivāsajñāna) and the knowledge of death and rebirth (cyutypapādaññāna).

10. To know the causes and results of the past and the future and, being fully aware of skillful means (upāya), to break the continuity (prabandha) of the mechanism of cause and effect, this is the power of the cessation of impurities (āsravakṣayabāla). The Buddha knows the twofold causality of the three times, distinguishes and evaluates the moral faculties (indriya), the aspirations (adhimukti) and the acquired dispositions (dhātu) of beings and, in order to break their impurities, he preaches the Dharma to them. This is what is called the power of cessation of the impurities (āsravakṣaya).

Second Section THE TEN POWERS IN PARTICULAR

I. THE POWER OF THE POSSIBLE AND THE IMPOSSIBLE

Question. – What is the power of the knowledge of the possible and the impossible (sthānāsthnajñānabala)?

Answer. – The Buddha knows all dharmas, their causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) and the mechanism of the fruit of retribution (vipākaphalantyāma): from such and such causes and conditions there arises such and such a fruit of retribution; from such and such other causes and conditions there arises such and such another fruit of retribution. How is that?
As it is said in the *To-sing king* (Bahudhātukasūtra) in regard to things possible and impossible:

“It is impossible that a woman should be a noble cakravartin king” (aṭṭhānam etam anavakāso yaṁ itthi rājā assa cakkavattī, n’ etam thānaṁ vijjati). Why? Because any woman dependent on a man cannot obtain sovereignty (aśvarya). And if a woman cannot be a noble cakravartin king, how then could she be Buddha? If a woman obtains liberation, nirvāṇa, it is thanks to a man that she obtains it. It is impossible that she could obtain Bodhi by herself (svataḥ).

“It is impossible that two noble cakravartin kings appear simultaneously in the world” (aṭṭhānam etam anavakāso yaṁ ākkīsā lokadhūtuyā dve rājāno cakkavattino apubbaṁ acarimaṇḍ uppaṭṭeyyaṁ, n’ etam thānaṁ vijjati). Why? Because a cakravartin king never encounters any rivalry (pratyarthikatva). And if two noble cakravartin kings cannot be in the same world, how then could two Buddhas?

“It is impossible that a bad action [of body, speech or mind] could result in a pleasant [agreeable] retribution.” (aṭṭhānam etam anavakāso yaṁ kāyavacīmanoduccaritassa ēṭṭho kanto manāpo vipāko nibbatteyya, n’ etam thānaṁ vijjati). And if a bad action cannot bring worldly happiness (laukikasukha), how then could it bring supramundane happiness (lokottarasukha)?

“It is impossible that the person who is of bad conduct [body, speech or mind] could, as a result of this fact, [at the dissolution of the body] be reborn in heaven” (atthānam etam anavakāso yaṁ kāyavacīmanoduccaritasamāngaṁ tannidānā tappaccayā kāyassā bhedā param maranā sugatim saggam lokam uppaṭṭeyya, n’ etam thānaṁ vijjati). And if the person who is of bad conduct cannot be reborn in the heavens, how then could he obtain nirvāṇa? In fact, the five obstacles (pañcaśāvaraṇa) cover the mind, one is distracted (vikṣipta) and, without developing the seven factors of enlightenment (saṁbodhyaṅga), it is impossible to attain nirvāṇa. As long as the five obstacles cover the mind and one does not cultivate the seven factors of enlightenment, it is impossible to attain the Bodhi of the śrāvakas, not to speak of the Bodhi of the Buddhas. But when the mind is free of obstacles, the Bodhi of the Buddhas can be obtained and, all the more so, that of the śrāvakas.

All of these possibilities and impossibilities the Buddha has explained from his own mouth in the *To-sing king* (Bahudhātukasūtra) but, relying on the word of the Buddha, scholars have developed these possibilities and impossibilities at length.

---

600 An extract of the *Bahudhātukasūtra* of Majjhima, III, p. 64-67 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 47, p. 723c28-724b28), repeated in Anguttara, I, p. 26-30 as well.

601 See also above, p. 134F, 545F.

602 See above, p. 302-303F, 535F.

603 The *Traité* undoubtedly has in mind the Abhidharma authors who have considerably increased the list of possibilities and impossibilities drawn up by the Buddha: see, e.g., Vibhaṅga, p. 335-338; Kathāvatthu, p. 172; Puggalapaññatti, p. 11, 12.
the path of seeing the truths (satyadarśana), re-arise, that the saints hide their faults, and that the srotaāpānas are reborn twenty-five times.604 See what has been said at length in the classification of the saints (āryavibhaṅga).

It is impossible that people guilty of the five heinous crimes of immediate retribution (ānantarya), the five types of eunuchs (pañcavidhasandha), beings in the four bad destinies (caturdurgatipatitasattva), the inhabitants of Uttarāvati and the retinue of Māra (māraparivāra), being hindered by the three obstacles (āvaraṇa),605 can attain the Path….606 [237c]

There are innumerable impossibilities (asthāna) of this kind and it is the same for the possibilities. The Buddha knows the possible things and the impossible things; he distinguishes (vibhanakīti) them and evaluates (tulayati) them. For beings able to be converted (vaiṇeyasattva), he preaches the Dharma; for beings unable to be converted, it is the [free] play of causes. The Buddha is like a good physician (vaidya) who understands the curable and incurable illnesses.

On the other hand, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know very few things. Sometimes they want to convert beings unable to be converted, as was the case for the Cheou-lo (Asura?); sometimes they do not convert beings who ought to be converted, as was the case [for Śrīvṛddhi] who was not converted by Śāriputra.607

604 The srotaāpanna is saptakṛtyaḥ paramah, i.e., he will be reborn a maximum of seven times: cf. Anguttara, I, p. 233, l. 13; IV, p. 381, l. 13; Nettipakaraṇa, p. 169, l. 27; p. 189, l. 28; Visuddhimagga, p. 611, l. 26; Kośa, VI, p. 200.

605 The obstacle consisting of action (karmāvaraṇa) bars the Path to people guilty of the five ānantaryas; the obstacle consisting of passion (kleśāvaraṇa) bars it to eunuchs; the obstacle consisting of retribution (vipākāvaraṇa) bars it to beings in the four unfortunate rebirths (nāraka, tiryagyoni, preta and asura) and to the inhabitants of Uttarakuru: cf. Kośa, IV, p. 201-213.

606 The Traité continues by mentioning still other possibilities.

607 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 412-413: Sthavirasāriputreṇa pravrājyāprekṣapuruṣapratyākhyānam:
“Śāriputra rejected a man who asked for the going-forth from home.”

The Kośavyākhyā, p. 644, tells the circumstances for this refusal: Āryaśāripureṇa kila kasyacit pravrājyāprekṣasya puruṣasya ... dhatupāśaṇivare nilinam iva kāṇcanam //

Transl. – It is said that a man asked for admission into the monastic Order. The noble Śāriputra looked for some root of good in him before producing the deliverance but, as he saw none, he refused him and did not allow him into the Order. The Buddha, however, found one and allowed him into the Order. The monks questioned the Buddha about this man and the Blessed One said: Here is an action done by this man which will be worth arhathood for him. Actually, actions do not ripen in the elements earth, water, fire or wind, but indeed in the aggregates, the elements and the bases of consciousness appropriated by him. And the Buddha said: “I definitely see in him a very small seed of deliverance, like a speck of gold caught in the interstices of a mineral.”

This story is told in full in the following collections:
The Buddha himself makes no blunders. [His knowledge of the possible and the impossible] is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (prajñāti) and, since he knows fully and completely (prajñāti), it is called the first ‘power’.

II. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RETRIBUTION OF ACTIONS

The power of the knowledge of the retribution of actions (karmavipākajñānabala). - Whether it is a matter of actions carried out by the body or speech, of actions unaccomplished in the present lifetime, of actions resulting from discipline of vow (samādānasīla),608, of bad actions, of actions to be carried out during one day and one night 609, of sinful or meritorious actions: the Buddha has summarily explained the threefold sphere of action of all of these, and this is what is called the natures of karman.

1) The Buddha knows the past (atīta) actions of all beings the retribution of which is also past, the past actions the retribution of which is taking place in the present (pratyutpanna), the past action the retribution of which is in the future (anāgata), the past actions the retribution of which is in the past and the present, the past actions the retribution of which is in the past and the future, the past actions the retribution of which is in the present and the future, the past actions the retribution of which is in the past, future and present. It is the same for present actions.

---

608  Discipline of vow, see above, p. 819-852F.
609  Also called discipline of upavāsastha: cf. p. 825-929F.
2) Furthermore, among the good minds (kuśalacittā), there are those that undergo the retribution of good (kuśala), bad (akuśala) or indeterminate (avyāktra) actions.610 It is the same for bad (akuśala) minds and indeterminate (avyāktra) minds.

3) Furthermore, as a result of a salutary (kṣema) action, one undergoes a pleasant retribution (iṣṭavipāka); as a result of a pernicious (akṣema) action, one undergoes an unpleasant retribution (aniṣṭavipāka); as a result of an action that is neither salutary nor pernicious (naivakṣemanākṣema) action, one undergoes a neither unpleasant nor pleasant retribution.611

As a result of an action to be experienced in the present lifetime (dṛṣṭadharmavedanīya), one undergoes a retribution in the present lifetime; as a result of an action to be experienced after having been reborn (upapadyavedanīya), one undergoes a retribution after having been reborn [i.e., in the very next lifetime to come]; as a result of an action to be undergone later (aparaparyāyavedanīya), one undergoes a retribution in a later existence [from the third onward].612

As a result of an impure (aśubha) action, one undergoes a retribution of torment; as a result of a pure (śubha) action, one undergoes a retribution free of torment. As a result of a mixed (saṁbhinna) action, one undergoes a mixed retribution.

---

610 Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 51, p. 263a6; Kośabhaṣya, p. 227, l. 5: Kuśalam akuśalam avyāktraṁ karmat.

611 Kośabhaṣya, p. 227, l. 7-9: Kṣemaṁ karma kuśalam yad iṣṭavipākaṁ nirvānaprāpakaṁ ca duḥkhaparitrāṇāṁ tatkālam atyantaṁ ca. akṣemaṁ akuśalam kṣemaṁca āṣamaḥ tābhyaṁ itarataṁ karma naivakṣemanākṣemaṁ yat tatkuśalākūśalabhyaṁ itarataṁ veditavyaṁ.

Transl. – Good action is salutary whether it brings a pleasant retribution or whether it makes one obtain nirvāṇa; in the first case, temporarily, in the second case, once and for all. Bad action is pernicious, for it is, by nature, opposed to salvation: it is unpleasant retribution. An action different from the two preceding ones, namely, good and bad, is neither salutary nor pernicious.

612 Here it is a matter of determinate (niyata) action, i.e., action that must necessarily be experienced (niyatavedanīya). It is of three kinds: cf. Kośabhaṣya, p. 229-230: Niyataṁ trividham dṛṣṭadharmavedanīyaṁ upapadyavedanīyaṁ aparaparyāyavedanīyaṁ... tatra dṛṣṭadharmavedanīyaṁ yatra janmanī kṛtaṁ tatraiva vipacyate. upapadyavedanīyaṁ dvitiye janmanī. aparaparyāyavedanīyaṁ tasmāt pareṇa: “Determinate action is of three kinds: i) action to be experienced in the present lifetime or action that ripens in the same existence as it was accomplished in; ii) action to be experienced after having been reborn or action that ripens in the existence following the one in which it was accomplished; iii) action to be experienced later or action that ripens in a later existence, after the third.”

4. Furthermore, there are two kinds of actions: the action that must necessarily be experienced (niyatavedanīya) and the action that will not necessarily be experienced (aniyatacedanīya).\textsuperscript{613}

The action that must necessarily be experienced is that from which one cannot escape.

a. Sometimes the action that must necessarily be experienced depends (apekṣate) on the time (kāla), a person (pudgala) and the place (sthāna) in order to undergo its retribution.

Thus a person who is to enjoy happiness in the company of a noble cakravartin king awaits the moment when the noble cakravartin king appears in the world, and that is the moment when he attains his reward: therefore he depends on the time. He depends also on an individual, on the occurrence of the noble cakravartin king, and finally, he depends on the place, i.e., the place where the noble cakravartin king is born.

But there are actions that must necessarily be experienced which do not depend on any skill or any deed. Whether they are beautiful (suvarṇa) or ugly [238a] (durvarṇa), they present themselves without being sought, Thus for the person who has taken birth in the paradises, the happiness resulting from merit (puṇyasukha) appears by itself, and for the person who is in hell (niraya), the suffering resulting from the sin (āpattiduḥkha) follows him by itself. These actions do not depend on causes and conditions because they are especially serious (guru).\textsuperscript{614}

As actions inevitably to be experienced (niyatavedanīya), see for example the army of P‘i-lieou-li (Viruḍhaka) that killed seventy-two thousand men who were in possession of the Path (mārgaprāpta) and innumerable lay practitioners (upāsaka) who were keeping the five precepts (pañcaśikṣāpada).\textsuperscript{615}

See also the great magicians (mahāṛddhika) like Mou-lien (Maudgalyāyana), etc., who could not be saved.\textsuperscript{616}

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
613 See Kośa, IV, p. 241.
614 In order to estimate the lightness or heaviness of an action, six causes must be considered: see Kośa, IV, p. 241.
615 After having massacred the Śākyas, Viruḍhaka (Viḍūdabha in Pāli) and his army established their encampment on the shores and the bed of the Aciravati river. During the night, a sudden flood drowned them and they all perished. See above, p. 508-509F, note.
616 Although he was the most powerful of the magicians, Maudgalyāyana ended his last lifetime tragically: he was beaten like sugar-cane by heretics who reduced his bones to powder, and this resulted in his death. The great disciple thus expiated a sin he had committed against his parents in an earlier lifetime.


According to others, on the other hand, Maudgalyāyana really assassinated his blind parents in a pretended attack by robbers: Pāli Apadāna, I, p. 31-33; Commentary of the Dhammapada, III, p. 65-69.
\end{flushright}
See also Po-kiu-lo (Bakkula) who was thrown by his step-mother into the fire, into boiling water and into water, but who did not die.617

Finally, the Buddha, when he was traveling through the kingdoms as a wandering mendicant (*pravrajita*), was begging and did not lack for offerings of food. However, five hundred carts brought him kingly food; in the foliage [alongside of which] he was walking, there grew seeds of rice (*śāli, tenḍula*) and in his cooked rice (*odana*) there was an emulsion of a hundred flavors (*ojāḥ śatarasam*).618

Good or bad, actions of this kind are to be experienced (*niyatavedaniya*) necessarily; the others do not necessarily have to be experienced (*aniyatavedaniya*).

5) The desire realm (*kāmadhātu*) is the place (*sthāna*) where one undergoes the retribution (*vipāka*) for three kinds of actions, namely, action to be experienced pleasantly (*sukhavedaniya*), action to be experienced unpleasantly (*duḥkhavedaniya*) and action to be experienced neither unpleasantly nor pleasantly (*aduḥkhāsukhavedaniya*).

The form realm (*rūpadhātu*) is the place where one undergoes the retribution of two types of actions, namely, the action to be experienced pleasantly (*sukhavedaniya*) and the action to be experienced neither unpleasantly nor pleasantly (*duḥkhāsukhavedaniya*).

---

617 For Bakkula, see above, p. 1386F. The detail given here appears, to my [Lamotte’s] knowledge, only in the King liu yi siang, T 2121, k. 37, p. 201a1-9 (transl. Chavannes, *Contes*, III, p. 229-230): Bakkula lost his mother at the age of seven and his father took another wife who hated the son of her predecessor. While she was steaming some cakes in an earthenware jar, the child asked his step-mother for some and she threw him into the jar; then she closed the opening with a plate in the hope of killing the boy; but the latter, finding himself inside the jar, ate the cakes and did not die.

At another time, she took the child and put him on a red-hot baking-sheet; but he ate the cakes on the sheet and did not die. .

Later, having gone to the river bank to wash clothes, the woman threw the boy into the river; a fish swallowed him, etc.

618 On the Buddha’s food (*ojas* or *ojā*) of a hundred flavors (*śatarasa*), see above, p. 125F, note 1. The Mūlasarv. Vinaya (*Gilgit Manuscript*, III, part 1, p. 38-39; T 1448, k. 10, p. 47a9-23) also tells the following: When the Bhagavat began to eat the barley (*yava*) at Verañja, the venerable Ānanda, completely upset, began to weep: The Bhagavat, he said, in the course of his existences, gave the gift of his hands, his feet and his head; at the end of three incalculable periods, he attained omniscience and now here he eats barley growing in holes! The Bhagavat said to him: Ānanda, do you want to eat these barley grains stuck between the teeth of the Tathāgata? When Ānanda said yes, he gave him one of these grains and said: This, O Ānanda, is the very pure food of the Tathāgata; it eclipses the the best of all flavors. If the Tathāgata eats no matter how coarse a food, this food changes for the Tathāgata into food of a hundred flavors (*yadi tathāgataḥ prākṛtam āpy āhāram paribhūnte tad api tathāgatasāyaśāvatārgasyaśatāsāvatāṃ samparivartate*).
The formless realm (ārūpyadhātu) is the place where one undergoes retribution of one single kind of action, namely, the action to be experienced neither unpleasently nor pleasantly (adhihkāsukhavedaniya). 619

6) There are retributions dependent on an object (vastupekṣa) and it is thanks to this object that one obtains the retribution of action. Thus, in the pools (taḍāga) of king Fou-kia-lo-p'o [erroneous transcription for Fou-kia-lo-so-li = Pukkusāti] there grew thousand-petaled golden lotuses (sahasrapatṛisuvārṇāvabhsāni padmāni), as large as chariot wheels and, because of them, a large crowd of people were overjoyed and many went forth from home (pravrajita) and obtained Bodhi.

7) The Buddha knows the places (sthāna) where beings carry out their actions, whether in the desire realm (kāmadhātu), the form realm (rūpadhātu) or the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu).

If it is in the desire realm, he knows in what destiny (gati); if it is in the divine destiny (devagati), he knows among which gods; if it is among humans (manusya), he knows in what continent (dvīpaka); if it is in Jambudvīpa, he knows in what kingdom (rāṣṭra); if it is in a kingdom, he knows in what city (nagara) or village (nīgama); if it is in a vihāra, he knows in what place; if it is in a city (naga), he knows in what quarter (vāṭa), in what street (vīthi), in what house (prāṣāda) and in what room (sthāna).

8) The Buddha knows at what time a given action has been carried out, whether it was one generation ago, two generations ago, up to a hundred thousand generations ago.

9) He knows the number of times the retribution of a given action (karmavipākaphala) has been undergone, has not yet been undergone, will necessarily be undergone or not necessarily undergone.

10) He knows the good or bad tools that have been used [to carry out an action]; a knife (śastra), a stick (daṇḍa), an order for an execution (vadhaśāsana), etc.; he knows if one has killed oneself or if one has ordered someone else to kill. It is the same for all other bad actions and also all good actions.

11) The Buddha knows what generosity (dāna) and what disciplines (śīla) have been cultivated.

619 All of this is fully explained in Kośa, IV, p. 109.
620 Pukkusāti, king of Takṣasāl, a contemporary and friend of Bimbisāra, king of Magadha. Having read the description of the Three Jewels on a golden plaque sent to him by Bimbisāra, Pukkusāti renounced his throne, put on the yellow robe of a monk and went to search for the Buddha. Stage by stage he came to Rājagṛha and took his lodging at the home of the potter Bhaggava. The Buddha himself joined him there and during the night preached the Dhātuviṅghāsūtra (Majjhima, III, p. 237-247) to him. Pukkusāti requested and obtained ordination. Leaving immediately to seek for an alms- bowl and robe, he was attacked and killed by a cow. The Buddha disclosed to his monks that Pukkasāti had attained the fruit of anāgamin and has taken rebirth in the Avrūha heaven.

The history of this disciple is fully told in the Commentary of the Majjhima, V, p. 33 seq.
621 These giant lotuses have been described above, p. 571f.
The Buddha knows the various causes and conditions of bad actions, such as greed (and equanimity (various causes and conditions of good actions such as faith (discipline involving abstention from certain actions).

In regard to discipline (śīla), the Buddha knows if it is a discipline of vow (samādānaśīla), a discipline acquired naturally (dharmatāprātilambhikāśīla),622 a discipline of mental order (cātasikāśīla), a discipline of speech (vākśīla), an ekadeśakārīrin discipline, a pradeśakārīrin discipline, a yadbhuṣyakārīrin discipline, a paripūrṇakārīrin discipline,623 a discipline of a single day (ekadivasāśīla),624 a discipline of observing the seven good paths of action (saptakusuṭalakarmapatha),625 a discipline observing the ten precepts fully (daśāsikṣāpada), or a discipline joined with concentration (samādhi).

12) In regard to meritorious works (puṇya), the Buddha knows those who cultivate the first, second, third or fourth dhyāna, the four immeasurables of loving-kindness (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekṣa) and other similar causes and conditions of good actions.

13) The Buddha knows the various causes and conditions of bad actions, such as greed (mātsarya), malice (vyāpāda), fear (bhaya), bad views (mithyādṛṣṭi), [238b] bad friends (pāpamitra), etc. He knows the various causes and conditions of good actions such as faith (śraddhā), compassion (karuṇā), respect (sattāra), trance (dhyāna) and absorption (samāpatti), wisdom (prajñā), good friends (kalyāṇamitra), etc.

Actions are dominant (adhipatī): there is no one among gods or men who is able to change the nature of actions.

For thousands of years, myriads, hundreds of thousands of existences, action always follows its perpetrator without release, like a creditor (ṛṇāyika) pursuing his debtor.626

622 See the list of disciplines in Pañcaviṃśati (T 223, k. 23, p. 390b13-14; T 220, vol. VII, k. 467, p. 15-17). As the Kośa says, the discipline of vow (samādānaśīla) depends on a vijnāpti, on an information, whereas the discipline acquired naturally (dharmatāprātilambhikāśīla or dharmatāśīla), i.e., arisen from samādhi, is just avijñāpti, non-information.

In Kośa, IV, p. 49, n. 3, L. de La Vallée Poussin explains: We distinguish the samādhiśīla, the discipline obtained by making a vow, a resolution: “I will not do this or that” (type: Pratimokṣa discipline) and the dharmatāprātilambhikāśīla, the discipline acquired either without vow or act of speech: this is the discipline acquired just by the fact of possessing a dhyāna (for one possesses a dhyāna only by becoming detached from the affictions of kāmadhātu) or by entering into the Path (pure discipline involving abstention from certain actions).

623 These four disciplines, ekadeśakārīrin, etc., in regard to the layperson have already been defined above, p. 821F and note.

624 See above, p. 825F.

625 The discipline consisting of the observing of the seven good paths of material (rūpin) action (karmapatha): abstaining from the three misdeeds of body and the four misdeeds of speech.

When the action meets the combination of causes and conditions (hetupratāyasāmagrī), it produces its fruit of retribution (vipākaphalam dadāti), like a seed (bīja) planted in the soil, encountering the complex of causes and conditions and the right time (hetupratāyasāmagrīṃ prāpya kālaṃ ca), germinates anew.627

Action projects the being into an existence of the six destinies with the speed of an arrow...

All beings are heirs to their actions (karmadāyāda) in the way that sons inherit the wealth of their fathers which is bequeathed to them.628

When the fruit of action is in progress, it cannot be stopped, like the fire at the end of the kalpa (palpodāha).

Action distributes beings among the various places where they are to be reborn, like the great king of a country distributes administrative posts according to the services rendered.

When a man dies, action covers up his mind like a great mountain extending its shadow over things.

Action assigns various bodies [to beings] like the master artist (citromara) who makes different images (pratimā).

If a person acts well, action procures a fine reward for him; if the person acts badly, action procures a bad punishment for him, like the man who serves a king and is rewarded according to his services.

This is a classification of actions and their retribution.

14. [Mahākarmavibhaṅgasūtra].629 – Moreover, in the Fen-pie-ye-king (Karmavibhaṅgasūtra), the Buddha said to Ānanda: “[It may happen] that a man who does bad deeds is reborn in a good place (sugatim utpadyate) and that a man who does good deeds is reborn in a bad place (durgatim utpdyte).”

Ānanda asked: “How is that possible?”

The Buddha replied: “If the bad action (pāpakarman) done by the evil man during the present lifetime (drṣṭa eva dharme) has not yet ripened (aparipakva) and if a good action done by him during a previous

627 Paraphrase of the classical stanza:
Na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi kalpakotiśatair api /
saṃagrīṃ prāpya kālaṃ ca phalanti khalu dehinām //

628 Cf. Saṁyutta, II, p. 101-102; III, p. 152: Seyyathāpi bhikkhave rajako vā cittakāro vā sati rajanāya vā lākkhāya vā haliddiyā vā nīliyā vā maṇijjāya vā suraśivā dharma vē phalake bhittiyā vē dussapatte vē itthināppam vē abhininnineyya sabhāngappaccaṇapam…“Just as a painter, using colors, lacquer, ginger, indigo or madder, using a well-polished piece of wood, a wall or a cloth, draws a picture of a woman or man with all its members and limbs…” so action, which is mind (citta), in imitation of the painter (citraka), creates all the destinies of beings.

The Saddharmasamṛtyupasthāna (T721, k. 5, p. 23b18-c25) is inspired by this canonical passage in the parable dedicated to the mind of the painter. This parable has been commented learnedly and fully by Lin Li-Kouang, L’Aide-mémoire de la Vraie Loi, 1949, p. 65 seq.

lifetime (*pūrve kṛtam kalyānakarma*) is already ripened (*paripakva*), then for this reason - although presently he is doing something bad - he takes rebirth in a good place. Or again if, at the moment of his death (*maranakāle*), a good mind (*kuśalacitta*) and good mental events (*kuśalacaitasikadharma*) arise in him, then for this reason, he takes rebirth in a good place.”

“[It may also happen] that a man who has done a good deed takes rebirth in a bad place. If the good action (*kalyānakarma*) done by the honest man during the present lifetime (*drṣṭa eva dharme*) has not yet ripened (*aparipakva*) and if a bad deed done by him during an earlier lifetime (*pūrve kṛtam kalyānakarma*) is already ripe (*paripakva*), then, for that reason and although he is doing good actions presently, he is reborn in a bad place. Or also if, at the moment of his death (*maranakāle*), a bad mind (*akuśalacitta*) and bad mental events (*akuśalacaitasikadharma*) arise in him, then, for that reason he takes rebirth in a bad place.”

---


Transl. – It may happen, O Ānanda, that an individual who is actually a murderer, a thief and of wrong views, at the dissolution of the body after death, is reborn in a paradise world, either if a good action to be experienced favorably has been done by him or a good action to be experienced favorably was done by him after, or, at the moment of death, a right view has been adopted by him and strongly held by him. This is why, at the dissolution of the body after death, he is reborn in a good destiny, in a paradise world. But being actually a murderer, a thief and of wrong view, he undergoes the retribution of this action either in the present existence or in the existence following [the one in which he had done that], or in a later existence [starting from the third].


Transl. – It may happen, O Ānanda, that an individual who is actually abstaining from killing living beings, abstaining from robbing and is of right view, nevertheless, on the dissolution of the body after death, is born into misfortune, the bad destiny, the abyss, hell, if a bad deed to be experienced unpleasantly had been carried out by him previously, or if a bad deed to be experienced unpleasantly had been carried out by him afterwards, or if, at the moment of death, a bad view was adopted and fervently held by him. This is why, on the dissolution of the body after death, he is reborn in misfortune, the bad destiny, the abyss, hell. But actually abstaining from killing living beings, abstaining from stealing and
Question. - This way of seeing in regard to action already ripened (paripakva) and action not yet ripened (aparipakva) is acceptable. But how can the mind at death (maranacitta), which lasts only a short time, prevail over the power of actions (samskarabala) that extend over an entire lifetime?632

being of right view, he receives the reward either in the present lifetime, or in the next lifetime, or in a later lifetime [from the third onwards].

632 This is the objection made by Milinda to Nagasena in the Milindapañha, p. 80: Tumhe evam bhañata: yo vassasataṁ akusalaṁ kareyya maranakāle ca ekam Buddhagatam satim pāṭilabheyya so devesu uppaṭijeyyāti; etaṁ na saddhāmi: You say: “The one who has done bad deeds for a hundred years but who, at the moment of death, has even one single thought of the Buddha, is reborn among the gods”, that I do not believe.

But every Indian - and not just Buddhists - puts great importance on the last mind, the ‘mind at death’ (maranacitta). We read in the Bhagavadgītā, VIII, 6: “Whatever existence is conceived of by the person who, at the end of his life, is separated from his body, this is the existence into which he passes; it is always in this condition that he is reborn.”

Buddhists, it is true, deny the existence of a soul, but, nevertheless, they recognize that the mind at conception (upapatticitta) is the continuation of the mind at death (maranacitta). Hence the necessity of properly preparing the dying person for death.

Well-meaning rather than enlightened, the deities of gardens, forests and trees invite the householder Citta to wish to become a cakravartin king, but the dying person refuses because that is a transitory (anicca) unstable (addhuva) situation destined to pass away (Saṁyutta, IV, p. 302-304).

The Buddha entrusts to the Upāsaka the duty of consoling the sick and maintaining the dying (Saṁyutta, V, 408-410). “Have you not heard”, he asks his cousin Mahānāman, ”that an upāsaka endowed with wisdom should encourage an upāsaka endowed with wisdom who is sick, who is suffering, who is gravely ill?” He is reminded that he has intelligent faith (aveccappasāda) in the Three Jewels and the moral precepts dear to the saints. If he is troubled about the outcome of his affairs, he is invited to lay aside such worries inasmuch as his death is near and he will be unable to do anything more about them. If he remains attached to the five objects of sense enjoyments (colors, sounds, smells, tastes and tangibles), he is asked to renounce these human pleasures, scorned by the gods. If he aspires to the bliss of the paradises, he is told to notice that even Brahmā’s heaven is impermanent and not final, because it involves the idea of self (sakkāyapariyāpanna). Finally, a pressing invitation is made: “Lift you mind up and apply it to the cessation of the self (cittam vutāpetvā sakkāya nirodhe cittaṁ upasaṁhara).” Indeed, the Buddha has stated that there is no difference as to the deliverance of the mind between such an upāsaka and a bhikṣu whose mind is liberated from the afflictions. If the upāsakas must assist one another, what can be said of residential monks (āvāsika bhikṣu) specially charged with the care of the householders? According to the Anguttara, III, p. 263-264, the resident monk is held to five services: "He leads them to a high morality (adhisīla). He causes them to live in the mirror of the Dharma (dhammandassana). He visits the sick and encourages them to fix their attentiveness (sati), the most important thing of all. He encourages the populace to welcome strangers who are monastics

1256
properly, for their coming is an occasion to gain merit. He eats good or bad food offered to him in order not to spoil a gift given in faith.”

The Buddha’s concern for the sick and the dying has been shared by his disciples in the course of the centuries:

a. Already at the time of the Buddha, the housewife Nakulamattī addressed admirable advice to her dying husband, the purports of the texts of which have been preserved for us (cf. Anguttara, III, p. 295-298).

b. Several centuries later, the emperor Aśoka was concerned about the salvation of those whom he had condemned to death. In his fourth pillar edict (cf. J. Bloch, Les Inscriptions d’Aśoka, p. 165), he proclaimed: “For prisoners whose penalty is fixed and who are condemned to death, I reserve three days for their use. Their relatives will intercede to save their lives, or if there is nobody to intercede, they will do charitable deeds or will carry out a fast in view of the next world. For this is what I desire: that even after the expired time limit, they will gain the other world.”

c. In Ceylon at the time of Buddhaghosa (cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 469), a kind of sacrament for the dying was carried out. Friends came to the sick person and said to him: A worship of the Buddha is going to be carried out according to your wishes; be of peaceful mind therefore (tav’ athāya Buddhapājā kariyati, cittam pasādehi). Five kinds of offerings are prepared: flowers, garlands, flags and banners for the eye, recitations of the text and music for the ear, incense and perfume for the smell, honey and cakes for the taste, cloth for the touch. “Touch these objects”, the dying person is told; “these are the offerings that will be given by you.” The mind at death thus represents a complete sacrifice to the Buddha and will determine the future mind at conception favorably.

In Buddhist pietism, the last thought will preferably be a final invocation to a Buddha or a bodhisattva of choice. The invocation itself is indispensible. An enviable fate is promised to those who have heard the name of the Tathāgata Bhaiṣajyaguru: “At the time of their death, eight bodhisattvas miraculously present themselves and show them the path” (Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra cited in Śīkṣāsamuccaya, p. 175: teṣām maraṇakālasaye ‘ṣṭau bodhisattvā rdhyāgatyā mārgam upadārṣayanti). Surrounded by magical monks, Amitabha is present at the death of his devotees who, in ecstasy on seeing this Tathāgata and without detaching their minds from him, leave this world to take rebirth in Sukhāvati (Sukhāvatīvyūha, p. 48: te tena tathāgatatadarśanaprasādālambanena saṁadhināpramūṣantarā smṛtyā cyutās tatraiva buddhakṣetre pratvājanisayanti). No matter how great his crimes, the devotee of Avalokiteśvara is comforted in his last moments by twelve Tathāgatas: “Fear not, O son of good family; you have heard the Kāraṇḍavyūha, you will wander in saṁsāra no longer; there will be no further birth, old age or death for you” (Kāraṇḍavyūha, p. 23, 95).

But the problem that arises is to know whether the mind at death is able to wipe out completely a life of sin. This is what the Traité maintains here by emphasizing the primordial role of the last mind, abandoning the body and the organs. Nevertheless a few comments may be made:

1) The state of death (maraṇāvasthā) is physically and mentally lifeless (mandika), and at death as at birth, the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) is associated with the feeling of indifference (see Kośa, III, p. 118, 131). Therefore the last mind is not as sharp (paṭu) as is claimed.
Answer. – Although this mind may be very short, its power (bala) is intense (paṭu). It is like fire (agni) or poison (viṣa) that, although small, can accomplish great things. The mind at death is so determinate (niyata) and so strong (dhṛta) that it prevails over the power of action (samskārabala) extending over a century.

This last mind is called ‘the great mind’ (mahācitta) for it has, as its urgent task, the abandoning of the body (svadeharparyāga) and the organs (indriya).633 Thus the man in battle (raṇa), who does not spare his life, is called a hero (śūra), and the arhat, who gives up attachment to life, attains arhathood. [238c]

Those are the various retributions of sinful and meritorious actions as well as their functioning (pravṛtti).

The śrāvakas know only that bad action is punished and good action rewarded, but they are unable to analyze the problem with such clarity.634 The Buddha himself understands fully and completely both action and the retribution of action. The power of his knowledge (jñānaprabhāva) is without obstacle (avyāhata), is indestructible (akṣaya) and invincible (ajeya): this is why it is described as the second ‘power’.

2) The person is not the master of his last mind. Practically and logically, is good death is possible only if one has lived well, for, according to the fortunate expression of the Buddha, “the tree falls to the side in which it was leaning” (see above, p. 1082-1083F and notes).

3) According to orthodox opinion, every volitional past action entails a retribution. Therefore the last mind in no way prevents the other mind-actions from bearing their fruit: in some circumstances, however, it can be rewarded before the others. In regard to the order in which actions are rewarded, we are reduced to hypotheses. A stanza by the sthavira Rāhula cited by the Kośabhāṣya, p. 477, l. 20-21, and commented on in Kośavyākhya, p. 719, presents it as follows:

Yad guru yac cāsannaṃ yac cāhyastam kṛtam ca yat /
puṛvaṃ puṛvaṃ puṛvāṃ vipacyate karmasaṃsāre //

In other words, the following are rewarded in order: the grave (guru) action; in its absence, the recent (āsanna) action that perfumes the dying mind; in its absence, the habitual (abhyasta) action; lacking the preceding ones, an action from an earlier life (puṛvākṛtam) the efficacy of which has been delayed by those of more serious actions.

This present note is especially inspired by the works of L de La Vallée Poussin on the last mind: see Death in HERE, IV, p. 448-449; Notes bouddhiques, Bull. Cl. Lett. Acad. Roy. De Belgique, 1925, p. 18-20; Morale bouddhique, 1927, p. 55, 181, 233.


633 See Kośa, II, p. 133.

634 The Buddha declared that the retribution of actions is incomprehensible and forbids trying to understand it: Kammavipāko bhikkhave acinteyyo na cintetabbo yaṃ cintento ummādassa vighātassa bhāgī assa (Anguttara, II, p. 80).
III. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DHYĀNAS, ETC.

The power of the knowledge of defilement, purification and the types of trances, liberations, concentrations and absorptions (dhyānavimokṣasamādhisamāppattinām saṃkleśo vyvadānam vyavasthānam).

By trance (dhyāna) is meant the four dhyānas.

The Buddha knows these dharmas auxiliary to the Path: he knows their name (nāman) and their characteristics (lakṣaṇa), their order and their practice; he knows if they are impure (sāsrava) or pure (anāsrava), in the course of being practiced (śikṣita) or already practiced (aśikṣita), purified (vyavadāta) or defiled (saṃkliṣṭa), with flavor (sarasa) or without flavor (arasa), profound (gambhīra) or superficial, and other distinctions of this kind.

The eight liberations (vimokṣa) have been explained in detail in reference to the dhyānas (above, p. 1291F). The dhyānas include all the meditative stabilizations of the form realm (rūpadhātu); the liberations include all the absorptions (samāpatti) and the perfection of trance (dhyānapāramitā).635 The vimokṣas, dhyānas, samāpattis and samādhis are ‘concentrations’, and by concentrations is meant the non-distraction of the mind (cittāvivekśepa).

[The Buddha knows their defilement] and by defilement (saṃkleśa) is meant the conflicting emotions (kleśa) such as affection (anunaya), wrong view (dṛṣṭi), pride (māna), etc.

[The Buddha knows their purification] and by purification is meant the true concentrations: those that are not mixed with the conflicting emotions – affection, wrong view, pride, etc. – and that are like real gold.

[The Buddha knows] the types (vyvasthāna): among these concentrations, we must distinguish those where only one mind is functioning, those where several minds are functioning, those that are always functioning and those that do not always function, the concentrations into which it is difficult or easy to enter, difficult or easy to come out of, the concentrations that grasp the characteristics of the object separately or those that grasp them inclusively, the concentrations to be avoided and those not to be avoided.

As concentrations to be avoided, we may cite for example the mind of loving-kindness (maitreṣīcitta) if one is full of passion, the meditation on the horrible (asubhabhāvana) if one is full of hate, the meditation on the finite and infinite (antānantaabhāvana) if one is stupid, the use of the knowledge and discrimination of dharmas if one is excited, the desire to concentrate the mind if one is depressed. But in the reverse cases, the cited concentrations are not to be avoided.

Furthermore, in regard to the concentrations, time (kāla) and place (sthāna) must be distinguished. If the body is exhausted, that is not the time to practice concentration. This is what the Bodhisattva said when he was practicing austerities (duṣkaracaryā): “Now I am incapable of producing a meditative stabilization.” Also, places where there are crowds are not desirable places to practice concentration.

635 The text here seems to be corrupt.
Furthermore, the Buddha knows the loss (dhvaṃsa) of the dhyānas, the duration (sthiti) of the dhyānas, the increase (vardhana) of the dhyānas and the dhyānas that end up in nirvāṇa.

Furthermore, the Buddha knows those who enter into and come out of concentration with difficulty, those who enter and come out of concentration easily, those who enter easily and come out with difficulty, and, finally, those who enter with difficulty and come out easily.636

The Buddha knows that such and such a man should obtain such and such a dhyāna. He knows that such and such a man who has lost the dhyāna is enjoying the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguna). He knows that such and such a man, having enjoyed the five objects of enjoyment, will obtain the dhyāna anew and depending on this dhyāna, he will attain arhathood.

By means of his profound knowledge, the Buddha knows fully these dhyānas, vimokṣas, samādhis and samāpattis, and as this knowledge is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (ajeya) [in him, it is called the third ‘power’.

IV. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEGREE OF THE MORAL FACULTIES

The power of the knowledge of the degree of the moral faculties of beings (parapudgalānām indriyaparāparajñānabalam). - The Buddha knows the beings who are of sharp faculties (tīkṣṇendriya), of weak faculties (mṛdvinendriya) or of medium faculties (madyendriya). The strong knowledge (tīkṣṇajñāna) is called superior (para); the weak knowledge (mṛdvinjñāna) is called inferior (apara). [239a]

Using this awareness of the degree of the faculties of beings, the Buddha distinguishes (vibhanakti) the beings who are of keen, medium or weak faculties:

Such and such an individual who has such and such faculties can, in the present existence (ihajanma), obtain only the first fruit (phala), i.e., the fruit of srotāpañña, but cannot obtain the other fruits; such and such another individual can obtain only the second, the third or the fourth fruit.

Such and such an individual can obtain only the first dhyāna; such and such another can obtain only the second, third or fourth dhyāna, etc., up to the absorption of the cessation of discrimination and feeling (samjñāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti).

Such and such an individual will become conditionally liberated (samayavimukta); such and such another individual will become unconditionally liberated (asamayavimukta)637.

636 In Samyutta, III, p. 272, the Buddha distinguishes four kinds of meditators (jhāyin): the person who is skillful in staying in concentration and unskillful in coming out of concentration (samādismim ṭhitikusalo na samādhisimim vutṭhānakusalo), etc.
637 See Kośa, VI, p. 251-252.
Such and such an individual can obtain the first rank (agratā) among the śrāvakas; such and such another can obtain the first rank among the pratyekabuddhas; such and such another, completely fulfilling the six perfections (pāramitā), can obtain supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttarā samyaksambodhi).

Knowing all this, the Buddha also knows those who pass to the other shore (pāṛaga) if [the Dharma] is preached to them in brief (samkṣepena), fully (vistareṇa), or in brief and fully at the same time. He knows which beings are to be instructed by means of gentle words (ślaksṇavacana), which by means of rough words (paruṣavacana), or which by means of both gentle and rough words.

Such and such an individual who already possesses the other faculties (indriya) should act so as to increase further his faculty of faith (śraddhendriya); such and such another should act so as to produce the faculties of exertion (vīrya), mindfulness (smṛti), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (prajñā).

By using his faculty of faith (śraddhendriya), such and such an individual enters into certitude [of the acquisition] of the supreme good (samyaktvaniyām avakrāmati); such and such another individual, by using the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya), enters into the certitude [of the acquisition] of the supreme good.

These people, of keen faculties (tiṣṇendriya), are hindered by the fetters (samyojana): for example Yang-k‘iun-li-mo-lo (Aṅgulimala), etc. Certain others, of keen faculties, are not hindered by the fetters, for example Chō-li-fou (Śāriputra), Mou-lien Maudgalāyana, etc.

638 Aṅgulimala, son of the brāhmin Bhaggava, chaplain of king Pasenadi of Kosala, studied at the university of Takkasilā and soon became the favorite of his teacher. But the latter suspected him of having failed to respect his wife and demanded fees of a very special kind from his disciple: a thousand fingers cut from the right hand of a human. To acqit himself of his debt, the young man lay in ambush in the Jālinī forest at Kosala, killed all those who tried to cross through it, cut off a finger from each corpse and from the cut fingers he made a garland which he wore around his neck. Hence the nickname Aṅgulimala, meaning ‘Finger Garland’.

In order to complete the number of a thousand demanded by his teacher, there remained only one more finger to be cut. And so, when his mother came to warn him that he was being hunted by the king, Aṅgulimala prepared to kill her. But the Buddha, foreseeing his destiny, came in person towards him, prevented him from committing this last crime and, having won him over, admitted him into the Order according to the swiftest procedure. Subsequently Aṅgulimala showed himself to be an exemplary monk.

Quite a body of literature has grown up around Aṅgulimala, but the main source remains the Aṅgulimalasutta in Majjhima, p. 97-105, translated many times into Chinese: Tsa a han, T 99, no. 1077, k. 38, p. 280c18-281c2; Pie yi tse a han, T 100, no. 16, k.1, p. 378b17-379a22; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 31, p. 719b20-722c22; three separate versions (T 118-120) of which the oldest, entitled Yang kiue mo king, is by Dharmarakṣa.
The Buddha knows the individuals of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) but who are not hindered [by the fetters], for example Tcheou-li-pan-t’o-k’ie (Cūḍapathanka). But there are people of weak faculties who are hindered by the fetters.

Angulimala occupies an important place in the Pāli commentaries: Comm. on Majjhima, III, p. 328-344; on Dhammapada, III, p. 169-170 (tr. Burlingame, III, p. 6-14); of the Theragāthā, (tr. Rhys Davids, Brethren, p. 318-325); of the Jātakas, V, p. 456 seq.

In the neighborhood of Śrāvasti, a stūpa marked the place where Āṅgulimala was converted. This monument was mentioned by the Chinese pilgrims Fa hien (T 2085, p. 860b11) and Hiuan-tsang (T2087, k. 6, p. 899a19).

639 He recognizes his own stupidity in the Anavataptagāthā (ed. Bechert, p. 163-166; transl. Hofinger, p. 249-250); Fo wou poi tseu, T 199, p. 197c16-198a3; Mūlasarv. Vinaya, T 1448, k. 17, p. 85b21-c12). His last life and his earlier existences are told in full in the Cūḍapathakāvadāna in the Mūlasarv. Vinaya (Divyavadāna, p. 483-515; T 1442, k. 31-32, p. 794c26-803c21), a northern source in which H. Bechert (l.c.) has revealed a borrowing from the golden legend of the Jains.

Mahāpanthaka and Cūḍapathāka were born from the union of a wealthy young girl in Rājagṛha and a slave. They were born at the side of a great highway which is why they were named Great Path and Lesser Path respectively. Raised by their grandparents, they embraced the Buddhist faith. Mahāpanthaka was the first to become a monastic and, shortly thereafter, welcomed his brother into the Order.

Entrusted with his religious instruction, he gave him a very simple stanza to learn by heart: Pāpaṃ na kuryāna manasā na vācā, etc., but Cūḍapathāka was so dim-witted (duṣprajñā) that at the end of three months, he had not yet succeeded in memorizing it. Then he passed into the service of the saṅvargīya monks, which did not make him any smarter. At the instigation of the latter, he requested a subject of study (svādhyāyanikā) from this elder brother, but Mahāpanthaka, judging that he would be cured only by scorn, grabbed him by the neck and threw him out of the monastery, Weeping, Cūḍapathāka went to the Buddha and confided the reason for his tears: “I am neither a monk nor a lay-man; I am a great idiot (paramacūḍa), a great fool (paramadhandha).” The Buddha replied: “There is no fool but the one who thinks he is smart” (cf. Udānavarga, XXV, v. 22), gave him two lines to meditate on “I remove the dust, I remove the dirt” (rajo harāmi malām haramī) and sent him to clean the monks’ shoes (upanāhān poṇcchitum), an important detail which the Traité will mention below (k. 28, p. 268a6-7).

While he was busy with this simple task, Cūḍapathāka discovered the mystery: To remove the dust is to suppress desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and ignorance (moha). At once, all his passions were cut through and he attained arhathood.

To test his new qualities, the Buddha appointed him instructor (avavādaka) of the nuns. Those who thought him to be a fool were expecting the worst, but the new arhat accomplished such feats of magic and preached the Dharma with such eloquence that they were forced to change their minds. Swept along by his zeal, he kept his listeners until late in the night, a violation which the Buddha condemned by proclaiming the 22nd pācittiya (see Pāli Vinaya, IV, p. 54-55; Dhammaguptaka Vin. T 1428, k. 12, p. 647b9-648a17; Sarv. Vin., T 1435, k. 11, p. 80b2-81a11).
The Buddha knows the people whose [passions] have been destroyed by seeing the truths (satyadarśanahīna) and whose faculties are weak, the people whose [passions] have been destroyed by meditation (bhāvanāhīna) whose faculties are keen, the people whose passions have been destroyed by meditation and whose faculties are keen, the people whose passions have been destroyed by meditation and whose faculties are weak, and finally, the people whose passions have been destroyed by seeing the truths and whose faculties are keen.

In such people, all the faculties (indriya) are equally weak (mṛdu) or equally keen (tīkṣṇa); in others all the faculties are neither equally weak nor equally keen.

A given person is of great strength as a result of previous causes (pūrvahetu); another person is of great strength as a result of present conditions.

A given person, while searching for bondage (bandhana), finds liberation (mukti); another person while searching for liberation, finds bondage. Thus, Aṅgulimāla, who wanted to kill his mother and torment the Buddha, found liberation, whereas a bhikṣu who had obtained the four dhyanas and developed pride (abhimāna) because of that, fell into hell.640

Finally, the Buddha knows that such and such an individual will fall into the bad destinies (durgati), that a second individual will come out only with difficulty, that a fourth will come out easily, that a fifth will come out quickly and that a sixth will come out after a long time.

The Avadāna also mentions an episode concerning the future arhat. The day that Čudāpanthaka became a monk, the famous physician Jīvaka invited the Buddha and the Saṅgha except for Čudāpanthaka whom he deemed to be too stupid. The Buddha accepted the invitation, but noticing that the Saṅgha was not complete, he refused to partake of the meal. Jīvaka sent someone to look for Čudāpanthaka in the monastery, but the latter created thirteen hundred fictive monks exactly like himself magically and by this trick made himself invisible. A formal order by the Buddha was necessary for him to consent finally to come to Jīvaka’s house.

Since Čudāpanthaka had created fictive monks to confuse Jīvaka and since he had also triumphed over the distrust of the monks, the Buddha proclaimed him the foremost among those who create spiritual shapes and change minds (see also Anguttara, I, p. 24; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 3, p. 558a15-17; T 126, p. 831b29).

Besides the Čudāpanthakāvadāna, which has just been summarized here, we should also mention the Mahākarmavibhaṅga (p. 43) which briefly tells the story of the arhat, and especially the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 180, p. 902) which analyzes the story precisely and in detail.

The Pāli sources are in agreement with the northern sources, at least in regard to the last lifetime of Čudāpanthaka. Among the main texts, we may mention the Theragāthā, v. 557-566; the Apadāna, I, p. 58; the commentaries of the Āṭakas, I, p. 114-20, of the Anguttara, I, p. 209-220, and above all of the Dhammapda, I, p. 239-255 (transl. Burlingame, I, p. 299-310).

640 See above (p. 1052-1053F) the story of the bhikṣu who confused dhvāna and fruits of the Path and fell into the Avīci hell.
The Buddha knows fully and completely (prajñā) all these various degrees of the faculties of beings and since this knowledge is intact (avyāhata) [in him] and invincible (ajeya), it is called the fourth ‘power’.

V. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF BEINGS

The power of knowledge of the various aspirations of beings (nānādhimuktijñānabala).

By aspiration (adhimukti) is meant trusting joy (prasāda), inclinations (rci).

[Beings] love the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguṇa), as did Souen-t’o-ło-nen-t’o (Saundarananda).641

They love fame (yaśas), as did T’i-p’o-t’ao (Devadatta).642

They love worldly goods (lokadhana), as did Siu-mi (var. na)-tch’a to-lo (Sunakṣetra).643

They love the life of a monk (pravrajyā), as did Ye-chö (Yaśas).644

They love faith (śraddhā), as did Po-kia-li (Vakkhali).645

641  Nanda surnamed Nanda the Handsome, ordained as the result of a trick and who mourned for his young wife. See p. 118F, 226F, 286F.

642  See p. 868-878F.

643  Sunakṣetra, a Licchavi of Vaiśālī, who entered into the Order and for a time was the Buddha’s assistant (upasthāyaka), but who later became attached to the bad teachers, Khorakkhatiya, Kandaramasaka and Pāṭiputta. According to the Traité (k. 100, p.755a12-14), he had been a disciple of the Buddha out of greed.

644  Later the Traité (k. 49, p. 411b20-22) summarizes his story in a few words: “Yaśas, son of a śreṣṭhin [of Benares], having seen in the middle of the night that all the courtesans resembled corpses, left his precious sandals (maṇipādūkā) worth a hundred thousand kārṣāpanas on the bank of a river and, crossing it by means of a ford, went to find the Buddha.” The following is known: Yaśas, also known as Yaśoda, taught by the Buddha, attained arhathood and entered into the Order while his aged parents entered into the lay community. Cf. Catuspariṣad, p. 172-202; Mūlasarv. Vinaya, T 1450, k. 6, p. 128c-129b; Pāli Vinaya, I, p. 15-18; Mahīśasaka Vin., T 1421, k. 15, p. 105; Dharmaguptaka Vin., T 1428, k. 32, p. 789b-790a; Mahāvastu, III, p. 402-413; Nidānakathā, p. 82; Comm. on Dhammapada, I, p. 87; Yin kouo king, T 189, k. 4, p. 645; Fo pen hing tsi king, T 190, k.35, p. 815-824; Tchong hiu ho ho ti king, T 191, k. 8, p. 954c-955a; Fo so hing tsai, T 192, k. 4, p. 30c (cf. E. H. Johnston, Buddha’s Mission and Last Journey, Acta Orientalia, XV, 1937, p. 12; Tchong pen k’l king, T 196, k. 1, p. 149a-b; Tchou yao king, T 212, k. 29, p. 769a-b).

645  According to the Mūlasarv. Vinaya (T 1448, k. 4, p. 15b11-c3; Divyāvadāna, p. 49), Vakkhali, whose name means ‘Clothed in bark’, was a rṣi dwelling on Mount Musalaka, not far from Šūrpāraka in Aparānta. Having seen the Buddha from the top of this mountain, he felt great admiration for him and
They love the rules (śikṣā), as did Lo-heou-lo (Rāhula), etc.

They love generosity (dāna) as did Che-po-lo (Śaivala), [a note in red says that he was the son of Kan-lou (Amṛtā, aunt of the Buddha)].

felt strongly drawn to him and, so as to join him more quickly, he threw himself into the void. The Buddha caught him by his magical power, taught him the Dharma and ordained him by the quick method. He declared Vakkhali to be the foremost of those who feel faith toward him (agro me śraddhādhimuktānām).

The same episode is told in the Pāli sources (Apadāna, II, p. 467, v. 26-33; Comm. on Anguttara, I, p. 248-251; Comm. on Dahammapada, IV, p. 119), but these make Vakkhali to be a brāhmin native of Śrāvasti who, long after his ordination, threw himself from the top of Grdhraṅkūṭaparvata in despair of being deprived of seeing the Buddha. The latter, wearied by the constant attendance of his disciple, had momentarily gone away from him saying: “It is enough for you, O Vakkhali, to contemplate my rotting body: he who sees the Dharma sees me, and he who sees me sees the Dharma.”

Vakkhali having fallen gravely ill, the Buddha consented to visit him. Vakkhali confided to the Master that he had no twinges of conscience and that his only regret was the lack of enough strength to go himself to the Buddha. Beyond that, he was deeply convinced of the impermanent nature, painful and ever-changing, of the five aggregates of existence.

After the Buddha’s visit, Vakkhali had himself carried in a litter to the Black Rock on Mount Rṣigiri. The next day at dawn, he “took the knife” (satthāṃ āharesi) and killed himself. The Buddha revealed to the monks that Vakkhali had entered nirvāṇa.

Vakkhali’s suicide is told in the canonical sources: Saṃyutta, III, p. 119-124; Tsa a han, T 99, no. 1265, k. 346b7-347b13; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 19, p. 642b29-643a22. 646 Śaivala, Sivali in Pāli, was proclaimed by the Buddha (Anguttara, I, p. 24) to be the foremost of those who receive (aggaṃ lābhīham) and his generosity equaled his wealth. In the Anavataptaṭāgāha (ed. Bechert, p. 142), he explains the ‘fabric’ of his actions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Abbāvaṃ jyeṣṭaputro} \ 'hān \ Kṛkirājaḥ yaśvinān / \\
\text{prathamaṃ ca mayā chatterāṃ jinastāpaṃ pratiṣṭham} // \\
\text{tat karma kusalaṃ kṛtvā yatra yatropapannavān} / \\
\text{devabhūto manuṣyad ca kurtapunyo virocitaḥ} // \\
\text{bhavāmy ādhiyo mahābhūgas tāsu tāsāpattiṣu} / \\
\text{mahādānapatiś cāhaṃ bhavāmi dhanadhānyavān} // \\
\end{align*}
\]

Transl. – I was the eldest son of the glorious king Kṛkin (of Benares), and the first parasol was planted by me on the stūpa of the Victorious (Kāśyapa).

Having done this good deed, everywhere that I was born, as god or as man, I gained merit and I was famous.

I was rich, opulent in all these existences. I was a great master of generosity, loaded with wealth and rice.

647 See above, p. 227F, where it is said that Amṛtā, daughter of Saṃhahanu and sister of Śuddhoddhana, had a son named Che p’o lo (Śaivala, and not Dānapāla as I [Lamotte] have erroneously
They love the strict observances (dhūta) and solitude (viveka), as did Mo-ho-kia-chō (Mahākāśyapa).

They love solitary meditation (pratisaṅgīlayana), as did Li-po-to (Revata).648

They love wisdom (prajñā), as did Chō-li-fou (Śāriputra).

They love learning (bahuśrautyā), as did A-nan (Ānanda).

They love to understand the discipline (vinaya), as did Yeou-p’o-li (Upāli), etc.

All these disciples of the Buddha each had their preferences, and the worldly people (pyṛthagjana), they too, each have their own tastes: some are pleased with desire (rāga), others with hatred (dveṣa).

Furthermore, the Buddha knows those who abound in lust (rāgabahula), those who abound in hatred (dveṣabahula) and those who abound in ignorance (mohabahula).

Question. – What are the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of those who abound respectively in lust, hatred or ignorance?

Answer. – Here it is necessary to cite fully the characteristics of the threefold poison (triviṣa) described in the Tch’an king (Dhyānasūtra). Knowing these characteristics, the Buddha corrects especially lustful people by means of a sermon (paryāya) on the horrors of the body (aśubha); he corrects those who are especially hateful by means of a sermon on the mind of loving-kindness (maitrīcittā); and he corrects those who are especially stupid by means of a sermon on dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda).

In this way, he preaches the Dharma according to the aspirations (adhimuktī) of beings. If these aspirations are good (kuśala), he preaches in accordance with the minds of the beings, like a boat going along with the current (naur anusrotogāminī); if these aspirations are bad (akuśala), he addresses them with rough words

---

restored it). For the geneology of the Buddha, see the notes above, p. 226-227F, and A. Bareau, La légende de la jeunesse du Budha dans les Vinayapitaka anciens, Oriens Extremus, IX, 1962, p. 8-11.

According to the Pāli sources (Udāna, p. 15-18; Comm. on Anguttara, I, p. 243-248, of Dahammapada, IV, p. 192-194, tr. Rhys Davids, Brethren, p.60-62, and Jātaka, I, p. 407-409), Sīvali was the son of Suppavāsā, princess of the Koliyas, who carried him in her womb for seven years. At his birth, the baby was able to speak. Sāriputta spoke with him and, with the approval of his mother, proceeded to ordain him. During the ceremony of his tonsure at each snip of the scissors, the child attained a new fruit of the religious life, becoming successively srota-āpanna, sakṛdāgāmin, anāgāmin and finally arhat.

648 Revata surnamed Khadiravaniya “Of the acacia forest”. He was the youngest brother of Śāriputra, and the Buddha proclaimed him to be the foremost of those who live in the forests (aggam āraṇīkānaṃ): cf. Anguttara, I, p. 24. His taste for retreat was well known. A lay disciple named Atula, accompanied by five hundred upāsakas, visited him one day in hopes of receiving his teachings. Revata who was enjoying meditation like a solitary lion (pnatiśallānāraño sīho viya ekacāro) did not gratify their wishes with even a single word (Comm. on Dhammapada, III, p. 326).
(paruṣavacana) according to the method of driving out a peg by means of a counter-peg (āṇīpratyanīnīrharayogena).649

649 An expression recorded in the Mahāvyutpatī (ed. Sakaki, no. 6865; ed. Wogihara, chap. 245, no. 460). The meaning presents no problem. It results from a passage in Majjhima, I, p. 119: "Seyyathā pi bhikkhave dakkho palaganḍo vā palaganḍantevāsi vā sukhumāyaṇiyā olārikaṃ āṇīṃ abhinīhaneyya abhinīhareyya abhinīvarajjeyya... "Jut as, O monks, a skillful carpenter or his apprentice, by means of a small peg, is able to take out, drive out, tear out, a big peg... ."

But the corresponding passage in Madhyamagama (T 26, k. 25, p. 588a14-15) is completely different: "Just as a master carpenter or his apprentice, taking a line (kālasūtra), places it on a piece of wood, then with a sharp axe, hacks along it and smooths it out to make it straight."

Chinese scholars have always rendered the expression āṇī pratyāṇī nirhārayogena by means of the characters jou yi sie tchou sie fang pien "a way of taking out a wedge by means of a wedge". This is the phrase used by Bodhisuci (T 675, k. 3, p. 679a8), by Paramārtha (T 1593, k. 3, p. 127a29; T 1595, k. 11, p. 235b6), by Dharma Gupta (T 1596, k. 8, p. 305c6) and by Huan-tsang (T 676, k. 3, p. 702b11; T 1594, k. 3, p. 146c18; T 1597, k. 8, p. 361c27-28; T 1598, k. 8, p. 427b10-11).

On the other hand, the Tibetan translations present difficulties: here are some differences:

Mahāvyut., ed. Sakaki, no. 6865: khye ḥu ḥus khye ḥu ḥbyun bahl tshul du.


But khye ḥu means a boy and khyi ḥu a little dog, which would give the expression an unsatisfying meaning: “As one drives out a boy by means of a boy” or “As one drives out little dog by means of a little dog”. See Tibetan-English Dictionary, S. C. Das, p. 160, v. khīhi-khyiḥu.

My [Lamotte] respected colleague, Walter Simon, has examined the question and proposes to correct khye ḥu by ke ḥu, “wedge”, a word mentioned in the Manual of Colloquial Tibetan by Sir Charles Bell, 1905, p. 438. The phrase would then mean: “As one drives out a peg by means of a peg”, in perfect agreement with the original Sanskrit and the Chinese translation.

Consulted in turn by W. Simon, Prof. J. Brough comes to the following conclusion: [In English] As an alternative for consideration, I would like to suggest that khye ḥu might be the correct reading, but that the word is used as a technical term in ‘carpenter’s language’ for ‘peg’ or ‘pin’. The semantic situation would then be similar to that of English ‘male screw’.

Information gathered in the Tibetan culture would confirm Prof. Simon’s conjecture. In a letter dated July 3, 1967, P. Denwood writes from Kathmandu: [In English] “I have been asking my Tibetan friends about your ke ḥu. Both Tashi and Pasang Kambache know the word. Tashi knows it as a piece of ‘carpenter’s language’, Pasang as a word in Sherpa language, and both agree that it means a wedge of hard wood or metal used for splitting wood. First an axe cut is made, then the wedge driven in with a hammer. A wedge for holding open a door or other static use is known to all Tibetans I have asked as ‘tsab’ This word is given as rtsabs on pg. 957 of Lama Dawa Ssamdup Kazi’s English-Tibetan
These aspirations are fully and completely known (prajānāti) by the Buddha and as this knowledge is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (ajeya) [in him], it is called the fifth ‘power’.

VI. THE KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUIRED DISPOSITIONS

The power of the knowledge of acquired dispositions (dhātujñānabala). The Buddha knows the world with its many varied acquired dispositions (nānādhātukam lokam anekadhātukam prajānāti).

By acquired disposition (dhātu) is meant an accumulated habitual pattern (ācitavāsanā). The characteristics (lakṣana) arise from the dhātu. The aspiration (adhimukti) functions in accordance with the dhātu. Sometimes the dhātu results from the adhimukti. Habitual patterns (vāsanā) and aspirations (adhimukti) realize the dhātu. Dhātu is the lofty resolution (adhyāśaya), adhimukti arises as a result of the conditions (pratītyasamutpanna). These are the differences between adhimukti and dhātu.650

The Buddha knows “the world with its many various acquired dispositions”; indeed, each being has many dispositions, infinite (apramāṇa) and incalculable (asamkhyeya) dispositions. This is what is called the many dispositions of the world.

There are two kinds of world (loka): the world as universe (lokadhātu) and the world of beings (sattvadhātu). Here it is a question of the world of beings only.

The Buddha knows that beings have such and such acquired dispositions (dhātu), such and such aspirations (adhimukti) and that they come from such and such a place (sthāna). He knows the beings endowed with good roots (kuśalamūla) or bad roots (akuśalamūla), those who are able to be converted (vaineya) or incapable of being converted (avaineya), determinate (niyata) or indeterminate (aniyata), destined or not destined.

---

Dictionary which also has ka-ru and skyeg-bu for ‘wedge’. Tashi pronounces ‘kiu’ (unaspirated) and Pasang “khiu” (aspirated). Other Tibetans have not heard the word. The shape seems to be normal wedge-shape.”

This digression may perhaps be of some use to many readers of Buddhist-Hybrid Dictionary by Edgerton where the innocent phrase āṇipratyāṇinirhārayogena which appears on p. 91 is interpreted as ‘by homosexual procedure’.

650 Kośavyākhyā, p. 385: Pārvajanmasu guṇadoṣavidyāśilpakarmābhyyāsebhyo yā vāsana tās khale iha dhātavo viśeṣaṇa bodhavyāḥ: “Here in particular, by dhātu we should understand the traces resulting from the qualities, faults, sciences and arts, actions and habitual patterns in the course of previous rebirths.”

Dhātu should be interpreted in the same way in the canonical passage (Samyutta, II, p. 154, 157): Dhātuso sattā samsandanti samenti: “It is because of their acquired dispositions that beings come together, marry.” The hīnādhimuktikas join with the hīnādhimuktikas, the kalyāṇādhimuktikas with the kalyāṇādhimuktikas.

There is a slight difference between adhimukti, dhātu and āśaya, as the Traité says here.
destined; he knows in what practices they are engaged, in what places they are born, in what lands they are to be found.

Furthermore, the Buddha knows the various dispositions particular to beings. According to the place where they are led, they have such and such inclinations, such and such evaluations, such and such high resolutions, such and such actions, such and such conduct, such and such emotions, such and such knowledge of life, determination, attitude, ways of seeing, ways of thinking; they do or do not acquire such and such fetters (saṃyojana).

Among them, attachment rules aspiration, aspiration rules defiled mind (variant: profound), defiled mind rules direction, direction rules evaluation, [239c] evaluation rules inquiry (vitarka), inquiry rules judgment (vicāra), inquiry and judgment rule speech (bhāṣā), 651 speech rules mindfulness, mindfulness rules activity, activity rules action and action rules retribution.

Furthermore, using this power of knowledge of the various acquired dispositions, the Buddha knows the beings capable or incapable of being converted, the beings to be converted in the present existence or in a future existence, the beings to be converted at this very moment or at another time, the beings to be converted publicly or without being seen, the beings to be converted by the Buddha, by a śrāvaka or by both together, the beings to be necessarily converted or not, the beings to be converted by a short discourse, by a developed discourse or by a discourse first shortened and then developed, the beings to be converted by praise or by blows, the beings to be converted by seeing them frequently or by leaving them alone, the beings to be converted by a subtle teaching or by an obvious teaching, the beings to be converted by suffering, by gentleness, or by both suffering and gentleness.

The Buddha knows those who have wrong views (mithyādṛśti) and those who have right views (saṃyagdṛśti), those who are attached to the past (atta) or the future (anāgata), attached to nihilism (uccheda) or eternalism (śāsvata), attached to the view of existence (bhavadṛśti) or the view of non-existence (vibhyavadṛśti), wanting to be reborn or disgusted with rebirth, seeking happiness in wealth and fame or attached to dull wrong views.

The Buddha knows those who profess the non-existence of causes and conditions; those who profess wrong causes and conditions or right causes and conditions; those who profess non-action, bad action or right action; those who advocate non-seeking, wrong seeking or right seeking; those who esteem the self, the five objects of enjoyment, gain, drink and food, joking; those who like crowds, company (saṃsarga) or solitude (parivarjana), those who indulge especially in pleasures (rāgacaritra) or those who indulge especially in wrong views (dṛṣṭicarita); those who love faith or those who love wisdom; those who should be kept or those who should be left behind; those who esteem discipline (śīla), concentration (samādhi) or wisdom (prajñā); those who understand easily or those who understand with difficulty by means of explanations; those whom it is enough to guide and those to whom it must be explained word by word; those who are of keen faculties (ṭīkṣṇendriya), of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) or of medium faculties.

651 According to the principle Vitarkya vicārā vācaṁ bhāṣate nāvītarkya nāvīcārya. Cf. Majjhima, I p. 301; Samyutta, IV, p. 293.
Furthermore, the Buddha knows the beings belonging to the desire realm (kāmadhātu); the form realm (rūpadhātu) or the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu); the beings [in the realms of the] damned (naraka), animals (tiryagyoni), hungry ghosts, humans (manusya) or gods (deva): born from eggs (aṇḍaja), from the womb (jāraṇya), from moisture (samsvedaja) or of apparitional birth (upapāduka); with form (rūpin) or formless (arūpin); aware (saṃjñika) or unaware (saṃjñika); of short life (alpāyuṣa) or of long life (dīrghāyuṣa); simple ordinary people (prthajāna) who have not yet destroyed desire (avātarāga) or ordinary people who have destroyed the desire of the lower levels (avarabhūmi) but have not yet destroyed the desire of the dhyānas. The Buddha knows all these beings up to and including the beings who are neither discriminating nor non-discriminating (naivasamjñānasamjñā), the holy candidates [for the fruits] of the path (mārgaphalapratiyopanaka) or in possession of the fruits of the path (phalaprajñā), the pratyekabuddhas or the buddhas at unhindered liberation and various other categories of this type: the five destinies (gati), the four modes of birth (yoni), the three categories (rāṣṭi), the designations (prajñapti), the obstacles (āvatana), the aggregates (skandha), the bases of consciousness (āyatana), the elements (dhātu), the roots of good (kusalamūla), the roots of bad (akuśalamūla), the fetters (saṃyojana), the levels (bhūmi), actions (karman), the fruits (phala), the beings capable of being converted (vaineyajīva) or incapable of being converted, the knowledge of the destruction of suffering (niruddhajñāna), etc.

These are all the distinctions that “the Buddha knows the world with its many and varied acquired dispositions” and its deliverance is without obstacle. The Buddha knows completely and fully these many diverse dispositions and, since this knowledge is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (ajeya) [in him], it is called the’ sixth power’.

652 The category predestined for salvation (samyakvaniyatarāśi), the category predestined to bad rebirths (mithyāniyatarāśi), the category foreign to the two previous ones (aniyatarāśi): see Dīgha, III, p. 217; Dhammasaṅgaṇī, p. 186; Kośa, III, p. 137.
VII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE WAY LEADING TO THE VARIOUS DESTINIES

The power of the knowledge of the way leading to the various destinies (sarvatragāminīpratipajñānabala).653

1) Some say that action (karman) is this way (pratipad). Why? It is because of action that one circulates through the destinies (pañcagati). If action exists, there is the possibility of destroying it and putting an end to it. This ending consists of the three elements of the noble Path (āryamārga)654 and pure intention (anāsravacetasā). This is why actions are the way leading to the various destinies.

2) Others say that it is the concentration of five members and five knowledges. [A note in red says that this is pure concentration (anāsravasamādhi) and the five factors of trance (dhyānāgā).] In all cases, it realizes profitable things (upakāra).

3) Others say that the fourth dhyāna is the way in question. Why? The fourth dhyāna is the culmination of all the concentrations; as is said in the sūtras, the good minds (kuśalacitta), concentrated (samāhita), free of distraction (avikṣipta), collected (saṃgrhita), all enter into the fourth dhyāna.655

4) Others say that mindfulness of the body (kāyasminyupasthāna) is the way leading to the various destinies (sarvatragāminī pratipad), for it is the origin (mūla) of the benefits (upakāra) resulting from the Path.

653 Pratipad, ‘way’, should be understood as the cause determining the five destinies (naraka, tiryagoni, preta, manusya, deva-gati) and nirvāṇa: cf. Vibhaṅga, p. 339. 1. 8-10. We may note, with Kośa, VII, p. 70, that pratipad is the cause of the destinies but not of nīrodha.

654 Śīla, samādhi and prajñā.

655 Entry into the dhyānas is the natural culmination of a state of mental concentration. Śākyamuni had this experience on the night of his awakening: Vin., III, p. 4; Majjhima, I, p. 21, 117, 186, 242-243; III, p. 85-87; Saṃyutta, IV, p. 125; V, p. 68, 76, 331, 332; Anguttara, I, p. 148, 282; II, p. 14; Itivuttaka, p. 119-120: Āraddhaṃ kho pana me viriyam ahosi assālīnāṃ, upaṭṭhitā sati asammutthā, passaddho kāyo asāraddho, samāhitaṃ cittaṃ ekaggam. So kho aham... pathamam... dutiyam... tatiyaṃ... catuttham jhānaṃ upasampajja vihāsiṃ: “There opened within me an energy without laziness; present, an unfailing mindfulness; my body was relaxed and impassive; my mind, concentrated and one-pointed. This is how I attained and remained in the first... second...third... fourth dhyāna.”

The fourth dhyāna is the best way to nirvāṇa. According to the canonical scriptures (Dīgha, III, p. 106, 228; Anguttara, II, p. 149-152; V, p. 63) there are four ways: i) the difficult way for slow intellects (pratipad duḥkha dhandhābhijñā), ii) the difficult way for quick intellects (pratipad duḥkha kṣiprābhijñā), iii) the easy way for slow intellects (pratipad sukhā dhandhābhijñā), iv) the easy way for quick intellects (pratipad sukhā kṣiprābhijñā). And the Kośabhāṣyā, p. 382, explains: Caturdhvāneṣu mārgaḥ pratipad aṅgaparigrahaśamathavipasīyanāsamatābhīyām ayatnavāhitvā: “The path followed in the dhyānas is the easy path for it proceeds effortlessly, being furnished with the factors [of the dhyānas] and having a complete balance of quietude and insight.”
5) Others say that it is a question of all the noble paths (āryamārga) for, by using these noble paths, one obtains the benefits at will (vāṭheṣṭam).

6) Finally, there are teachers who have explained all the good paths, all the bad paths, all the noble paths, and for each of them, [the Buddha] knows the culmination as is said in the Mao-chou king (Romaharṣaṇīyasūtra).656

The Buddha knows all of this fully and completely (prajñānati) and, since this wisdom is intact (avyāhati) and invincible (ajeya) [in him], it is called the ‘seventh power’.

VIII. THE KNOWLEDGE OF FORMER ABODESS

The power of the knowledge of former abodes (pūrvanivāsajñānabala).

Former abodes657 are of three types: i) those of which one has the awareness (abhiñā), ii) those of which one has the knowledge (vidyā), iii) those that are the object of the power of knowledge (jñānabala).

The ordinary person has only the awareness of them. The śrāvaka has both the awareness and the knowledge of them. The Buddha has the awareness, the knowledge and the power [of the knowledge] of them. Why is that? The ordinary person knows only through which former abodes he has passed but does not know what sequence of karmic causes and conditions (karmahetupratyayabandha) provoked them.

656 The Hair-raising Sūtra, understood here not as a sign of fear but as a sign of joy. This is the Mahāśīhanāda of the Majjhima, I, p. 68-83. At the end of this text, Nāgasamāla asks the Bhagavat how to name this sūtra, and the Buddha gives him the title, in Sanskrit, Romaharṣaṇīyasūtra, cf. Karmavibhāṅgopadesa, p. 158, l. 11), in Pāli, Lomahaśānavariyāya (cf. Majjhima, I, p. 83, l. 25; Milindapaṇḍha, p. 396, l. 2) or Lomahaṃsanasutta (Sumaṅgala, I, p. 179, l. 3).

This is one of the rare cases where a Hinayāna sūtra itself gives its own title. On the other hand, the Mahāyānasūtras generally end by allocating two or three titles to themselves. Cf. Vimalakīrti, p. 392, n. 42.

The Mahāśīhanāda, alsias Lomahaṃsana, has been the object of several Chinese translations, the oldest of which were incomplete: Ts a han,T 99, no. 684, k. 26, p. 186b26-187b6; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 23, p. 670c2- 672b3; k. 42, p. 776b14-777a14; k. 48, p. 811a29-812b13; Chen mao hi chou king, T 757, p. 591c-600b; Sin kiai tcho li king, T 802, p. 747a-748c.

This sūtra alludes to a number of śrāmaṇas and brahmaṇas searching for the path of deliverance and purity (śuddhi) in food (āhāra), saṃsāras, rebirths (upapatti), dwellings (āvāsa), sacrifice (yajña) or sacrifices (agniparicāraṇa). The Buddha, who has followed all these paths in the course of innumerable existences which he remembers, declares that they are not the true Path.

657 We may recall that former abodes (pūrvanivāsa) form the object of the fifth abhiñā (within the range of the ordinary person as well as the saint), of the first vidyā (reserved for the śrāvaka) and the eighth jñānabala (belonging to the Buddha).
This is why the ordinary person has only awareness (abhiñā) of former abodes, but does not have knowledge (vidyā) of them.

Because he knows the truth of the origin of suffering [240b] (samudayasatya), the śrāvaka knows clearly the sequence of causes and conditions from which the previous abodes derived. This is why the śrāvaka has the awareness (abhiñā) and the knowledge (vidyā) of them.

If at the start, when he was still an ordinary person (prthagjana), the śrāvaka had awareness of his previous abodes and later, having entered into the path of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga), he recognized the causes and conditions of their origins, it is during the eighth pure mind (aṣṭamake ‘nāravacitte) that he succeeds in cutting off wrong views (dṛṣṭi) and from then on the [simple] awareness (abhiñā) [that he had of his previous existences] changes into knowledge (vidyā). Why? Because knowledge (vidyā) is the root of seeing (darśanamāla).

On the other hand, if the śrāvaka first obtains the noble path [of seeing the truths] and only later does the knowledge of former abodes arise in him, he has already recognized the power of the causes and conditions which are the origin [of suffering] and, from then on, the awareness (abhiñā) that he has of his former abodes changes into knowledge (vidyā).

Question. - But at the beginning, when he was still the Bodhisattva, the Buddha had awareness of his earlier abodes, then cut off the passions inherent in the sphere of nothingness (ākimcanyāyatana) and finally entered into the noble path [of seeing the truths].658 [In these conditions], why did the Buddha say: “In the first watch of the night [of the enlightenment, when I was still a worldly person], I obtained the first knowledge (vidyā), [i.e., the knowledge of former abodes]”659

[According to your reasoning, the Buddha should have said that he obtained the awareness (abhiñā) of former abodes and not their knowledge (vidyā).]

Answer. – At that time, [during the first watch of the night of enlightenment], it was not yet a knowledge (vidyā). But later, when the Buddha was in public, he said: “It was at that time that I attained this knowledge”, and he declared to people: “This knowledge was obtained by me during the first watch.”

658 When he was seated under the Bodhi tree, Śākyamuni was still only a worldly person (prthagjana). He attained enlightenment in 34 moments of mind: 16 moments of the Path of seeing and 18 moments of the path of meditation. See above, p. 434F, 1036F; Kośa, II, p. 206; VI, p. 137, n. 3; J. May, Candrakīrti, p. 216-217 and notes.

659 Majjhima, I, p. 22, l. 23-25; 248, l. 13-15; Mahāvastu, II, p. 283, l. 13-14; Lalitavistara, p. 344, l. 5-8. Although at that very time the future Buddha was still an ordinary person, all the sources agree in saying that he had acquired the knowledge (vidyā) - not the awareness (abhiñā) - of former abodes (pūrvanivāsa), also called the divine eye (divyacaksus).

On the acquisition of the three knowledges by the bodhisattva, see Majjhima, I, p. 22, l. 9-23, l. 28; p. 117; p. 247, l. 36-249, l. 22; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 25, p. 589c14-23; Tsaeng yi a han, T 125, k. 23, p. 666b22-666c20; Dharmaguptaka Vin., T 1428, k. 31, p. 781b5-c11; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 5, p. 124a9-b7; Mahāvastu, II, p. 283, l. 13-285, l. 21: Lalitavistara, p. 344, l. 5-345, l. 22.
He may be compared to the king who, before exerting his kingship, had fathered a son. Only later, when this king was exerting his kingship, people questioned him about his son and asked when he had been born. The king replied: "The king’s son was born at such and such a date." However, at the time when his son had been born, the king was not yet exerting his kingship, but as now he is the king, he considers his son as son of the king and he affirms that ‘the king’s son’ was born at that particular date.

It is the same for the Buddha. At the time when he knowledge of former abodes (pūrvanivāsajñāna) arose in him, it was not yet a knowledge (vidyā) but was only an awareness (abhiñā). But in the course of the last watch [of enlightenment], the Buddha recognized the causes and conditions of the origin [of suffering] and from then on this ‘awareness’ [of former abodes] changed into ‘knowledge’. And later in public, the Buddha declared: “During the first watch, I obtained this knowledge.”

Question. – That is what should be understood by awareness (abhiñā) and knowledge (vidyā) [of former abodes]. Then what is the power (bala) [consisting of awareness of these abodes]?

By using this knowledge (vidyā), for himself as well as for other people, the Buddha knows the former abodes occupied during innumerable and infinite generations as well as the many causes and conditions from which they derive. The Buddha knows this fully and completely (prajñā), and as this knowledge is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (ajeya) in him, it is called the ‘eighth power’.

IX. THE KNOWLEDGE OF DEATH AND REBIRTH

The power of the knowledge of death and rebirth (cyutypapādajñānabala). Using the divine eye, the Buddha sees the place of deaths and rebirths of beings.

The worldly person (prthagjana) using the divine eye sees, at the maximum, one universe of four directions (caturdvipaka). The śrāvaka, at the maximum, sees about a small chiliocosm (sāhasracūḍika lokadhātu); he sees it entirely from top (ūrdhvam) to bottom (adhas).

660 According to the variant no. 9 in the Taisho edition, p. 240.
661 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 419-430: Kiṭṭad dūrāṃ punāṃ divyena caṅsūṣā paśyati. yasya yādṛṣṭam caṅṣur bhavati. śrāvakapratyekabuddhabuddhās tv anabhisāṃskāraṇa sāhasradvisāhasarākān lokadhāṭūn yathāsāṃkhyāṇaḥ paśyanti… savābhisaṃskāraṇa saha śrāvakāko ’pi dvisāhasram lokadhāṭum divyena caṅsūṣā paśyati, trisāhasra m khadgaviśāṅkaḥ, buddhas tu bhagavān asaṃkhyeyān lokadhāṭūn paśyati yāvadevecchati.

Transl. – To what distance does one see with the divine eye? That depends on who possesses the eye and the eye itself. The śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and the Buddhas, without any effort, see sāhasra, dvisāhasra and trisāhasra universes respectively. With effort, with the divine eye, the śrāvaka sees up to one dvisāhasra, the rhinoceros-like [pratyekabuddha] sees a trisāhasra, and the Buddha Bhagavat sees as many innumerable universes as he wishes.

The sāhasra, dvisāhasra and trisāhasra universes have been defined above, p. 337-448F.
Question. – But the great Brahmārāja, he too is able to see a chiliocosm. How does the śrāvaka differ from him?

Answer. – The great Brahmārāja, standing in the middle (madhya) of the chiliocosm, sees it all, but standing at the edge (pārśve), he does not see the other parts. This is not so for the śrāvaka: wherever he is, he always sees [all of] the chiliocosm.

The pratyeekabuddha sees a hundred thousand universes (lokadhātu); the Buddhas see innumerable (apramāṇa) and infinite (ananta) universes.

In worldly people (pythagjana), the knowledge of the divine eye (divyacāṣṭurjñāna) is an awareness (abhijñā) but not yet a knowledge (vidya). He sees only the things (vastu) that exist, but he cannot see for what karmic causes and conditions (karmahetupratyaya) they have taken birth. See what has been said in regard to former abodes (p. 1555F).

Furthermore, in A-ni-lou-teou (Aniruddha), the foremost of those who possess the divine eye, the material derived from the four great elements (caturmahābhautikarūpa) of the form realm – the matter constituting his divine eye – was only semi-pure (prasanna). On the other hand, in the Buddha, the divine eye, material derived from the four great elements, is completely pure: this is the difference.

Furthermore, it is in the concentrations (samadhi) in which he is dwelling (viharati) that the śrāvaka obtains the divine eye and it is in the concentrations in which he is dwelling that he can see, and this is a matter of concentration with investigation and analysis (savitarvaksavīcarasamādhi), of concentration without investigation but with analysis (avitarvāvicārasamādhi), or of concentration with neither investigation or analysis (avitarvāvicīrqqsamādhi). On the contrary, as soon as he enters (praviśati) into concentration, the Buddha, if he so wishes, is able to see everything. Abiding in concentration without investigation or analysis, he obtains the divine eye; entering into concentration with investigation and analysis, or into concentration without investigation but with analysis, he can see equally.

Furthermore, when the śrāvaka sees by means of the divine eye and if his mind in concentration (samādhicitta) enters into another concentration, his divine eye disappears. This is not the case in the Buddha: even if his mind enters into another concentration, his divine eye does not disappear.

By means of this knowledge, the Buddha knows the places of birth and death of all beings and since this knowledge is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (ajeyə) [in him], it is called the ‘ninth power’.

X. THE POWER OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE IMPURITIES

The power of the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñānabala).

662 Being natural and acquired by birth, the divine eye of the gods, including Brahmārāja, is defiled by eleven apakṣāla; as it is acquired by abhijñā, the eye of the śrāvaka is free of defilement and is very pure (suviśuddha). Cf. Kośavyākhya, p. 279, l. 5-9.
Question. – There are differences in the degrees of knowledge for the first nine powers: [namely, of the śrāvakas, the pratyekabuddhas or the Buddha]; but here the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya) is the same [for all]. How is [the knowledge of the Buddha] different here from that of the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha?

Answer. – Although the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya) is the same [in all], the various knowledges (jñānaviśeṣa) [which recognize them] is very different.663

In the śrāvaka, the very strong fetters to be destroyed by meditation (bhāvanāheyasamyojana) are destroyed at three times: i) the time of arising (upādabhāga), ii) the time of duration (sthitibhāga) and iii) the time of disappearance (bhangaḥbāga). This is not the case in the Buddha: it is at the very moment of their arising that they are completely destroyed.

663 It is acknowledged in both Vehicles that liberation (vimukti), in other words, the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya), is the same in the śrāvaka, the pratyekabuddha and the Buddha (cf. Vībhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 62b-c; Kośa, VI, p. 282; Vasumitra, transl. Masuda, p. 49 (thesis 37 of the Sarvāstivādin), p. 62 (thesis 22 of the Mahāsākāra), p. 64 (thesis 3 of the Dharmaśravakā), p. 62 (thesis 22 of the Mahāśākāra); Saṃdhinirmocana. X, §2; Sūtraśīlā, XI, v. 53 (vimokṣatulyatva); Saṅgraha, p. 327-328; Buddhabhūmiśāstra, T 1530, k. 5, p. 312b-7-15.

No matter that there are many differences between the bodhi of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas on the one hand and the anuttarasamyaksambodhi of the Buddhas on the other hand. They are noted in many texts: Vībhāṣā, T 1545, k. 143, p. 735b; Traité here and at k. 53, p. 436b. The latter is perhaps inspired by the Upāsakaśīlaśūtra, T 1488, k. 1, p. 1038a-c (analysed in Hobogirin, p. 87):

The śrāvakas obtain bodhi by debating, the pratyekabuddhas by reflecting, and they understand only a part of the truth; the Buddhas understand everything without a teacher, without listening, without meditating, as a result of their practices.

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of things; the Buddhas know the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) and only they are omniscient.

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas know the four noble truths (satya) but not causes and conditions (hetupratyaya); the Buddhas know the causes and conditions. The water of the Ganges being compared to the river of pratītyasamupāda, the śrāvaka is like a rabbit that crosses the river without knowing its depth; the pratyekabuddha is like a horse that knows the depth when it touches the bottom; the Buddha is like the elephant that knows its full depth.

The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have cut off the passions (kleśa) but not their habitual tendencies (vāsanā); the Buddha has cut off everything at the root.

- We should recall once more that all these differences are of interest only to the scholar of the Lesser Vehicle of whom the Traité here is only a spokesman without sharing his opinions. From the Mahāyāna point of view to which the Traité subscribes, bodhi is only a name and, in the true sense, śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha and Buddha do not exist: see Vimalakīrti, p. 195-196, 423-425.
In the śrāvaka, the fetters to be destroyed by seeing the truths (śatyarāṣaṃakṣayasya) are destroyed at the moment of their arising, but the fetters to be destroyed by meditation (bhāvanāḥṣaṃakṣaṇa) are destroyed at three times. For the Buddha there is no difference between the fetters to be destroyed by seeing the truths the fetters to be destroyed by meditation.664

When the śrāvaka enters the noble path [of darśanamārga] for the first time, the moment of entry (praveśa) consisting of the duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti) is distinct from the moment of understanding (abhisamayakṣānti consisting of the duḥkhe dharmajñāna). In the Buddha, it is in a single moment of mind that the entry (praveśa) and the understanding (abhisaṃaya) occur. He obtains omniscience (sarvajñāna), destroys all the obstacles (āvarana) and obtains all the attributes of Buddha in a single moment of mind.

The śrāvakas have two kinds of liberation (vimukti): i) liberation from the passions (kleśavimukti) and ii) liberation from the obstacles to the Dharma (dharmāvanāvanimukti). The Buddha possesses liberation from all the conflicting emotions and also liberation from all the obstacles to the Dharma.665

---

664 The passions to be abandoned during the Path of meditation are called bhāvanāḥṣaṃakṣaṇa, bhāvanāḥkleśa or also savastukkleśa ‘passions with point of support’ (Kośa, VI, p. 257). Each of the nine levels – kāmadhūtā, four dhīyānas, four samāpattis – making nine categories: strong-strong, strong-medium, strong-weak, medium-strong...(Kośa, VI, p. 199). Thus there are in all 81 categories of bhāvanāḥṣaṃakkleśa of which each is destroyed by one moment of abandoning or expelling (prahāna or ānantaryamārga) and one moment of liberation (vimuktimārga) (Kośa, VI, p. 198-199); in all, 162 moments of mind.

The passions to be abandoned in the course of the Path of seeing the truths are called darśanaheya, drgheya or also avastuka ‘passions without point of support’ In their nature they are ‘wrong view’ (drṣṭi), belief in a self, etc. (Kośa, VI, p. 257). They are destroyed by seeing the four noble truths, suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path to its cessation. The ascetic takes possession of each of these truths by two moments of mental acceptance (kṣānti) and by two moments of knowledge (jñāna): in all, sixteen moments of mind. The mental acceptances are the path of destruction (prahāṇamārga) or the uninterrupted path (ānantaryamārga) because they cut through doubt; the knowledges are possession of the cessation of doubt (Kośa, VI, p. 183-185, 189-191). For a succinct explanation of the Path, refer to my [Lamotte’s] Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 677-686.

For the ordinary practitioner, the bhāvanamārga is long, whereas the darśanamārga is quick (Kośa, VII, 8). This is why it destroys the passions to be destroyed by meditation in three times and the passions to be destroyed by seeing in one time. The Buddha destroys all the categories in one single moment. This does not prevent the scholastic from attributing 34 moments of mind to the enlightenment of a Buddha (see above, p. 1556F, n. 1).

665 A passage the extreme conciseness of which makes it obscure. If I [Lamotte] understand it well, the śrāvaka is liberated from the obstacle consisting of the conflicting emotions (kleśāvaraṇa) and only a part of the obstacle to knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa), that which opposes awareness of the Dharma and the four noble truths. The Buddha is free of the obstacle consisting of the passions and the obstacle opposing the grouping of knowledge, of awareness of all things in all their aspects (sarvākāraṇa).
It is by himself (svatas) that the Buddha attains wisdom (prajñā). The śrāvakas, on the other hand, obtain it by following the teachings (deśanā) of another.

Furthermore, some say: When the Buddha cuts off the defilements (kleśa) of all beings by means of his wisdom, his own knowledge is neither dulled nor diminished. Just as a red-hot iron ball (ādīptāyoguḍā) set down on a cotton cloth (tālapaṭṭikā) burns the cotton without its power of combustion being diminished, so the Buddha’s wisdom burns all the defilements without the power of his knowledge (jñānabala) being thereby diminished.

Furthermore, the śrāvakas know only if their own impurities are destroyed. The Buddhas know that their own impurities are destroyed and also know if those of others are also destroyed. On this subject see the Tsing king (Praśāntasūtra).666

Above (p. 346F), the Traité has mentioned the triad of obstacles consisting of the passions (kleśa), action (karma) and retribution (vipāka). This triad is of canonical origin (Anguttara, III, p. 435; Vibhaṅga, p. 341). The Adhyadhaśatikā (T 240, k. 1, p. 776b6-7; T 243, k. 1, p. 784b14; T 244, k. 1, p. 786c22-23) and the Laṅkāvatāra, p. 241, propose another triad: kleśa-, karma-, and dharma-āvaraṇa, but do not define the last one.

666 A sūtra presenting, beside the Buddha, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī and the devaputra Praśāstavinayēśvara (in Tibetan, Rab tu ēî ba rnam par dul baḥi dbaṅ phyug), a name usually misinterpreted in Chinese as Prāśāntavinaya-ava: Tsi chouen liu yin according to Dharmarakṣa, (T460, p. 448b3), Tsi tiao fou yin according to Kumārajīva (T 1489, p. 1075c10), Tsi tiao yin according to Fa hai, (T 1490, , p. 1081a19). The Chinese have maltreated the name of Avalokiteśvara in the same way, which they most often render as Avalokita-svara. The sūtra in question here deals with conventional and absolute truth (saṃvritiparamārthasatya) in its first section. This explains the many titles under which it has been cited. It was translated into Chinese four times (but the second translation has been lost) and into Tibetan once.

1) T 460: Wen chou che li tsing liu king (Mañjuśrīpraśāntavinayasūtra), tr. by Dharmarakṣa of the Si Tsin. The colophon of this translation is preserved in the Tch’ou (T 2145, k. 7, p. 51b8-13): The śramaṇa Tchou Fa-hou (Dharmarakṣa), at the capital (Lo-yang), met Tsi-tche of the Western Land who issued this sūtra orally. The sūtra still contained many chapters which this man had forgotten, but what he did issue was soon translated into the language of the Tsin. Having recovered the original, Dharmarakṣa corrected and completed the translation on the 8th day of the 4th month of the t’ai-k’ang year (May 14, 289) at the Po-ma sseu [of Lo-yang]. Nie Tao-tchen wrote it down with the brush.“

This translation was listed in the Tchong king lou (419) of Tchou Tao-tsou (Li, T 2034, k. 6, p. 63a11-12; K’ai, T 2154, k. 2, p. 495a1-2).

2) T 1489: Ts ‘ing-tsing p’i-ni fang-kouang king (Praśāntavinayāvipulayasūtra), tr. by Kumārajīva of the Later Tsin, at an undetermined date between 402 and 409. This was the third translation, also called Tsing liu king (Praśāntavinayasūtra): cf. K’ai. T 2154, k. 4, p. 513a3; k. 12, p. 606b19.
Finally, the Buddha is the only one who knows the modalities inherent in the minds of beings with their ninety-eight perverse tendencies (anuśaya)\textsuperscript{667} and their ninety-six errors (paryavasthāna).\textsuperscript{668} No one but the Buddha knows them. [241a]

The Buddha is also the only one who knows the nature of the fetters destroyed in the course of the duḥkhe dharmajnāna, the duḥkhe 'nvayajñāna and so on up to the mārga 'nvayajñāna. Similarly, he knows [the fetters] destroyed by meditation (bhāvanāhīna) in the course of the nine moments of liberation (vimuktimārga).\textsuperscript{669}

The Buddha knows these things about beings fully and completely (prajānāti). The little that the śrāvaka knows of them or says about them may be ascribed to the Buddha’s teachings.

This is the power in the Buddha of the knowledge of destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣayaṇānaprabhāva) and, since this knowledge is intact (avyāhata) and invincible (ajeya) [in him], it is called the ‘tenth power’.

---

\textsuperscript{667} Cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545, K. 46, p. 237b-238a; Kośa, V, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{668} For this expression, see Kośa, V, p. 3-5 and notes.

\textsuperscript{669} The Buddha knows the darśanaheyyakeśa that are destroyed during the sixteen moments of mind of the Path of seeing, and the bhāvanāheyyakeśa from which the practitioner is liberated during the 81 vimuktimārga of the Path of meditation, nine vimuktimārgas for each of the nine levels.
Third Section APPENDICES TO THE TEN POWERS

I. THE BEST OF THE TEN POWERS

Question. – Which is the best (śreṣṭha) of these ten powers?

Answer. – Each is great in its own domain (svadeśa), just as water (vārī) that moistens and fire (agni) that burns each has its own power.

1) Some say that the first is the greatest because it includes all the ten at once (cf. p. 1522F).

2) Others say that the power bearing on the destruction of the impurities (āsravaksaya) is the greatest because it contributes to the attainment of nirvāṇa.

3) Some scholars say that the ten forces together constitute the root (mūla) of unhindered liberation (avyāhatavimukti) and that this unhindered liberation is sovereign (adhipati).

II. WHY THE BUDDHA THINKS HIGHLY OF HIS TEN POWERS

Question. – The ten powers are exclusive to the Buddha and, in the course of the present lifetime (ihajanmani), none of his disciples (śrāvaka) is able to obtain them.670 Then why does the Buddha speak of them?

Answer. – The Buddha wants to cut off peoples’ doubts (saṃśaya) about these ten powers, to strengthen the minds of the ignorant and lead the fourfold assembly (catuspariṣad) to rejoice and to say: “Our great teacher (mahācārya) is the only one to possess such powers which he does not share with anyone.”

Furthermore, the heretics (tīrthika) say: “The śramaṇa Gautama dwells always in peace (vyupaśama) and his wisdom (prajñā) is decreasing.” This is why the Buddha makes this statement of truth (satyavacana): “In me, the ten powers (jñānabala) and the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) are well-established (supratiṣṭha) and complete (sampanna).” In the great assembly, the Buddha speaks of his perfect wisdom (saṃpannaprajñā), converts beings (sattvān paripācayati), utters the lion’s roar fully (samyak simhanādāṃ nadati) and turns the wheel of Brahmbā (brahmacakraṃ pravartayati) which no heretic, god or human, can turn. Therefore it is to arrest criticism that the Buddha speaks of his ten powers.

---

670 This is the matter of a controversy among the Sarvāstivādins which the Traité refrains from discussing. As will be seen the following chapter, the Traité does not include the ten powers among the attributes exclusive to the Buddha.
III. THERE IS NO BOASTFULNESS IN THE BUDDHA

Question. – According to a rule of human decency, even the sage cannot boast. How then (kah\ṣ\ḥ punarvādaḥ) could a being free of egotism boast of his ten powers? Indeed, it is said:

To boast about oneself (ātmotkarṣaṇa), to blame oneself (ātmapamsana),

To boast about another (parotkarṣaṇa) and to blame another (parapamsana)

Those are four things

Which the sage does not do.

Answer. – Although free of egotism and attachment, the Buddha possesses innumerable powers and, out of his great compassion (mahākarunā) to save beings, he speaks of only ten powers: that is not boasting.

Thus, the good caravan leader (sārthavāha), seeing robbers (caura) deceiving his merchants and inviting them to take the wrong road, is moved by compassion and says to his merchants: “It is I who am truthful (satyavādin); do not follow these hypocrites (śaṭha)!” And also, when charlatans are deceiving the sick (glāna), the good physician (vaidya), out of compassion for these [sick people], tells them: “I have the good remedy (bhaisajya) and I am able to cure your illness; do not believe these impostors! You will become even more sick.” [341b]

Furthermore, the qualities (guna) of the Buddha are profound and distant; if the Buddha did not speak about himself, nobody would know him, and the little that he does say is very useful to beings. This is why the Buddha himself speaks about his ten powers.

Furthermore, there are beings to be converted (vaineya) to whom it is necessary to speak, and among the things to say to them, he must, at the proper time, speak of the ten powers. If one did not speak about them, [these people] would not be converted. This is why the Buddha himself tells them about them.

Thus when the sun (sūrya) and the moon (candra) rise, they do not think: “By lighting up the world, we will have glory.” The mere fact of their rising is worthy itself of glory. It is the same for the Buddha: he thinks not at all about collecting glory when he speaks about his own qualities. When the Buddha is preaching the Dharma in a pure voice and the brilliance of his rays (raśmiprabhasa) destroys the shadows of ignorance among beings (mohatamas), he derives great glory from that automatically. Therefore there is nothing wrong in the Buddha himself speaking of his ten powers and his other qualities.

Power can have results. By using the ten powers, the Buddha increases wisdom (prajñāṃ vivardhayati): this is why he can confound the scholars (upadeśacārya). By using the ten powers, he increases wisdom: this is why he preaches the Dharma. By using the ten powers, he increases wisdom: this is why he triumphs over his adversaries. By using the ten powers, he increases wisdom; this is why he attains sovereignty (atīśvarya) over all the dharmas, just as the great master of a kingdom gets sovereignty over the ministers, the people and the populace.
This has been a brief explanation of the ten powers according to the śrāvaka system.671

671 The Mahāyāna system on the ten powers will be explained in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XL: THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES AND THE FOUR UNOBSSTRUCTED KNOWLEDGES (p. 1567F)

First Section THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES OF THE BUDDHA ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

PRELIMINARY NOTE

This chapter is poorly entitled and poorly divided. The previous chapter dealt with the ten powers (bala) of the Tathāgata according to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. The present chapter consists of three sections:

1. The four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) of the Buddha according to the Abhidharma.
2. The ten powers and the four fearlessnesses of the Buddha and the bodhisattva according to the Mahāyāna.
3. The four unobstructed knowledges (pratisaṃvid) according to the Abhidharma, then according to the Mahāyāna.

I. THE VAIŚĀRADYASŪTRA

The basic canonical text is the sūtra on the fearlessnesses vouched for by numerous sources:

1. Pāli wording in the Vesārajjasutta: Anguttara, II, p. 8-9; Majjhima, I, p. 71, l. 32-72, l. 14:
   \[\text{Cattār’ imāni Sāriputta tathāgatassa vesārajjāni yehi vesārajjehi sampalīgata tathāgato āsabhan ṣāmanām ... dukkhakkhayāyāti, tatra vata maṃ ... na samanupassāmi ... etam p’aham ... viharāmi.}\]

2. Sanskrit wording in Kośavyākhya, p. 645, l. 30–646, l. 13; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 211, l. 1-15; Śatasāhasrikā, p.1448, l. 6–1449, l. 17; Arthaviniścaya, p. 578-579:
   \[\text{Catvārīmāni Sāriputra tathāgatasva vaiśāradyāni yair vaiśāradyaiḥ sampalīgataḥ tathāgato ’rhan ... na samanupaṣyāmi, idam ātra nimittam ... sahadharme.}\]


Transl. of the Sanskrit. – Here, O Śāriputra, are the four fearlessnesses of the Tathāgata; endowed with these fearlessnesses, the Tathāgata, the holy One, fully and completely enlightened, who claims the noble
place of the bull (var. of the Ṛṣi), rightly utters the lion’s roar in the assembly and turns the wheel of Brahmā. What are these four?

1. While I claim to be fully and completely enlightened, I see no reason to fear that a śramaṇa, a brahmaṇa, a god, Māra, Brahmā or anyone in the world can legitimately object that such and such dharmas are unknown to me. Seeing no reason to fear that, I have obtained security, absence of fear, certainty, and I abide there; I claim the noble place of the bull (var. Ṛṣi), I rightly utter the lion’s roar in the assembly and I turn the wheel of Brahmā never yet set in motion legitimately by a śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a god, Māra, Brahmā or anyone in the world.

2. While I claim to have destroyed the impurities, I do not see any reason to fear that a śramaṇa… can legitimately object that such or such impurities have not been destroyed by me. Not seeing any reason to fear that…

3. I see no reason to fear that a śramaṇa… can legitimately claim that the dharmas presented by me as obstacles to the Path do not constitute obstacles in the person who brings them into play. Seeing no reason to fear that…

4. I see no reason to fear that a śramaṇa… can legitimately claim that the way shown by me as the noble path leading to release does not lead the person who follows it to the proper cessation of suffering, to the suppression of suffering. Seeing no reason to fear that, I have obtained security, absence of fear, certainty, and I remain there; I claim the noble place of the bull (var. of the Ṛṣi), I utter the lion’s roar rightly in the assembly and I turn the wheel of the Dharma never yet legitimately set in motion by a śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, god, Māra, Brāhma or anyone in the world.

II. THE VAIŚĀRADYAS IN THE ABHIDHARMA AND THE ŚĀSTRAS

The Pāli Abhidhamma mentions them often but with scarcely any explanation. In contrast, the Abhidharma treatises and the śāstras of both Vehicles have analyzed them plentifully and commented upon the sūtra of the fearlessnesses. Here I [Lamotte] will limit myself to indicating the ones that seem to me to be most instructive:

1. Among the Sarvāstivādin treatises: Saṃyuktabhidharmasāra, T 152, k. 6, p. 922c; Abhidharmāmṛta, T 1553, k. 2, p. 974c20-23 (reconstr. Sastri, p. 93, l. 4-8); Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 158a17-159b13; Kośa, VII, p. 74-75; Kośabhāṣya, p. 414; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 748b23-749a15; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 389-390.

2. Among the Yogācāra treatises: Sūtrakīrtikāra, XXI, v. 52 (p. 186); Bodh. bhūmi, p. 402; Saṃgraha, p. 286-287, 298-299; Abhidharmasamuccaya, T 1605, k. 7, p. 691c4-14 (reconstr. Pradhan, p. 98, l. 6-14); T 1606, k. 14, p. 760c13-761a18.

In the Kośa (l.c.) the four vaiśāradyas are designated in the following way:

1. Sarvadharmābhisambodhivaiśāradya.
2. Sarvāsravākṣayajñānavaśāradya.

3. Āntarāyikadharmaūkaraṇavaiśāradya.


Compare the readings in Dharmasaṃgraha, § 77, and in Mahāvyut., no. 131-134.

1. Definition of the Four Fearlessnesses in the Vaiśāradyasūtra

Here are the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya):

1. The Buddha makes the following proclamation (pratijñā): I am fully and completely enlightened (samyaksaṃbuddha) and I see not the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a god, Māra, Brahmā or anyone else can say truthfully that I do not know certain dharmas. This is why I have obtained security (kṣemapṛpta), I have obtained absence of fear (abhayaprpta), I occupy the place of the Holy Teacher (viharāmy ārṣaṃ sthānam) like that of the royal bull (ārṣabha),672 in the great assemblies I utter the lion’s roar (pariṣatu simhanādam nadāmi) and I turn the Wheel of Brahmā (brāhmaṃ cakram pravartayami) which no śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, god, Māra, Brahmā or anyone [241c] else is truly able to turn. This is the first fearlessness.

2. The Buddha makes this proclamation: I have destroyed the impurities (kṣināsra) and I see not the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā or anyone else can say truthfully that I have not destroyed these impurities. This is why I have obtained security, I have obtained absence of fear, I occupy the position of Holy Teacher like that of a king-bull, in the great assemblies I utter the lion’s roar, and I turn the wheel of Brahmā which no śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā or anybody else is truly able to turn. This is the second fearlessness.

3. The Buddha makes this proclamation: I have expounded the dharmas that create obstacles (āntarāyikadharma) and I do not see the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, god, Māra, Brahmā, or anyone else can say truthfully that these dharmas which create obstacles are not obstacles to the Path. This is why I have obtained security, I have obtained absence of fear, I occupy the place of the holy Teacher like that of the bull-king, in the great assemblies I utter the lion’s roar and I turn the wheel of Brahmā that no śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā or anyone else can truly turn. This is the third fearlessness.

4. The Buddha makes this proclamation: The noble path shown by me can lead out of the world (yā mayā pratipad ākhya āryā nairvyānikī niryātti) and the one who follows it is able to destroy all the sufferings (tatkārasya samyag duḥkhaśayāyāti), and I see not the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, bhrāmaṇa, god, Māra, Brāhma or anyone else can say truthfully that the one who follows this path cannot get out of the world or destroy suffering. This is why I have obtained security, I have obtained the absence of fear, I

672 Here the Traité is juxtaposing the two readings ārṣa and ārṣabha mentioned above.
occupy the place of the holy Teacher like that of the king-bull, in the great assemblies I utter the lion’s roar, and I turn the wheel of Brāhma which no śrmamṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brāhma or anyone else is able truly to turn. This is the fourth fearlessness.

2. Why the Buddha Mentioned His Four Fearlessnesses

Questions. – For what reasons does the Buddha speak of his four fearlessnesses?

Answer. – The Buddha calls himself omniscient (sarvajñā) and omnivoyant (sarvadarśin). But in the world, there are infinite treatises, arts (kalā), sciences (vidhi), knowledges (jñāna), crafts (śilpa), methods (upāya). For all the beings taken together to know all these things would already be difficult: it would be more difficult still for the Buddha himself alone to possess omniscience. So many things, so many difficulties!

The Buddha, who experiences no fear, wishes to destroy incorrect suspicions and, in order to refute objection, he speaks of the four fearlessnesses.

Furthermore, before the Buddha appeared in the world, heretics (tīrthika) in various ways deceived people who were searching for the Path or seeking merit. There were those who ate all kinds of fruits (phala), all kinds of vegetables (vyāñjana), all kinds of plants (trna) and roots (mūla), cow-dung (gomaya) or false millet, who ate once a day, every second day, every tenth day, once a month or once every two months, who swallowed smoke, drank water, ate moss and other things of this kind, who dressed themselves in tree bark, leaves or grass, deer-skins or wooden planks, who slept on the ground, on branches, on ashes or spines, who, in the cold season went into the water, or in the hot season scorched themselves between five fires, who died by going into the water, entering into the fire, by throwing themselves on picks or by starving themselves to death.673 In the course of these different austerities (duskaracaryā), they were seeking paradise (svarga) or they were seeking nirvāṇa. They also recommended their disciples not to renounce these practices and, by leading people of little intelligence in this way, they collected homage (pūjā).

As long as the sun (sūrya) has not risen, the firefly (khadyotaka)674 gleams somewhat; but when the sun has risen and is shining, the moon (candra) and stars (tāraka) no longer shine and even less so, the firefly. Similarly, as long as the Buddha had not yet appeared in the world, the heretics were illuminating the world with a feeble light and receiving homage; but as soon as the Buddha has appeared in the world, he eclipses the heretics and their disciples by the brilliance of his great knowledge (mahājñānāloka) and none of them

673 The austerities described here are those of the naked ascetics (acelaka) already described by the Buddha in the Udumbarika-Sīhanādasuttanta (Dīgha, III, p. 40-42; Tch’ang a han, T 1, k. 8, p. 47c; Ni keou t’o fan tche king, T 11, k. 1, p. 223b; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 26, p. 592b).

674 The example of the firefly or the shining worm (Sanskrit khadyotaka, Pāli khajjopanaka) is classic: cf. Majjhima, II, p. 34, 41; Visuddhimagga, p. 347; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 41.
Having lost homage and profits, they increase their lies (mṛṣāvāda) against the Buddha and his disciples.

[Sundarīṣṭutra]. - As has been said in the Souen-t’o-li-king (Sundarīṣṭutra), they accused the Buddha of having killed Sundarī. They said to people: “The lowest man in the world would not do that, and the person who is mistaken about human laws on this point is even more mistaken about nirvāṇa.”

Wishing to destroy such slander, the Buddha himself proclaimed his own true qualities (guṇa) and his four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya), saying:

“I alone am omniscient (sarvajñā) and nobody can truthfully say that I am not cognizant. I do not fear that.”

“I alone have destroyed all the impurities (āsrava) and their traces (vāsanā) and nobody can truthfully say that the Buddha has not destroyed the impurities. I do not fear that.”

“I have proclaimed the dharmas that create obstacles to the Path to nirvāṇa (nirvāṇamārgāntārayikadharma) and nobody can truthfully say that these dharmas do not create obstruction to nirvāṇa. The Buddha does not fear that.”

“The Buddha has stated the path to the destruction of suffering (duḥkhanirodhapratipad) that leads to nirvāṇa and nobody can ruthfully say that this path does not lead to nirvāṇa. The Buddha does not fear that.”

In summary (saṃkṣepena), here is the nature of these four fearlessnesses:

1. Complete knowledge of all the dharmas (sarvadharmābhisambodhī).
2. Destruction of all the impurities (sarvāsravakṣaya) and their traces (vāsanā).
3. A report of the dharmas that create obstacles to the path (mārgāntarāyikadharmaivyakaraṇa).
4. A report of the path of the cessation of suffering (duḥkhanirodhapartipadivyākaraṇa).

The Buddha does not fear that anyone can truthfully say that he does not fully know these four things. Why? Because he knows them precisely and fully.

The first two fearlessnesses are personal qualities or perfections [for the Buddha]; the last two fearlessnesses are qualities useful to beings.

In the first, third and fourth fearlessness, it is a matter of knowledge; in the second, it is a matter of destruction (kṣaya). The matter is governed by the perfection of wisdom and cessation.

---

675 Considerations already developed in the Pāli Udāna, p. 12.
677 Cf. Kośa, VII, p. 75; Dharmasamgraha, § 77; Mahāvyut., no. 131-134.
678 Sūtrālāṃkāra, p. 186: Atra jñānapraḥāṇaṇārakatvena svārthe, nirvāṇaṣvāpadeśilatvena ca parārthe, nirādhṛṣyatvād anyatīrthṣyaḥ bhagavato yathākramāṇaṃ caturvidham vaiśāradhyam udbhāvitam. See also Bodh. bhūmi, p. 402.
3. Similarities and Differences Between Powers and Fearlessnesses

[242b] Question. – The ten powers (bala) are knowledges (jñāna) and the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāraḍyā) are also knowledges. What are the similarities and the differences?679

Answer. – When the qualities (guna) of the Buddha are explained at length (vistareṇa), this is bala; when they explained in brief, this is vaiśāraḍyā.

Furthermore, when there is activity (kriyā), this is bala; when there is neither doubt (saṃśaya) nor difficulty (duṣkara), this is vaiśāraḍyā.

When wisdom (prajñā) is accumulated, this is bala; when ignorance (avidyā) is dispersed, this is vaiśāraḍyā.

Accumulating good dharmas (kuṣaladharma) is bala; destroying bad dharmas (akuṣaladharma) is vaiśāraḍyā.

Possessing wisdom personally is bala; there being no one who can destroy you is vaiśāraḍyā.

The vigor of wisdom is bala; being able to respond to objections (praśna) is vaiśāraḍyā.

Accumulating the wisdoms is bala; using them outwardly is vaiśāraḍyā.

Similarly, when the noble cakravartin king is endowed with his seven jewels (saptaratnasamāṅgata), this is bala; having obtained these seven jewels, when he travels through the four continents (caturdvīpa) subduing the entire world, this is vaiśāraḍyā.

Similarly also, when the good physician (vaidya) knows the remedies (bhaiṣajya) well, this is bala; when he mixes the remedies to give them to people, this is vaiśāraḍyā.

Realizing one’s own personal (svārtha) benefit is bala; realizing the benefit of others (parārtha) is vaiśāraḍyā.

Destroying one’s own disturbing emotions (kleśa) is bala; destroying the disturbing emotions of others is vaiśāraḍyā.

Not wasting away is bala; being without difficulty or decline is vaiśāraḍyā.

Being able to realize one’s own good is bala; being able to realize the good of others is vaiśāraḍyā.

The knowledge of good planning (suvidhiṇātā) is bala; the application of this knowledge is vaiśāraḍyā.

Omniscience (sarvajñatā) and the awareness [of things] in all their aspects (sarvākāraṇātā) is bala; the manifestation of this omniscience and this awareness of all the aspects is vaiśāraḍyā.

679 Cf. Saṃyuktābhidhammasāra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 922c12 seq.; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 159a23 seq.; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 749a6 seq.
The eighteen special attributes (āveṇikadharma) of the Buddhas are bala; the outward manifestation of these eighteen special attributes is vaiśāradya.

Completely penetrating the nature of things (dharmatā) is bala; if one asks all kinds of questions (praśna) and does not think any more and if one replies in the very same moment, this is vaiśāradya.

Possessing the Buddha eye (buddhacakṣus) is bala; seeing beings to be converted (vaineya) with this Buddha eye and preaching the Dharma to them is vaiśāradya.

Obtaining the [first] three unobstructed knowledges (pratisamvid) is bala; obtaining the unobstructed knowledge of elocution (pratibhānapratisamvid) is vaiśāradya.

Mastery of omniscience (sarvajñatāvaśita) is bala; adorning one’s speech with all kinds of stories (avadāna) and apoloulges (nidāna) and preaching the Dharma is vaiśāradya.

Destroying the troops of Māra is bala; destroying the heretics (tīrthika) and the scholars (upadeśācārya) is vaiśāradya.

These are the various ways of distinguishing bala and vaiśāradya.

Question. – What is fearlessness called?

Answer. – The absence of doubt (niḥsaṃśaya), the absence of fear (nirbhaya), the non-decline of wisdom, not becoming discouraged (anālīnatā), not becoming exasperated (aromaharṣa), acting in all ways as has been said (yathāvādī tathākāri), all that is vaiśāradya.

4. How Do We Know That The Buddha is Fearless?

Question. – How do we know that he was fearless?

Answer. – 1) Had he had fear, he would not have led the great assemblies by welcoming, dismissing, roughly reprimanding or teaching by means of gentle [242c] words.

Thus, one day the Buddha sent Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana away but then, out of compassion (karuṇā) received them back again.680

680 Cūtamasutta in Majjhima, I, p. 456–457 (Tseng yi a hab, T 125, k. 41, p. 770c; Chō li fou… yeou sseu k’iu king, T 137, p. 860a-b):

One day the Bhagavat was in Cūtumā, in the Myrobalan Garden. At that time, five hundred bhikṣus headed by Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana came to Cūtumā to see the Bhagavat. The newcomers exchanged greetings with the resident monks, prepared their lodgings, arranged their bowls and robes, uttered loud cries and shouted at the tops of their voices (uccāsaddā mahāsaddā ahesum). Then the Bhagavat asked Ānanda: What are these loud shouts, these loud cries? One would say they were fishermen catching fish (kevaṭṭā maññe macchavilopa). [Chinese transl.: One would say that somebody was cutting wood or stones.]
2) There were formidable people, such as these scholars (upadesācārya) who were absorbed in the height of pride (mānastambha). Intoxicated by their false wisdom, they presented themselves as unique in the world and unrivalled. Knowing their own books deeply, they refuted others’ books and criticized all the systems with wicked words. They were like mad elephants caring for nothing. Among these madmen, we cite: Ngan-po-tcha (Ambaṭṭha), Tch’ang-tchao (Dirghanakha), Sa-tchö-tche Ni-k’ien (Satyaka Nirghanthiputra), P’i-lou-tch’e (Pilotika), etc.681

The Buddha subdued all these scholars. Had he been afraid, this would not have been the case.

The five wandering mendicants (parivrājaka) beginning with Kiao-tch’en-jou (Kauṇḍinya),682 the thousand Jaṭilā rjis beginning with Ngeou-leou-p’in-louo Kia-chō (Uruvilva Kāṣyapa),683 Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Mahākāśyapa, etc., all entered into religion (pravrājita) in the Buddha’s Dharma.

A hundred thousand Che-tseu (Śākya) who all were great kings in Jambudvīpa, king Po-sseau-ni-che (Prasenajit), king P’in-p’o-so-lo (Bimbisāra), king Tchan-t’o Po-chou-t’i (Caṇḍa Pradyota), king Yeou-t’ien (Udayana), king Fou-kia-lo-p’o-li (Pukkusāti), king Fan-mo-to (Brahmadatta), etc., all became his disciples.684

The Bhagavat summoned the perpetrators and said to them: “Go away, O bhikṣus; I send you away; you cannot stay in my presence (gacchatha bhikkhave paṇāmemi vo, na vi mama santike vatthabba).”

Below (k. 26, p. 247c), the Traité will return to this event. Yet another time, five hundred monks meeting at Śravasti were similarly driven away by the Buddha (cf. Udāna, p. 24-25).

681 Ambaṭṭha was a young brāhmin of the Ambaṭṭha clan, versed in the three Vedas and auxiliary sciences. He lived at Ukkaṭṭhā in Kosala and had as teacher Pokkharasādi. The Buddha preached the Ambaṭṭhasutta for him (Dīgha, I, p. 87-110), but in contrast to his master, he was not converted.

For Dirghanakha, also called Mahākausūthīla, see above, p. 46-51F and notes, 184F, 633F, 639F. For Satyaka Nirghanthiputra, see above, p. 46-47F and notes: below, k. 26, p. 251c10; k. 90, p. 699a9.

Pilotika, already mentioned above (p. 221F) was a parivrājaka sage (Majjhima, I, p. 175 seq.).

682 Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya, the foremost of the group of five (pañcavargīya) who were witnesses of the Buddha’s austerities and were present at the sermon at Benares. They became arhats when the Buddha preached the Anattalakkhanasutta to them (Vinaya, I, p. 14; Catusparisād, p. 170). The Traité has already mentioned them above, p. 102F, 1426F.

683 See above, p. 1355F, note 2.

684 According to some sources mentioned above (p. 177F, note) five hundred Śākyas were forced to enter the religious life by an edict of king Śuddhodana.

Prasenajit, king of Kosala, became upāsaka after the preaching of the Daharasutta (Saṃnyutta, I, p. 70; Mūlasarv. Vin, T 1450, k. 9, p. 142b-143a). The Traité has already mentioned this king and will return to him later, k. 27, p. 261a18; k. 33, p. 305a8; k. 58, p. 470b15.

Bimbisāra, king of Magadha, had two well-known meetings with the Buddha. The second took place at the Supatiṭṭhacetiya of the Lāṭṭhivaruṇyāna; it was then that the king was converted with all his
Brāhmin householders (grhsatha), having gone through all the worldly sciences and respected by great kings such as Fan-mo-yu (Brahmāyus), Fou-kia-lo-p’o-li (Puṣkarasārin), Kieou-lo-t’an-t’o (Kūṭadanta), etc., all became his disciples. Some obtained the first [fruit] of the Path; others the second, third or fourth fruits.685

people and became srotaāpanna (references above, p. 30F as note). Further mentions in the Traité at p. 93F, 147F, 175F, 186F 637F, 990-992F and notes.

Caṇḍa Pradyota, king of Avanti, was converted by the disciple Mahākātyāyana specially sent to him. The stanzas that the disciple addressed to him on this occasion are preserved in the Theragāthā, p. 52, v. 496-499.

After having been noted for his great cruelty (cf. above, p. 993F and note), Udayana, king of Kauśāmbhī, during a friendly visit to the disciple Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja, was converted and entered into the brotherhood of the upāsakas (Saṃyutta, IV, p. 110-113).

For Pukkusāti, king of Takṣaśilā before his entrance into the religious life, see above, p. 1531F.

Brahmadatta is the dynastic name of the kings of Benares: many jātakas in which they make an appearance concern early times. At the time of the Buddha, Kāśi (Benares) was incorporated into the kingdom of Kosala, and Prasenajit reigned over both countries.

685 Brahmāyus was a brāhmin from Mitilā in Videha. He was versed in the three Vedas and the auxiliary sciences. At the age of 108 years, he sent his disciple Uttara to the Buddha to learn if the latter indeed possessed all the physical marks of the Mahāpuruṣa. The disciple was able to reassure him not only on the physical integrity of Śākyamuni but also on his perfect deportment. Shortly afterwards, the Buddha came to Mithila and settled at Makhādevambavana. Brahmāyus went to visit him and confirmed de visu the secret signs of the Buddha. Prostrating at his feet, he begged the Teacher to come to his home with the monks and he entertained them for a week. After the departure of the Community, Brahmāyus died and the Buddha declared that the old brāhmin had found the fruit of anāgāmin. – This is told in the Brahmatīyasutta of the Majjhima, II, p. 133-146 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 41, p. 685a-690a; Lao p’o lo men king, T 75). See also Vibhāsā, T 1546, k. 1, p. 3a4; Mahāvastu, II, p. 76-82.

Puṣkarasārin according to the Divyāvadāna, p. 620, Pokkharasāti or Pokkharasādi according to the Pāli sources, was a brāhmin of high lineage, famed for his science, his wealth and his beauty. He lived at Ukkaṭṭhā in Kosala on some property that he had been given by king Prasenajit. He presided over the brāhmin assemblies and had many disciples, Ambaṭṭha, Vaseṭṭha, Dubha Todeyya, etc. Wanting to find out the real merit of the Buddha, he sent his disciple Ambaṭṭha to him, but as the latter had presented himself in a boorish manner to the Teacher, Puṣkarasārin came himself to apologize and invited the Buddha to a meal. Impressed by the teachings of the Teacher, he declared himself his follower and obtained the fruit of srotaāpanna (Dīgha, I, p. 110). – Puṣkarasārin appears in various sūtras: Ambaṭṭha (Dīgha, I, p. 87-110), Subha (Majjhima, II, p. 200-201), Vāsetṭha (Suttanipāta, p. 115), Tevijja (Dīgha, I, p. 235); he is mentioned in Vibhāsā, T 1545, k. 16., p. 77b26-27.

Kūṭadanta, another learned brāhmin dwelling at Khānumata in Magadha, was a feudatory of king Bimbisāra. The Buddha, passing through that area, was interrogated by the brāhmin on the way of
Great yakṣas such as A-lo-p’o-kia (Āṭavaka), etc., great nāga-kings such as A-po-lo (Apalāla), Yi-lo-po-to-lo (Elapatra), etc., evil men such as Yang-k’iu’n-li-mo-lo (Aṅgulimāla), etc., submitted and took refuge in him.

correctly carrying out “the sacrifice with its threefold methods and its sixteen accessory instruments” (tividhayaññasaṃpadam sojasaparikkāram). The Teacher preached the Kūṭadantasutta (Dīgha, I, p.127-149) for him and, at the end of the sermon, Kūṭadanta obtained the fruit of srotaśāna. The Buddha wanted to save him and appeared at the yakṣa’s dwelling without having been invited. Āṭavaka used his magical power to try to drive him away. The Buddha resisted all his attacks victoriously, but agreed to solve eight puzzles that intrigued the yakṣa (Sāṃyutta, I, p. 213-215; Suttanipāta, p. 31-33). Satisfied with this solution, Āṭavaka was converted and attained the fruit of srotaśāna.

686 Dwelling in the Āṭavī forest, between Śrāvasti and Rājagṛha, the yakṣa Āṭavaka ate the humans beings whom the king of the country had pledged to provide for him. The population was rapidly decimated and the time came when the only prey to be offered to the yakṣa was the king’s own son, prince Āṭavika. To tame him, the Buddha called upon the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi. For details, see my [Lamotte’s] article Varapāṇi en Inde, in Mélanges de Sinologie offerts à Paul Demiéville, I, 1966, p. 130-132.

A late source, the Commentary on the Dhammapada, III, p. 230-236 (tr. Burlingame, III, p. 56-60) tells that at the time of the Buddha Kassapa, the young monk Erakapatta, traveling along the Ganges, passed by a thicket of cardamom (eraka) and seized a leaf which tore off while the boat was passing by. This was a serious wrong-doing, but he neglected to confess it; the result was that he was reborn in the Ganges in the form of an enormous snake-king called Erakapatta. Waiting for the future Buddha, he tried to find out when the latter would appear in the world. To this end, he taught his daughter a gāthā containing questions which only a buddha would be able to answer. Each evening he had her dance on his hood and sing this gāthā, promising his daughter and all his goods to whoever could solve the
questions asked. In the long space of time separating the Buddha Kassapa from his successor Śākyamuni, many attempted to decipher the enigma, but without success. One day however, Śākyamuni was sitting in a grove of seven śīriṣa trees not far from Benares and heard that a young brāhmin, Uttara, had decided to attempt it and, wanting to help him, he revealed the correct answers to him. Uttara communicated these to Erakapatta who thus knew that a new Buddha had appeared. Joyfully, he struck the waters of the Ganges with his tail, not without causing a flood. Then the nāga went to visit the Buddha, received his teachings and, but for his animal shape, he would have attained the fruit of srotāpañna.

A fragment of this legend has passed into the Mahāvastu, III, p. 383, l. 19 – 386, l. 7. It is found, in a much more developed form, in the Chinese sources, with the difference that the young brāhmin who communicated the solution of the enigma to Elapatra was not Uttara but his brother Nārada (Naradatta), nephew of Asita and sometimes identified with Kātyāyana. Among these sources are:

3. Dharmagupta Vīn., T 1428, k. 32, p. 791a6-792c15.
5. Fou kai tcheng hing so tsi king, T 1671, k. 11, p. 741b6-742a9, sūtra attributed to Nāgārjuna.

The legend is represented on the balustrade of the Bhāhrut stūpa with two inscriptions: Erapato nāgarājā and Erapato nāgarājā bhagavato vadate; cf. Bhāhrut Inscriptions (Corpus), p. 110, pl. 19 and 39; A. Coomaraswamy, La sculpture de Bhāhrut, p. 48-49, pl. 8, fig. 25 center. It appears also on a bas-relief at Gandhāra; Foucher, Art Gréco-bouddhique, I, p. 505, fig. 251a.

Prof. Waldschmidt has pointed out the complete agreement between the Bhāhrut sculpture and the Pāli version of the legend.

B. Elapatra in magical phrases.

In the words of the earliest sources, this nāga king is invoked in the case of snake bites. Three groups of texts are to be considered: the texts telling of the death of Upasena, Śāriputra’s younger brother; the texts about the death of an anonymous bhikṣu; a passage of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya.

I. Texts about the death of Upasena.

1. Upasenasutta, of Saṃyutta, IV, p. 40-41. – In a cave of the Sitavana at Rājagaha, Upasena was bitten by a snake. Since he had long ago eliminated notions of me and mine, the snake-bite in no way changed his body or his senses. Nevertheless, he caused himself to be borne up into the sky, and there his body was scattered like a fistful of straw (bhūsamuṭṭhi).

2. Hien yu king, T 202, k. 10, p. 417b10-418a5. – Story of the death of Upasena along with a jātaka giving an explanation.

3. Upasenasūtra of Saṃyuktāgama, T 99, no. 252, k. 9, p. 60c14-61b28; original Sanskrit published By E. Waldschmidt, Das Upasenasūtra, ein Zauber gegen Schlangenbiss aus dem Saṃyuktāgama, Nachrichten der. Akad. Der Wissens. in Göttingen, 1957, no. 2, p. 27-44. – Corresponds to the Pāli Upasenasutta, but with an important addition: Informed of Upasena’s death, the Buddha
declared that he would not have died if he had recited certain stanzas (gāthā) and certain magical syllables (mantrapāda).

The stanzas, nine in number, express the loving-kindness (maitrī) of the wounded one towards all beings in general and to eight families of snakes in particular: 1) Dhrtrāśtra, 2) Airāvana, 3) Chibbāputra, 4) Kaṃbalāsvatara, 5) Karkotaka, 6) Kṛṣṇagautama, 7-8) Nandopananda.

The magical syllables are a dhāraṇī: Otumbile, tumbile, etc.

4. Mūlasarv. Vinayavibhaṅga, T 1442, k. 6, p. 654b28-657b22. – Corresponds essentially with no. 3, with the same gāthā and the same mantrapāda.

5. Souei jong tsouen tchö king, p. 773. – Same comment as for the preceding.

II. Texts about the death of the anonymous bhikṣu.

1. Anguttara, II, p. 72-73. – At Sāvatthi, a bhikṣu whose name is not given is bitten by a snake and dies. The Buddha declares that he would not have died if he had included in his loving-kindness four families of snake-kings (ahirājakula): 1) Virūpakkha, 2) Erāpatha, 3) Chhabaputta, 4) Kaṃṭhāgotamaka.

The Buddha then formulates a Parittā “charm” to ward off snake bites.


3. Mahāsāsaka Vin., T 1421, k. 26, p. 171a16-28. – Similar to the two preceding texts with the difference that eight, not four, families of snakes must be invoked: 1) Dhrtrāśtra, 2) Tan-tch’e (?), 3) Airāvana, 4) Chibbā, 5) Kaṃbalāsvatara, 6) Virūpākṣa, 7) Gautamaka, 8) Nandopananda.


All these texts propose gāthās to be recited as Parittā, but none make any mention of mantrapāda.


The hero of the story is a newly ordained monk named Svāti (cf. Anavatapta-gāthā, ed. Bechert, p. 158-161). Wishing to be of service to the Buddha, he went to cut wood in the forest and was bitten on the big toe by a snake. The physician prescribed a vile food (vikṛtabhojana), i.e., excrement and urine of young calves, ash from five kinds of trees, earth taken from a depth of four fingers. The unfortunate Svāti derived no relief from it. The Buddha was consulted and the latter, without mentioning any nāgarāja to be conjured by these stanzas, advised Ānanda to memorize and to go and recite the Mahāmāyūrī vidyā near the sick monk. It consisted of an homage to the Buddha, the Dharma and the Community, followed by a dhāraṇī: amale, vimale, nirmale, etc. Svāti was cured immediately.

C. Elapatra’s residence and treasure.

Fa-hien (T 2085, p. 864a10-20) locates the place where the nāga Elapatra asked the Buddha when he would be free of his dragon form at Mrgadāva in Benares, but Elapatra had his usual home in the north-west of India. The evidence of Huian-tsang (T 2087, k. 3, p. 884c4-12) is formal: The pool where the nāga-king Elapatra lives is more than 70 li north-west of Takṣaśilā. This nāga is the bhikṣu who, at the time of the Buddha Kāśyapa, had torn off a caradamom (eraka) leaf. From then on, when the native people pray for rain or fine weather, they should go to the pool in question with a śramana: by
addressing the Nāga, they are sure to see their prayers answered in the time of a finger-snap. More than 30 lī south-east of the pool, a stūpa built by Asoka marks the place where, at the coming of Maitreya, one of the four great treasures is to appear. We may add that archeologists identify this stūpa with the ruins at Baoti Pind (cf. Marshall, Taxila, I, 1951, p. 348).

The four great treasures (mahānīdhāṇa, mahānīdhi) which the Buddhist tradition speaks of bear the names of their guardians, the catvāra mahārajās catuṃmahānīdhisthāḥ (Divyāvadāna, p. 61, l. 1-2) or catvāra nidhānādhipatayo nāgārājānāḥ (Mahāvastu, III, p. 383, l. 20). According to most sources (no. 4 and 5 below), they still exist and are used by the indigenous people on the 7th day of the 7th month:

1) A stanza locates them:

Piṅgalaḥ ca Kaliṅgeṣu, Mithilāyaḥ ca Pāṇḍukah /
Elāpatraḥ ca Gāndhāre, Śaṅkho Vārāṇasīpūre //

Cf. Divyāvadāna, p. 61, l. 3-4; Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1448, k. 6, p. 25a12-15; Maitreyavyākaraṇa, T 455, p. 426c1-4.

2) As in 1), except that Piṅgala is placed at Surāśṭra: cf. Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 44, p. 788a14-18; k. 49, p. 818c6-18; 819a16-17; Maitreyavyākaraṇa, T 453, p. 421b19-22; T 454, p. 424a25-28; T 456,p. 430a10-13.


4) As in 1), except that Pāṇḍuka is located at Vidiša: cf. Upāsakaśīlāṣūtra, T 1488, k. 5, p. 1063.a.


6) Elapatra in the northern region, at the city of Takṣaśilā; Pāṇḍuka in the land of the Kaliṅgas in the city of Mithilā; Piṅgala in the land of Vidiša, in the city of Surāśṭra; Śaṅkha in the country of Kāśī in the city of Vāraṇasī: cf. Sūtra of the conversion of the seven sons by Anāthaśiṇḍa, T 140, p. 862b.

7) Treasure of gold at Gandhāra, guarded by the nāga Elāpatra; treasure of silver guarded by the nāga Pāṇḍuka; treasure of mani at Surāśṭra guarded by the nāga Piṅgala; treasure of vaiḍūrya at Vāraṇasī: cf. Maitreyavyākaraṇa, T 457, p. 434c.

8) Simple mention of four treasures in Pūrṇāparāntasūtra in the Tchong a han, T 26, k. 14, p. 53a15.

According to the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, p. 278, the four great inexhaustible treasures (aṅkṣayamahānīdhāna) were also found in the house of Vimalakīrti in Vaiśālī. The same text compares the bodhisattvas as well to inexhaustible treasures.

Daridrāṇāṃ ca satvānāṃ nidhāṅa bhonti akusayāḥ /
tesāṃ dāmāni datvā ca bodhicicattam janenti te //

This is a well-known stanza often quoted by the Madhyamika scholars such as Śāntideva (Śūkṣaśamuccaya, p. 326, l. 5-6; Bodhicaryāvatāra, III, v. 9).
Had the Buddha been afraid, he could not have sat by himself on the lion seat (śimhāsana) at the foot of a tree.

When he was about to attain supreme complete enlightenment (anuttara samyaksaṃbodhi), king Māra and his army (senā) created heads of lions (śimha), tigers (vyāghra), wolves, bears (ṛkaṣa): some had but a single eye, others had many eyes; some had but a single ear, others, many ears. Carrying mountains and spitting fire, they surrounded the Buddha on all four sides. The Buddha struck the earth with his fingers (mahīṃ parāhanati sma) and in the blink of an eye, everything vanished. The Buddha guided the minds of the great asuras such as Pi-mo-tche-ti-li (Vemacitrin), Che t'i p'o-na-min (Śakra devānāṃ indra), Fan-t'ien-wang (Brahmā devarāja), etc., and all became his disciples.

He guided the minds of the great asuras such as Pi-mo-tche-ti-li (Vemacitrin), Che t'i p'o-na-min (Śakra devānāṃ indra), Fan-t'ien-wang (Brahmā devarāja), etc., and all became his disciples.

Had he been afraid, in the middle of the great assemblies he could not have preached the Dharma. Because he had no fear, he was able to preach the Dharma in these great assemblies of devas and yakṣas. This is why he is said to have no fear (viśārada).

3) Furthermore, the Buddha is the most venerable and the highest of all beings. He has reached the other shore of all the dharmas (sarvadharmāṇāṃ pāraṃ gataḥ). Having obtained great glory (yaśas), he himself proclaimed his vaiśāradya. [243a]

4) But let us put aside these [supernatural] qualities of the Buddha. In regard to his mundane qualities (laukikaguṇa), no one is able to attain them because he has rooted out dreadful things at their very roots. These dreadful things are: i) being born into a low family (nīcakulajanman); ii) a low place of birth (nīcājātisthāna); iii) ugliness (durvārāṇatā); iv) lacking right attitudes (īryāpatha); v) coarse speech (pārusyavāda).

i). Birth in a low family (nīcakulajanman). – Those of the śūdras for example who take birth in low families of the eaters of dead flesh, night-soil men, chicken or pig farmers, hunters, executioners, tavern-keepers, mercenaries, etc. Such people are very fearful in the great assemblies.

The Buddha himself from the very beginning (ādita eva) has always taken birth in the lineage of noble cakravartin kings. He was born into the families of the lineage of ‘sun kings’: king Ting-cheng (Māndhātār...
or Mūrdhāta), king K'ouai-kien (Sudarśana), king So-kie (Sāgara), king Mo-ho-t’i-p’o (Makhādeva), etc.694
This is why he has no fear.

ii) Low place of birth (nīcājātisthāṇā). – For example:

Ngan-t’o-lo (Andhra).695
Chō-k’ie’lo (Tukhāra).696

695 The territory included between the Godāvari basin and the Kistna basin, occupied by people of Dravidian race and of Telugu language and called Andhradeśa nowadays. The Śavara are probably represented by the Saravalu or Saura of the Vizagapatam mountains and the Savari of the Gwalior territory. On the Andhra whose territory has been incessantly modified, see L. de La Vallée Poussin, L’Inde aux temps des mauryas, p. 203-219 and Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 373-384.

According to the sources mentioned above (Preface to vol. I, p. xii seq.), Nāgārjuna, the presumed author of the Traité, lived part of his life in Andhra at Śrīparvata, and had friendly relations with the Śatavāhana or even the Iksvākus who reigned over the region in the 2nd and 3rd century C.E. In that case, it is hard to see why the writer of the Traité shows so much scorn for Andhradeśa by putting it at the top of the list of bad places to be born.

696 The Tukhāras were designated by Huian-tsang (T 2087, k. 1, p. 872a6) under the name Tou-houo-lo (formerly T’ou-houo-lo) according to Kumārajīva’s note, the land of the Lesser Yue-tche: an important piece of information in S. Lévi, Les Tokharien, JA, 1933, p. 1-30 and commented upon by P Pelliot, Tokharien et koutchéen, JA, 1934, p. 23-106.

At the beginning of the 2nd century B.C.E., the Yue-tche were living between Touen-houang and the K’i lien-chan, in western Kan-sou. Towards 176 C.E., driven out of eastern Mongolia by the Hiong-nou, most of them turned westward and ended up reaching Ta-hia, i.e., Bactriana. Nevertheless, as Sseu-m Ts’ien tells us (Che-ki, chap. 123), “their other small tribes, who did not leave, settled among the K’iang of the Nan-chan and they are called the Lesser Yue-tche.”

But P. Pelliot has commented rightly: “These are the Lesser Yue-tche of north-western India and not those remaining in the region south of Touen-houang, who should, in my eyes, be the ‘Lesser Yue-tche’ whom Kumārajīva says are identical with the Tukhāras”. I [Lamotte] would like to add a comment: Kumārajīva here does not mean the Tukhāras speaking a language foreign to and unaffected by Buddhism, not these Tukhāras of “northern India in the kingdom of the Yue-tche” to which the Traité alludes above (p. 547F) and which it evidently considers as the second sacred land of Buddhism.

During the first five centuries of our era, the dynasties of Yue-tche origin played an important role in the history of India and Iran. The Kuśāna built a powerful empire extending from the Oxus to the Ganges with Bactriana and Kabul as center and extensions into Sogdiana and Central Asia. They
Those who are born in the border-lands (pratyantajanapada) are very frightened when they are in the middle of the great assemblies.

respected and even favored the beliefs of their subjects and some of them, such as Kaniṣka and Vāsudeva, became benefactors of Buddhism in the Indian portion of their territories. They were no strangers to it and the Buddhist texts compare the Sons of Heaven of China, the Mediterranean west and the Yue-tche, to the ‘devaputras of India’ (Che eul yeou king, T 195, p. 147b; P. Pelliot, La Théorie des Quatre Fils du Ciel, T’ouan Pao, 1923, p. 97-199; S. Lévi, Devaputra, JA, 1934, p. 1-21). A Buddhist prediction often repeated attributes the future disappearance of the Holy Dharma to foreign kings of western origin, Scythian, Parthian, Greek and Tuṣāsa, variant of Tukhāra (Prediction to Kātyāyana, T 2029, p. 11b12; T 2028, p. 8c24; Aśokāvāna, T 2042, k. 6, p. 126c; Saṃyuktāgama, T 99, k. 25, p. 177c; Candragarbhasūtra, T 397, k. 56, p. 377b; sources translated in Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 217-222).

697 The Sieou-li of the Traité, of the north of the Tukhāra domain, are the Sogdians, the Sou-li of Hiuan-tsang (T 2087, k. 1, p. 871a11), possessing a special scripture and a definite literature.

698 Ngan-si (Arsak) designates Parthia proper, or Arsadian Persia, since the year 224 C.E. under the Sassanid dynasty. Buddhists have not hidden their scorn for the Persians (Pārāsīka) and their seers (the Mou-kia) who advised the killing of aged father and mother, the sick, and authorized sexual intercourse with mother, sister or a woman of one’s own gotra (cf. Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 116, p. 605c17-22; 606a17-22; Kośabhāṣya, p. 240, l. 23; 241, l. 8; Kośavyākhya, p. 394, l. 6; T 1558, k. 16, p. 85b23-24; T 1559, k. 12, p. 241a25-27; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 41, p. 576c20-22; 577a11; Karikāvibhāṣa, T 1563, k. 22, p. 879b28-29). Besides, as the Traité will note later (k. 91, p. 705a22-23), all those born in the border-lands such as the Ngan-si are by nature fools and unable to be converted.

Despite its wealth and military power, the Ta-Ts’in, the Mediterranean west, did not enjoy a good reputation.

699 At all times, Buddhists have distinguished two kinds of territories: the Central Land (madhyadeśa) where the religious discipline is carried out in all its rigor, and the Frontier Lands (pratyantajanapada) enjoying ease and indulgences. In the early sources, the Central Land, roughly corresponding to Āryāvarta, was limited in the east by the Puṇḍravardhana (northern Bengal) and the city of Kacchagālā (see above, p. 170F note), to the south by the Śrāvatī river, to the west by the villages of the Sthūnopasthāṇka brāhmīns, to the north by the Śrīgarī (cf. Vinaya, I, p. 197; Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 30, p. 846a; Sarvāstivād. Vin., T 1435, k. 25, p. 181c; Mālasarv. Vin. in Gilgit Manuscripts, III, part IV, p. 190, and Divyāvadāna, p. 21; Yeou-pou-p’i-ko-che, T 1447, k.1, p. 1053a; E. Waldschmidt, Zur Śrōṇakoṭikarṇa-Legende, NAWG, 1952, p. 137). Boundled in this way, this Land included fourteen of the sixteen mahājanapada recorded in the 6th century B.C.E. (see Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 8-9) and was 500 leagues long, 250 leagues wide with a perimeter of 900 leagues; its inhabitants were
virtuous; noble persons, including the Buddhas, gladly chose it as a cradle (cf. Sumāṅgala, I, p. 173; Jātaka, III, p. 115-116; Comm. on Dhammpada, p. 248). It included seven major cities: Śrāvastī, Sāketa, Campā, Vārānasī, Vaišāli, Rājagṛha and Kauśāmbi (Dīgha, II, p. 146; Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 304; Tch’ang-a-han, T 1, k. 3, p. 211b; T 5, k. 2, p. 169c; T 6, k. 2, p. 185b; T 7, k. 2, p. 200c).

In my introduction to Vimalakīrti, I [Lamotte] think I was able to show that Kumārajīva and the Kaśmir school, Nāgārjuna, the author of the Madhyamakāsūtra, must have lived in the 3rd century, between 243 and 300 C.E., and everything leads one to believe that, strictly based on these works, the Traité must have been produced during the 4th century. At that time, the religious map of India had been transformed considerably and Buddhist propaganda had reached central Asia and China. Its spokesmen were not only Indians but also the foreign Yue-tshe, Sogdians and Parthians. Under the Han, during the second half of the 2nd century C.E., missionaries and translators who worked at Lo-Yang consisted of a true mosaic of nationalities: it consisted of two Parthians, the bhikṣu Ngan Che-kao and the upāsaka Ngan Hiuan; three Yue-tshe, Tche Leou-kia-tch’an (Lokakṣema?), Tche Yuan and Tche Leang, two Sogdians, K’ang Mong-siang and K’ang kiu; and three Indians Tchou Fo-che, Tchou Ta-li (Mahābala?) and T’an-kouo (Dharmaphala?).

Later, at the time of the Three Kingdoms (220-280), the Wou empire, in the Blue River basin, welcomed the Yue-tshe Tche K’ien, the Sogdian K’ang Seng-houei and the Indians Wei-k’i-nan (Vighna?) and Tchou Tsang-yen to Wou-tch’ang and Kie-ye (Nanking). The Wei empire in the Yellow River basin did not lag behind and at Lo-yang had the Indian T’an-ko-kia-lo (Dharmakāla), the Sogdian K’ang Seng-k’ai (Dharmavarman) and the two Parthians T’an-wou-ti (Dharmastaya?) and Ngan Fa-hien (Dharmabhadra?).

It is impossible that the disciples of Nāgārjuna, writers of the Traité - and especially Kumārajīva, his official translator-annotator - were unaware of this internationalization of the Buddhist propaganda in the first centuries of our era. If they passed over in silence this passage on the merits of the foreigners with which we are here concerned, it was from an Indian reaction. From their point of view, the Buddhist Madhyadeśa is purely Indian; the frontier regions where Aryan is not spoken are low places of birth (nīcājātisthāna). A list of foreign languages appears in the three versions of the Vibhāṣā which have come down to us: 1) translation by Saṃghabhadra made at Tch’ang-ngan in 383 (T 1547, k. 9, p. 482c18-21); 2) translation by Buddhavarman and his group made at Leang-tcheou in 435 (T 1546, k. 41, p. 306c26-29); 3) translation by Hiuan-tsang made at Tch’ang-ngan (T1545, k. 79, p. 410a19-21). These languages are the tche-na (Chinese), cho-kia (Śaka, Scythian), ye-fa-na (Yavana, Greek), ta-la-t’o (Drāvidian), mo-lo-p’o (Mar-po, perhaps Ladakh: cf. Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 4, p. 890a9), k’ie-cha (Kāśgar), tou-houo-lo (Tukhāra), po-ho-lo (Bakhla, Bactrian).

There is some similarity between this list of foreign languages and the list of low places of birth presented by the Traité.

It goes without saying that the ideas developed here lose their value if the passage under discussion is an interpolation attributable to an author unaware of affairs in India and leading a life of luxury in Kucha or in China as was the case for Kumārajīva. This is the opinion of R. Hikata (Suvikrāntavikrāmin, Introduction, p. LV).
The Buddha himself, who was born at Kia-p’i-lo-p’o (Kapilavastu), has no fear.

iii) Ugliness (durvarṇatā). – There are people whose physical form is worn-out, ruined, thin, and whom no one wants to look at. In the middle of the great assemblies, they too are afraid.

The Buddha with his golden color (suvarṇavarṇa) and his brilliance (prabhā) is like the fire that illumines the Mountain of Red Gold (kanakagiri). Having such beauty, he is not afraid.

iv) Absence of proper bodily positions. – In their way of entering, of standing, moving, sitting or rising up, there are people who lack etiquette and they too are afraid. The Buddha does not have any of these defects.

v) Coarse speech (pāruṣyavāda). – There are people who pronounce badly, stammer, repeat themselves and lack coherence. As they displease people, they have fear.

The Buddha has no such fear. Why? The voice of the Buddha (buddhavāc)⁷⁰⁰ is truthful (satya), gentle (mṛduka), continuous (saḥita), easily understood, neither too fast nor too slow, neither too concise nor too prolix, without subsiding (alīṇa), stainless (vimala), without bantering. It surpasses the (harmonious) sounds of the kia-ling-p’i-k’ie bird (kalaviṅka).⁷⁰¹ Its letter (vyāñjana) and its meaning (artha) are clear (vispaṣṭa); it causes no harm. Free of passion (rāga), it is without blemish (anupalipta); having destroyed hatred (dveśa), it is without conflict (apratigha); having eliminated error (moha), it is easy to penetrate. Since it increases joy in the Dharma (dharmarati), it is pleasant (premaṇīya). Since it opposes wrong-doing (āpatti), it is safety (kṣema). It follows another’s mind (paracitta) and favors liberation (vimukti); its meaning (artha) is profound (gambhīra) and its expression (vyāñjana) marvelous. Having its reasonings, it is logical (yukta). Thanks to its examples (upāma), it is well-expressed. Its work over, it reviews it well. Since it takes into account the various minds of others, it is expressed with variety. Finally, all its words lead to nirvāṇa; this is why they are of one taste (ekarasa).⁷⁰²

Adorning his speech in multiple and innumerable ways, the Buddha has no fear when he speaks. And if, thanks to these purely worldly attributes (laukikadharma), the Buddha is without fear, what can be said then about his supramundane attributes (lokottaradharma)? This is why it is said that the Buddha possesses the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya).

⁷⁰⁰ In the list that follows, the Traité is inspired in part by a topic related to “The Speech of the Tathāgata endowed with sixty aspects” (tathāgatasya śaṣṭyākāropetā vāk), a subject appearing in the Tathāgataintyaguhyanirdeśa (T 310, k. 10, p. 55c20-56a5; T 312, k. 7, p. 719c7-720a29) of which the original text is preserved in the Sūtramārkāra, p. 79-81 and the Mahāvyut, no. 445-504.

For other qualities of the Buddha’s voice, see Hobogirin, s.v., Bonnon (p. 133-135); Butsugo, p. 207-208; Button, p. 215-217.

⁷⁰¹ A bird with melodious song, not to be confused with the kācilindika famed for the softness of its down (cf. Śūrangamasamādhī, p. 261 note).

⁷⁰² Cf. Vinaya, II, p. 239; Anguttara, IV, p. 203; Udāna, p. 56; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 8, p. 476c11; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 37, p. 753b1): Seyyathā pi mahāsamuddo ekaraso lonaraso evam eva ayaṃ dhammavinayo ekaraso vimittiraso: “Just as the ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, so this Dharma and this discipline have but one taste, the taste of deliverance.”

1300
5. Why Distinguish Between the Powers and the Fearlessnesses?

Question. – Do the ten [powers (bala) of the Buddha not contain the fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya)? If they do contain the fearlessnesses, one should not speak only of four fearlessnesses, [but of of ten]. If they also contain the subjects of [243b] fear, why is it said that the Buddha is endowed with fearlessnesses (vaiśāradyasamanvāgata)?

Answer. – One and the same knowledge (jñāna) in ten places (sthāna) means that the Buddha is endowed with ten powers, in the same way that one and the same man who knows ten things is called after these things.

When the ten powers (bala) appear and function in four places, these are the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya).

[The first power], the knowledge of things possible and things impossible (sthānāsthānajñāna) and [the tenth power], the knowledge of the cessation of the impurities (āsravakṣayajñāna) constitute the first fearlessness [i.e., sarvadharmābhisambodhi] and the second fearlessness [i.e., sarvāsravakṣaya] respectively.

Although the other eight powers are extensive, it is said that they are mixed up with the third fearlessness [mārgāntarāyikadharmavākaparathā] and the fourth fearlessness [duḥkhanirodha-pratipadvākaparathā].

Thus, although the fearlessnesses are contained in the ten powers, there is nothing wrong in speaking of them separately.

6. Literal Commentary on the Vaiśāradyasūtra

A. “I am fully and completely enlightened”

I am fully and completely enlightened. – The Buddha knows all dharmas without error (viparyāsa), fully (samvak) and unmistakenly, in the same way as the other Buddhas of the past. He is therefore called Samyaksambuddha.

Thus the Buddha said to Ānanda: “That which is unknown to the entire world with its gods and men, the Buddha himself knows completely: this is why he is called Samyaksambuddha.”

But there are people who say that the Buddha does not know certain dharmas.

Question. – Who are these people?

Answer: In the same place, the Buddha said: A śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a deva, Māra, Brahmā or someone else. They want to debate with the Buddha [and challenge him on his knowledge of certain dharmas].
What are these dharmas?

For some, it is the sacred texts of which the Buddha has not spoken, eighteen great holy texts:703 heretical sūtras, grammars (vyākaraṇa), arithmetical (saṃkhyā), Vedas, etc.

For others, it is the weight of Mount Sumeru, the thickness of the great earth (mahāprthivi) and the total number of plants.

For others, it is the fourteen difficult points to which the Buddha has not replied (avyākṛtvāvastu): is the world eternal (śāsvata) or non-eternal (aśāsvata), finite (antavat) or infinite (anantavat), etc.?704

For others, it is material dharmas (rūpin) or non-material dharmas (arūpin), visible (sanidarśana) or invisible (anidarśana), resistant (sapratīgha) or non-resistant (apratīgha), impure (sārava) or pure (anārava), conditioned (saṃskṛta) or unconditioned (asamskṛta), etc. [According to them,] the Buddha knows only the causes and conditions of the category of things concerning the Dharma but, in regard to the various causes and conditions of other things, sometimes the Buddha does not know them completely.

[In the phrase: A srāmaṇa, brāhmaṇa, deva, Māra, Brahmā, or some one else…], srāmaṇa means a monk who has gone forth from home (pravrajita); brahmāṇa means a sage dwelling at home; deva means an earth deity or a deity of space; Māra is the six groups of Kāmadevas; Brahmā is one of the deities whose leader is Brahmā Devarāja and also all the deities of rūpadhātu; finally, some one else designates all the others with the exception of the previously mentioned.

[That he is able to speak] in accordance with the truth…i.e., being able to object correctly, with logic.

I do not see the slightest reason to fear…: reason (nimitta) means ‘grounds’. I do not see the least grounds for fearing that he will be able to attack me in accordance with the truth (sahā dharmena).

Seeing none, I claim to occupy the place of a-li-cha (ārṣam sthānam). [Note by Kumārajīva: In the language of the Ts’in, Cheng-tchou, ‘Holy Teacher’].

B. “I have destroyed all the impurities”

The Buddha proclaims: “I have destroyed all the impurities (kṣīṇārava).” If people say that he has not destroyed them, he is not afraid.

What are the impurities (āsārava)? These impurities are of three kinds: i) lust impurity (kāmārava); ii) existence impurity (bhavārava); iii) ignorance impurity (avidyārava).705

---

703 The eighteen great holy texts of the heretics already mentioned above, p. 48F, 92F, 637F, 639F. See Mochizuki, Cyclopedia, p. 2360.
704 See above, p. 164-159F, 421F, 529F, 913F; and later, k. 26, p. 153b; k. 28, p. 266a’ k. 35, p. 321c.
705 Majjhima, I, p. 55; Anguttara, I, p. 165; III, p. 414; Samyutta, IV, p. 256; V, p. 56, 189; Itivuttaka, p. 49.
Furthermore, the impurities are mental events (caitasika dharma) associated with defiled minds (saṃkliṣṭacittasamprayukta) arising in regard to the six sense organs (śadindriya).

Finally, see the Yi-ts’ie leou-tchang king (Sarvāsravasūtra) which distinguishes seven kinds of impurities.  

C. “I have stated the dharmas that constitute an obstacle”

[243c] By dharmas that constitute an obstacle to the path (āntarāyika) is meant the impure actions (sāsravakarman), the conflicting emotions (kleśa) to be remunerated in the bad destinies (durgatī) and, insofar as they are worldly (laukika), generosity (dāna), morality (śīla), the observing of the ten good paths of action (kuśalakarmapatha) and the enjoyment of the dhyānas of delight. In short (saṃksepeṇa), everything that puts an obstacle to nirvāṇa, whether it be good (kuśala) or undefined (avyākṛta) is called ‘dharma constituting an obstacle to the path’ (mārgāntarāyikadharma).

D. “The noble path indicated by me can lead to exit from the world”

Some say that this way (pratipad) is two things: the holy concentration (āryasamādhi) and the holy wisdom (āryaprajñā) and that these two things lead to nirvāṇa.

Others say that it is the path with its three elements (triskandhaka mārga): morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi) and pure (anāsrava) wisdom (prajñā).

Others say that it is four things: the four noble truths (āryasatya).

Others say that it is the five supramundane faculties (lokottarendriya).

Others say that it is the six elements leading to emancipation (niḥsaraṇīya dhātu).

706 Sabbāsavasutta of Majjhima, I, p. 7 (Tchong a han, T 26, k. 2, p. 432a10; Yi ts’ie lieou chō cheou yin king, T 31, p. 813b5; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 34, p. 740b1): There are impurities to be destroyed (āsavā pahātābbā) by visions (dassana), by control (saṃvarā), by right usage (paṭisevana), endurance (adhivāsana), avoidance (parivajjana), elimination (vinodana) and meditation (bhāvanā).

707 I.e., insofar as they still constitute an attachment to the world.

708 Dīgha, III, p. 247-250; Anguttara, III, 290-292; Tch’ang a han, T 1, k. 8, p. 52a8-16; 54b1-9: Cha nissāraṇīya dhatuyo… Nissāraṇaṁ h’etam vyāpādassa yadidaṁ mettā cetovimutti… Nissāraṇaṁ h’etam vihēsāya yadidaṁ karunā cetovimutti… Nissāraṇaṁ h’etam aratiyā yadidaṁ muddā vetovimutti… Nissāraṇaṁ h’etam rāgassa yadidaṁ upekkhā cetovimutti… Nissāraṇaṁ h’etam subbanimitṭānaṁ yadidaṁ animittā cetovimutti… Nissāraṇaṁ h’etam vicikicchākathāṃ kathāsālassa yadidaṁ asmiṭi mānasamugghāto.

Transl. – There are six elements leading to emancipation: emancipation from malice is liberation of the mind by means of loving-kindness; emancipation from harm is liberation of the mind by means of compassion; emancipation from sorrow is liberation of the mind by means of joy; emancipation
Others say that it is the eight members of the noble path (āryaṣṭāṅgamārga) leading to nirvāṇa.

Some scholars (upadeśācārya) say that it is all the pure paths (anāsravamārga) leading to nirvāṇa.

“I see not the slightest reason to fear that a śramaṇa, brāhmaṇa, etc., can say according to the truth that that is not true. Not seeing anyone, I claim to occupy the ārṣa sthāna.”

E. “I hold the place of Holy Teacher”

Question.- Why does the Buddha claim that he occupies the ārṣa sthāna?709

A canonical expression showing some interesting variations:


The commentary of Majjhima, II, p. 26 explains: Āsabhāṃ ṭhānaṃ ti setṭhaṭṭhānaṃ, uttamaṭṭhānaṃ. Āsabhā vā pubbabuddhā, tesam ṭhānaṃ ti attaḥ: “The place of the bull, i.e., the best place, the supreme place. Or else, the bulls are the Buddhas of the past and he occupies their place.”

In the corresponding Sanskrit texts: Udāraṃ ārṣabhaṃ sthānaṃ pratijānāti: “He lays claim to the noble place of the bull”: cf. fragments of the Daśabalaśūtra (L. de La Vallée Poussin, Documents sanscrits de la seconde collection M., A. Stein, JRAS, 1911-1912, p. 1063; E. Waldschmidt, Bruchstücke budd. Sūtras, p. 209, 211, 215; Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung, VII, 3, 1958, p. 400); Avadānasūkta, II, p. 105, l. 15; Kośavyākhya, p. 645, l. 31-32; Pañcaviṃśati, p. 211, l. 5; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1448, l. 12; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 386, l. 13.

Ārṣabha is an adjective derived from rṣabha ‘bull’.

2. The variant ārṣam sthānaṃ pariṭijānāti “he lays claim to the place of the Rṣi” is vouched for by the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 385, l. 15-18 (Yogācārabhūmi, T 1579, k. 49, p. 569a24). As we will see, it is preferred by the most prominent Chinese translators and Edgerton wrongly condemns it in his Dictionary, p. 105. The Bodh. bhūmi explains: Āryaṣṭāṅga mārgena labhyatvāt sarvopadravavahayāpagatvāc cārṣam ity ucayate. ātmanas tadadhitgamapatijānāti pariṣṭijānāti ity ucayate: “Faced with being attained by means of the eightfold noble path and being free of all suffering and all fear, this place is called ‘of the Rṣi’. As he maintains that he has acquired it himself, he lays claim to it. “

Ārṣa is an adjective derived from rṣi and means ‘related to the sage, archaic’.

3. The Chinese versions of the Āgamas do not come out in favor of either variant. Guṇabhadra renders the phrase by sien fo tchou tch’ou, ‘place of the earlier Buddhas’ (Tsa a han, T 99, k. 14, p.
Answer. – His own qualities (guṇa) are complete (saṃpanna) and, moreover, he makes beings find happiness (sukha) and the good (hita).

If the Buddha obtained a pleasant abode (sukhavihāra) for himself but did not bring about the good of others, he would not occupy the ārṣa sthāna.

If he brought about only the good of beings but did not fulfill his own qualities completely, he would not occupy the ārṣa sthāna either.

But since he himself has the qualities and also brings about the good of beings, he lays claim (pratijānāti) to occupy the ārṣa sthāna.

Furthermore, the Buddha has destroyed evil for himself and also destroys evil for others. Destroying these two evils, he is absolutely pure (paramaviśuddha). Preaching the Dharma in a wondrous way, he occupies the ārṣa sthāna.

Moreover, the Buddha turns, explains, teaches and propagates this [wheel of the Dharma] of the four noble truths (āryasatya), the wheel of three revolutions (triparivarta) and twelve aspects (dvadasākāra). This is why he affirms that he occupies the ārṣa sthāna.

Finally, as he has driven away all doubts (saṃśaya) and wrong views (mithyādṛśti), the Buddha is able to answer all the most profound questions (atigambhīra praśna). This is why he occupies the ārṣa sthāna.

[Note by Kumārajīva: Ārṣa means absolute, supreme, very high. Not falling back, not refusing, not collapsing, completely fulfilling the qualities, not having any weakness is called ārṣa sthāna.]

F. “In the assemblies I utter the lion’s roar”

In the assemblies, I utter the roar of the lion. – By assemblies (parśad) is meant the eight assemblies: i) assembly of śramaṇas, ii) assembly of brāhmaṇas, iii) assembly of warriors (kṣatriya), iv) assembly of

98a15), and Gautama Saṃghadeva by yu chen kien so tchö, ‘without attachment for the world’ (T 125, k. 19, p. 645b28; k. 42, p. 776a19-20).

On the other hand, Kumārajīva and Hiuan-tsang resolutely favor the variant ārṣaṃ sthānam:

The former transcribes it as a-li-cha tch’ou (Traité, T 1509, k. 25, p. 243b25) and translates it as cheng-tchou tch’ou ‘the place of the holy Teacher’ (ibid., and Pañcaviṃśati, T 223, k. 5, p. 255b28; k. 24, p. 395a22). The latter, resorting to the equivalence ṛṣi = sien, translates it as ta sien tsouen wei, ‘the place of the great immortal’ (Mahāprajñāpāramitā, T 220, vol. VII, k. 415, p. 81b9; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 31, p. 158a22; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. 14, p. 760c21).

710 See Vimalakīrti, p. 107, note.
devas, v) assembly of Cāturmahārājikas, vi) assembly of Trāyastriṃśa devas, vii) assembly of Māra, viii) Brahmā assembly.711

Beings hope to find wisdom in the bosom of these eight assemblies and this is why only these eight assemblies are mentioned in this sūtra.

But the Buddha utters the lion’s roar (siṃhanādam nadati) in all the [244a] assemblies. This is why this sūtra adds: and in all the other assemblies. Why? Because those who hear the voice (ghoṣa) of the Buddha constitute all those assemblies.

Moreover, some say: “The Buddha preaches the Dharma alone and in secret”. This is why it is specified that it is in these assemblies that the Buddha declares that he possesses the ten powers and the four fearlessnesses. Hence the phrase: In the assemblies I utter the lion’s roar.

Finally, the Buddha declares: “I am absolutely truthful. I am the teacher of the whole world and I am omniscient (sarvajña). Let those who doubt or who do not believe come and I will explain to them.” This is why the sūtra says: In the assemblies I utter the lion’s roar.

The Buddha utters the lion’s roar. He is like the king of the lions (siṃharāja).

[Prosopeia of the Buddha-lion.].712 – This lion-king is born of a pure race. He dwells in the deep mountains and great valleys. He has a square jaw, large bones and his flesh is fat and full. His head is large, his eyes are wide, brilliant and clear. His eyebrows are arched and pure white. His muzzle is big, heavy and massive. His teeth are sharp, joined, pointed, and he shows a pink tongue. His ears are pricked up high and his mane is striking. The forepart of his body is broad; his skin and flesh are firm. He has a long spine, a narrow waist and an invisible belly. He has a long tail, sharp claws and well-planted paws. He has a big body and great strength. When he comes out of his den, he bends and stretches his spine. Striking the ground with his paw, he manifests his great power. He does not let the hour of his meal pass by, he announces the dawn and shows the strength of the lion-king. He terrifies the deer, bears, tigers, leopards and wild boars. He awakens those who have been sleeping for a long time; he humbles the strong and powerful. He opens the way for himself by uttering loud roars. When he roars in this way, those who hear him are either joyful or fearful. The animals who live in holes hide; those who live in the water dive deeply; those who live in the mountains withdraw; the tame elephants shake off their fetters and flee in bewilderment; the birds fly off into the sky and, gaining altitude, disappear in the distance.713

The Buddha-lion is very similar. He is born into the great families of the six perfections (pāramitā) and the four ancient stocks of saints (āryavamśa).714 He lives in the high mountain of cessation (nirodha) and the deep valley of the dhyānas and the samāpattis. The acquisition of the knowledge of all the aspects

711 These eight assemblies are mentioned in the canonical sources: Dīgha, II, p. 109; III, p. 260; Majjhima, I, p. 72; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 307-308; Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa, p. 138, 142, 300. The lists show some variations.
713 Cf. Anguttara, II, p. 33; Saṃyutta, III, p. 84-85.
714 Dīgha, III, p. 224-225.
(sarvākārajñāna) is his head. The accumulation of the roots of good (kuśalamūla) is his muzzles. The pure right vision (anāsrava samyagdṛṣṭi) is his brilliant eye. The practices of concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā) are his high wide eyebrows. The four fearlessnesses are his white sharp canine teeth. The unhindered liberations (apratihatavimokṣa) are his perfect muzzle. The four right efforts (samyakpradhāna) are his strong chin. The thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipākṣa) are his sharp teeth, joined and pointed. The practice of the meditation on the horrible (asubhabhāvana) is his pink tongue. Mindfulness (smṛti) and wisdom (prajñā) are his pricked-up ears. The eighteen special attributes (āveñikadharma) are his dazzling shiny mane. The three gates of deliverance (vimokṣamukha) are the forepart of his body with firm flesh. The three wonders (prātiḥārya) are his long spine. The perfection of the sciences and practices (vidyācaranasampad) is his invisible belly. Patience (kṣānti) is his narrow waist. The practice of solitude (praviveka) is his long tail. The four foundations of magical power (rddhipāda) are his well-planted paws. The five faculties (indriya) of the aśaikṣa are his sharp claws. The ten powers (bala) are his enormous strength. The collection of the pure dharmas (anāsravadharma) is his perfect body. The royal concentrations of the Buddhas (buddhasamādhirāja) are the出门 of which he comes. It is with the four unhindered knowledges (pratisamvid) that he stretches out (vijrmbhati). It is on the earth of the dharmas that he strikes the paw of his unhindered liberations (ānantaryavimokṣa). Based on the ten powers, he does not [244b] let the time of saving beings pass by. It is to the entire world with its gods and men that he announces (the morning of deliverance). He manifests all the qualities of the king of Dharma. He terrifies the heretics (tīrthika), the scholars (upadeśācārya) and the heterodox. He awakens to the four truths those who have been sleeping. He humbles the pride and haughtiness (mānastambha) of those who are attached to the five aggregates (pañcaskandha) as their self. He opens the way through the theories (upadeśa) and wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi) of the heretics (pāśanda). Bad people (mithyācarita) are afraid and good faithful people (adhimukta) rejoice. He spurs on the lazy, he comforts his disciples and he destroys the heretics (tīrthika). The gods of long life (dīrghāyuṣa) who for ages have enjoyed heavenly bliss finally recognize impermanence (anityatā). Thus, beings who hear the lion’s roar of the four truths all experience a mind of disgust (nirvedacitta) for the world; being disgusted, they withdraw from it; being withdrawn from it, they enter into nirvāṇa.

This is the meaning of the expression: In the assemblies, I utter the lion’s roar.

Moreover, there are differences between the roar of the Buddha and the roar of the lion.

When the lion roars, all the animals (paśu) fear either death or the sufferings of coming close to death. When the Buddha roars, it is to abolish the fear of death.

When the lion roars, he causes the fear, from age to age, of the sufferings of death. When the Buddha roars, he announces death in the present lifetime and the absence of all later suffering.

When the lion roars, his voice is rough and unpleasant and nobody likes to hear it because it brings fear of saṃsāra. When the Buddha roars, his voice is sweet (mṛduka): those who hear it do not tire of it and

715 Dīgha, III, p. 220.
everybody is deeply happy. It is heard everywhere at a distance and can bring two kinds of happiness: i) the happiness of a rebirth among the gods and ii) the happiness of nirvāṇa.

These are the differences.

Question. – But when the Buddha roars, it is to frighten his listeners also; how does his roar differ from that of the lion?

Answer. – Those who hear the roar of the Buddha are somewhat afraid for some moments but afterwards are greatly benefited.

People attached to the idea of a self (ātmacittābhiniṅśa), hoping for the happiness of this world (lokasukhādhimukta), bound by the errors (viparyāsa) consisting of believing to be eternal [that which is not eternal], having their minds disturbed by wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭi): these are the ones who are afraid [when they hear the Buddha’s preaching]. Thus it is said in a sūtra:

“When the Buddha preaches the four truths (satya), even the higher gods are afraid and think: ‘So we too are impermanent (anītya), full of suffering (duḥkha), impersonal (anātman) and empty (śūnya). As a result of what mistake have we believed in eternal bliss?’”

This is the difference.

Furthermore, all those who hear the roar of the lion are afraid except those who have renounced desire (vītarāga). When the Buddha roars an invitation to nirvāṇa, even those who have renounced desire are afraid.

When the lion roars, the good and the bad are afraid. When the Buddha roars, only the good are afraid.

Furthermore, when the lion roars, he frightens at all times. When the Buddha roars, he does indeed frighten beings a little by revealing the world’s defects for those who hope to be born there no more. But by making them see the qualities and advantages of nirvāṇa, he drives away all the fears of the world, he closes the bad destinies (durgati), he opens the good path and he makes people reach nirvāṇa.

Finally, there are twenty reasons why the Buddha’s voice is called the lion’s roar: 1) it depends on the ten powers; 2) it is not too concise; 3) it is not too [244c] prolix; 4) it has the accents of Brahmā; 5) it is wondrous (adbhūta); 6) it leads the great assemblies; 7) it frightens wicked Māra; 8) it throws Māra’s people into disorder; 9) it makes the gods rejoice; 10) it delivers one from Māra’s net; 11) it breaks Māra’s fetters; 12) it breaks Māra’s fish-hook; 13) it bypasses Māra’s domain; 14) it increases its own system; 15) it reduces others’ systems; 16) its fruit of retribution is not deceptive; 17) his preaching is not futile; 18) worldly people (prthagjana) enter into the noble Path; 19) those who have entered the noble Path obtain

complete destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya); 20) according to needs, one acquires the three Vehicles. This is why the Buddha’s voice is called the roaring of the lion.

In its general characteristics (sādhāraṇa-lakṣaṇa) and its specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) this is the meaning of the Roar of the Lion.

G. “I turn the Wheel of Brahmā”

I turn the Wheel of Brahmā. – Because it is pure (viśuddha), it is called ‘of Brahmā’. The wisdom of the Buddha (buddha prajñā) and of the Dharma associated with his wisdom (tatprajñāsamprayuktadharma) is called ‘Wheel’. Because those who adopt it follow the Dharma (anudharmaṃ caranti), it is a wheel.717

[The Wheel of Brahmā]. – This wheel has the four perfect foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) as its hub (nābhi). The five spiritual faculties (indriya) and the five strengths (bala) are its spokes (āra). The four foundations of magical power (ṛddhipāda) are its solid rim (nemī) and the right efforts (samyakpradhāna) are the joints. The three liberations (vimokṣa) are its pegs (ānī). Concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā) are the coachman. Pure morality (anāsravaśīla) is the perfume with which it is sprinkled. The seven factors of enlightenment (sambodhyāga) are the varied flowers with which it is ornamented. Right view (samyagdrṣṭi) is its turning to the right. Purity of faith (cittaprasāda) is its beauty. Right exertion (samyagvīrya) is its speed. The fearless lion’s roar is its pleasant sound which frightens Māra’s wheel, breaks the twelve-membered wheel [of dependent origination] (dvādaśāṅgapratīyaśamutpada), destroys the wheel of saṃsāra, drives away the wheel of the passions (kleśa), derails the wheel of karma, stalls the wheel of the world and crushes the wheel of suffering. It brings forth the joy of the yogins and the respect of gods and men.

No one [other than the Buddha] can turn this Wheel for it consists of the Dharma of the Buddha. This is why the latter declares: I turn the Wheel of Brahmā.

[The Wheel of the Buddha and the wheel of the cakravartin.] – Moreover, the Buddha turns the Wheel of the Dharma like the noble cakravartin king turns the jewel of the wheel.718

Question. – What resemblance is there between the Buddha and the noble cakravartin king?719

Answer. – This king is pure and takes birth in an unmixed lineage (vaṃśa). In accordance with his family (kula), his actions are perfect. All the physical signs (lakṣaṇa) adorn his body. His royal virtues are complete and he is able to turn the jewel of the wheel. Anointed with perfumed water on his head (mūrdhābhīṣikta), he takes up his royal rank and reigns over the four continents (caturdīpa). He has destroyed banditry so well that no one dares to oppose him. His treasury of jewels is abundant and the morale of his troops is raised by the presence of the seven jewels (of the cakravartin). He wins over

717  More details will be found in Manorathapūraṇī, III, p. 9-10.
718  The wheel (cakra) is one of the seven jewels with which the cakravartin king is furnished: cf. Dīgha, II, p. 17, 172-177.
719  A subject already discussed above, p. 116F.
(saṃgrahavastu) all beings by the four methods of captivating. He exercises the royal law well and
delegates the noble families. He governs the kingdom by means of his prefects, his soldiers and his
ministers. He loves to distribute his most precious wealth. From beginning to end, his knowledge and his
mindfulness are unchanging.

The Buddha, king of the Dharma, is just like that. The Buddha - Śākyamuni, Dīpaṃkara, Ratnaṃpusa, etc. –
takes birth in the pure family of the Buddhas. He actualizes the bodily positions (īryāpatha) of the previous
Buddhas. He possesses all of the thirty-two physical marks (lakṣaṇa) that serve him as [245a] adornments.
His attitudes as Holy Teacher (ārṣeryāpatha) being perfect, he turns the true Wheel of Dharma. He receives
the crucial anointment with the elixir of wisdom (prajñārasāyana): he is the elder in the triple world
(jyeṣṭa). He destroys the bandits that are the conflicting emotions (kleśa). None dare to transgress the
precepts (śīla) that he has put in place; the assemblies of śaikṣas and aśaikṣas rejoice. The immense
precious treasure of his Dharma is filled. The seven factors of enlightenment are his ornament; the eighty-
four thousand articles of the Dharma (dharmaskandha) are his troops. By means of the four supraworldly
means of captivating (lokottara saṃgrahavastu), he wins over beings. He knows the skillful means
(upāya), he peaches the Dharma of the four noble truths (āryasatyā): that is the attitude of a king of
Dharma. Great generals (senāpati) such as Śāriputra, Maitreya, etc., govern the Buddha’s kingdom
well. He loves to share his most precious wealth: the pure spiritual faculties (indriya), the powers (bala),
the [factors] of enlightenment (saṃbodhyāṅga). He carefully seeks for the good of beings and the
mindfulness that he keeps is firm.

These are the similarities.

Furthermore, the Buddha is superior to the noble cakravartin king.

The noble cakravartin king has not eliminated all the passions (kleśa); the Buddha has eliminated them
definitively.

The noble cakravartin king is plunged in the mud (paṅka) of old age (jarā) and death (marāṇa); the Buddha
has come out of it.

The noble cakravartin king is subject to the emotions; the Buddha has transcended them.

The noble cakravartin king follows the dangerous path of saṃsāra; the Buddha has transcended it.

The noble cakravartin king is immersed in the shadows of error (mohatama); the Buddha lives in the
supreme light (paramāloka).

The noble cakravartin king reigns over a maximum of four continents (caturdvīpa); the Buddha reigns over
innumerable and infinite universes.

720 Śāriputra was called dharmasenāpati ‘general of the Dharma’) Apadāna, I, p. 29, 44; Theragāthā, p.
96), while Ānanda bore the title of dharmabhāṇḍāgmarika ‘treasurer of the Dharma’.
The noble cakravartin king has at his disposal material jewels (āmiṣaratna); the Buddha has at his disposal the jewels of the spirit (cittaratna).

The noble cakravartin king aspires to celestial bliss (divyasukha); the Buddha who has attained the bliss of the summit of existence (bhavāgra) has renounced it.

The noble cakravartin king derives his happiness from others; the Buddha fosters happiness by his own mind.

This is why the Buddha is far superior to the noble cakravartin king.

Moreover, the noble cakravartin king whose hand turns the jewel of the wheel encounters no obstacle in space; the Buddha who turns the Wheel of the Dharma encounters neither obstacle nor resistance in the entire world with its gods and men.

Those who see the jewel of the wheel eliminate the material poisons (viṣa); those who encounter the Wheel of the Dharma of the Buddha eliminate the poison of all the passions (kleśa).

Those who see the jewel of the wheel avoid calamities (vipatti) and torments (vihethana); those who encounter the Wheel of the Dharma of the Buddha see the calamities and the torments of all wrong views (mithyādṛśti) and all doubts (viciktsā) disappear.

The king with his wheel governs four continents (caturdīpa); the Buddha with the Wheel of the Dharma governs the entire world with its gods and men and makes them obtain mastery over the Dharma (dharmavaśita).

These are the resemblances.

Moreover, the Wheel of the Dharma has great superiority over the jewel of the wheel.

The jewel of the wheel is deceptive; the Wheel of the Dharma is absolutely truthful.

The jewel of the wheel increases the fire of the three poisons (triviṣāgni); the Wheel of the Dharma extinguishes the fire of the three poisons.

The jewel of the wheel is impure (sāsrava); the Wheel of the Dharma is pure (anāsrava).

The jewel of the wheel is connected to the happiness resulting from the five objects of enjoyment (pañcakāmaguna); the Wheel of the Dharma is connected to the happiness of the Dharma.

The jewel of the wheel is a basis for fetters (samyojanasthāna); the Wheel of the Dharma is not a basis for fetters.

The jewel of the wheel has a limited domain (mitagocara); the Wheel of the Dharma has an unlimited domain (apramanāgocara).

The jewel of the wheel can be acquired from lifetime to lifetime thanks to a single purity of mind (cittaviśuddhi) or a gift; the Wheel of the Dharma is acquired thanks to all the causes for good actions and the wisdoms accumulated for innumerable incalculable periods (asamkhyaeyakalpa).
The jewel of the wheel no longer turns when the king is dead; the Wheel of the Dharma still keep turning after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa.

The jewel of the wheel belongs to one single person; the Wheel of the Dharma belongs to all beings capable of being converted (vaineyasattva).

Wheel of Brahmā or Wheel of the Dharma.] – Moreover, [in the expression Brahmaakra], brahma means vast (brhat), for the Wheel of the Buddha or the Wheel of the Dharma extends everywhere in the ten directions.

Furthermore, it is called the Wheel of Brahmā because the Buddha teaches the four abodes of Brahmā (brahmavihāra), because at the very beginning, when the Buddha attained enlightenment, Brahmā, the king of the gods, invited him to turn the Wheel of the Dharma, because at Benares when the Buddha turned the Wheel of the Dharma and Ājñāta Kaṇḍinya obtained the Path, the Buddha voice penetrated as far as the Brahmā heaven, or else because there are people who respect the god Brahmā and want to please him.

Question. – Sometimes the Buddha says Wheel of the Dharma, sometimes Wheel of Brahmā.721

Answer. – There is no difference between Wheel of Brahmā and Wheel of Dharma. However, according to some, we say Wheel of Brahmā when it discloses the four immeasurables (paramāṇacitta), and Wheel of the Dharma when it teaches the four noble truths.

Furthermore, we say Wheel of Brahmā when the path is acquired thanks to the four immeasurables, and Wheel of the Dharma when it is acquired thanks to some other thing.

The Wheel of Brahmā teaches the four dhyānas, and the Wheel of the Dharma teaches the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipāsikadharma). The Wheel of Brahmā teaches the path consisting of the practice of concentration (samādhibhāvanā), and the Wheel of the Dharma teaches the path consisting of the cultivation of wisdom (prajñābhāvanā).

These are the various distinctions to be made between the Wheel of Brahmā and the Wheel of the Dharma.

7. Nature and Order of the Fearlessnesses

Question. – What is the nature (svabhāva) of the fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya)?

Answer. – When the Buddha attained enlightenment, he obtained all the attributes of Buddha, the powers (bala), the absence of fear (abhaya), etc. Subsequently, he obtained the dharmas associated with knowledge free of fear (abhayañānasamprayuktdharma), dharmas called fearlessnesses.722 Similarly also [the dharma] associated with the four immeasurables is called maitra.

721 See references above, p. 467F, note 2.
722 The Kośabhāṣya explains, p. 414, l. 8: Jñānakṛtam vaiśāradyam yujyate, na jñānam eva:

“Fearlessness is the result of knowledge, but it is not knowledge.”
Question. – What is the order (krama) of these four fearlessneces?

Answer. – In the first fearlessness, the Buddha declares that he knows all dharms (sarvadharmābhisisambodhi). Since he knows all dharms, he affirms that he has destroyed the impurities (āsravākṣaya). Since he has destroyed the impurities, he claims to know the dharms that are obstacles to the Path (mārgāntarāyikadharma). Since he has destroyed these dharms that are obstacles, he preaches the Path (mārgavyākaraṇa).

Furthermore, the first fearlessness is like the master physician (bhaiṣajyaguru) in possession of all the remedies (oṣadhi). The second proclaims the destruction of all sicknesses (vyādhikṣaya). The third knows what one should abstain from. The fourth proclaims the foods that it is necessary to take.

Finally, in the first fearlessness, the Buddha speaks of the awareness [of things] under all their aspects (sarvakārajñāna). In the second fearlessness, he speaks of the absence of all the passions (kleśa) and their traces (vāsanā). In the third fearlessness, he preaches a Dharma without deceit or fault. In the fourth fearlessness, he deals with things that bring one to nirvāṇa.

Second Section THE TEN POWERS AND THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

PRELIMINARY NOTE

In the preceding chapter and in the first section of the present chapter, the Traité has spoken of the ten powers (bala) and the four fearlessneses (vaiśāradya) of the Buddha according to the doctrine of the Sūtras and the Abhidharma. Now it will discuss the conceptions of the Mahāyāna in regard to the same subject.

It will position itself successively from the absolute truth point of view (paramārthasatyā) and the relative truth point of view (samvṛtisatyā).

1. From the absolute point of view, the balas and the vaiśāradyas are without distinctive natures and, like all other dharms, come within the emptiness of non-existence (anupalambhaśūnyatā) in terms of which “dharms, whether past, future of [present, do not exist at all” (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 197, l. 15-16: ye dharma atīśāgatapratyutpamās te nopalabhīyante).

Bala and Vaiśāradya fall under the judgment of the Prajñāpamārmitāsūtras (Pañcaviṃśati, p. 146, l. 9-20; Śatasāhastikā, p. 839, l. 13-842, l. 17):

“The bodhisattva does not grasp (nopalabhate) the ātman, whatever the names by which it is designated: sattva, jīva, poṣa, puruṣa, pudgala, manuja, mānava, kmaraka, vedaka, jānaka, paṣyaka. He does not grasp things, skandha, dhātu, āyatana, or their pratītyasamutpāda. He does not grasp the noble truths, duḥkha,
samudaya, nirodha, mārga. He does not grasp the threefold world, kāma-, rūpa- and ārūpyadātu. He does not grasp the levels of concentration, apramāna, dhyāna and ārūpyasamāpatti. He does not grasp the thirty-seven auxiliaries of enlightenment, smṛtyupasthāna, samyakpradhāna, rddhipāda, indriya, bala, bodhyaṅga and mārga. He does not grasp the Buddha attributes, daśabala, caturvaiśāradya, aṣṭādaśāvenika. He does not grasp the categories of saints, srotāpāpana, sakṛdāgamin, anāgamin, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva, buddha. If he does not grasp them, it is because of their absolute purity (ayantaviṣuddhitā). What is this purity? Non-production (anupāda), non-manifestation (aprādurbhāva), non-existence (anupalambha), non-activity (anabhissamkāra)."

2. From the relative or conventional point of view, it is permissible to consider things and to find their distinctive characteristics for, just as empty space (ākāśa) does not oppose matter, so “the emptiness of non-existence is not an obstacle to any dharma.”

Provided that he is not attached at all to his mind - in other words, provided that he recognizes its fundamental non-existence - the bodhisattva can, for the purpose of saving beings, discourse very well on the various attributes of the Buddha: the ten balas, the four vaiśāradyas, the four pratisamvids and the eighteen āvenikabuddhadharmas.

The sūtras and the Hīnayāna Abhidharmas make no distinction between Buddha attributes and bodhisattva attributes for the valid reason that the bodhisattva is a future Buddha and between the former and the latter there can be only a difference of degree and not of nature.

The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras have remained at this stage. Thus the Pañcaviṃśati (p. 203-212), setting out to define the Mahāyāna, suggest twenty-one practices to be completely fulfilled (paripūravyātavya) or to be imitated (ikaśītavya). The first seventeen are dharmas of the śrāvaka: 1) four smṛtyupasthānas, 2) four samyakpradhānas, 3) four rddhipādas, 4) five indriyas, 5) five balas, 6) seven bodhyaṅgas, 7) eight mārgāṅgas, 8) three samādhis, 9) eleven jñānas, 10) three indriyas, 11) three samādhis, 12) ten anusmṛtis, 13) four dhyānas, 14) four apramānas, 15) four samāpattis, 16) eight vimokṣas, 17) nine anupāravivhāras).


But in a later approach, other Mahāyānasūtras have deemed it proper to propose, apart from these Buddha attributes, a series of bodhisattva attributes distinct from the preceding, but also including ten balas, four vaiśāradyas, four pratisamvids and eighteen āvenikadharmas.

Although the Traité presents itself simply as a faithful commentary on the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, it does not hesitate to borrow these lists of bodhisattva dharmas from the more recent Māhāyānasūtras. Its or their authors want to appear as knowledgeable of the latest progress in scholasticism with the result that, from the scholastic point of view, an important Mahāyānist production has been intercalated between the Prajñāpāramitasūtras and the Traité.
With the exception of the eighteen āvēnikabuddhadharmas which the old texts do not mention, the lists of Buddha attributes, namely, the ten balas, four vaiśāryadris and the four pratisaṃvids, have been fixed since the time of the canonical sūtras (nikāya and āgama) and are maintained practically without any change throughout the later literature.

It was not the same for the lists of bodhisattva dharmas, the elaboration of which has given room for hesitation and alteration. Here I [Lamotte] will examine only the Mahāyānasūtras with which the Traité was familiar and which make up its sources and I will designate them by the following:

Ś = Śūramgamasamādhisūtra.
V = Vikurvaṇarājaparipṛcchasūtra
A = Buddhāvatamsaka.
R = Ratnameghasūtra.
Vyut = Mahāvyutpatti, dependent on the preceding ones.

1. First list of ten bodhisattvabalas:

It is this first list that the Traité will adopt here.

2. Second list of ten bodhisattvabalas:

Vyut, no. 760-769.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List I</th>
<th>List II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. drḍhādhyāśayabala</td>
<td>1. āśayabala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. sarvasattvāparityāgabala</td>
<td>2. adhyāśayabala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. mahākaruṇābala</td>
<td>3. prayogabala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. mahāvīryabala</td>
<td>4. prajñābala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. samādhibala</td>
<td>5. praṇidhānabala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. prajñābala
7. saṃsāraparikhedabala
8. anutpatti-kadharma-kṣāntibala
9. vimuktibala
10. pratisaṃvidbala

6. yānabala
7. caryābala
8. vikuṇṭhabala
9. bodhibala
10. dharmacakra-pravartanabala

3. List of four bodhisattvaśārayas:


Vyut., no. 782-785.

This is the list adopted by the Traité here.

4. List of ten bodhisattvaśārayas:


5. First list of eighteen āvenikabodhisattvadhamas:


6. Second list of eighteen āvenikabodhisattvadhamas:


Vyut., no. 787-804.

7. List of ten āvenikabodhisattvadhamas:

8. List of ten bodhisattvasāmādhis:
Vyut., no. 737-745.

9. List of twelve bodhisattvadīrāṇīs:
Vyut., no. 747-758.

10. List of six bodhisattvābhijñās:

11. List of ten bodhisattvavaśitas:
Vyut. – no. 771-780.

It may be noted that the lists of bodhisattva dharmas given here do not appear in the two oldest Chinese translations of the Ratnameghasūtra: the Pao yun king (T658) made by Mandrasena in 503, and the Ta tch’eng pao yun king (T 659) made by Mandrasena and Seng k’ie p’o lo.

[k. 25, p. 245c]

I. THE EMPTINESS OF NONEXISTENCE

Question. – In the Prajñāpāramitā it is said that [the dharmas], from the five aggregates (skandha) up to the ten balas, the four vaiśrādyas and the eighteen [245c] āveṇikadharmas, are all empty (śūnya). Why then do you distinguish the characteristics here?

Answer. – In the Buddhadharmā, the emptiness of non-existence (anupalambhaśūnyatā) is not an obstacle to any dharma. It is precisely because of the emptiness of non-existence that one can speak of the teachings

723 Pañcaviṃśati, p. 146, l. 9-20: Šatasahāsrikā, p. 839, l. 13-842, l. 17; passage cited above, p. 1605F.
of the Buddha or of the twelve classes of texts (dvādaśaṅgabuddhavacana). In the same way, it is because space (ākāśa) is nothing at all that everything depends on it and develops.

Furthermore, if here we distinguish powers (bala) and fearlessnesses (vaśāradya), it is not that we are grasping characteristics (nimittodgrahaṇa) or that we are attaching our mind (citābhiniveśa) to them; we want only to save beings, for knowing that the being comes from causes and conditions (hetupratyayotpanna) [and is not independent] is to obtain deliverance (vimukti). In the same way, the medicinal plant (osadhī) is used only to cure the sickness and not at all to investigate the characteristics (nimitta) of the medicinal plant.

See what is said by the Tchong-louen (Madhyamakaśāstra):

If you believe in the emptiness of dharmas
You are in agreement with logic.

If you do not believe in the emptiness of dharmas,
Everything becomes contradictory.724

If one rejected emptiness,
There would be nothing more to do.
Activity would exist without being undertaken,
One would be agent without being active.725

724 Madh. kārikā, XXIV, 14, p. 55; Tchong louen, T 1564, k. 4, p. 33a22-23:

Sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate /
sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyam na yujyate //

Transl. J. May, Candrakīrti, p. 234: “If emptiness is logical, everything is logical; if it is absurd, everything is absurd.”

The translator compares this stanza of the Vigrahavyāvartanī, ed. Johnston and Kunst, p. 150:

Prabhavati ca śūnyateyam yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ/
prabhavati na tasya kimcinna prabhavati śūnyatā yasya //

S. Yamaguchi, Pour écarter les vaines discussions, JA, 1929, p. 60. translates: “Where non-substantiality is possible, everything is possible. Where non-substantiality is not possible, nothing is possible.”

For the Madhyamaka, dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) equals emptiness (śūnyatā) and, in this regard, Candrakīrti, in his Madh. vrṣṭi, p. 500, cites the well-known stanza:

Yah pratayair jāyati sa hy ajāto na tasya utpāda svabhāvato ’sti /
yah pratayādhitu sa śūnya ukto yah śūnayaṃ jānmati so ’pramattaḥ //

“That which arises from conditions is not born really; its production does not exist as intrinsic nature. That which depends on conditions is called empty. He who knows emptiness is free of mistakes.”
This [true] nature of dharmas,
Who then would be able to conceive of it?
Only the pure and straight mind.
Here words have no foundation.726

Eliminate the views of existence and non-existence
And the mind will be exhausted inwardly by itself.727

Question. – This is how the śrāvaka system speaks of the ten powers (bala) and the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya). How does the Mahāyāna distinguish them in its turn?

Answer. – An exhaustive knowledge, a universal knowledge, is contained in these ten balas and four vaiśāradyas, and it is in this regard that the ten balas and four vaiśāradyas are spoken of in the Mahāyāna.

725 Madh. kārikā, XXIV, 37, p. 513; Tchong louen, T 1564, k. 4, p. 34b18-19:
Na kartavyam bhavet kincid anārabdhā bhavet kriyā /
kārakah syād akurvāṇah śānyatām pratibādhatas //
“There would be nothing to do; activity would exist without being undertaken; one could be agent without doing anything if one rejects emptiness.”

In other words, denying emptiness is to condemn oneself to imputing a sin that he has not committed (akṛtyābhāṣyāma) to an innocent person and to considering as nothing and non-existent every accomplished action (kṛtavarama); cf. Madh. vṛttī, p. 325, l. 3, and note; Pañjikā, p. 469, l. 9; Mahāvyut., no. 7529-7530.

726 Madh. kārikā, XVIII, 7, p. 365; Tchong louen, T 1564, k. 3, p. 24a3-4:
Nivṛttam abhidhātavyaṁ nivṛtte cittagocare /
anupannāniruddhaḥ hi nirvāṇam iva dhammatā //
“All that can be named is destroyed if the object of the mind is destroyed. Indeed the [true] nature of things in unborn, not destroyed, like nirvāṇa.”

727 Unidentified stanza, but several centuries later, Śāntideva expressed himself in almost the same terms (Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX, st. 35):
Yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ samāṣṭhate puraḥ /
tadānayatayabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati //
“When existence or non-existence no longer arise to the mind, then without any other alternative, the mind, deprived of object, is exhausted.”

It is said that after having pronounced this stanza, Śāntideva rose up into the sky and disappeared.

1319
Question. – But in the śrāvaka system it is also a question of this exhaustive knowledge, this universal knowledge. Why does the Mahāyāna return to it?

Answer. – The scholars (upadeśācārya) say the following: That the Buddha cognizes in an exhaustive way, a universal way, was not said by the Buddha himself; it is here in the Mahāyāna and in regard to the ten balas and the four vaiśāradyas that the Buddha himself declares that he cognizes in an exhaustive way, in a universal way.

Furthermore, when he preaches the ten balas and four vaiśāradyas to the śrāvakas, it is in connection with the four truths (catuḥsātā), the twelve causes (dvādaśasātā) and other śrāvaka theories all serving to arrive at nirvāṇa. But here in the Mahāyāna, when he preaches the ten balas and four vaiśāradyas, it is in connection with great compassion (mahākarunā), the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dhammas and the doctrine of non-arising (anutpāda) and non-cessation (anirodha).

II. THE TEN POWERS OF THE BODHISATTVA

Question. – The Buddha possesses ten powers (bala) and four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya). Does the bodhisattva possess them?

Answer. – He does possess them. What are they?

1) He makes the resolution [to reach] omniscience (sarvajñatā): this is the power of high resolve (drjāḥdhāhyāṃsayabala).

2) Because he is endowed with great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrīsamānāgata), he possesses the power of not abandoning beings (sarvasattvāpanāṃgabala).

3) Because he does not seek any benefit by way of worship (pūjā) or veneration (satkāra), he possesses the power of great compassion (mahākarunābala). [246a]

4) He believes in all the attributes of the Buddha and his mind never tires in order to reproduce them completely in himself; this is why he possesses the power of great exertion (mahāvīryabala).

5) He is mindful (smṛtimat) and he conducts himself intelligently and does not transgress the attitudes (īryāpatha); this is why he possesses the power of the concentrations (samādhibala).

6) He avoids the pairs of extremes (antadvaya), he acts in conformity with the twelve-membered [pratītyasamutpāda], he destroys false views (mithyādrṣṭi), he suppresses all thought (manasikāra), all

---

728 Actually, in the definition of the ten balas, the canonical texts cited above, p. 1506F, each time use the word pratijñāt to insist on the exhaustive and universal nature of these knowledges.

729 Here the Traité adopts the first list of 10 bodhisattvabalas already prepared by the Śūraṃgamasamādhī and the Vikurvanaparipṛcchā: see references cited above, p. 1606F.

730 Adopting the variant houei hing.
discursiveness (*vikalpa*) and all idle proliferation (*prapañca*); this is why he possesses the power of wisdom (*prajñābala*).

7) He ripens beings (*sattvān paripācayati*), he takes on innumerable births and deaths (*apramaṇāni jātimaraṇāny ādadāti*), he relentlessly accumulates the roots of good (*kuśalamūlany ācinoti*), he knows that the whole world is like a dream (*svapnasama*): this is why he possesses the power of being tireless in the voyage through transmigration (*sāṃsārāparikhedabala*).

8) He sees the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of dharmas; he knows that there is neither one’s self (*ātman*) nor beings (*sattva*); he is convinced (*adhimucyate*) that dharmas do not arise, are unborn: this is why he possesses the conviction that things are unborn (*anutpattikadharmakṣāntibala*).

9) He has passed through the gates of liberation (*vimokṣamukha*), namely, emptiness (*śūnyatā*), signlessness (*ānimitta*) and wishlessness (*apraṇihita*); he knows and sees the liberation of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas: this is why he possesses the power of deliverance (*vimuktibala*).

10) He has mastery over the profound dharmas (*gambhīradharmavāśita*), he knows the wanderings of the mind and the behavior of beings (*sattvavittacaritragati*): this is why he possesses the power of the unhindered knowledges (*pratisaṃvidbala*).

These are the ten powers of the bodhisattva.

### III. THE FOUR FEARLESSNESSES OF THE BODHISATTVA

What are the four fearlessnesses (*vaiśāradya*) of the bodhisattva?

1) He retains all that he has heard (*śruta*), he possesses the *dhāraṇīs* and he suffers no loss of memory (*smṛtihāni*): this is why [he possesses] the fearlessness of preaching the Dharma in the assemblies (*parṣatsu dharmanirdeśavaiśāradya*).

2) He has obtained liberation in all things (*sarvadarmesu vimuktī*), he distinguishes, cognizes and uses all the remedies of the Dharma (*dharmabhāṣajya*) and he knows the spiritual faculties (*indriya*) of all beings: this is why he possesses the fearlessness of preaching the Dharma as is suitable in the great assemblies (*mahāparṣatsu anukūladharmanirdeśavaiśāradya*).

3) Having driven away every fear definitively, the bodhisattva never asks if there is anyone in the ten directions who could come and make objections (*codana*) to him and to whom he would be unable to answer. Not seeing any reason to fear that, he possesses the fearlessness of preaching the Dharma in the great assemblies.

---

731 Resuming the definitions already given above, p. 339F, the *Traité* here adopts the list of the 4 bodhisattvavaiśāradyas from the Vikurvaṇājaparipṛcchā and the Ratnamegha, a list also repeated in Mahāvyutpatti: see references above, p. 1607F.
4) He allows everyone to come and question him, and to each question he replies without the slightest hesitation (saṃśaya): this is why he has the fearlessness of preaching the Dharma in the great assemblies. These are the four fearlessnesses of the bodhisattva.

**Third Section  THE FOUR UNHINDERED KNOWLEDGES** (p. 1614F)

**PRELIMINARY NOTE**

The pratisaṃvids, literally ‘special knowledges’, in Pāli, paṭisambhidā, in Tibetan so so yan dag par rig pa, in Chinese ngai kiai, wou nagi tche, wou, ngai pien, ‘explanations, knowledges or unhindered speech’ are the unimpeded, unfailing knowledges (asaktam avivartyam jñānam) that make a good preacher.

The pratisaṃvids are four in number:

1. *Arthapratisaṃvid*: knowledge of the thing designated (bhāṣitārtha) or more precisely, knowledge of its self-nature (svalakṣaṇa): for example, knowing the thing designated by the word ‘earth’ the intrinsic nature of which is solidity.

2. *Dharmapratisaṃvid*: knowledge of the designation (bhāṣitadharma), or the names (nāman), phrases (pada), syllables (vyañjana) used to designate the thing: for example, knowing that the name ‘prthivi’ serves to designate the earth.

3. *Niruktipratisaṃvid*: knowledge of vocal expression (vāc, adhivacana). It is not enough to know the word *in abstracto*, but it is also necessary to express it with the appropriate number (singular, dual, or plural), gender (masculine, feminine, neuter) and case, taking account of its etymology. All of this varies according to the language used so that, considering everything, niruktipratisaṃvid is none other than the knowledge of languages.

4. *Pratibhānapratisaṃvid*: knowledge of elocution or, more simply, eloquence. This is the ability to speak in a precise and easy way (yukta-mukta-prtibhāna) resulting from mastery in regard to the Path (mārga-vāśita) and unfailing attentiveness.

The pratisaṃvids are inseparable: the person who possesses one possesses all of them. On the other hand, they are the same in all, although realized to varying degrees. Thus, there is no way to make distinctions between the pratisaṃvid of the śrāvaka, the bodhisattva or the Buddha if this is not in the mind or intention governing their practice.

It is often a question of the pratisaṃvids in the canonical and scholastic literature, but the definitions given are rather rare and often divergent. Here I [Lamotte] will mention a few particularly interesting texts:
1) In the Nikāyas and the āgamas: Anguttara, I, p. 24.l. 29; II, p. 160; III, p. 113, 120; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 21, p. 656c26-657a17; Mahānidddeaa, I, p. 234; Patisambhīda, I, p. 88, 119, 132; II, p. 150, 157-158, 185, 193.

The Buddha accepts that bhikṣus can have the pratisaṃvids and gives Mahākauṭi as an example. But Śāriputra, the wisest of all, held them in only a limited way (odhiso) and in a manner of speaking (vyañjanaso); in these conditions, those who wish clarifications should speak to the Buddha rather than to him.


3) In the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and śāstras: Prakaraṇapāda, T 1542, k. 5, p. 712b11-12; Jñānaprasthāna, T 1544, k. 18, p. 1018b; Vibhāsā, T 1545, k. 180, p. 903c-906b; Kośa, VII, p. 89-94; Kośabhāṣya, p. 418-421 (very clear explanation); Abhidharmadīpa, p. 393.

4) In the Mahāyānasūtras: for example Pañcaviṃśati, p. 211, l. 15-16; Śatasāhasrikā, p. 1449, l. 18-21; Daśabhūmika, p. 77. – Brief commentary in Āloka, p. 455, l. 25 seq.

5) In the Viśnūvatān treatises: Sūtrakāra, p. 138-139; Saṃgraha, p. 293, with commentary as note; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 258, l. 4-17; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhya, T 1606, p. 759b23-c16; Siddhi, p. 652.

I. THE PRATISAṂVIDS ACCORDING TO THE ABHIDHARMA

The four pratisaṃvids ‘unhindered knowledges’ are: i) arthapratisaṃvid [bearing on the thing designated or bhāṣitārtha],732 ii) dhamnapratisaṃvid [bearing on the designation or bhāṣitadharma], iii) niruktipratisaṃvid [bearing on vocal expression or nirukti], iv) pratibhānapratisaṃvid [bearing on elocution or pratibhāna].733

1. Arthapratisaṃvid

732 Artha has several meanings, but in the expression arthapratisaṃvid it means thing and not meaning or signification. However, out of long habit, the better Chinese translators, such as Kumārajīva and Hiuan-tsang. render it as yi, notion of a thing, idea, signification (in English, meaning, purport, interpretation). Without being so presumptuous as to try to correct these virtuosos of Chinese Buddhism, I [Lamotte] would prefer to read the character king, sometimes used by Hiuan-tsang to translate artha taken in the meaning of viṣaya, ‘object’ (e.g., in his translation of the Kośa, T 1558, k.1, p. 2b7, corresponding to Kośabhāṣya, p. 5, l. 20).

733 The Traité will put forward here the Ābhidhārmikas’ definitions for the main part: cf. Vibhaṅga, p. 293, l. 4-6; Visuddhimagga, ed. Warren, p. 372, l. 29-52; Vibhāṣā citing the Prakaraṇapāda, T 1545, k. 180, p. 904a8-13; Kośabhāṣya, p. 419, l. 17-18; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 76, p. 751a2 seq; Abhidharmadīpa, p. 393, l. 6-12; Āloka, p. 455, l. 25 seq.
The pratisaṃvid of the designated thing. – Things (vastu) expressed with the help of names (nāman) and by the voice (vāc) each have their own nature (lakṣaṇa): for example, the nature solidity (khakkhaṭalakṣaṇa).\(^{734}\)

In this example, the solid nature (khakkhaṭalakṣaṇa) of the earth (prthivī) is the artha ‘the thing designated’; the name (nāman) ‘earth’ is the dharma ‘designation’; to say ‘earth’ using the voice (vāc) is the nirukti ‘expression’; the ease of speaking (muktiḥhipāpitā), the mastery (vaśītva) over these three kinds of knowledge is the pratibhāna ‘elocution’. Penetrating these four things without difficulty constitutes the pratisaṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge’.

The solidity (khakkhaṭatva) characterizing earth (prthivī), the moistness (daratva) characterizing water (ap), the heat (uṣṇatva) characterizing fire (tejas), the movement (iṇaṭatva) characterizing wind (vāyu), the intelligent nature of the mind (citta), the impermanent (anitya) painful (duḥkha) and empty (śūnya) nature of the five aggregates of attachment (pañcapadāsāmkandha), the non-self nature (anātma) of all dharmas, those are general characteristics [246b] (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and specific characteristics (svaḥa). Distinguishing them in this way is called arthapratisāṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge of the [designated] thing’.

2. Dharmaṃpratisāṃvid

The pratisaṃvid of designation. – Knowing the name (nāman) of the thing (artha), knowing that solidity is called earth (prthivī) and having no difficulty in distinguishing all the names of this type, is called dharmapratisāṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge of the designation’.\(^{735}\)

\(^{734}\) The object of arthapratisāṃvid is the artha for the Vibhaṅga, the Kośa and the Nyāyānusāra; the paramārtha for the Viṃśaṭī; the dharmaṃlakṣaṇa for the Áloka. We can say with the Traité that it is the real thing, constituted by its own nature and capable of being designated.

\(^{735}\) The object of dharmapratisāṃvid is the dharma [taken in the sense of deśana] for the Viṃśaṭī; the paryāya ‘preaching’ for the Áloka; the nāman for the Nyāyānusāra; the nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāya ‘groups of names, phrases and syllables’ for the Viṃśaṭī and the Kośa. It is a question therefore of a knowledge bearing upon the designation, the preaching. But in the Buddhist perspective, this designation, this preaching, is limited to the speech of the Buddha. This is why the Viṃśaṭī, p. 294, l. 22-24, specifies: Idha bhikkhu dhammaṃ jānāti suttam geyyam veyyākaraṇam gmatham udānām itivuttakam jātakaṃ abhutadhamaṃ vedallaṃ: ayaṃ vuccati dhammapatisambhida.

This is all well summarized in the definition in the Abhidharmadīpa (l.c.): Dvādasāṅgasamgrhiṭesu vaksyaṃ añārthasambandhiṣu vivakṣiteṣu nāmākāyadīṣu yad avivartyaṃ jānāṃ sā dharmapartisāṃvid: “The unfailing knowledge of the groups of names, etc., contained in the twelve-membered [speech of the Buddha] referring to things to be expressed and brought into discussion is the dhammapratisāṃvid.”
Why? Because the thing is not grasped separately from the name (nāman) and one can recognize the thing only by the name. This is why the designation (dharma) comes immediately after the thing (artha).

Question. – Is the thing (artha) joined with the name (nāman) or separate from the name? If it were joined with the name, we would burn our mouth by saying “fire”. If it were separate from the name, we would get water by saying “fire”.

Answer. – The thing is neither joined with nor separate from the name. Out of convention (saṃvṛti), the ancients fixed the names designating things, and their descendants, thanks to these names, recognized things. Thus for each thing there is a name called dharma [here].

3. Niruktipratisaṃvid

But what has to be done in order that beings can obtain the consciousness of this name (nāman) and this thing (artha)? Recourse must be made to expressions (niruktī), to various ornamentations, so that people can comprehend them. Penetrating these processes without difficulty is called niruktipratisaṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge of expression’.

4. Pratibhānapratisaṃvid

---

736 A problem already asked by Plato at the beginning of the Cratylus (383A) and which preoccupied the sophists of his time: do words have a natural pertinence – which Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, maintains, or, as Hermogenes would have it, are they due to convention? On this subject, see Leroy, Étymologie et linguistique chez Platon, Bull. Cl. Lettres de l’Ac. Roy. De Belgique, LIV, 1968, p. 121-152.

737 Niruktipratisaṃvid has as object the atthadhammaniruttābhilāpa ‘the expression of language relating to the thing designated and to the designation’ according to the Vībhāṅga; the vāc ‘voice’ according to the Vībhāṣā, the Kośa and the Nyāyānuśāsāra; the janapadabhāṣā ‘the speech of the region’ according to the Āloka.

By voice the Kośabhāṣya, p. 410, 1. 17-18 means the [correct] expression of singular, dual, plural, masculine, feminine, etc. (ekadvibhuṣipuruṣādyadhivacan). But niruki also means the etymological explanation (nirvacana): for example rūpyate tasmād rūpam.
If the speech (abhilāpa) is provided with logic (nyāya), if the account (prakāśana) is inexhaustible and also if the orator has obtained mastery over the concentrations (samādhivasītā), there is then an ease [of speech] called pratibhānapratīsāṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge of elocution.’

5. Levels, knowledges and types of pratīsāṃvid

1) The first and the fourth pratīsāṃvid occur in nine levels: [kāmadhātu, four dhyānas and four samāpattis].

2) The second and third pratīsāṃvid are worldly knowledges (saṃvṛtiṣṭhāṇa).

3) The first pratīsāṃvid is ten knowledges (daśajñāna).

4) The fourth pratīsāṃvid is nine knowledges [by excluding the knowledge of cessation of suffering (nirodhajñāna)].

738 For the Vibhāṣa, the Kośa and the Nyāyānusāra (l.c.), pratibhānapratīsāṃvid is the knowledge of correct and easy elocution and of mastery in regard to the path (mārgavaśita), which presupposes that the orator has mastery over the concentrations.

739 Cf. Kośabhāṣya, p. 418-419: Sā punar arthapratisāṃvid sarvabhitā… Dharmapratisāṃvid pañcabhiṣṭā kāmadhūtacaturthadhīyānasaṃgrhiṣṭā, ārdhvaṃ nāmakāyābhiṣṭā… Niruktapratisāṃvid kāmadhūtāprathamadhīyānabhitā, ārdhvaṃ vitarkābhiṣṭā… Sarvabhitā [pratibhānapratīsāṃvid] kāmadhūtāv yāvat bhāvagre vānmārgayor anyatarālambanāt. – “The arthapratisāṃvid arises in all the levels… The dharmapratisāṃvid is in five levels, in kāmadhūtu and the four dhyānas; the nāmakāya is absent above [and consequently the pādakāya and vyanjanakāya also]… The niruktapratisāṃvid had the kāmadhūtu and the first dhyāna as levels; vitarka is absent above… The pratibhānapratīsāṃvid is in all the levels from kāmadhūtu to bhāvagra, since it has as object either the voice or the Path.”

But according to the information of the Vibhāṣa, T 1545, k. 180, p. 904a25-b2, this opinion is not unanimous.

740 Cf. Kośabhāṣyā, p. 418-419: Dharmaniruktapratisāṃvida saṃvṛtiṣṭhāṇasvabhāva nāmakāyādivāgālambanavabhāvatāt… Arthaprāthibhānasvabhāva [should be corrected to: arthapratisāṃvid] sarvadharmāsa ced artha daśa jñānāni, nirvāṇapādājñānāni bhavnāyaanirodha-ksavyātadāsamvṛtiṣṭhāṇāni… Navajñānasvabhāvā pratibhānapratīsāṃvid anyatta nirodhajñānāt. – “The dharma- and the niruktapratisāṃvid are conventional knowledge because they have as object the nāmakāyas, etc., and the voice… The arthapratisāṃvid, if by artha is meant all dharmas, is ten knowledges; but if by artha is meant nirvāṇa, it is six knowledges: dharma, anvaya, nirodha, kṣaya, anuttāta and saṃvṛtiṣṭhāṇa. The pratibhānapratīsāṃvid is nine knowledges, excluding the nirodhajñāna.”
3) The *pratisaṃvids* are higher (*agra*), middling (*madhya*) or lower (*avara*): higher among the Buddhas, middling among the great bodhisattvas, lower among the great arhats.

Question. – The *balas*, the *vaiśāradyas* and the *pratisaṃvids* are all knowledges (*jñāna*). Having the *balas* inwardly and the *vaiśāradyas* outwardly would be complete (*paripūrṇa*). Why speak further of the *pratisaṃvids*?

Answer. – The *balas* and the *vaiśāradyas* have been explained. There are people who, while fearlessly preaching the Dharma in the great assemblies, still have hesitations. This is why particularly the *pratisaṃvids* are spoken of. The *pratisaṃvids* ‘adorn’ the *vaiśāradyas* and the *vaiśāradyas* adorn the *balas*.

Moreover, when we speak of the *vaiśāradyas*, some people have doubts and ask how anyone would not experience any fear in the great assemblies. But the Buddha first experiences the ten *balas* and finally the four *pratisaṃvids*. This is why, in the great assemblies, he has no fear of preaching the Dharma.

This completes the explanation of the four *pratisaṃvids*.

II. THE PRATISAṂVIDS ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Question. – Are there also four *pratisaṃvids* of the bodhisattva in the Mahāyāna?

Answer. Yes. They are as follows:

1. Arthapratisaṃvid

Pratisaṃvid of the thing designated. – The thing designated (*artha*) is the true nature (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of all dhammas, which is inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*).

The thing designated (*artha*), the name (*nāma*) and the voice (*vāc*) are not different (*abhinna*), and this is so at the beginning (*ādau*), at the end (*paryavasāna*) and in the middle (*madhya*): that is the *artha*. Apart from name (*nāma*) and voice (*vāc*), there can be no *artha*. It is as a result of the identity of the three things (*vastutrayasamata*) that there is *artha*.

---

741 Hesitations about their capacity to preach the Dharma.
742 Note that, in contrast to the *balas* and the *vaiśāradyas*, the *pratisaṃvids* of the Buddhas, the bodhisattvas and the śrāvakas bear the same names but are practiced in a different spirit.
743 This is not a theory on the nature of language. If the word is mixed up with the thing, it is not that it is naturally tied to it, but because, from the point of view of the true nature of dhammas, words and things are alike empty and non-existent.
Furthermore, knowing clearly and penetrating without difficulty the reality (artha) of all dharmas is called arthapratisaṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge of the thing designated’.

2. Dharmapratisaṃvid

Pratisaṃvid of designation. – The designation (dharma) is applied to things (artha) because the name (nāman) serves to make known the thing (artha).

Furthermore, having entered into the dharmapratisaṃvid, the bodhisattva always believes the authentic teaching but does not believe in the person who is teaching (dharmāya śraddadhāti na tu pudgale śraddadhāti);744 he takes refuge in the truth and does not take refuge in error (dharmapratisaraṇa na tv adharmapratisaraṇaḥ). Taking refuge in the truth, he is free of error. Why? Because he knows that the person (pudgala), names (nāman) and speech (vāc) are without intrinsic nature (svalakṣaṇahita).

Finally, by this pratisaṃvid, the bodhisattva distinguishes the three kinds of Vehicles (yānatraya), but while distinguishing them, ‘he does not contradict the fundamental element (dharmadhātuṃ na vilomayati).’745 Why? “Because the fundamental element has but a single nature, namely, the absence of nature” (dharmadhātur ekalakṣaṇo yadutālakṣaṇaḥ).746 The bodhisattva who uses his voice (vāc) to preach the Dharma knows that the voice is empty (śūnya) like an echo (pratirūtkaśama).747 The Dharma that he preaches to beings leads them to believe and recognize one and the same fundamental element (dharmadhātu).

Penetrating the names (nāman) and voices (vāc) to be uttered deeply and without difficulty, that is dharmapratisaṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge of the designation’.

3. Niruktipratisaṃvid

Pratisaṃvid of expression. – Using the voice (vāc), the bodhisattva expresses names (nāman) and things (artha). Adorning his discourse in various ways (nāṇāprakāreṇa) and in harmony with the needs of the

---

744 According to the Sūtra of the four refuges (catvāri pratisaraṇāni); dharmapratisaraṇena bhavitavyam na pudgalapratisaraṇena. See above, p. 536-539F.
745 According to the Sūtra of the four great teachings (mahāpadeśa) where it is said, more or less, in the Sanskrit version (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, p. 4; Pañjikā, p. 431): Buddhavacanasvedāṃ lakṣaṇaṃ yat sūtre ‘vatarati vinaye samdrśyate dharmatāṃ ca na vilomayati. – “The characteristic mark of the Word of the Buddha is that is is found in the Sūtra, appears in the Vinaya and does not contradict the nature of things.” – For detail see: La critique dans le bouddhisme, India Antiqua, Leyden, 1947, p. 218-222.
746 See references in footnote 74 above.
747 Comparison developed at length in Vimalakīrti, p. 148-149 and Šūramgamasamādhi. p. 188-189.
circumstances, he makes beings find an understanding of all languages (nirukti): the language of the devas; the languages of the nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, mahoragas and other amanuṣyas; the languages of Śakra, Brahmā, Cāturmahārājika and other lords of the world, human languages; one language, two languages, or several languages; concise or prolix language; language of women or language of men; languages of the past, the present or the future. He causes everybody to understand all these languages and that there is no disharmony between one’s own language and that of others.

How is that? The totality of things is not in language; language is not a true reality. If language were a true reality, it would be impossible to express evil by way of good words. It is solely in order to lead people to nirvāṇa that the bodhisattva speaks in a way that he can be understood, but without being attached to speech.

Finally, the bodhisattva uses speech so that beings may act in accordance with the authentic teaching (dharma) and reality (artha). His discourses all aim at the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. That is called niruktipratisaṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge of expression’.

4. Pratibhānapratisaṃvid

Pratisaṃvid of elocution. – In a single phoneme (aṅkara) the bodhisattva can express all the phonemes; in a single word (ghoṣa), he can express all words; in a single dharma, he can express all dharmas.748 Everything that he says is Dharma, is true, is real, and also useful, since it is adapted to beings to be converted (vaineya).

To those who like sūtras, he preaches sūtras; to those who like geyas, he preaches geyas; to those who like vyākaraṇas, he preaches vyākaraṇas; to those who like gāthās, udānas, nidānas, avadānas, ityuktas, jātakas, vaipulyas, abhutadharmas or upadeśas, he preaches all these texts.

He adapts himself to the spiritual faculties (indirya) of beings in order to preach to them: if they like faith, he preaches them the faculty of faith [247a](śraddhendriya); if they like exertion, he preaches to them the faculty of exertion (vīryendriya); if they like mindfulness, he preaches to them the faculty of mindfulness (smṛtyīndriya); if they like concentration, he preaches to them the faculty of concentration (samādhīndriya); if they like wisdom, he preaches to them the faculty of wisdom (prajñendriya). And he does likewise for all the roots of good (kuśalamūla) as he does for these five faculties.

Moreover, there are 21,000 faculties (indriya) of passionate people (rāgacarita) and it was on this subject that the Buddha preached the 84,000 topics of the Dharma (dharmaskandha) as counteragents.749 In regard

748 Daśabhūmika, p. 77: Sarvadharmaprajñaptavyavacchedena dharmaṃ deśayaṁ.

749 On these 84,000 (or 80,000) dharmaskandhas preached by the Buddha, see Histoire du bouddhisme indien, p. 155, 162-163. They serve to cure the four groups of 21,000 beings dominated by lust (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), ignorance (moha) or a mixture of the three, respectively: cf. Kośa, I, p. 47; Nyāyānusāra, T 1562, k. 3, p. 346c; Satyasiddhiśāstra, Y 1656, k. 9, p. 314a.
to these faculties, the bodhisattva speaks about the series of counteragents (pratipakṣadharma): this is his ‘elocution’ (pratibhāna).

There are 21,000 faculties of the hateful person (dveśacarita), etc.

There are 21,000 faculties of the foolish man (mohacarita), etc.

There are 21,000 faculties of the person with mixed passions, and on this subject the Buddha preached the 84,000 topics of the Dharma that counteract them: this is his ‘elocution’.

This is what is called pratibhānapratisaṃvid ‘unhindered knowledge of elocution’.

Furthermore, using this pratisaṃvid, during the course of a kalpa or half a kalpa, the bodhisattva adorns his preaching of the Dharma (dharmanirdeśa) but ‘does not contradict the nature of the fundamental element’ (dharmaṇātumaṃ na vilomayati).

Sometimes this bodhisattva hides and becomes invisible, but preaches the Dharma through all his hair-pores (romakūpa),750 and, while adapting himself to the needs [of beings to be converted], he does not fail in his original practices (pūrvacarya).

The wisdom (prajñā) of the bodhisattva is immense: no scholar (upadeśācārya) is able to exhaust it or, even less, destroy it.

When, in possession of this pratisaṃvid, the bodhisattva transforms himself and takes on rebirths, he spontaneously and completely understands (svataḥ samjñāte) the holy texts (sūtra), the mantras, the knowledges (jñāna) and the arts (kalā) possessed by sages having the five supranormal powers (pañcābhijñārṣi): for example, the four Vedas, the six Vedaṅgas, the Atharva, the [Jyotिषka] dealing with the sun, the moon and the five planets, oniromancy [??], earthquakes, the language of the yaksas, the language of birds, the language of hands,751 the language of quadrupeds and of people possessed by demons, divination, abundance or famine, struggle against the sun, the moon and the five planets, pharmacology, calculus, spells, scenic plays, music. The bodhisattva knows deeply and penetrates poetry, the arts, the treatises of this kind better than anyone, better than the heretics, but he is not at all boastful and troubles no one. He knows that these ordinary sciences do not serve for nirvāṇa.

Because this bodhisattva is endowed with the four pratisaṃvids, his beauty, his power, his brilliance surpass those of the Brahmās. The Brahmās honor him, love him and respect him, but his mind is detached (asakta), Respected and honored by all these gods, he is without attachment. He produces only the ideas of impermanence (anītya), of suffering (duḥkha), of emptiness (śūnya) and of non-self (anātman). By means of his supranormal powers (abhiṣēka) he encourages the gods, leads them to aspire ardently and preaches them the Dharma inexhaustibly [247b] and impeccably. He destroys their doubts and establishes them in ‘anuttara samyaksambodhi’.

According to the Mahāyāna, this is the power of the four pratisaṃvids of the bodhisattva, a power capable of saving beings, This is the meaning of the four pratisaṃvids.

---

750 Daśabhūmika, p. 80: Sarvaromakūpebhyo ghoṣān niścārayati.
751 Adopting the variant cheou yu.
CHAPTER XLI: THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA

PRELIMINARY NOTE

I. THE EIGHTEEN ĀVEṆIKADHARMAŚ OF THE BUDDHAS

By special attributes (āveṇikadharma) we mean the attributes possessed by the Buddha alone which are not shared with others.

As far as we know, they do not appear in the old canonical sūtras except for the Chinese translation of the Brahmāyūhsūtra of the Madhyamāgama by Tche K’ien (T 76, p. 885b17-18).

On the other hand, eighteen āveṇikabuddhadharmas, the details of which are not given, are frequently mentioned in the Hīnayānist post-canonical literature and the Mahāyānasūtras. Most often they are cited equally with the ten balas and the four vaiśāradyas to which other categories of attributes came to be added, such as the three vidyās, the four pratisamvids, mahāmaitrī, mahākarunā, the sarvajñānas, etc.

In the Hīnayāna literature, see: Lieou tou tsi king, T 152, k. 7, p. 43b5-6; P’ou sa pen hing king, T 155, k. 1, p. 108c25; Hien yu king, T 202, k. 10, p. 418c29-419a1; k. 12, p. 433a9; Tsa pao tsang king, T 203, k. 10, p. 496b16; Abhinīkramaṇasūtra, T 190, k. 47, p. 871a2-3.

In the Mahāyānist or semi-Mahāyānist literature, see: Lalitavistara, ed. Lefmann, p. 5, 1, 2; 403, 1, 2; and T 186, k. 7, p. 52c28; T 187, k. 5, p. 565b16-17; k. 8, p. 585a22-23; k. 11, p. 605b8-9, 611b6; Pañcevaṁśati, T 223, k. 1, p. 219a17-19; k. 2, p. 228a19-20; k. 4, p. 243a22-23; k. 7, p. 266c17-19; k. 9, p. 285c18-20; k. 17, p. 345c19-20; k. 23, p. 384a25-26, and many other Mahāyānasūtras.

The Pāli texts, with the exception of those of late date, are practically silent about the Buddha’s āveṇikas, but the Milindapaṇhā should be mentioned which three times notes (p. 105, 216, 285) the 18 attributes of the Buddha (attārasabuddhadahmmā) without, however, giving any further explanations.

When the sources do detail the 18 āveṇikas, we find three different lists, two of Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāṣika origin and the third of Mahāyānist, probably Mahāsāṃghika, origin.

The first Sarvāstivādin list. – It is by far the best established and what is special about it is that it considers the 18 āveṇikas not as dharmas distinct from the other attributes of the Buddha but rather as a simple group of the four categories of buddhadharmas already appearing in the old canonical sūtras, namely, the 10 balas, 4 vaiśāradyas, 3 smṛtyupasthānas and mahākarunā, making up 18 āveṇikas. The balas and the vaiśāradyas have already been dealt with in the preceding chapters; as for the three smṛtyupasthānas belonging to the Buddha, they are also found “in the sūtra” (Pāli version in Majjhima, III, p. 221; Sanskrit version in Kośavyākhyā, p. 646, l. 34-647, l. 19).
This list is customary in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma and the Vaibhāṣikā Śāstras: Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 17, p. 85a26-27; k. 120, p. 624a14-15; k. 143, p. 735c16-18; T 1546, k. 37, p. 277b13-14; Samyuktābhidharmasāra, T 1552, k. 6, p. 922c15-17; Kośa, VII, p. 66-67; Kośabhāṣya, p. 411; Kośavyākhya, p. 640, l. 33-34; Nuṣyānusāra, T 1562, k. 75, p. 746a11-12; Kośakārikāvibhāṣā, T 1563, k. 36, p. 955b2-3.

The Dīvyāvadāna, p. 182, l. 20; 268, l. 4, also mentions the 10 balas, 4 vaiśāradyas, 3 smṛtyupasthānas and mahākarunā as a group, but does not describe them as āvēnikabuddhadhārmās.

A somewhat aberrant list is in Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā (T 468, k. 2, p. 505a28-29: the 18 āveṇikas are the 10 balas, the 4 vaiśāradyas plus the 4 great apramāṇas (maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā).

The second Sarvāstivādin list. – Here the āveṇikabuddhadhārmās are not mixed in with the other categories of attributes but rather form an independent and distinct series. To my [Lamotte’s] knowledge, the Traité is the only one to speak of it (see below, p. 1699F). It seems to attribute it to a group of Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāṣika scholars and will comment that this list does not appear in the Tripiṭaka or in any of the other sūtras.

The Mahāyānist list. – Here also it is a matter of 18 āveṇikabuddhadhārmās completely independent and distinct from the other categories of attributes of Buddha. Even though they are not of canonical origin, this list is by far the best known and is adopted by all the Mahāyānasūtras. Its title shows some divergences and the 18 āveṇikadhārmās are not always cited in the same order.

The Sanskrit version of this list appears in the Prājñāpāramitāsūtras and especially in the Pañcaviṃśati, p. 211, l. 17-212, l. 7, and the Śatasahasrika, p. 1449, l. 22-1450, l. 14. The text of the editions contain some misprints which I [Lamotte] will take the liberty of correcting:


1. nāsti tathāgasya skhalitaṃ,
2. nāsti raviitaṃ,
3. nāsti muṣitaṃsmṛtiḥ,
4. nāsti nānātmakaṃjñā,
5. nāsty asamāḥitaṃ cittaṃ,
6. nāsty apratisamhātyoṣpekaṣa,
7. nāsti chandaparihāṇīr,
8. nāsti vīryaparihāṇīr,
9. nāsti smṛtiparīhāṇir, <nāsti sammadhiparīhāṇir>,
10. nāsti brahmāparīhāṇir,
11. naṅti vimuktiparīhāṇir,
12. nāsti vimuktijñānadarśanaparīhāṇir,
13. sarvaṃ tathāgatasya kāyakarma jñānapūrvavāngamaṃ jñānānuparīvarti,
14. sarvaṃ vākkarma jñānapūrvavāngamaṃ jñānānuparīvarti,
15. sarvaṃ manaskarma jñānapūrvavāngamaṃ jñānānuparīvarti,
16. atīte 'dhvany apratihatam asaṅgaṃ darśanam,
17. anāgate 'dhvany apratihatam asaṅgaṃ jñānam darśanam,
18. pratyutpane 'dhvany apratihatam asaṅgaṃ jñānam darśanam.


I [Lamotte] have described this list as Mahāyānist because it has been adopted by all the Mahāyānasūtras where it is discussed at length, e.g., in the Ratnakūṭa, section of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka (T 310, k. 40, p. 229b-233a; T 316, k. 15, p. 815b-818b). However, it was known by all Buddhists whatever their affiliation:

1) It appears in the Chinese version of the Lalitavistara by Dharmarākṣa: T 186, k. 6, p. 522c16-24.
2) It appears in the Mahāvastu, I, p. 160, l. 8-16.
3) It is mentioned in the Kośavyākhya next to the first list of the Sarvāstivādins, p. 640, l. 34-641, l. 8.
4) It is repeated in the Vijñānavādins treatises: Sūtrālaṃkāra, XXI, 57, p. 187; Saṅgraha, p. 288-290, 302; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhya (T 1606, k. 14, p. 761c5-762a27) where it is commented on at length; Yogācārabhūmi, T 1579, k. 79, p. 738b18-c25. – We may note, however, that beside these 18 āvenīkas, the Yogācārabhūmi also accepts 40 others (T 1579, k. 50, p. 574b4; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 375, l. 3).
5) Glossaries such as the Dharmasānggraha, chap. 79, the Mahāvyutpatti, no. 136-151 and the Arthavinīsacaya, cap. 24, p. 579-580, list it.
6) It was known to the Ceylonese masters of late date such as Buddharakkhita (5th cent.), author of the Jinālāṅkāra, and Moggallāna (12th cent.) author of the Abhidānappadīpikā: cf. Burnouf, Lotus, p. 649; Kern, Histoire, I, p. 283.

In the pages that will follow, the Traité will unreservedly adopt this Mahāyānis list and will criticize the two Sarvāstivādin lists which, in its opinion, include attributes not exclusively belonging to the Buddha himself.
II. THE EIGHTEEN ĀVEŅIKADHARMAS OF THE BODHISATTVAS

In the preceding chapter we have seen that the Traité, on the basis of various Mahāyānasūtras, juxtaposed the balas, vaiśāradyas and pratisaṃvids of the bodhisattva to the balas, vaiśāradyas and pratisaṃvids of the Buddha. We would expect it to do the same here and that, after having explained the āveṇikadharmas of the Buddha, it deals with the āveṇikadharmas of the bodhisattva. This omission is more odd in that some sources used by the Traité, such as the Ratnameghasūtra (cited at k. 100, p. 756b7-8) contained a list of 18 āveṇikabodhisattvadharmas (T 660, k. 4, p. 301b25-c12; T 489, k. 7, p. 722b19-c4; Tib. Trip., vol. 35, no. 897, fol. 51a3-51b2), the original Sanskrit of which has been reproduced by the Mahāvyut., no. 787-804.

Here is the text and the translation:

1. Bodhisattvā amupadiṣṭadānāḥ
2. amupadiṣṭaśīlāḥ,
3. amupadiṣṭaksāntayāḥ,
4. amupadiṣṭavīryāḥ,
5. amupadiṣṭadhīnānāḥ,
6. amupadiṣṭaprajñāḥ,
7. samgrahavastusarvastvasamgrāhakāḥ,
8. parināmanavidhiṇāḥ,
9. upāyakauśālayena sarvasttvacaritādhipatāyaḥ paramayānanirṇiyānirṣaṃdardarśakaḥ
10. mahāyānācyutatāḥ,
11. saṃsārānirvāṇamukhasaṃdardarśakaḥ,
12. yamakavyayastāhārakusalāḥ,
13. jñānapīrvaṃgama [a]nabhisamśkāranirvadyena sarvajamābhimukhapavṛttāḥ,
14. daśakusālopetakāyavagmanaskarmāntāḥ,
15. sarvadūḥkhaskandhasah[mā]nātmopadānā[t] sarvasattvadhātvaparitāgīnaḥ,
16. sarvajagadabhirucisāṃdardarśakaḥ,
17. kiyatkrchrabālaśraūvakamadhy[e] śubhavyāharatmakalpavṛksa[sama]dṛḍhasarvajñatā-cittāsāṃpramuṣītāḥ,
18. sarvadharmapattābhīṣekapraṇī[to] buddhadharmasāṃdharśanānirvṛttāḥ.

Transl. – 1- 6. The bodhisattvas possess a generosity, morality, patience, exertion, trance and wisdom which were not taught to them by others; 7. they charm beings by means of captivating means; 8. they know the rule of applying [merits]; 9. sovereign teachers of all the activities of beings by virtue of their
skill in skillful means, they show how to escape from saṃsāra by way of the Greater Vehicle; 10. they do not regress from the Greater Vehicle; 11. they show the direction of saṃsāra and of nirvāṇa; 12. they are skilled in uttering reverse and inverse sounds (cf. Vimalakīrti, *Introduction*, p. 33-37); 13. preceded by knowledge, they impeccably go towards all [kinds] of rebirths; 14. their actions of body, speech and mind are endowed with the ten good [paths of action]; 15. taking up existences capable of supporting the mass of suffering, they never abandon the world of beings; 16. they load beings with contentment; 17. in the midst of fools and listeners no matter how difficult, they never forget the strong mind of omniscience towards the pure wonders such as the precious Kalpavṛkṣa ‘the wish-fulfilling tree’; 18. having acquired the crown and the anointing of all the dharmas, they never cease to preach the Buddhadharma.

Above (p. 1607F) I [Lamotte] have mentioned the other lists of āvenikabodhisattvadharmas.

First Section MAHĀYĀNIST LIST OF THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA

[k. 26, p. 247b]

I. TEXT OF THE LIST ACCORDING TO THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ

Here are the eighteen special attributes (*aṣṭādaśaśāvenikadharma*):

1. The Tathāgata has no bodily defect (*nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam*).
2. He has no vocal defect (*nāsti rAVitam*).
3. He has no failure of memory (*nāsti muṣitasmṛtitā*).
4. He has no notion of variety (*nāsti nāmātvasaṃjñā*).
5. He does not have an unconcentrated mind (*nāsty asamāhitaṃ cittaṃ*).
6. He does not have thoughtless indifference (*nāsty apratisamkhya-vöypekṣā*).
7. He has no loss of zealousness (*nāsti chandaparihāṇiḥ*).
8. He has no loss of exertion (*nāsti vīryaparihāṇiḥ*).
9. He has no loss of mindfulness (*nāsti smṛtiparihāṇiḥ*).
10. He has no loss of wisdom (*nāsti prajñāparihāṇiḥ*).
11. He has no loss of liberation (*nāsti vimuktiparihāṇiḥ*).
12. He has no loss of the knowledge and vision of deliverance (*nāsti vimuktijñmanadārśanapariṇāṇiḥ*).
13. Every bodily action of the Tathāgata is preceded by knowledge and accompanies knowledge (sarvam tathātagatasya kāyakarma jñānapūrvavgamam jñāṇānaparivartī).

14. Every vocal action is preceded by knowledge and accompanies knowledge (sarvam vākkarma jñānapūrvavgamam jñāṇānaparivartī).

15. Every mental action is preceded by knowledge and accompanies knowledge (sarvam manaskarma jñānapūrvavgamam jñāṇānaparivartī).

16. He has non-attached and unobstructed knowledge about past time (aitte 'dhvany asaṅgam apratihatam jñīmanam darśanam).

17. He has non-attached and unobstructed knowledge about future time (anāgate 'dhvany asaṅgam apratihatam jñīnaṃ darśanam).

18. He has non-attached and unobstructed knowledge about the present time (pratyutpanne 'dhvany asaṅgam apratihatam jñānaṃ darśanam).

Question. - Thirty-six attributes752 are all attributes of the Buddha. Why are just these eighteen special?

Answer. – The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas possess some of the eighteen first attributes, but they do no share this second series of eighteen attributes.

Thus, Sāriputra was able to answer any question whatsoever and always develop it with further words because he penetrated it without any obstacle, and the Buddha congratulated him saying that he understood the fundamental element well (dharmadhātu).753

Aniruddha was the foremost of those who possess the divine eye (divyacakṣukāṇām agryāh).754

---

752 A first group of 18 buddha attributes consisting of the 10 balas (discussed in chap. XXXIX), the 4 vaiśāradyas and the 4 pratisaṃvids (discussed in chap. XL) plus a second group of 18 attributes that are the object of the present chapter. The Sarvāstivādins consider the first group to be the special attributes of the Buddha, whereas the Mahāyānists disagree with this affirmation: for them, the second group alone constitutes the all the special attributes of the Buddha.

753 Cf. Nidānasamyukta, p. 203-204 (Tsa a han, T 99, k. 14, p. 95c8-16); Samyutta, II, p. 54 and 56): Śāriputra says: Saced ekaṃ divasam, ekaṃ rātridivisam, saptāpi ... praśnam prṣṭo vyākurvām: “If for one day, for one night and one day, and even for seven nights and seven days, the Blessed One asked me a question on a given subject always with different phrases and different syllables, I would be able, for these seven nights seven days, to answer the Blessed One on this same subject for and seven nights and seven days, always with new phrases and new syllables.” And the Buddha declares: “It is indeed in this way that the fundamental element is well understood to its depths by the monk Śāriputra.”

If Śāriputra is able to preach the Dharma with such ‘assurance’, it is because he possesses the four vaiśāradyas. Therefore the vaiśāradyas are not attributes exclusively reserved for the Buddha.

754 Anguttara, I, p. 23: Etad aggaṃ mama sāvakānām bhikkhūnaṃ dibbacakkukānām yadidam anuruddho.
Such śrāvakas all shared the four fearlessnesses (*vaisāradya*), and since they shared them, the Buddha said: “Among my disciples who utter the lion’s roar (*simhanādika*), the foremost is Pin-t’ou-lo P’a-lo-to-che (Pinḍola Bhāradvāja).”

Śāriputra affirmed of himself: “For seven nights and seven days I was able to expand on the same subject”, so inexhaustible his knowledge on the four ways of answering (*catvārīvyākaraṇānī*).

The arhats Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Pūrṇa, Ānanda, Kātyāyana, etc., also know things (*artha*), names (*nāman*), expressions (*nirukti*) and elocution (*pratibhāna*).

This is why the eighteen first attributes [of the Buddha] do not merit the [247c][name of ‘special attributes of the Buddha’.

**II. DETAILED COMMENTARY ON THE LIST**

1-2. The Buddha has no bodily or vocal defect

Question. – Why does the Buddha have no bodily defect (*skhalita*) or vocal defect (*ravita*)?

Answer. – For innumerable incalculable periods (*asaṃkhyyakalpa*) the Buddha has observed purity of morality (*ṣīlavāsuddhi*): this is why his bodily and vocal actions are faultless. The other arhats such as Śāriputra, etc., have cultivated the precepts for less time, sixty kalpas at maximum: this is why they have faults. For innumerable incalculable periods the Buddha has accumulated and perfected the pure precepts (*vāsuddhiśīla*), he has always practiced the profound concentrations (*gambhīrasamādhi*), he has obtained all the marvelous knowledges and has properly cultivated the mind of great compassion (*mahākaruṇācitta*): this is why he is without faults.

Furthermore, the Buddha has uprooted all the root causes of the wrongdoings: this is why he is faultless. The root causes of the wrongdoings are of four kinds: i) lust (*rāga*), it) hatred (*dveṣa*), iii) (bhaya), iv) ignorance (*moha*). The Buddha has uprooted these root causes and their traces (*vāsanā*). The arhats and pratyekabuddhas, although they have uprooted the causes of the wrongdoings, have not eliminated the traces (*vāsanā*): this is why they sometimes have faults. The Buddha himself knows all these dharmas fully and completely.

---

755 Ibid., p. 23: *Etad aggaṃ mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ simhanādikānaṃ yadidaṃ pinḍola-Bhāradvājo.*

One cannot utter the lion’s roar without having the *vaisāradyas*. The fact that Pinḍola utters it shows that the Buddha is not alone in possessing the *vaisāradyas*.

756 If these disciples know these four things, it is because they had the four *pratisamvids*; therefore the Buddha is not alone in having them.

757 Cf. Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 71, p. 366c11-12; k. 101, p. 525b19.
Those who do not know them [thus] commit faults. Thus, Śāriputra while walking with five bhikṣus came to an empty house where he spent the night. It was a day when the pratimokṣa is recited. Śāriputra was not familiar with the rules for the inner limits (antḥasimā) and the outer limits (bāhyasimā). This was reported to the Buddha who said: When one leaves the residence (āvāsa) at the end of one night, there are no determined limits.

Another time Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana returned leading five hundred bhikṣus who uttered loud shouts and cries (uccaśabdā mahāśabdā abhūvan). Then the Buddha chased them away (praṇāmayati sma). This was a vocal fault [on the part of the disciples].

Another time Śāriputra had neglected the dietary rules and the Buddha said to him: You are eating impure food (avīśuddhāra). Thus, therefore, [the arhats] had bodily and vocal faults. But the Buddha who has eliminated the traces of the passions (kleśavāsanā) has no such faults.

Finally, in the Buddha, all the bodily and vocal actions accompany knowledge (jñānānaparivartin): this is why his body is faultless and his voice is faultless.

For all these kinds of reasons, the Buddha has no defect of body (nāsti skhalitam) and no defect of speech (nāsti ravitam).

3. The Buddha has no lapse of mindfulness

There is no failure of mindfulness (nāsti muusitasmrṭi). Indeed, during the long night (dīrgharātram) he developed the mind of the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), he developed the profound concentrations (gambhīrasamādhi), his mind was without any distractions (avikṣipta), he eliminated the thirst of desires (kāmatṛṣṇā) and joy of the dharma (dharmaprīti), his mind was not attached to any dharma and he attained the supreme safety of mind (paramacittakṣemavārā). If the mind is fearful or hasty, there are lapses of mindfulness; but the mind of the Buddha has none of these faults: this is why he has no lapses.

Furthermore, by means of the [memory of] former abodes (pūrvanivāsānusmrṭi), the sciences (vidya) and the powers (bala), the Buddha has triply adorned his mindfulness which is perfect and without defect because his mindfulness often bears upon the past.

Furthermore, as his faculty of mindfulness (smṛtindriya) is of immense and inexhaustible power, his memory has no lapses.

758 These are the precepts relating to the boundaries of the parishes (sīmā) and the celebration of the Upoṣada in common: cf. Vinaya, I, p. 102-136.
759 Episode related in Majjhima, I, p. 456-457 and already mentioned above, p. 1575F.
760 Episode related in detail above, p. 120-121F
Finally, in the Buddha, all mental actions accompany knowledge (sarvaṃ manaskarma jñānānuparivartī): this is why his mindfulness has no lapses since at each moment it accompanies the mind.

This is what is understood by mindfulness without lapse. See what has been [248a] said in the T’ien wen king (Devatāparprechāsūtra).761

[The deity asked]:

Who is the man without fault?
Who is the man with unfailing mindfulness?
Who is the ever-attentive man (smṛtimat)
Who accomplishes what he must do?

[The Buddha answered]:

The man who knows all dharmas perfectly,
Who is freed of all obstacles
And is endowed with all the qualities:
He is unique: it is the Buddha.

4. The Buddha has no notion of variety

He has no notion of variety (nāsti nānātvasamjñā). The Buddha has no point of distinctions (vibhaṅga) among beings; he makes no difference between those who are far away and those who are close; he does not say: This one is noble and I can speak to him; that one is lowly and I must not speak to him. Just as the sun lights up everything, so the Buddha with the rays of his great compassion (mahākaruṇāraśmi) has pity for all and saves all alike. Whether one honors him or does not honor him, whether it concerns enemies or relatives, noblemen or scoundrels, all are alike to him.

See for example this stranger, the dung-sweeper called Ni-t’o (Nītha): the Buddha converted him and he became a great arhat.762

762 Nītha (?) was a refuse-sweeper. His long hair hung down in disorder; he was filthy and his clothes were in tatters. When he found a rag on his way, he used it to mend his garments. On his back he carried a jar full of refuse. One day when the Buddha was visiting Rājagrha, Nītha, lowly and impure, did not dare to come near him for fear of increasing his misdeeds further. He took flight across the city, but at each corner the Buddha appeared before him. The Teacher said to him: “Although your body is impure, your heart possesses the excellent and wonderful perfume of the Dharma. You must not think of yourself as lowly.” Having received the Buddha’s teaching, Nītha entered the religious life and became an arhat.
See also the vaisya Tō-hou (Śrīgupta) who wanted to harm the Buddha with a ditch full of fire and with poisoned rice. The same day, the Buddha liberated him from the threefold poison (trivīṣa) and extinguished the fire of wrong views (mithyāḍṛṣṭi) in him.763

Such examples show that the Buddha has no notion of variety (nānātvasamjñā).

Furthermore, the Buddha has no fondness (anunaya) for the practitioners of his doctrine such as Śāriputra, the bodhisattva Maitreya, etc.; he has no aversion (pratigha) either for people of wrong view such as Devadatta or the six heretic masters, Pūraṇa, etc. As the Buddha has formed his mind [in total impartiality] for innumerable incalculable periods (asaṃkhyeyaklpa), he is the Jewel (ratna) among beings and, like pure gold, he does not undergo variations.

Furthermore, the Buddha has praised the good dharmas (kuśaladharma) in many ways (anekaparyāyena) and criticized the bad dharmas (akuśaladharma) in many ways. However, faced with good or with bad, his mind shows no increase or decrease (anūnādhika): it is only in order to save beings that he makes distinctions. Thus he has no notion of variety.

Furthermore, it is said in the Yi-ts’ie-pou-hing king (Sarvadharmapravṛttinirdeśa):765 “The Buddha considers all beings as his own self, as having fulfilled their role (kṛtya) and having neither beginning, middle or end (anādimadhyaparyavasmana).”766 That is why he has no notion of variety.

The name of the dung-sweeper is poorly established: Nītha or Nīhi in the fragments of the Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, Sunīṭa in Pāli, Ni-t’o and Ni-t’i in the Chinese transcriptions. His story is told in the following sources:

Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā, p. 158-160 (very mutilated fragments) and Sutrālaṃkāra said to be by Aṣvaghoṣa, T 201, no. 43, k. 7, p. 203c-297a (transl. Huber, p. 192-210): Theragāthā, p. 63-64, v. 620-631, and its commentary (tr. Rhys Davids, Psalms of the Brethren, p. 271-274); Hien yu king, T 202, k. 6, no. 35, p. 397a-390a; Tch’ou yao king, T 212, k. 19, p. 710a1-c1. Nītha is also mentioned in passing in the Hien yu king, T 202, k. 4, p. 377a12, and the Sarvāstivādavinayavibhaṅga, T 1442, k. 42, p. 858a28-29.

763 For Śrīgupta, see above, p. 184F, note 4.
764 Stock phrase: cf. Divyāvadāna, p. 95, 124, 265; Avadānaśataka, i, p. 16, 30, 72, etc.
765 The correct title is indeed Sarvadharmapravṛttinirdeśa (cf. Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 6, l. 16; 90. l. 19; 99. l. 3; Mahāvyut. no. 1362) ‘Teaching of the non-functioning of all dharmas’ and not Sarvadharmapravṛttinirdeśa as it is spelled most often in western lists. This sutra has come down to us in three Chinese translations and one Tibetan translation:

1) T 650: Tchou fa wou hing king, transl. by Kumārajīva.
Furthermore, the Buddha sees that all beings and all things are, from the beginning, unborn (anuppana), unceasing (aniruddha), always pure (śuddha) and like nirvāṇa: thus he has no notion of variety.

Finally, the Pou-eul-jou fa-men (Advayapraveśadhamaparyāya) or the ‘Teaching on the entry into non-duality’⁷⁶⁷ is the doorway to the true nature of dharmas (dharmāṇo bhūtalakṣaṇa). Variety (nānāva) is duality (dvaya), and duality is wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi). But the Buddha is not a deceiver (amāyāvin) and cannot commit a deception (māyā). He always applies the Teaching on the entry into non-duality, and deception is variety.

That is why he has no notion of variety.

5. The Buddha has no non-concentrated mind

He has no non-concentrated mind (nāsty asamāhitacittam). Concentration (samādhi) is the non-distraction of the mind (cittāvikṣepa). In a distracted mind, it [248b] is impossible to see the truth: distraction is like a body of water disturbed by waves where one cannot see one’s own face; it is like a lamp (dīpa) in the full wind which cannot illumine well. This is why it is said that the Buddha does not have a non-concentrated mind.

Question. – The concentrations go from the anāgamya [preliminary concentration of the first dhyāna] on up to the absorption of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti). When one enters into these absorptions, it is impossible to assert any physical action (kāyakarman) or vocal action (vākkarman). Hence, if the Buddha is always concentrated (samāhita) and has no non-concentrated mind, how can he travel through the kingdoms, take up the four positions (īryāpatha) and preach the Dharma to the great assemblies with all kinds of nidānas and avadānas? Whether these actions are of the domain of the desire realm (kāmadhātvavacara) or of the Brahmā world, the Buddha cannot enter into concentration if he wants to accomplish them.

Answer. – When we said that he has no non-concentrated mind, that can have several meanings.

---

2) Tchou fa pen wou king, transl. under the Souei by Jinagupta between the 6th and 7th month of the 15th, k’ai houang year or August to September 595 (cf. Li, T 2034, k. 12, p. 103c6).

3) T 652: Ta tch’eng souei tchouan chhou tchou fa king, transl. under the Pei Song (960-1127) by Chao tō and others.

4) OKC 847: Chos thams cad Ḫbyun ba med par bstan pa, transl. by Rin chen mtsho.

766 Cf. Tchou fa wou hing king, T 650, k. 1, p. 751a28-29: “Beings are Bodhi; Bodhi is beings. Bodhi and beings are one and the same thing, namely, the Bhagavat.”

767 According to the practice somewhat current at its time, the Traité here refers to the Vimalakīrtinirdesāsūtra by citing the title of one of its chapters instead of the title of the sūtra itself. It refers to chapter VIII: ‘Introduction to the doctrine of non-duality’ (p. 301-318 of my [Lamotte’s] translation of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa).
Being concentrated means being fixed on the good dhamas with a mind that is always absorbed (sadāsamgrhītacittena). Now the Buddha is fixed on the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dhamas and never strays from that. Therefore he does not have a non-concentrated mind.

Furthermore, in the desire realm (kāmadhātu) there are some concentrations where those who have entered into them are able to preach the Dharma. Thus, in the Abhidharma it is a question of [concentrations] belonging to the desire realm (kāmadhātvavacara), such as the four levels of saints (āryavaṃśa), the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), the four right efforts (samyakpradhāna), the four bases of magical power (ṛddhipāda), the five faculties (indriya), the five strengths (bala), the concentration preventing being attacked by others (araṇāsamādhi), the knowledge resulting from aspiration (pranidhījñāna), and the four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvid). There are marvelous qualities of this kind in which the Buddha is established while entering into the world of desire: this is why he has no non-concentrated mind.

When the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas emerge from concentration (samādher vyuthitāḥ), they enter into an undefined mind (avyākrtacitta), they enter into a good mind (kuśalacitta) or they enter into a defiled mind (samalacitta). But when the Buddha comes out of concentration and enters into a concentration of the desire realm (kāmadhātusamādhi), he has not a single moment of distracted mind (vikṣiptacitta): this is why he has no non-concentrated mind.

Furthermore, according to the śrāvaka system, when the magically created beings (nirmita) preach the Dharma, their creator (nirmātr), namely, the śrāvaka, does not speak, and when the creator speaks, the magically created beings do not speak. It is not so with the Buddha: the magically created beings and their creator, namely, the Buddha, preach the Dharma together. [In the śrāvakas, the mind in concentration (samādhicitta) is necessarily different from the mind of creation (nirmāṇacitta)] and when the śrāvaka enters into concentration, he does not speak. The Buddha himself, while remaining in concentration, is able to preach the Dharma and to walk about (caṅkramitum). This is what is said in the Mi-tsi king (Guhyasūtra, 768)

769 See above, p. 4F and note 1, 633F, 1041F; Kośa, VII, p. 86-87.
770 See Kośa, VII, p. 88-89.
771 In other words, when the Buddha comes out of a dhyāna or a samāpatti of the two higher realms in order to enter into the concentrations of the desire realm so as to devote himself to the practice of the bodhipākṣikadharmas.
772 Here the Traité is repeating what it has already said above, p. 468-469F. Once more it seems to stray from the canonical sources in whose words the nirmitas of the śrāvakas speak when the śrāvaka speaks and remain silent when the śrāvaka is silent. Only the Buddha was able to converse with his nirmitas.
or Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa), in regard to the Secret of the mind (cittaguhyā).\footnote{Cf. T 310, k. 11, p. 59c8 and seq; T 312, k. 9, p. 724c14 and seq.: “From the night when the Tathāgata realized the Bodhi of the Buddhas until the day when he was nirvāṇized, during that interval, the Tathāgata is free of doubt and transformation: his mind is without thought, without movement, without instability, without mixing, without scattering, without distraction, without change…”.”}

“The mind of the Buddhas is always in concentration”, but they are still able to preach the Dharma.

Furthermore, distractions (vikṣiptacitta), fetters (saṃyojana), doubts (vicikitsa) do not exist in the Buddha. Although he has no doubts concerning the four truths (catuḥsatya), the arhat often still has doubts about dhammas. The eternally concentrated Buddha has no doubts about dhammas: this is why he has no non-concentrated mind.

Moreover, the arhat who still has traces of the disturbing emotions (kleśavāsanā) and is capable of regressing (parihāṇadharman) has distractions. The Buddha who, in his omniscience, has complete knowledge, has no distractions. He is like a vessel (ghaṭa) full of water where there is neither sound (svara) nor movement (īraṇa). The Buddha is the only person who can be called free of deception (amāyāvīn);\footnote{However, the bhikṣu who has destroyed the impurities (kṣīṇāsvāra) is also without cheating or deceit (asaṭho hoti amāyāvi): cf. Majjhima, I, p. 97; II, p. 95, 25; Anguttara, III, p. 65; V, p. 15.} he is the foremost of the three strong individuals (drḍhapudgala).\footnote{According to the Tseng yi a han (T 125, k. 12, p. 607a2-5), the three individuals worthy of homage (pūjā) are the Tathāgata, the disciple of the Tathāgata who has destroyed the impurities and is arhat, and the cakravartin king. For the pratyekabuddhas, these individuals are worthy of a stūpa (Dīgha, II, p. 142; Anguttara, II, p. 245).} His mind remains unchanged in suffering as in happiness.

All the characteristics of things (dhammalakṣaṇa), unity (ekārtha), multiplicity (nānārtha), production (upāda), cessation (nirrodha), interruption (uccheda), permanence (śāśvata), coming (āgama) and going (nirgama) are deceptions, \footnote{The eight characteristics in question are rejected by Nāgārjuna in the dedication to his Madhyamakakārikā (cf. Madh. vṛtti, p. 3, l. 11:}

These are the eight well-known Nāgārjunian negations.

\footnote{The Traité lists five acintyas: cf. k. 30, p. 383c17-20: “The sūtra speaks of five incomprehensible things, namely: i) the number of beings, ii) retribution of action (karmavipāka), iii) the strength of a man}
(gambhīranidhāna) of the Buddha. Who can understand them? This is why it is certain that the Buddha has no non-concentrated mind.

Although the Buddha enters into concentration, he does not have these coarse minds (audārikacitta) of investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra) and, having incomprehensible knowledge (acintyajñāna), he can preach the Dharma.

The heavenly musical instruments (divyatūrya) make all sorts of sounds dear to the gods, and they do so while being without mind (citta) or consciousness (viñāna) by virtue of the merits (puṇya) acquired by the gods.778 If these heavenly musical instruments that are without mind or consciousness do such things, how could it be said that the Buddha, who is endowed with mind, cannot preach the Dharma?

This is why it is said that the Buddha does not have a non-concentrated mind.

6. The Buddha has no unconsidered equanimity

He has no unconsidered equanimity (nāsty apratisāṃkhyopecṣā). – Beings have three types of sensations (vedanā): unpleasant (duḥkhavedanā), pleasant (sukhavedanā), neither unpleasant nor pleasant in trance (dhyāyibala), iv) the strength of the nāgas (nāgabala), v) the power of the Buddhas. Of these five incomprehensible things, the power of the Buddhas is the most incomprehensible.” – See also later, k. 90, p.698b20; k. 93, p. 714a21; k. 98, p. 743b14. – The same list is repeated by T’an louan (476-542) in his notes on the Amitāyusūtra, T 1819, k. 2, p. 836b7-10.

However, the canonical sūtras list only four acintyas (in Pāli, acinteyya):

1) Anguttara, II, p. 80: Cattar’ imāni bhikkhave acinteyyāni na cintetabbāni yāni cintento ummādassa vighātassa bhāgī assa. katamāni catthi? Buddhānaṃ buddhavisayo… jhāyissa jhānavisayo… kammavipako… lokacintā: “Here, O monks, are the four incomprehensible things about which you should not think, for the person who thinks about them will be prey to mistakes and trouble. What are these four things? The Buddha domain of the Buddhas, the domain of the person in trance, the retribution of action, and philosophical speculations about the world.”

2) Ekottarāgama, T 125, k. 18, p. 6406-9: i) lokadhātu, ii) sattva, iii) nāgaviṣaya, iv) buddhaviṣaya.

3. Ibid., k. 21, p. 657a2-21: i) sattva, ii) lokadhātu, iii) nāgaviṣaya, iv) buddhaviṣaya.

4) Ratnakūṭa, T 310, k. 8, p. 43c16-18; k. 86, p. 493c16-19: i) karmaviṣaya, ii) nāgaviṣaya, iii) dhyānaviṣaya, iv) buddhaviṣaya.

Contrary to the Traité, the Vibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 113, p. 586b24; T 1546, k. 22, p. 163a8-9) considers that, of the five acintyas, karmaviṣaya is the most profound.

Finally, in the Hien yang cheng kiao louen (T 1602,k. 6, p. 510c2-6), Asaṅga postulates six acintyas: i) ātman, ii) sattva, iii) loka, iv) sarvasattvakarmaviṣaya, v) dhyānasāksātkāra and dhyānaviṣaya. vi) buddha and buddhaviṣaya.

778 See above, p. 1049F, the comments on the lute of the Asuras.
(adṛkhāsukhavedanā). The unpleasant sensation produces hatred (dveṣa), the pleasant sensation produces love (rāga), the neither unpleasant nor pleasant produces confusion (moha). Of these three kinds of sensation, the unpleasant sensation produces suffering (duḥkha), abides in suffering and destroys happiness; the pleasant sensation produces happiness (sukha), abides in happiness and destroys suffering; as for the neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation, one does not know if it is suffering or if it is happiness.

Other people who are of weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) experience the unpleasant and the pleasant sensations especially, but they do not feel the neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation, they do not know it and have only indifference (upekṣā) for it: they are fettered by the fetter of confusion (mohasaṃyojana).

The Buddha, on the other hand, knows completely the moment of arising (utpāda), the moment of duration (sthiti) and the moment of cessation (bhaṅga) of the neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation: this is why it is said that the Buddha has no unconsidered equanimity.

Question. – But what is equanimity (upekṣā) here? Is it the absence of suffering and happiness which is upekṣā, or is it a matter of the upekṣā that is one of the seven factors of enlightenment (saṃbodhyāṅga), or again is it the upekṣā that is one of the four immeasurables (apramāṇacitta)?

Answer. – The absence of suffering and of happiness constitutes the twofold domain (sthānadvaya) of upekṣā and the abandoning [of this domain] is also called upekṣā. How is that?

In the course of a neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation, other people do not take into account, from moment to moment, the moments of arising (utpāda), of duration (sthiti) and cessation (bhaṅga) of this sensation: it takes a long time for them to notice it. But the Buddha cognizes [these three moments] completely each successive moment.

Upekṣā is also part of the seven factors of enlightenment (saṃbodhyāṅga); when the mind is completely balanced, when it is not sinking (nāvāliyete) or being scattered (na vikṣipyate), this is when equanimity (upekṣā) should be practiced. In the moments of sinking, one practices the notion of exertion (vīryasaṃjñā), and in the moments of distraction, one practices the notion of concentration of the mind (cittasaṃgrahanaśaṃjñā).

In some circumstances, the arhats and pratyekabuddhas concentrate their mind wrongly or excite it wrongly, and their equanimity is thus in disequilibrium. The Buddha, however, is never without completely cognizing the coarseness or the subtleness, the profundity or the superficiality inherent in the instantaneous minds. Knowing that, he is [truly] indifferent.

Question. – If that is so, how was the Buddha able to talk to the bhikṣus about Nan-t’o, saying: “In Nanda, the sensations (vedanā) are completely conscious at the moment when they arise, completely conscious when they endure and completely conscious at the moment when they are destroyed, and it is the same for the notions (saṃjñā) and investigations (vitarka)?” [Is that not a privilege reserved to the Buddha?]  

Answer. – There are two ways of being conscious: [249a]

1) When a duḥkhavedanā ‘unpleasant sensation’ arises, knowing that a duḥkhavedanā is arising; when a duḥkhavedanā continues, knowing that a duḥkhavedanā is continuing; when a duḥkhavedanā ceases, knowing that a duḥkhavedanā is ceasing. When a sukhavedanā ‘pleasant sensation’ arises, knowing that a
sukhvedanā is arising; when a sukha-vedanā continues, knowing that a sukha-vedanā is continuing; when a sukha-vedanā ceases, knowing that a sukha-vedana is ceasing. The same for a duḥkha-vedanā ‘neither unpleasant nor pleasant sensation’. This is knowing only the general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), but not the specific characteristics (sva(lakṣaṇa) of the sensation. [This way of being conscious was that of Nanda.]

2) Having full consciousness and full awareness from moment to moment of the duḥkha-, sukh- and aduḥkha-vedanā succeeding one another from moment to moment (kṣanekṣaṇā) and not ignoring the mental events (caitasikadharma) following one another from moment to moment. [This is the way of being conscious of the Buddha.] This is why it is said that he has no unconsidered indifference.

Furthermore, the Buddha sometimes went away from beings in order to enter into deep meditation (pratisaṃlayitum) for one or two months. There are people who doubt and wonder: The Buddha came into the world to save beings; why then is he always in concentration?

The Buddha tells them: “It is for many reasons and knowingly that I am leaving beings. There is no unconsidered indifference (apratisamkhyāipekṣā) in me.”

Question. – What are the reasons why he leaves them knowingly?

Answer. – In the middle of the great assemblies, the Buddha is tired and that is why he wants to rest for a while.

779 These retreats of the Buddha have been frequently mentioned in the texts: Vinaya, III, p. 68, 230; Dīgha, II, p. 237; Samyutta, V.p. 12-13, 320, 325. The Buddha always used the following expression to tale leave: Iccham’ aham addhamāsāṃ (or temāsāṃ, cattāro māse) paṭisallīyitum, n’amhi kenaci upasaṃkamitabbo aṭṭhātra piṇḍapātanīhārakena: “I wish to go into meditation for two weeks (three or four months); I do not wish to be approached by anyone except the person who will bring me food.”

780 Several times, having preached until late in the night, the Buddha was tired and asked one of his disciples, Śāriputra, Ānanda or Maudgalyāyana, to continue with the teaching. The episode is always related in the following words:

Dīgha, III, p. 209; Majjhima, I, p. 354; Samyutta, IV, p. 184; Anguttara, V, p. 126: Atha kho Bhaga... āyasmaṁṭaṁ sāriputtaṁ ānantesi: Vigatathānāpattimahā kho Sāriputta bhikkhuṁgho, paṭibhātu tām Sāriputta bhikkhuṁṇā dhammaṁkathā. Pīṭhī me āgilāyati, tam aham āyamissāmīti. – Evam bhante to kho āyasna Sāriputto Bhagavato paccassosi. – Atha kho Bhagavā catugghoṇaṁ saṁghāṭīṁ paññāpūṇaṁ dakkhiṇena passena sīheyyaṁ kapppesi, pāde pādaṁ accādhāya sato sampajāno utṭhānaṁ saṁbhāṛivatvā.

“Then the Blessed One said to venerable Śāriputra: ‘The community of monks is free of langor and torpor, O Śāriputra; let the religious instruction [for it] come into your mind. My back is sore: I am going to lie down.’ Saying: ‘May it be so, O Lord’, the venerable Śāriputra gave his assent to the Blessed One. Then the Blessed One, having folded his cloak into four, lay down on his right side in the lion pose, one foot resting on top of the other, attentive, lucid, after having fixed his mind on the time to re-arise.”

1346
Furthermore, from lifetime to lifetime, the Buddha has always liked solitude (nāisākramya).

When, as a bodhisattva, he was in his mother’s womb (mārkaṇḍya), his mother loved solitude as well, and it was at forty li from the capital, in the forest of Lan-pi-ni (Lumbini) she gave birth to him.781

When the Buddha attained Bodhi, it was in the forest of Ngeou-leou-p’in lo (Uruvilvā) alone, at the foot of a tree that he became Buddha.782

When he turned the wheel of the Dharma for the first time, it was also at Sien-jen tchou-tch’ou (Ṛṣipatana) in the forest of Lou-lin (Mṛgadāva).783

Furthermore, when the Buddha finished preaching the Dharma, he always advised the bhikṣus to practice solitary meditation (pratisamālayana) in the manner of having no regret (paścātāpa) and, as he himself applied the advice that he gave (kaṇṭhokta), he entered into concentration.

Furthermore, he disliked homage (pūjā) but, when he knew there were beings to be converted (vaineya), he entered into concentration and created fictive beings (nirmitapuruṣa) to come to save them.784

Furthermore, there are beings whose concentrations (samañcādhi) are rare and whose wisdoms (prajñā) are numerous. By giving them the example of his own practice of the dhyānas, the Buddha converts them.

Furthermore, there are people who get tired of always seeing the Buddha, and the Buddha withdraws a little so that they might aspire to see him again.785

---

781 See above, p. 21F, note 2.
782 See above, p. 179F, 227-228F.
783 See above, p. 87F; 182F, note 1, 420F.
784 See the miracle of the multiplication of the fictive buddhas, p. 531-534F and notes; 1352-1353F.
785 Allusion to the schism at Kauśāmbī related above, p. 896-898F and notes.
Furthermore, when the Buddha wished to preach the Dharma to the devas, he went to a solitary place (vivikte sthāne).786

Furthermore, it is in order to establish a rule for future generations that the Buddha meditated and, when he turned the Wheel of Dharma, he passed this custom on to his disciples: this is why he entered into concentration.

Furthermore, the Buddha has shown a twofold path for gathering beings (sattvasamgrahāya): that of concentration (samādhi) and that of wisdom (prajñā). When the Buddha preaches the Dharma in the great assemblies, he illustrates the path of wisdom (prajñāmārga); but when he concentrates his mind in a solitary place (vivikte sthāne cittaṃ samgrhṇāti), he illustrates the path of concentration (samādhimārga).

[249b]

Finally, in the face of the six sense objects (sadviśaya), beings have three kinds of reactions (samskāra): i) seeing beautiful colors (rūpa), they experience the happiness of joy (prītisukla); ii) seeing ugly colors, they experience the suffering of sadness (daurmanasyaduhkhā); iii) seeing neither unpleasant nor pleasant colors, they experience a feeling of indifference (upekṣacitta). And it is the same for [the other sense objects] on up to dharmas. The Buddha, however, has control (vaśita) over the six sense objects (sadviśaya): in the face of pleasant or unpleasant objects, he is able to produce a feeling of indifference as has been said in regard to his holy magic (rddhi).

These are the various reasons why he enters into concentration and does not have any unconsidered indifference.

7. The Buddha has no loss of zeal

He has no loss of zeal (nāsti chandaparihānīh). – Knowing the value of the good dharmas (kuśaladharma), the Buddha always wants to accumulate the good dharmas and since his mind never tires of cultivating the good dharmas, he has no loss of zeal.

[The Buddha helps a blind bhikṣu thread his needle.]787 – Thus there was once an partially blind old bhikṣu who was repairing his cloak (samghāṭi). Unable to thread his needle (sūcī), he said to people: “Would someone who wants to gain merit thread my needle for me?” The Buddha appeared before him and said: “I am someone who loves merit without ever tiring of it. Bring your needle.” Full of respect, the bhikṣu caught a glimpse of the Buddha’s radiance and recognized his voice. He said to the Buddha: “The Buddha

786 Thus Śakradevendra was converted in the Indraśailaguhā (abive, p. 180F, note 2), and the four Caturmahārājaśakāyikadevas, on the shores of lake Mandākini (Sarvāstivādin Vin., T 1435, k. 26, p. 193a; Mūlasarv. Vin., in Gilgit Manuscripts, III, I, p. 256-259; Tch’ou yao king, T 212, k. 23, p. 734b; Vibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 79, p. 410a; T 1546, k. 41, p. 306c; T 1547, k. 9, p. 482c).

787 Anecdote taken from the Śibijātaka of the Avadānanaśataka, I, p. 182-183 which the Traité has already related above, p. 569-570F.
has exhausted the ends and the depths of the immense sea of qualities (*apramāṇaguṇasāgara*); why is he not yet satisfied?” The Buddha said to the bhikṣu: “The reward of the qualities (*guṇavipāka*) is very profound (*gambhīra*). There is nobody who knows their benefits as I do. Although I have exhausted the ends and the depths, my zeal (*chandacitta*) for merit is not yet satisfied (*atṛpta*): this is why I have become Buddha, Consequently, even now I do not stop. Although there are no further qualities that I might obtain, my zeal does not cease.” In fear, gods and men understood: “If the Buddha, [perfect as he is] is so insatiable for the qualities (*guṇavatṛptaḥ*), what would it be for other people?” The Buddha preached the Dharma to the bhikṣu and at once his fleshly eye (*māṃsacakṣus*) was enriched with the pure eye of wisdom (*prajñācakusus*).

Question. - But the Buddha had previously eliminated the zeal for all the good dharmas (*sarveṣu kuśaleṣu dharmeṣuchandaḥ*); why is it said here that he has not lost zeal (*nāsti chandapariṇāṇiḥ*)?

Answer. – When he ruled out zeal for all the good dharmas, he had in mind those who are “zealous to obtain good dharmas that have not yet been obtained” (*anupannānāṃ kuśalānāṃ dharmānāṃ utpādāya chandam janayanti*) or who “are zealous so that good dharmas already obtained should develop” (*upannānāṃ kuśalānāṃ dharmānāṃ bhūyobhāvāya chandam janayanti*). But the Buddha does not have that type of zeal. Completely endowed with all the qualities (*sarvagunasampanna*), there is nothing that he has not obtained and he has nothing to increase. Here the word ‘zeal’ (*chanda*) means what I have said above: although the Buddha is endowed with all the qualities, his zeal for them has not come to a stop.

In the horse-jewel (*aśvaratna*), even if it has arrived at its destination, the desire to go forward never ceases and persists until death. It is the same for the Buddha-Jewel. When the great fire at the end of the kalpa (*mahākalpoddāha*) has burned and consumed the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu, the power of fire has not disappeared. It is the same for the fire of the Buddha’s wisdom: when he has burned up all the passions (*kleśa*) and illumined all things, the zeal associated with this wisdom (*prajñāsamprayuktachanda*) is not extinguished.

Moreover, although the Buddha fulfills all the good dharmas and all the qualities, beings are inexhaustible (*akṣaya*) in number and this is why the desire which the Buddha has to save them all does not stop.

Question. – If the desire that the Buddha has to save all beings never [249c] ceases, why then does he enter into nirvāṇa?

Answer. – There are two ways to save beings: some obtain salvation when the Buddha is present, others obtain salvation after his nirvāṇa. Thus it is said in the Fa-houa king (Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra):

---

788 Two of the four *samyakpradhānas*.
789 One of the seven jewels of the cakravartin king.
791 In the view of the Mahāyāna, the nirvāṇa of the Buddha is not an historical fact but simply skillful means (*upāyu*), a fiction destined to convert beings.
“When the master physician had given the medicinal plants he had gathered to his sons, he left them.”

This is why the Buddha enters into nirvāṇa.

Moreover, there are beings with weak faculties (mṛdvindriya) and slight virtues who are incapable of realizing the grand undertaking [of salvation] and who can only plant the causes of merits. This is why the Buddha enters into nirvāṇa [without waiting for them to reach their salvation].

Question. – But even after the death (nirodha) of the Buddha, there are still people who become arhat; why do you say that they can only plant the causes of merits?

Answer. – Although some become arhat, they are so rare that it is not worth mentioning. On the other hand, as soon as the Buddha preaches the Dharma, there are, in the ten directions, innumerable and incalculable beings who obtain Bodhi. After the death of the Buddha, it is the same. Similarly in a great kingdom, there are indeed some punitive military expeditions, but these are so rare that we do not speak about them. This is why, although beings are inexhaustible in number, the Buddha enters into nirvāṇa.

Finally, it is said in the Mo-ho-yen Cheou-leng-yen king (Mahāyāna Śūraṃgamasamādhisūtra): “In the Pratimaṇḍitī universe, the Buddha has a life-span of seven hundred incalculable periods (asamkhyeyalkalpa) during which he saves beings.” This is why it is said that the Buddha has no loss of zeal (chandaparihāṇī).

792 Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, p. 322, l. 5-6 (cf. Transl. of Kumārajīva, T 202, k. 6, p. 43a27-28: Sa (vaidyapuruṣa) evaṃ tān putrān upāyakausalyenānusīṣyārayatarāṃ janapadapradeśāṃ prakṛntāḥ.

A physician, having returned from a voyage, found his sons sick from a poisonous drink. He offered them an antidote. Some of his sons took it and were cured at once. Others, repulsed by the smell and taste of the remedy, refused to drink it. In order to make these recalcitrants take the potion, the physician resorted to a skillful stratagem. He gave them the antidote again, then he left for a foreign land. From there, he spread the rumor of his death, and his afflicted sons, in memory of their father, finally took the remedy and were cured. Knowing that his sons were free of their illness, the physician showed himself to them again.

Similarly, the Buddha preaches the path of salvation, but some of his listeners refuse to take it. Then the Buddha pretends to enter into nirvāṇa so that the obstinate ones, grieved by his death, finally consent to be converted. Actually this nirvāṇa is just a skillful stratagem. 


“The public ministry of the Buddha Śākyamuni lasted only 45 years. Working for such a short period of time for the good and happiness of beings, Śākyamuni experienced only a rather lukewarm zeal. How can you say that he had no loss of zeal?”

In order to answer this objection, the Traité appeals here to a passage from the Śūraṃgamasamādhi identifying the Śākyamuni of the Sahā universe, who entered nirvāṇa at the age of 48 years, with the buddha Vairocana of the Pratimaṇḍitī whose life-span is seven hundred incalculable periods.
8. The Buddha has no loss of exertion

He has no loss of exertion (nāsti vīryaparihāṇih). – See what has been said about loss of zeal: zeal (chanda) is synonymous with exertion (vīrya).

Question. - If that is so, the special attributes (āvenikadharma) are no longer eighteen in number [but just seventeen]. Furthermore, in the list of mental events (caitasikadharma), a distinction is made between zeal and exertion. Then why do you say that zeal is confused with exertion?

Answer. – Zeal is the action taken at the beginning and, when zeal is developed, it has the name of exertion. This is what the Buddha said: “All dharmas have zeal as their root” (chandamālakāḥ sarve dharmāḥ). Zeal is like a thirsty man who wants to find something to drink; exertion is like the means (upāya) used to seek something to drink. Zeal is mind (citta), desire to find: exertion serves to realize the thing. Zeal comes from a mental action (manakarman); exertion comes from three actions: [mental action, vocal action and physical action]. Zeal is internal; exertion is external. These are the resemblances and the differences.

In the passage in question, the bodhisattva Drdhmati asks Śākyamuni: “How long is your life-span and when will you enter nirvāṇa?” Śākyamuni answers: “My life-span is exactly the same as that of the buddha Vairocana of the Pratimaṇḍitā.” Drḍamati then goes to this universe to ask Vairocana who replies that his life-span will be exactly seven hundred incalculable periods like that of the buddha Śākyamuni. Returning to the Sahā universe, Drḍhamati communicates this information to the disciples of Śākyamuni and the latter finally acknowledges: “The buddha Vairocana is myself who, under a different name, assures the welfare and the happiness of all beings.”

The result is that the zeal of Śākyamuni is not limited to 45 years but extends over seven hundred incalculable periods.

Nevertheless, it would be a complete misunderstanding of the intent of the Mahāyāna to identify Śākyamuni with one or another Buddha in particular: in reality, he is mixed up with all the Buddhas whose true way of existing (tathatā) is an inconceivable ‘non-existence’.

In another passage (p. 129-131 of the translation), the Śūramgamasamādhī states that the Tathāgatas are non-existent in the past, the present and the future, and that they are identical in that they are like magic and a mirage, without coming or going. And the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa (p. 355-359) in turn affirms that the true manner of seeing the Tathāgata is ‘to see him as if there was nothing to see’.

794 The Pāli Abhidhamma (cf. Compendium of Philosophy, p. 237 and seq.) lists 52 mental events (cetasika); the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma (cf. Kośa, II, p. 150-165) has 46. Both make a distinction between chanda, defined as ‘desire for action’ (kartukamatā) and vīrya, defined as ‘endurance in the mind’ (cetaso ‘bhypsāhaḥ).

795 Anguttara, IV, p. 339, l. 4; V, p. 107, l. 6; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 28, p. 602c4: Chandamūlakā, āvuso, abbe dhammad.
Moreover, exertion is loved by the Buddhas: it is in this way that the Buddha Śākyamuni skipped over nine kalpas\textsuperscript{796} and quickly attained anuttara samyaksaṃbodhi.

\[Śākaśasūtra.\] – Moreover, it is said that one day the Buddha said to Ānanda: “Preach the Dharma to the bhikṣus; my back hurts (prṣṭhī ma āvīlāyati); I am going to rest for a while.” Then the Bhagavat folded his upper garment in four (caturguṇam uttarāsangam prajñapya), spread it on the ground and with his cloak (saṃgāti) as a pillow (bimbohana), lay down. Ānanda preached the seven factors of enlightenment (saptasambodhyaṅga). When he had come to the factor ‘exertion’ (vīryasambodhyaṅga), the Buddha arose with a start and said to Ānanda: “Ānanda, are you praising exertion?” (pratibhātāṃ ta Ānanda vīryam) Ānanda answered “I am praising it.” And this happened three times. Then the Buddha said: “Good, good! Exertion well cultivated leads to the supreme perfect enlightenment (vīryam āsevitam anuttarasamyaksambodhaye) and all the more so to the other Bodhis.”\textsuperscript{797}

This is why the Buddha has no loss of exertion and, if he does not stop \textsuperscript{250a} even when he is sick, what can be said about when he is not sick?

Moreover, in order to save beings, the Buddha gives up the happiness of his very deep concentration (gambhīrasamādhi) and he saves beings by means of all kinds of bodies (kāya), by all kinds of voices (vāc), by all kinds of means (upāya). Sometimes he borrows dangerous paths; sometimes he eats bad food;\textsuperscript{798} sometimes he suffers cold and heat (sītosya); sometimes he encounters wicked objections (mithyācodana), harmful words (pāruṣyavāda) and curses. He endures them patiently without disgust. Although he has mastery (vaśita) over all dharmas, the Buddha accomplishes these things without producing laziness (kausīḍya).

\[Conversion of Subhadra.\]\textsuperscript{799} – Thus, after having saved beings, when the Buddha had lain down in the Sol-o-lin (Śālavana) under two trees, the brahmacārin Siu-p’o (Subhadra) said to Ānanda: “I have heard that this very night (adya rātryāṃ) the Omniscient One (sarvajñā) will die: I would like to see the Buddha.” Ānanda stopped him, saying: “The Buddha has preached the Dharma far and wide to people and he is very sick (klānta).” The Buddha overheard and said to Ānanda: “Let Subhadra approach: he will be the last of my disciples (ayaṃ me paścimo bhavisyati śrāvānāṃ).” Subhadra was able to approach, questioned the

---

\textsuperscript{796} Normally a bodhisattva needs a hundred kalpas to accomplish the actions productive of the marks of the Great Man, but Śākyamuni, thanks to his exertion, accomplished them in 91 kalpas. On these nine kalpas skipped over thus by Śākyamuni, see the references above, p. 252, note 1.

\textsuperscript{797} This has already been cited twice, p. 243-244F and 942-943F. To the references given on p. 244F, the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 286-288, should be added and the Chinese version Pan ni yuen king (T 6, k. 2, p. 184b14-28) summarized by E. Waldschmidt, Lebensende des Buddha, p. 169-170. See also Tsa a han (T 99, no. 727, k. 27, p. 195b29-196a11.

\textsuperscript{798} Invited to Verañjā by the Brahmin Agnidatta, the Buddha was reduced to eating barley: see above, p. 124F and n. 1.

\textsuperscript{799} On the conversion of Subhadra, see above, p. 205-209F and n. To these references, add the account of this conversion given in the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 366-386.
Buddha on his doubts; the Buddha preached the Dharma to him as he wished and cut through his doubts. Subhadra obtained Bodhi.

Before the Buddha entered into nirvāṇa without residue (anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa), the bhikṣus said to the Buddha: “Bhagavat, it is wonderful (adbhuta) that, right at the end, you had compassion for this brahmārīn heretic and you spoke with him.” The Buddha said: “It is not just in the present lifetime (ihajanman) that I have saved him as I was dying. In an earlier lifetime (pūrvajanman), when I had not yet obtained Bodhi, I saved him as I was dying.”

[Jātaka of the deer who sacrificed himself]800 – Once, innumerable and incalculable periods (asamkhyaeyakalpa) ago, there was a great tree in the forest that sheltered many birds and animals. A forest fire (dāva) broke out which blazed on three sides at once: only one direction was saved, but it was blocked off by a river (nadi). All the animals crowded in there miserably without finding a way to save their lives by flight.

At that time there was a deer (mṛga) who was big and strong. With my forefeet I leaned on one bank, with my hind feet I crouched on the other bank. I ordered the animals to cross over by walking on my back (prṣṭha). My skin (tvac) and my flesh (māṃsa) were completely torn, but by the power of my compassion (karuṇā), I supported them up to my death.

At the end, there was one hare (śaśaka) left. My strength was exhausted, but at the price of a supreme effort, I let him cross. When he had crossed over, my back broke and I fell into the river and died.

This happened a long time ago and it is not just today [that I have saved someone when I was at the end of my strength]. Those who at that time were the first to cross are my present disciples; the hare who crossed last is today Subhadra.

800 This Jātaka exists in three different versions: The first appears in the Tibetan version and the Chinese version of the Mūlasarv. Vinaya (T 1451, k. 38, p. 397b21-c13), the one edited and the other translated by E. Waldschmidt in the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (p. 476-478). The original Sanskrit occurs in the Avadānaśataka, I, p. 235-236 (tr. Feer, p. 157-158): Bhūtapūrvaḥ bhikṣavo ‘tīte ‘dhvani anyatarasyāṁ parvatadaryāṁ m rgayūhapah prativasati ... kauśināgarā Mallā mṛgataśavako ‘yaṁ Subhadraḥ.

The second version is that of the Traité. It differs slightly from the preceding. The herd of deer is not controlled by the king, but is forced to flee by a fire. The last animal to pass on the deer-king’s back is not a baby deer but a hare. Finally the first animals to cross are not the actual Mallas of Kuśinagara but the actual disciples of the Buddha.

The third version, even more aberrant, is in the Lieou tou tsi king, T 152, no. 57, k. 6, p. 32c11-33a5 (transl. Chavannes, Contes, I, p. 218-220). Here a herd of five hundred deer is encircled; the deer-king stands on the rope that encircles them and lets all the other deer escape by passing over on his back. There is no fire and no little animal that is the last.

Also, the deer is one of the favorite animals of Buddhist folklore and often appears in other Jātaka tales such as the Ruru and the Nigrodhamiga Jātaka (see above, p. 972-975F).
Therefore it is from lifetime to lifetime that the Buddha likes to use exertion, and it is not just today that he never stops. This is why it is said that he has no loss of exertion.

9. The Buddha has no loss of mindfulness

He has no loss of mindfulness (nāsti smṛtiparihāniḥ). – Since he is endowed with all the knowledges (sarvajñāna) of the things of the three times (tryadhvadharma), his memory (smṛti) is perfect (sampūrna) and without lapse (aparihāni).

Question. – First it was said that the Buddha has no failure of mindfulness (muṣītasmrīti) and now it is said that he has no loss of mindfulness (smṛtiparihāni). Are the absence of failure of mindfulness and the absence of loss of mindfulness the same or different? If they are the same, why repeat it; if they are different, what does the difference (viśeṣa) consist of?

Answer. – Failure of mindfulness (muṣītasmrīti) is a mistake (viparyaya); loss of mindfulness (smṛtiparihāni) is a defect (abhibhava). Failure of mindfulness is an error in the postures (īryāpatha), the way one holds one’s head, comes or goes; non-loss of mindfulness is the mindfulness lasting during the concentrations (samādhi) and the superknowledges (abhijñā), the unhindered penetration (apraṭiṭaprativedha) of the past and the present. [250b]

Question. – Why is just non-loss of mindfulness (smṛtyuparihāni) itself a special attribute of the Buddha?

Answer. – The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas who practice the four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) well have strong mindfulness; but, strong as it is, it still has lows (ānatva) and obstacles (vighna) and does not penetrate deeply. As I have said in regard to the power of the mindfulness of former abodes (pūrvanivāsamṛṭijñānabala), the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas remember their former abodes for a maximum of 84,000 kalpas: beyond that they have lapses of memory. Moreover, in the path of seeing the truths (satyadarśanamārga), they cannot distinguish the successive moments [of the sixteen minds making up this path]. The Buddha himself distinguishes the three characteristics of each of these moments: [arising, duration and cessation]. There is not a single thing that the Buddha does not remember: this is why he alone has no loss of mindfulness.

Moreover, the power of knowledge of the former abodes is a knowledge (jñāna) depending on the memory. That is what the Buddha has power (bala) in. The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not possess this power of memory (smṛtibala) and other people still less.

Finally, the Buddha guards his mindfulness by his unobstructed deliverance (apraṭihatavimukta) and his omniscience: this is why he has no loss of mindfulness.

For all these reasons, the Buddha has no loss of mindfulness.

801 Above, p. 1555F.
10. The Buddha has no loss of wisdom

He has no loss of wisdom (nāsti prajñāparihāṇih). – As the Buddha has obtained all these wisdoms (prajñā), he has no loss of wisdom; as his wisdom of the three times (tryadvajñāna) is unobstructed, he has no loss of wisdom.

Moreover, he is endowed with the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) and the four unhindered wisdoms (pratisamvid): this is why he has no loss of wisdom. If the oil (taila) is plentiful and the wick (vartikā) is clean, the flame of the lamp (dīpajvāla) is excellent.802 It is the same for the Buddha who has concentrations such as the Samādhīrasamādhi as oil and, as clean wick, the absence of loss of mindfulness. This is why the radiance of his wisdom is immense and uneclipsed.

Moreover, since his first production of the mind of awakening (prathamacittotpāda) and for innumerable and incalculable periods (asamkhyevala), the Buddha has accumulated all the wisdoms and, in accordance with his high resolution (adhyāśaya), he has sacrificed his head (śiras), his eyes (nayana), his marrow (majjā) and his skull (mastaka), he has given all his inner and outer possessions, he has entered into fire, he has thrown himself down from mountains, he has flayed his skin, he has nailed his body, etc.;803 there is no suffering that he has not endured, careful to accumulate wisdom. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, the wisdom of the Buddha is aided by all the qualities: morality (śīla), concentration (samādhi), etc. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, from lifetime to lifetime, he has studied all the books, whether it is the conventional sciences (saṃvṛtidharma) or the Buddha dharma, coarse (audārika) or subtle (sūkṣma), good (kuśala) or bad (akuśala), he has studied it all and understands it all. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, he has read, thought about, meditated on and investigated the teachings heard from the mouths of the innumerable Buddhas of the ten directions. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, in the interest of beings and to increase all the good dharmas, he has destroyed ignorance (avidyā) everywhere. This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

Furthermore, his wisdom really understands the [true] nature of dharmas, non-arising (anutpāda), non-cessation (anirodha), non-defilement (asamkleśa), non-purification (avvavadāna), non-action (anabhisamskāra), non-functioning (asamudācāra). He makes no distinction between true knowledge and false knowledge.804 He knows that the dharmas are identical and equally pure (viṣuddha), without

802 Cf. Saṃyutta, II, p. 86: Seyyathāpi bhikkhave telaṃ ca paṭicca vaṭṭim ca paṭicca telappadīpo jhāveyya.
803 These deeds of the future Buddha have been told in preceding pages (143-144F, 688-691F, 714-720F, 755-766F, 889-890F, 972-977F, etc.). Most took place in the north-west of India.
804 An idea often developed by the Traité, e.g., p. 1058F, 1106F.
defilement (aṅkīṣṭa) and without stain (nirupalepa) like space (ākāśa). Disregarding all duality, he acquires the [true] nature of the Dharma, i.e., [250e] entry into non-duality (advayapraveśa). This entry into non-duality, characteristic of the Dharma, is immense (apramāṇa) and infinite (ananta). This is why he has no loss of wisdom.

For various reasons of this kind, the Buddha has no loss of wisdom.

11. The Buddha has no loss of deliverance

He has no loss of deliverance (nāsti vimuktiparihāṇiḥ). – Deliverance (vimuktī) is twofold: i) conditioned (saṃskṛta) and ii) unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). Conditioned deliverance is the deliverance associated with pure wisdom (anāsravaprajñāsaṃprayukta). Unconditioned deliverance is the cessation without residue of all the disturbing emotions (kleśa) with their residues (vāsanā). In the Buddha there is no loss of this twofold deliverance. Why? The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas whose wisdom is not very keen (tīkṣṇā) and whose disturbing emotions have not been entirely destroyed have loss of deliverance, but the Buddhas whose wisdom is supremely keen and whose disturbing emotions and the traces of the emotions have ceased definitively without residue have no loss of deliverance.

Moreover, as I have said above (p. 1560F) in regard to the power of the destruction of the impurities (āsravaksayabala), there are differences between the deliverance of the Buddhas and that of the śrāvakas. The Buddha has the power of the destruction of the impurities and therefore has no loss of deliverance; the adepts of the two Vehicles, (i.e., the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas), do not have this power and therefore have loss of deliverance.

12. The Buddha has no loss of the wisdom and the vision of deliverance

There is no loss of the wisdom and the vision of deliverance (nāsti vimuktiṣānaṣaṇaparihāṇiḥ). – In regard to these deliverances, the wisdom of the Buddha is immense (apramāṇa), infinite (ananta) and pure (viśuddha): this is why he has no loss of the wisdom and the vision of deliverance.

Question. – The Buddha has no loss of anything; why would it be only in regard to such things [chanda, vīrya, smṛti, prajñā, vimukti and vimuktiṣānaṣaṇa] mentioned in the special attributes no. 7 to12] that there is no loss?

Answer. – In order to realize one’s own benefit (svārtha) and the benefit of others (parārtha), the first four things are enough: i) chanda ‘zeal’ is the basis (mūla) for seeking all the good dharmas; ii) vīrya ‘exertion’ is capable of acting; iii) smṛti ‘mindfulness’ mounts guard like a gatekeeper (dauvārika): it lets the good enter but keeps out the bad; iv) prajñā ‘wisdom’ illumines all the teachings (dharmamukha) and destroys

805 Cf. Kośa, VI, p. 296 seq.
the disturbing emotions (kleśa). Using these four things allows the realization of the goal: [the benefit of oneself and that of others].

The fruit of retribution (vipākaphala) of these four things is twofold: i) vimukti, ‘deliverance’; ii) vimukti jñānadarśana, ‘knowledge and vision of deliverance’. The meaning of vimukti has been defined above. As for vimukti jñānadarśana, it is by using it that one understands the two kinds of deliverance, i.e., conditioned deliverance (saṃskṛta) and unconditioned deliverance (asaṃskṛta), and one also understands the other kinds of deliverance; occasional deliverance (sāmayikī vimukti), non-occasional deliverance (asāmayikī vimukti), deliverance of mind (cetovimukti), deliverance by wisdom (prajñāvimukti), twofold deliverance (abhayatobhāgavimukti), destructible deliverance (bhedayavimukti), indestructible deliverance (abhedayavimukti), the eight liberations (vimokṣa), the inconceivable liberations (acintyavimokṣa), the unobstructed liberations (avyāhatovimokṣa), etc.

The Buddha distinguishes all these deliverances, solid or non-solid: that is why ‘he has no loss of the knowledge and the vision of deliverance.’

As has been said above (p. 1358F) in regard to the recollection of the Buddha, among the five elements of sainthood (aśaiksaskandha), the latter possesses the element consisting of the knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimukti jñānadarśanaskandha). Here it is necessary to speak about it at length.

Question. – We say ‘knowledge and vision of deliverance’: it should be enough to say ‘knowledge’ (jñāna); why add ‘vision’ (darśana) as well?

Answer. – By saying knowledge and vision, we reinforce the matter. It is like with ropes (rajju): when two ropes are joined together into one, it is stronger.

Moreover, to say only ‘knowledge’ would not include all the wisdoms (prajñā). See what the Abhidharma says:

“The wisdoms (prajñā) are of three types: i) involving knowledge (jñāna) and not vision (darśana); ii) involving vision and not knowledge; iii) involving both knowledge and vision. Those that involve knowledge and not vision are: the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (āsravakṣaya jñāna), the knowledge of non-arising (anuptādajñāna) and the knowledge associated with the [251a] first five consciousnesses (pañcavijñānasamprayuktajñāna). Those that involve vision and not knowledge are the eight ksāntis [of the path of seeing the truths], right worldly vision (laukikā samyagdrṣṭi) and the five wrong views (mithyadṛṣṭi). Those that involve both knowledge and vision are all the other wisdoms.”

[In the case we are dealing with here] simply saying ‘knowledge’ would exclude vision; simply saying ‘vision’ would exclude knowledge. This is why we say ‘knowledge and vision’: that makes it complete (sampanna).

Moreover, whatever is conceived (vikalpita) and determined (vicārīta) as a function of the teachings of a third person is called knowledge (jñāna); what one realizes by oneself (svataḥ sākṣākṛta) is called vision (darśana). Similarly, if the ear hears something but still has doubts, that is called knowledge; on the other

806 See the detail in Viṣṇu, p. 490b-c.
hand, if the eye sees and perceives by itself unhesitatingly, that is called vision. These are the differences (*viṣeṣa*) between knowledge and vision.

Furthermore, according to some, arhats still doubt their own deliverance (*vimukti*) and do not recognize it personally. But such arhats are not real arhats. Also, in order to cut this wrong view (*mithyadṛṣṭi*), the Buddha said that the saints (*āryapudgala*) recognize and see deliverance. But such arhats are not real arhats. Also, in order to cut this wrong view (*mithyadṛṣṭi*), the Buddha said that the saints (*āryapudgala*) recognize and see deliverance.

The Buddha, on the other hand, is endowed with an absolutely pure faculty of wisdom (*adhimātraprajñendriyasamanvāgata*) and recognizes the instantaneous arisings and cessations (*ksaṇikotpādanirodha*) belonging to each dharma. This is why he ‘has no loss of knowledge and vision of deliverance’.

Finally, the Buddha is endowed with the perfection of the Dharma eye (*dharmacakṣurviṣuddhi*) and, as is said in regard to this Dharma eye, the Buddha knows the beings who enter nirvāṇa either by the gate of deliverance of emptiness (*śūnyatāvimokṣamukha*) or by the gate of deliverance of signlessness (*ānimitavimokṣamukha*) or by the gate of deliverance of wishlessness (*apraṇīhitavimokṣamukha*). He knows those who see the five aggregates (*skandha*), the twelve bases of consciousness (*āyatana*) and the eighteen elements (*dhātu*), and who, by these various teachings (*nānāvidhadharmamukha*), obtain deliverance. In this knowledge and this vision of deliverance, the Buddha has a complete and universal knowledge. This is why it is said that he has no loss of the knowledge and vision of deliverance.

13-15. Every physical, vocal or mental action of the Buddha accompanies knowledge

All his bodily actions, all his vocal actions and all his mental actions accompany knowledge (*sarvāṇi kāyavāgmanaskarmāṇi jñānānaparivartini*). - In the Buddha, all bodily, vocal and mental actions are preceded by knowledge (*jñānapūrvamgama*) and, subsequently, accompany knowledge (*jñānānaparivartini*).

Of all the bodily, vocal or mental actions of the Buddha, there is not one that is not useful to beings: this is why it is said that his actions are preceded by knowledge and accompany knowledge.

Thus it is said in a sūtra: “In the Buddhas, even the outbreath (*prāśvāsa*) and the inbreath (*āśvāsa*) are useful to beings.” How, then, would their bodily, vocal and mental actions not be useful to them? The wicked who smell the perfume (*gandha*) of the breath (*ānāpāna*) of the Buddha obtain pure faith (*cittaprasāda*) and love the Buddha. The gods who breathe the perfume of his breath renounce the five objects of desire (*pañcakāmaguṇa*) and resolve to practice the good. This is why it is said that his bodily, vocal and mental actions accompany knowledge.
The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not have this privilege. First they do good in their mind and then only afterwards by means of bodily or vocal actions.\textsuperscript{807} Sometimes even their mental action (\textit{manaskarman}) is indeterminate (\textit{avyākṛta}) and is produced without accompanying knowledge. [If that is so for [251b] them], what can be said for other people?

Take for example the bhikṣu \textit{Kiao-fan-po-t’i} (Gavāmpati): although he was arhat, he spit up his own food and then swallowed it again.\textsuperscript{808} Such an action does not accompany knowledge.

See also the bhikṣu-arhat \textit{Mo-t’eou-po-sseu-tcho} (Madhuvāsiṣṭha) who climbed onto scaffolding (gosāraka), walls (bhitti) and trees (vrkṣa).\textsuperscript{809}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{807} According to the principle: \textit{Cetanāham, bhikkhave, kammaṃ vadāmi; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena manasa:} “I say that action is volition, and it is after having willed that one does an action by the body, speech or mind” (Anguttara, III, p. 415; Kathāvatthu, p. 393; Tchong a han, T 26, k. 27, p. 600a24). In ordinary beings, volition must be followed by a bodily or vocal ‘gesture’ in order to be effective; in higher beings, volition is enough to realize the intention.

\textsuperscript{808} For Gavāmpati, see above, p. 97F and n. 2. In his earlier existences, he had been a ruminant and later, becoming an arhat, he always re-swallowed his food.

\textsuperscript{809} Unknown in the Pāli sources, the legend of Madhuvāsiṣṭha, ‘Excellent Honey’, appears in fragmentary state in the Chinese texts, but can easily be reconstituted:

\begin{itemize}
  \item A. Tchong a han, T 26, k. 8, p. 471a16-29.
  \item B. Mahāsāṅghika Vin., T 1425, k. 29, p. 464a13-27.
  \item C. Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 12, p. 163c8-164a12.
  \item E. Hien yu king, T 202, no, 54, k. 12, p. 429e10-430c3; Dzan-lun, transl. I.J. Schmidt, \textit{Der Weise und der Thor}, chap. XL.
  \item F. Mahāvastu, T 1545, k. 99, p. 514c29-515a14.
  \item G. Vibhāṣā, T 1546, k. 49, p. 372a13-27.
  \item H. \textit{Traité}, T 1508, k. 26, p. 251b2-4; k. 38, p. 337a6-8; k. 84, p. 649c10-13.
  \item I. Si-yu-ki, T 2087, k. 4, p. 890b19-c3 (transl. Watters, I, p. 309).
  \item J. Ibid., T 2087, k. 7, p. 908b16-21 (transl. Watters, II, p. 65).
\end{itemize}

Once, at the time of the buddha Kāśyapa, a young bhikṣu, on seeing another śramaṇa leaping over a canal, shouted: “This man is as agile as a monkey!” Bad luck overtook him: this irreverent comment brought him rebirth in the form of a monkey for five hundred lifetimes (sources E, H).

It was only during his last lifetime as a monkey that he met the Buddha Śākyamuni. A Brahmin named Vasiṣṭha was grieving because he had no son and the heretical teachers whom he consulted held out no hope for him. On his wife’s advice, he went to find the Buddha and offered him a new robe. The Teacher consoled him and predicted that he would soon have a son called to high destinies. Full of gratitude, the brahmin Vasiṣṭha invited the Buddha and the Sangha to a meal. On their return, Śākyamuni and his monks stopped near a pool and set down their bowls on the ground. It was then that there took
place the meeting between the Buddha and a monkey who was none other than the young monk who had been insolent in past times (source E).

The texts are not in agreement on the place where this meeting took place and have proposed, respectively:

Vaiśālī and more precisely, the Markaṭahradatīra ‘Edge of the Monkey Pool’ in the Kūṭāgarāśala ‘Hall of the Belvedere’ (sources A, D, F, J).

The shore of the Li-k’i-tcho river, not otherwise identified (source B).

Nādikā Kuṇjikāvasatha (in Pāli, Nādika Giṇjikāvasatha), i.e., ‘Nādikā, in the Tiled House’, a village in the land of the Vṛjis between Koṭigrāma and Vaiśālī (sources C, G).

Śrāvastī (source E).

A dried-up pool near Mathurā (source I).

Whatever the exact place, the monkey in question seized the Buddha’s bowl. The monks were afraid that he would break it and started off in pursuit, but the Buddha called them back. The monkey went off with the bowl, climbed up into a śāla tree (Vatica robusta), took some honey with which he filled the bowl, came back down carefully and gravely presented the pot of honey to the Buddha but the latter did not accept it. The monkey retreated several paces and, with a bamboo stem, took out the insects caught in the honey, came back again and presented the bowl anew, but again without any success. Not discouraged, he went to a clear spring, washed the honey with water and for the third time offered it to the Buddha who finally accepted it and shared it with his disciples (sources A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I).

Seeing his offering accepted, the monkey leapt with joy, but while he went away dancing, he lost his footing, fell into a ditch or hole where he died (sources B, C, E, F, G, I). One source (B) has it that he gained the Trāyastriṃśa heaven, but it is generally thought that he took birth directly into the world of humans (sources C, D, R, F, G, I).

He was incarnated in the womb of Vasīṣṭha’s wife and, as a reward for his merit, great wonders were realized: during the months of his gestation, a rain of madhu i.e., honey, fell from the sky (source C); on the day of his birth, all the utensils in the house were spontaneously filled with honey (source E). As honey seemed to follow him everywhere and his father was called Vasīṣṭha, he was given the name Madhu-Vasiṣṭha (sources C, E).

At the required age, Madhuvāsiṣṭha, triumphing over the resistance of his parents, entered the religious life, and the Buddha gave him ordination according to the quick procedure of ehībhikṣukā (source E). He practiced brahmacarya and became arhat (source B, C, D, E, F, G). But the miracle of honey followed him throughout his religious life: every day he was miraculously gratified by three pots of honey which he gave respectively to the Buddha, the Saṃgha and to his parents (source C); when he was walking with his colleagues and when he saw them faltering, it was enough for him to hold out his bowl and it became filled immediately by the gods (sources C, D).

Nevertheless, his great holiness had not liberated him from the traces of his passions (kleśavāsanā) and, retaining the habits of monkeys, he was often seen climbing on walls and in trees (source H).
Finally, see Pi-ling-k’ie-p’o-ts’o (Pilindavatsa) who insulted the Ganges and treated it as a little slave (vatsala)\(^8\)10811

Such bodily and vocal actions are not preceded by knowledge (jñānāpurvamgama) and do not accompany knowledge (jñānāparivartin). The Buddha himself has none of these things.

*** *** ***

**Digression on a case brought against the Buddha\(^8\)12**

It has long been noticed that, in the Si-yu-ki, Hiuan-tsang locates the monkey’s offering at a dried-up pool near Mathurā (source I) and locates farther east, at Vaiśāli, the place where the monkeys dug the pool that bears their name (markaṭahrada) and, not far from there, filled the Buddha’s bowl with honey (source J). The dividing up of the legend and the multiplying of the monkeys poses a twofold problem which has been resolved wisely by A. Foucher (AgbG, I, p. 512-515; La Vie du Bouddha, p. 291-293).


810 [Note by Migme Chodron: Edgerton’s Dictionary gives vatsa = ‘dear little child’.
811 See above, p. 121-122F and notes.
812 Above (p. 507-517), there was an accusation against the Buddha: it was asked if the nine or ten torments that the Buddha had to suffer were not the punishment for faults committed by him in the course of his previous lifetimes. To the references collected at that place should now be added a Sanskrit fragment related to torments 5 to 8, published in Gilgit Manuscripts, III, part I, p. 211-218.

But here it is a matter of an infinitely more serious case concerning the alleged bodily, vocal or mental faults which Śākyamuni may have committed after his enlightenment when he was already buddha. If these grievances proved to be justified, they might cause the validity to be disputed of the āvenikadharmas numbers 13 to 15 in the words of which: “ Every bodily, vocal or mental dharma of the Buddha is preceded by knowledge and accompanied by knowledge.”

I [Lamotte] do not think that the criticisms raised against Śākyamuni here are the deeds of heretics trying to sully the memory of the last Buddha to have appeared on this earth. They might have come from sincere disciples, but the reading of some texts had made them perplexed and anxiously wondering if the Buddha had not acted badly in such and such a circumstance.

In this imaginary case, we should note that the defense produces unknown pieces of accusation evidently borrowed from more recent sources. The impression is inescapable that some schools, mainly
1. The Accusation

Question. – So be it! But the Buddha sometimes has physical and vocal actions (kāyavākkarman) that do not seem to accompany knowledge (na jñānānuparivartin). How is that?

1. He goes into the assemblies of heretics (tīrthikapariṣad) to preach the Dharma, but nobody believes him or accepts him.

2. One day when he was preaching the Dharma in the great assembly (mahāmṛgha), he bared his breast and showed it to Ni-k‘ien-tseu (Nirgranthiṣṭutra).

3. When some doubted the two physical marks (lakṣāna) that were not visible to them, in the middle of the great assembly the Buddha showed the mark of his tongue (jihvālakṣana) and the mark of his cryptorchidia (kośagatavastiguhya).

4. He insults his disciples and treats them like foolish men (mohapurusa).

5. He insults Devadatta and says to him: “You are a fool (mūḍha), a corpse (śava), a spit-swallower (khetāśika).”

6. The Buddha forbids the possession (dhāraṇa) of eight kinds of begging-bowls (pātra) and authorizes the bhikṣus to use only two kinds of bowls: i) fired clay (mṛttikāpātra) and ii) iron (ayāhpātra) but he himself uses a stone bowl (śailapātra).

7. One day when the heretics (tīrthika) were questioning him, he remained silent and did not respond.

8. In various places, the Buddha says that the ātman exists and, in other places, he says that it does not exist.

9. In various places he speaks of the existence of dharmas and, in other places, he speaks of the non-existence of dharmas.

Such physical and vocal actions do not seem to accompany knowledge and since physical and vocal actions (kāyavākkarman) are inseparable from mental action (manaskarman), the result is that his mental actions, as well, did not accompany knowledge. Then why is it said that his actions always accompany knowledge (sadājñānānuparivartin)?

2. The Defense

that of the Sarvāstivādin, have reviewed and corrected the Āgamas and the Vinayas in such a way as to be able to justify the actions of Śākyamuni on every point and to answer in advance any blame to which he might have been exposed.
Answer. – That does not hold (ayuktam etad). In all of those circumstances, all of the Buddha’s actions were preceded by knowledge (jñānapūrvavamgama) and accompanied knowledge (jñānānuparivartin). Why is that?

A. Meeting With The Heretics

Entering into an assembly of heretics, the Buddha knew well that he would not be believed nor accepted in the present lifetime (ihajanman), but he wanted to plant great roots of good (mahānidāna) for future lifetimes (parajanmani).

Moreover, he wanted to put an end to the slander of the heretics who said: “The Buddha is proud (unnata).” This is the reason why he went personally into their assemblies.

Moreover, the heretics said: “The Buddha claims to have great compassion (mahākarunā), the same for all, but he preaches the Dharma only to the fourfold [Buddhist] assembly. And yet we too are religious mendicants (pravrajita) who are seeking the path and he does not preach to us!”

Finally, according to the sūtra [to which you allude], the Buddha went to an assembly of heretics and preached the Dharma there, but the sūtra does not say that nobody believed him and nobody accepted him: [Śramanasatyasūtra].813- Seeing at a distance a great assembly of heretics (tīrthikapariṣad) 814 who were debating in loud voices (uccaśabda), the Buddha wanted to go elsewhere and was turning around to leave.

The scholars (upadeśācārya) who had seen the Buddha approaching from afar said to their assembly: “Be quiet! The Buddha is a person who likes solitude (vivekakāma). If you look quiet and are silent, perhaps he

813 This sūtra has come down to us in numerous very divergent versions and bears various titles:
   A. Samanāsaccasutta, in Anguttara, II, p. 176-177.
   B. Brāhmaṇaparivṛjakasūtra, in Tsa a han, T 99,no. 972, k. 35, p. 251a20-b19. Sanskrit fragments of this version have been published by R. Pischel, Bruchstücke des Sanskritkanons... aus Idykutsari, 1904, p. 817-818.
   C. Pie yi ts a han, T 100, no. 206, k. 11, p. 450c5-451a10.
   The comparison with Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 18, p. 639a1-11, proposed in the edition of Taisho, is to be avoided.

814 These were very illustrious Paribbājakas, living on the banks of the Sappinī river in Paribbājakārama, namely, Antabhāra, Varadhara, Sakuludāyin, and other famous mendicants Version A. Versions B and C locate them at Magadha on the shores of the Sumangādhā pool.
will come here.” [251e] The assembly maintained silence. The Buddha entered into this assembly and preached the three truths of the brāhmaṇas (brāhmaṇasatya).\textsuperscript{815}

The heretic assembly remained silent (tūṣṇīṃbhūta). The Buddha thought: “These angry people are in Māra Pāpīmat’s grasp. This teaching is so wondrous that none of them will try to become my disciple.”\textsuperscript{816} Having had this thought, the Buddha arose from his seat and went away.

But the heretics, free from the grasp of Māra, thought: “We have been able to hear a marvelous Dharma; how can we profit from it?” At once they went to the Buddha, became his disciples, found the Path and escaped from suffering.\textsuperscript{817}

\textsuperscript{815} Here the Traité introduces an episode not found in the other sources; it is, in fact, a stock phrase (cf. Dīgha, I, p.179; III, p. 37, 39; Majjhima, I p. 514; II, p. 2, 3, 30; Anguttara, V, p. 185, 190): Appasaddā bhonto hontu, mā bhonto saddamakattha. Ayāṃ Samaṇo Gotamo āgacchati, appasadakkāmo kho pana so āyasmā, appasadassassa vaṇṇavādī, appeva nāma appasadāṃ parisāṃ viditvā upasamkamitabbaṃ māṇeyyāti.

By ‘brāhmaṇa truths’, we should understand here the truths of the adepts of the Buddhist religion (buddhadharmastha). Remember that the Wheel of the Buddha is often called Brahmacakra and that the Buddha described himself sometimes as Brāhmaṇa (cf. Udānavarga, XXXIII, stanza 68-73). Version A lists four brāhmaṇa truths, but the text of the PTS is faulty and should be corrected by that of the Commentary of the Anguttara, III, p. 162: Brāhmaṇo evaṃ āha: 1) Sabbe pāṇā avajjhāti…, 2) Sabbe kma aniccā dukkha vipariṇāmadhammā ti…, 3) Sabbe bhavā aniccā dukkha vipariṇāmadhammā ti…, 4) Nāhaṃ kbacana kassaci kiṃcana tasmiṃ na ca mama kvacana kathaci kiṃcanaṃ n’ athīti. – “The Brāhmaṇa says: 1) No being should be killed; 2-3) All pleasures (all existences) are impermanent, suffering and perishable; 4) I am in no way whatsoever an individual, and in no way whatsoever is there anything whatsoever that is me. (p. 1664F, n. 3)

The other versions that list only three truths boil down to this: No being should be killed; everything that is subject to production is subject to destruction; I am not that and that is not me.

These three truths are in contrast with the practices and beliefs of the traditional Brahmanism. In the words of the Vibhūṣaṇa (l.c.), the brāhmaṇins sacrifice cattle and sheep, accept nihilism or eternalism, and practice continence in order to be reborn in heaven and enjoy heavenly pleasure.

\textsuperscript{816} This disillusioned reflection is also noted in versions B and C.

\textsuperscript{817} The Pi yi Tsa a han (version C) is the only canonical source coming out in favor of the conversion of the heretics, and here are its words:

The Buddha had not long gone when the deity of the Summagadā pool pronounced these gāthās: “Just as soon trace designs on the water, harvest a crop by seeding a salt-pan, spray a dung-heap with perfume, dive into the water moistening the bank, make beautiful music by blowing into an iron pipe, hope for a mirage in the middle of winter: these heretics are so blunt that even if they hear the wondrous Dharma, they do not believe and do not accept it.”
Finally, the disciples of the heretics did not dare to go to the Buddha out of fear of their teachers. This is why the Buddha entered into their assemblies. When they hear the Dharma, their faith is strengthened; they no longer fear their teachers, they become disciples of the Buddha and sometimes they obtain ‘the traces of the Path’. 

It is for all these wise reasons that the Buddha enters into the assemblies of the heretics.

**B. Display of His Breast**

[Cūḍā-Satyaśāstra.] Moreover, Sa-tchō-k’i (iche) Ni-k’ien-tseu (Satyaka Nirgranthiṣṭra), his breast covered with copper plates, proclaimed: “There is no one who, engaged in debate with me (mayā vādena vādam samārabdhaḥ), would not be sweating (sveda) in streams and would not be defeated. Even a big elephant, a piece of wood, a stone, that would hear my objections, would sweat in streams.”

Having made this declaration, he went to the Buddha and debated with him. The Buddha questioned him but Nirgranthiṣṭra was unable to respond. His sweat flowed until it moistened the ground and his whole body was soaked. The Buddha said to him: “You just said: ‘There is no one who, engaged in debate with me, would not be sweating in streams.’ Now it is your sweat that is flowing and that moistens the ground. Do you want to examine the Buddha and see if he has any signs of sweat?” Immediately the Buddha took off his upper robe uttāraṅga) and asked: “Where is the sweat?”

However, there are people who say: “It is possible to be sweating on the forehead but the body is not sweating. Although the Buddha does not have a sweaty brow, certainly his body sweats.” This is why the Buddha removed his upper robe and showed his body. As a result of this, the heretics directed themselves to the faith and all entered into the Buddha Dharma.

Therefore this physical action of the Buddha was in accordance with knowledge.

---

Hearing the deity of the pool pronounce these gāthās, the brāhmaṇas quickly went to join the Buddha and asked to be allowed to enter the religious life. The Buddha accepted them and, having gone forth from the world, they cultivated the Path with exertion and obtained arhathood.

818 The characters tao tsi are often used to render the expression dharmābhīsamaya ‘understanding of the Dharma’ (cf. T. 1462, k. 2, p. 688c5).

819 Cūḷasaccasutta of the Majjhima, I, p. 227-237; Tsa a han, T 99, k. 5, p. 35a-37b; Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 30, p. 715a-717b.


821 According to Majjhima (l.c.), the Bhagavat, in this assembly, uncovered his golden-colored body (Bhagavā tasmiṁ parisatam suvannavānam kāyam vivarī). – According to the Tsa a han, T 99, k. 5, p. 36b23, he opened his upper garment (uttarāṇga) and showed his breast. – According to the Tseng yi a han, T 125, k. 30, p. 716b4-5, he removed his three robes (tricīvara) and said to Nirgranthiṣṭra: “Determine if the arm-pits of the Tathāgata have any sweat.”
C. Display of His Tongue and His Cryptorchidia

The Buddha showed the mark of his tongue (jīhvālaksana) and the mark of his cryptorchidia (koṣagatavastiguhya). Some people had doubts about these two marks of the Buddha’s body; they should have obtained the Path but because of these doubts, they did not obtain it. This is why the Buddha showed them these two marks. He put out his tongue and covered his whole face with it: although his tongue was so great, it easily went back into his mouth. Those who saw it had their doubts satisfied.

Some people, seeing the Buddha put out his tongue, still had feelings of scorn, for putting out one’s tongue is what little children do; but when they saw him withdraw his tongue and preach the Dharma without any difficulty, they felt respect and cried out at the wonder.

Some people had doubts about the Buddha’s cryptorchidia which is an invisible mark; then the Buddha created by magic a wondrous elephant or a wondrous stallion and, showing them, he declared: “My cryptorchidia is an invisible mark just like that.”

Some even said that the Buddha made his secret organs come out and showed them to someone to suppress his doubts. Scholars (upādśacārya) say that, [by acting in this way], the Buddha was manifesting his great compassion [252a] (mahākarunā) for, if a man sees the Buddha’s cryptorchidia, he is able to accumulate the roots of good (kusalamūla) and produce the thought of anuttarāsamātsambodhi. And those who can rejoice greatly and produce a mind of faith and veneration obtain the sight of the Buddha’s cryptorchidia and cut through their doubts; but other than them, nobody can see it.

Out of great compassion and in order to save beings, the Buddha showed himself three times in the space of a flash of lightning, and the beings who saw him knew that the Buddha has great compassion and that he really has no blind attachment (parāmarṣa) or prejudice (abhiniveśa) towards the moral precepts (śīla).

It is for these reasons that the Buddha showed these two marks: it was neither out of play nor out of a sense of modesty.

D. Insults to the Disciples

The Buddha had hard words for the bhikṣus and treated them like fools (mohapurusa).823

822 According to the sources noted above (p. 275-276F), the Buddha showed these two secret marks to Ambaṭṭha, Brahmāyu and Sela. The fact is not contested; it only proves that the Buddha was not embarrassed by prejudice when it was a matter of converting beings.

823 For various breaches of discipline, the Buddha frequently treated the bhikṣus as ‘foolish people’ (in Sanskrit, mohapurusa; in Pāli, moghaparisa). The adjective is so commonplace that it makes up the formulaic style and is the custom in stock phrases (cf. Vinaya, I, p. 45, 58, 60, 78, 154, 159-160, 189, 301, 305; II, p. 1, 14, 105, 161; III, p. 20-21, 45, 111, 188): Kathāṃ hi nāma tvāṃ moghapurisa…; m’etaṃ moghapurisa appasannānaṁ vā pasādāya pasannānaṁ vā bhīyyobbhāvya. - “How then, you
There are two kinds of hard words: i) insult coming from an evil intention (duṣcitā); ii) insult out of compassion for beings and with the intention of converting them (paripācana).

In the person detached from desire (virakta), there is no insult coming from a bad intention; how then would there be one in the Buddha? It is out of pity for beings and in order to convert them (paripācanārtham) that the Buddha had these strong words.

There are beings who are not introduced into the path by gentle words (ślaksṇavāc) or by friendly instructions. They need strong words and heavy instructions for them to enter into the Dharma. They are like a good horse (aśva) who starts up when he sees the shadow of the whip (kaśācchāyā) or the stupid donkey (gardabha) who starts walking only when he receives a blow. There are wounds that are cured only by a gentle herb (mṛḍvasadhi), by saliva (khetā) or a magic spell (mantra): there are wounds that are cured only when the sick flesh is cut out with a knife and a strong medicine applied to it.

Moreover, there are five kinds of strong words:

1) Merely idle speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa).
2) Harmful speech (pārusyavāda) plus idle speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa).
3) Harmful speech (pārusyavāda) plus idle speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa) plus falsehood (mṛṣāvāda).
4) Harmful speech (pārusyavāda) plus idle speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa), falsehood (mṛṣāvāda) plus malicious gossip (paiśunyavāda).
5) Hard speech coming from a pure mind (akliṣṭacitta) the aim of which is to teach beings to distinguish the good (kuśala) from the bad (akuśala) and to remove them from this level of suffering.

[The strong speech] that combines the four vocal faults (cf. no. 4) is the most serious. The third, second and first are [respectively and in order] smaller and smaller faults.

If a lay disciple of the Buddha (śrāvaka avadātavasana) who has obtained the first or the second paths [i.e., the state of srotāpanna or sakṛdāgāmin] uses harmful speech (pārusyavāda) to command his slaves (dāsa), for him this is not a bad path of action (akuśalakarmapatha).824

He who has accepted the discipline (saṃtatasamvara) is capable of committing two kinds [of harsh words]: either merely idle speech (saṃbhinnapralāpa) (cf. no, 1) or harmful speech (pārusyavāda) plus idle speech (cf. no. 2).

foolish man, can you…; that does not contribute, O foolish man, to the conversion of unbelievers or the increase of believers.”

The Buddha cannot be blamed for having used this strong language. In the view of the two Vehicles, all the words of the Buddha, rough as well as gentle, have only the purpose of benefiting beings; in the perspective of the Greater Vehicle, the Buddha never loses the view of the twofold non-existence of beings and of things (pudgala and dharma nairātmya): there is no one to be insulted and there is nothing to be blamed for; see Vimalakīrtinirdesha, p. 171-176, on this subject.

824 See above, p. 820F.
The anāgamins and the arhats utter harmful words (pārusyavāda) without any passion (kleśa); only with pure intention and when reproach is needed to convert beings do they speak harmful words (pārusyavāda) and idle words (sāmbhinnapralāpa). If the harmful speech is uttered without passion by the anāgamins and the arhats, it is the same and even more so in the Buddha.

Moreover, if the Buddha speaks harsh words, there is no need to hesitate and ask whether the Buddha utters these words with a bad intention (duṣṭacittena). Why? The Buddha long ago destroyed any bad intentions and it is only with the best intentions (adhyādāya) that he thinks of beings. He is like a loving father teaching his sons; when he reprimands them, it is to correct them; it is not with a bad intention.

When the Buddha was still a bodhisattva and had not yet destroyed the threefold poison (trīṣa), he was the rśi named Tch’an-t’i (Kṣānti) and, when the wicked king cut off his ears, nose, hands and feet, he did not feel any bad feeling [252b] and did not utter any harmful words. At that time he had not attained bodhi, but he had no bad feelings. And now that he has attained anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi, destroyed the three poisons (trīṣa) and is endowed with great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā), can one still ask if he has bad feelings and rough words?

Moreover, when the Buddha treats [the bhikṣus] as fools (mohapurūṣa), it is gentle speech (ślakṣṇavāc) and true speech (satyavāc). These disciples are fools, under the power of the threefold poison (trīṣa): they are fools because the Buddha wants to benefit them and they do not accept it because they do not understand the Buddha’s intentions and do not accept his words.

Moreover, in regard to lower things (adhyātmam), the Buddha always puts into action his knowledge of non-existence of self (anātmajñāna) and, in regard to external things, he always contemplates the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā). In these conditions [where there is nobody to speak to and nothing to say], why would the Buddha have harmful words (pārusyavāda)?

But beings who do not understand the mind of the Buddha seek out faults in his words. If beings knew with what good intentions (adhyāṣaya) the Buddha has pity on them, they would joyously throw themselves into a great fire if he asked them to, and that with as much enthusiasm as a person tormented by heat (gharmārtta) throws himself into a clear cool pool. And all the more so, why not accept his words?

But beings, under the grasp of Māra, do not know with what good intention the Buddha thinks of them; this is why they do not accept the words of the Buddha and this is why the Buddha treats them as fools.

Finally, there are people who, on hearing the reprimands of the Buddha, rejoice and say: “It is because he loves me that he speaks so.” That is why the Buddha had treated them as foolish people.

E. Insults to Devadatta

825 The Kṣāntijātaka has been fully narrated, p. 264F, 889-890F.
826 The story of Devadatta, cousin and rival of the Buddha, has been told above (p. 868-878F), but here we must return to the detail of why the Buddha treated him as khelāpaka (khelāsika, khełopaka) in

In his Samantapāsādikā (I.c.), Buddhaghosa has the following explanation: *Kheḷasako ‘ti micchājīvena uppannapaccayā ariyehi vantabbā kheḷasadisā, tathārupe paccaye ayam ajjhoharat ‘ti katvā kēḷāsakō ‘ti bhagavatā vutto*: “The foods which are procured by wrong livelihood must be spat out up by the Noble Ones like spit. In regard to the fact that Devadatta ate such food, Devadatta was treated by the Lord as *kheḷasaka* ‘to be spat out like spit’. Hence the translation of ‘evil-living’ proposed by Rhys-Davids and Oldenberg (*Vinaya Texts*, III, p. 239) and the translation ‘to be vomited like spittle’, better and more literal, given by I. B. Horner (*The Book of the Discipline*, V, p. 264). Thus it would seem to be just a ‘swear word’ not corresponding to an actual fact.

Nevertheless, taken literally, the expression *khelapaka* or *khelāsika* can mean ‘eater of spit’ and Rhys Davids-Stede in their *Pāli-English Dictionary* render it as ‘an abusive term meaning eating phlegm’.

I. In the case with which we are dealing here, the accusation claims that Devadatta never swallowed spit and as a result, treating him as *khelāpaka* is an unwarranted insult and a falsehood. The accusation can be based on an entire series of canonical texts:

1) According to the Pāli Vinaya (II, p. 184-185), the Dhammapada Commentary (I, p. 118), the Mahiśāsaka Vinaya (T 1421, k. 3, p. 17c21-25), the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (T 1428, k. 4, p. 592a9-18) and the Ekottarāgama (T 125, k. 47, p. 802c21-24), Devadatta, in order to win over prince Ajātaśatru, transformed himself into a youth clothed with a waistband of snakes and appeared on the lap of the prince. The latter, frightened, asked who he was, and Devadatta made himself known. The prince said: “If you are really Devadatta, take your original form.” Putting off the form of a youth, Devadatta reappeared dressed in monastic robes and carrying a begging bowl in his hand. From then on, the favors of Ajātaśatru were granted to him.

2) According to the same sources, several days later, Devadatta asked the Buddha to retire and hand over the Community to him. The Buddha, indignant, said to him: “I would not entrust the Community even to Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, so why should I entrust it to you, you corpse (chava), to be spat out like spit (*khelāsaka*).” – This is the version of the Pāli Vinaya (II, p. 188-189) and it is confirmed by the Mahiśāsaka Vinaya (T 1421, k. 3, p. 18b20) which, in the edition of the Souei and the Ming, render the expression *khelāsaka* by *jou sien t’o*, ‘like spit’, as does the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (T 1428, k. 4, p. 592b13-14) which translates it as *t’i t’o tche chen* ‘a mass of tears and spit’.

Nothing in Devadatta’s previous conduct seems to justify such an outrage. Thus the accusation would seem to be an unwarranted insult and lie. However, the matter is more serious in that the Buddha himself said in the Majjhima, I, p. 395: *Yaṃ Tathāgato vācāṃ jānāti abhātaṃ... na tāṃ Tathāgato vācāṃ bhāsaṭi*: “The Tathāgata never pronounces a word that is false”, no matter whether that word is pleasant or unpleasant to others.

II. In order to refute this major accusation, the defense produces here some articles unknown to the prosecutor and apparently taken from more recent canonical sources. These articles allow it to be
The Buddha said to Devadatta: “You are a fool (mūḍha), a corpse (śava), a swallower of spit (kheṭāśika).”

established that Devadatta really had swallowed Ajātaśatru’s spit and that consequently the Buddha, treating him as kheṭāśaka (in Sanskrit kheṭāśika) spoke the truth.

1) In the words of this source, the intention of Devadatta was not to frighten but to seduce the crown prince. For this purpose, he multiplied the transformations and changed successively into an elephant, a horse, an ox, which came to Ajātaśatru by passing through the wall and going out through the door or vice versa. He also changed into a monk and even into a veil or a hat, which Ajātaśatru made into a turban. Finally he took the form of a child adorned with a necklace of precious stones. Charmed, the crown prince took him in his arms, played with him and invariably ended up by putting some spit into his mouth. Out of love for honor and gain, Devadatta agreed to swallow it.

This new version first appeared in the Chinese Udāna (T 212, k. 14, p. 687c23-28) and a Vinaya of unknown origin (T 1464, k. 2, p. 859b22-29), each translated into Chinese in the years 382 and 383 by Tchou Fo-nien.

It also appears in the Saṃyuktāgama of the Kāśyapīya school (T 100, k. 1, p. 374b13-19), translated by a translator, whose name has not been preserved, about 400 C.E.

Finally, it was repeated and developed in the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya (T 1435, k. 36, p. 257c4-12) translated between 404 and 405 by Kumārajīva, and the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya (T 1450, k. 13, p. 168c7-16) of which an incomplete translation was made by Yi-tsing between 700 and 712.

It was to this evidence that the great exegetists of the 4th century turned, the five hundred Kaśmirian arhats who compiled the Mahāvibhāṣā (T 1545, k. 85, p. 443a1-8) and, as we will see, the author or the authors of the Traité.

2. When Devadatta asked the Buddha to retire and entrust the Community to him, the Buddha refused curtly and treated his cousin as mūḍha ‘fool’, śava ‘corpse’ and kheṭāśika ‘eater of spit’. Those who remembered the kiss exchanged between Ajātaśatru and Devadatta could not help but see an allusion in it to this repugnant action. This is why the translators of the previously cited sources translated kheṭāśika by the following characters:

a. Tan t’o ‘eater of spit’ (Sarv. Vin, T 1435, k. 36, p. 258b7),
b. Che t’o tchō ‘eater of spit’ (Mūlasarv. Vin., T 1450, k. 13, p. 169b26),
c. Che jen t’o tchō ‘eater of human spit’ (Mahāvibhāṣā, T 1545, k. 85, p. 443a6-7),
d. Seou t’o jen ‘swallower of spit’ (Traité, T 1509, k. 26, p. 252c3).

If the Buddha treated Devadatta as a swallower of spit, it is because the latter took Ajātaśatru’s spit, and because the Buddha spoke only the truth.

In the Majjhima, I, p. 395, the Buddha stated: Yañ ca kho Tathāgato vācaṁ jānāti bhūtam..., tatra kālaṁñāTathāgato hoti tassā vācāya veyyākaraṇāya: “Every word that the Buddha knows to be true, he waits for the opportunity to offer it”, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant for someone else.

In this case, the Buddha had the perfect right to treat Devadatta as kheṭāśika and the accusation made against him is invalid. In the words of the 14th āvenikadharma, all vocal actions of the Buddha are preceded by knowledge and accompanied by knowledge.
A ‘fool’ because, due to the gravity of his sins, Devadatta had to fall into the Avīci hell: hence the triple insult.

A ‘corpse’ because, in the appearance of a living man, Devadatta did not accumulate the roots of good (kuśalanūla). With his shaved head and his monk’s robes, one would have said he was a saint (āryapudgalu), but inwardly he had no wisdom: he was, therefore, a corpse.

Corpses are adorned in many ways, but they gradually decompose and it is impossible to revive them. This was the case for Devadatta. Each day the Buddha taught him in many ways, but his bad intentions (duṣṭacitta) increased, his evil tendencies (pāpakusalacitta) grew from day to day, and he finally committed three sins of immediate retribution (ānantarya): he was therefore a corpse.

He was also a ‘swallower of spit’. Devadatta, coveting gain (lāba) and honor (satkāra), changed himself into a young boy (kumāraka) of heavenly appearance and appeared in the arms of prince Ajātašatru. The prince breathed into his mouth and gave him his spit to swallow. This is why Devadatta was a swallower of spit.

Question. – Devadatta who possessed the concentrations (samādhi) had renounced sensual desires (vītarāga). Why would he still swallow another’s spit?

Answer. – In this individual, the evil tendencies (duṣṭacitta) were deep, but his faculties were keen (tiṣṇendriya). Having renounced sensual desires (vītarāga), he could change himself. When he swallowed the spit, he lost his sharp faculties, but when he wanted to, he recovered them. This is why he was called ‘swallower of spit’.

Futhermore Devadatta said to the Buddha: “The Buddha is worn out [252c] (jīra). Since he has always loved retreat (viveka), let him go into the forest and enjoy dhyāna there and let him entrust the Community to me.” The Buddha replied: “Sāriputra and Maudgalyāyana have great wisdom, are good, gentle and pure men, and yet I would not entrust the Community to them. Why then would I entrust it to you who are a fool, a corpse, a swallower of spit?”

It is for these reasons that the Buddha, although he had no attachment toward things, offered harsh words (on occasion), but with the sole purpose of converting beings.

F. Use of a Stone Bowl

“The Buddha forbade the bhikṣus to use eight kinds of bowls (pātra).”

---

827 He fomented a schism, injured the Buddha’s foot and mortally struck the nun Utpalavarnā: see above, p. 873-876F.
828 Ibid., II, p. 188: Sāriputtamoggallānānaṃ pi kho aham, Devadatta, bhikkhusamghaṃ na nissajjeeyyaṃ. Kim pana tuyhaṃ chavassa khelāpakassā ’ti.
829 According to its custom when it deals with disciplinary matters, here the Traité again refers to the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya, T 1435, k. 37, p. 260b6-8, where the Buddha says to the bhikkṣus: “Starting from
[Bowls 1-4]: Precious bowls of gold (suvarṇa), silver (rūpya), [beryl (vaiḍūrya) and pearl (maṇi)]. – Since people covet precious things, since the latter are hard to find (durlabha) and because people are attached to them, the Buddha prohibits the keeping (dhāraṇa) of these precious substances.

He does not allow even touching (sparśana) that which is ‘precious’ and neither does he allow keeping it. ⁸³⁰ If such a gift is made [to the bhikṣu], he allows them to realize their value, but not too expensive. ⁸³¹

[Bowl 7]: The wooden (dāru) bowl. – Since it retains grease (meda) and is not clean, the Buddha does not permit it to be kept.

Bowls 5, 6, 8]: The other three bowls [copper (tāmra), tin (trapu) and stone (śaila) do not have such disadvantages.

Question. – But the baked clay (mṛttikā) bowl and the iron (ayas) bowl [permitted by the Buddha] also retain grease and are no different from the wooden bowl. Why does the Buddha allow them?

Answer. – If the baked clay bowl and the iron bowl are not steamed (vāsiita), the Buddha does not permit them either, for they should be steamed in order not to retain grease.

As for the stone (śaila) bowl, it is thick (audārika) or thin (sūkṣma). Thin, it does not retain bad grease and that is why the Buddha used it himself, but he does not allow the bhikṣu to keep them because of their weight. A swallow of milk by the Buddha surpasses in power that of a myriad of perfumed white elephants (gandhahastin); this is why [the stone bowl] does not seem heavy for him, but out of compassion (karuṇā) for the bhikṣu, he does not allow them to keep them.

Question. – But the assistants (upaṣṭhāyaka) such as Lo-t’o (Rādhā), Mi-hi-kia (Meghika), Sīu-na-tch’a-tolo (Sunakṣetra), Na-k’ie-so’p’o-lo (Nāgasamāla), A-nan (Ānanda), etc., who followed the Buddha, brought him his utensils. ⁸³² Why did the Buddha not have pity on them?
Answer. – If these assistants carried the Buddha’s bowl, it was with the miraculous intervention (prātiḥāryabala) of the Buddha. Besides, they honored and venerated the Buddha so highly that they did not find his bowl too heavy. And also, the physical strength of Ānanda was great.

Furthermore, the Buddha does not allow the use of stone bowls (śailapātra) because fine ones (sūkṣma) are hard to find (durlabha) and because thick ones (audārika) retain grease. The Buddha’s bowl arose spontaneously (svatas) on the four summits of the mountains on which the four kings of the gods served the last seven Buddhas: Aśoka for Vipaśyin, Kṣemakāra for Śikhin, Upaśanta for Viśvabhuj, Bhadrika for Krakasunda (or Krakucchanda), Svastika for Kanakamuni, Sarvamitra for Kāśyapa, and finally Ānanda for Śākyamuni.

We know under what circumstances the last one chose Ānanda: in the twentieth year of his public ministry, the Buddha, feeling old age coming on, felt the need for a servant who would be attached to his residence, and he named Ānanda as his assistant. Having accepted this responsibility, the disciple set certain conditions: never to share the food and robes of the Buddha, not to accompany him among the lay-adepts but to have access to him at any hour of the day (cf. Upasthāyakasūtra of the Tch'ang a han, T 26, k. 8, p. 471c-475a; Mūlasarv. Vinaya, in W. W. Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 88; Fo pa'o gen king, T 156, k. 6, p. 155c22-25; Hien yu king, T 5, k. 2, p. 169a15; Traité, above, p. 94F). However, the Northern Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (T 374, k. 40, p. 601b26) notes only twenty years or more.

Before Ānanda took charge, other disciples functioned temporarily. The Comm. of the Theragāthā in Psalms of the Brethren, p. 350-352; Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, p. 192; Sanskrit Mahāvadānasūtra, p. 78; Divyāvadāna, p. 612). - Ānanda fulfilled his mission with the greatest devotion for the last twenty-five years of the Teacher’s life (Tch’ang a han, T 1, k. 3, p. 19c5; T 5, k. 2, p. 169a15).
(cāturmahārājakāyikadeva) dwell. But other people do not have these bowls that arise by themselves; to try to make one would be very difficult and very complicated. This is why the Buddha did not allow [the bhikṣus] to have stone bowls but used one himself to distinguish himself from his disciples, in the same way that the king venerated by people uses special utensils (bhājana) himself. Seeing the Buddha use a special bowl, people’s veneration (gurukāra) and respect (satkāra) is increased and they develop pure faith (cittaprasāda).

Question. – If it is fitting for the Buddha’s bowl to be special, why should his robe (cīvara) be the same [as those of the other bhikṣus]?

Answer. – But the clothing of the Buddha is also different from that of others. Thus, when the Buddha attained bodhi, he knew that Kāśyapa’s robe should be worn by the Buddha, and Kāśyapa’s robe was worth ten myriad ounces of gold.833 Next, Jīvaka offered the Buddha a chen-mo-ken cotton robe also worth ten myriad ounces of gold. The Buddha asked Ānanda to take this robe away, cut it up and make a cloak out of it.834 This being done, the Buddha put it on and this [253a] outfit differed [from all the rest].

Question. – However, it was following this event that the Buddha said to the bhikṣus: “Starting from today, provided that a bhikṣu mindfully seeks nirvāṇa and turns his back on saṃsāra, I allow him, if he so wishes, to wear a robe worth ten myriad ounces of gold, and I also allow him to eat the food of a hundred flavors (śatarasabhojana).”835 [Therefore at the beginning] his robe was different and it was only later that he

833 See above, p. 1399F.
834 As a fee for his medical attentions, Jīvaka received a great raincoat (bhṛhatikāprāvarana) worth a hundred thousand kārṣāpanas from the king of the Videhas. It was in fact a piece of impermeable cloth. Jīvaka offered it to the Buddha who asked Ānanda to cut it up and make a cloak out of it. Ānanda stretched it out on the ground and measured it: the material was so long that it could be made into numerous garments. Ānanda sewed the three robes (tricīvara) for the Buddha, an upper and a lower garment (śantarottara) for himself and a cloak (kusūlaka) for Rāhula. The rest, hundreds of pieces (paṭaśatāni), was given to the community of bhikṣus who did not know what to do with it. The Buddha said to them: “I allow the bhikṣus to keep robes offered by the householders, but only after having cut them up and dirtied them.”

All this is told in the Cīvaravastu of the Mūlasarv. Vinaya (Gilgit Manuscripts, III, part 2, p. 48): Jīvakaḥ kumārabhṛto Bhagavantam idam avocat. ācaritam bhadanta mama yasya rājñi vā rājāmātasya ...amujānaṃ bhikṣābhīr ghṛticīvarakāni āśtralātāni duvārṣikyta dhārajavyāṇi. 835 In fact, it was after another event that the Buddha permitted his monks to wear fine robes offered to them by householders. This event is told in most of the Vinayas:

Sarvāstivādin Vinaya, T 1435, k. 27, p. 194b25-c11: Jīvaka, wearing a robe of chen-mo-ken (material not yet identified) worth a hundred thousand [kārṣāpanas], wished to offer it to the Buddha. Bowing down at the feet of the Buddha, he stood to one side and said to him: “When I care for a king or a great minister, everyone favors me. Today, when I have cared for the Buddha, I would like the Bhagavat to grant me a favor.” The Buddha said to Jīvaka: “The Tathāgatas, arhat and
allowed [the bhikṣus to wear one similar to his].

His bowl [was unique of its type] and he never allowed [the bhikṣus to have a similar one].

Answer. – Here we must repeat what has been said before (p. 1676F) in regard to the stone bowl (śailapātra). The Buddha did not receive this bowl from human hands. When he attained bodhi and when meal-time came, he needed a utensil. Knowing the Buddha’s mind, the four kings of the gods (cāturmahārājakāyikadeva) brought four bowls and offered them to him.

Among the Buddhas of the samyaksambuddha, are atikrāntavara [i.e., have unsurpassed favors, or, do not grant favors without knowing what it is about]. Jīvaka said to the Buddha: It is something fitting (yad kalpati) that I beg you to grant me.” The Buddha said to Jīvaka: “What favor are you asking?” Jīvaka answered: “Bhadanta, here is a garment of chen-mo-ken worth a hundred thousand [kārṣāpanas]: I would like the Buddha to accept it out of compassion for me.” In silence, the Buddha accepted it. Knowing that the Buddha accepted silently, Jīvaka gave to the Buddha the garment of chen-mo-ken worth a hundred thousand [kārṣāpanas], then, having bowed his head to the Buddha’s feet, he went away. Because of this, the Buddha called the Saṃgha together and, having gathered the Saṃgha, he said to the bhikṣus: “This very day Jīvaka has given me a garment of chen-mo-ken worth a hundred thousand [kārṣāpanas]. From today on, if someone gives a garment of this kind to a bhikṣu, he will be able to wear it as he wishes. From today on, if a bhikṣu wishes to wear rags gathered from the dust-heap (pāṃśukūla), I permit him; but if he wishes to wear [fine] robes received from the householders (grhapaticīvarāṇi), I permit that likewise.”

Other Vinayas (Pāli Vin., I, p. 280; Mahiśasaka Vin., T 1431, k. 20, p. 134a28-b11; Dharmagupta Vin., T 1428, k. 40, p.854c2-21) which likewise tell this episode add several details: it was Pradyota, king of Avanti, who made the gift to Jīvaka of the precious garment, or rather two pieces of cloth coming from the land of the Sivi (Siveyyakam dussayugam). In Pāli (Vin. I, p. 280; III, p. 172) the rule stated by the Buddha was formulated as follows: Anujānāmi bhikkhave gahapaticīvarāṇi, yo icchati paṃṣukūliko hotu, yo icchati gaḥapaticīvarāṇi sādiyatu.

836 A passage from the Samantapāsādikā, V, p. 1119, noted by Horner, Book of the Discipline, IV, p. 296, remarks that, during the twenty tears following his enlightenment until the event related here, neither the Lord nor any monk accepted robes offered by the householders; all wore rags. However, according to the Traité, for some time at least, the Lord wore the fine robe of Kāśyapa.

837 See Catuspariṣatsūtra, p. 84-87, and the many similar texts collected by E. Waldschmidt: When the merchants Tripusa and Bhallika offered a honey-cake to the Buddha, the latter needed a bowl to receive it. Then the four great kings of the gods, understanding his wish, brought from the stone mountain (pāṣānayat pari vatāt) four stone bowls (catvāri pāṭrāṇi) made and crafted by non-human beings (amanusyakṛtānī amanusyasniṣṭhitānī), completely transparent (svacchāni), pure (śucāni), with no bad odors (nispratigandānī), and offered them to the Buddha. But the latter needed only one vessel, and in the words of the Mahāvastu, III, p.304, with a touch of his thumb, he made the bowls dissolve into one another; thus the four bowls became one bowl, but the rims of the other three were always to be distinguished on the last bowl. Hence, comments A. Foucher, AgbG, I, p. 420, the three lines that encircle the upper rim of the bowl on many bas-reliefs at Gandhāra
three times, it has been customary to receive their bowl from the hands of the four kings of the gods. At that
time, the Community (sāṃgha) did not yet exist; how could the Buddha authorize [a bowl to anyone]? And
if, later, [after the beginning of the Community], the Buddha had allowed the use [of a fine stone bowl],
nobody could have made one. Besides, in Jambudvīpa, people do not like stone bowls, so nobody would
have given him one.

Besides, the Buddha advised the bhikṣus to keep their own qualities (guna) secret.838 If the bhikṣus
received stone bowls, people would say that they had received them from the god realm or from the nāgas.
If the bhikṣus asked people to make them, the work would have been difficult. Furthermore, it might be
feared that people would say that the bhikṣus wanted to equal the Buddha; this is why the Buddha did not
permit them.

With regard to the garment, some say: “In the very midst of the Sāmgha, the Buddha receives magnificent
garments offered to him by the dānapatis, but he is the only one to wear them and does not allow the
bhikṣus to have any.” This is why the Buddha allowed the bhikṣus to have fine ones also.

Moreover, the bhikṣus do not wear [these fine robes], given the rarity of benefactors (dāyaka) [so generous]
and the rarity of recipients (pratigrāhaka) [so lucky]. People do not give [such fine clothing] to impure
bhikṣus: as for the pure (śuddha) bhikṣus839, as they had few desires (alpeccha) and were content with their
lot (saṃtusṭa), they did not wear [those that had been given to them].

It is to cut people’s doubts (sāṃśayacchedana) that the Buddha allowed the bhikṣus to wear [fine] robes; as
for the [stone] bowls that they could not expect to receive, he did not allow them.

Question. – It is said in the sūtras: “The Buddha, who has a diamond body (vajrakāya), has no need of
food.” Then why did he keep a bowl?

Answer. – The Buddhadharma consists of two Paths: i) the path of the śrāvakas; ii) the path of the Buddha.
In the śrāvaka system, the Buddha conforms to human customs and needs food; in the Mahāyāna system,
he resorts to skillful means (upāya) to save beings; this is why he appears to eat whereas in truth he does
not eat.

Question. – What is this skillful means?

Answer. – Wishing to save people, the Buddha borrows the customs of humans. If he did not do this,
people would take him for a non-human (amanusya) and would wonder why they follow his Dharma.
Moreover, there are people who find salvation in generosity (dāna); out of respect for them, the Buddha
accepts their offerings of food. Then these people say: “The food I offer contributes to sustaining the body

838 See, for example, Pāli Vinaya, II, p. 112: Na bhikkhave gihīnaṃ uttarimanussadhhamman
iddhipāṭhāriyaṃ dassetabbaṃ.

839 Horner, Book of the Discipline, IV, p. 449: “Suddha in such a connection means that a monk has
committed no offences, or that, if he has, he has confessed them and so is ‘pure’ to take his place at the
Pātimokkha recitation.”
of the Buddha.” Their mind becomes very joyful (mahāmuditā), and as a result of this joy, they welcome the Buddha’s words with faith.

It is like a great sovereign who is invited to dine by his ministers and subjects. The king has no need for it, but to win over his people, he eats enough so they are made happy. For similar reasons, the Buddha takes nourishment.

Question. – If the Buddha does not eat, where is the food that he does accept? [253b]

Answer. – The workings of the Buddha (buddhārya) are inconceivable (acintya): they should not be investigated.

Furthermore, there are people who are saved when they find food for the Buddha; there are others who are saved when they hear his sounds (śabda), see his color (rūpa), touch his body (kāya) or smell his smell (gandha). If they need [the Buddha’s] food to be saved, the Buddha gives it to them.

It is said in the Mi tsi kin kang king (Guhyakavajrapāniśūtra or Tathāgatacintyaguhyanirdeśa): “When the Buddha brings food to his mouth, there are devas seeking the Buddhist Path who carry it to the ten directions and distribute it.”840

Question. – If that is so, what did you mean when you said above (p. 1402F) in regard to Saṃghānismiti841 that nobody can eat the Buddha’s food?

Answer. – When the Buddha does not give his food away, it is because nobody is capable is able to eat it, but here, if he gives it, it is because it can be eaten. How do we know that?

When the Buddha ate oats (yava), he gave this food to Ānanda,842 and when the śramana Eul-che-yi-eul (Śroṇa Kotivimśa) offered the Buddha some good soup (yūṣa), the latter gave the leftovers to king Bimbasāra.

Thus we know that if the Buddha makes a gift of his food after having accepted it, it is that one is able to eat it; if he does not make a gift of it, it is that it one cannot digest it.

Furthermore, if food is offered to the Buddha and the latter does not eat it, people would be unable to digest it, but if, after having eaten, the Buddha gives the leftovers, it is that people are able to digest it. Therefore, actually, the Buddha does not eat, but in order to save beings, he pretends to accept food and he keeps a bowl (pātraṇa dhārayati) [for that purpose].

G. Silence on the Fourteen Difficult Questions

The Buddha did not answer fourteen difficult questions.843 -

840 On these feasts of immortality, see also the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, p. 319-324 and the appendix, p. 430-437.
841 Adopting the variant nien-seng.
842 See above, p. 1530F, n. 3.
The Buddha has four ways of answering (vyākaraṇa): i) answering in a categorical manner (ekāṃśena vyākaraṇam); ii) answering by distinguishing (vibhajya vyākaraṇam); iii) answering by asking a question (pariprechāvyākaraṇam); iv) answering by not replying (sthānāntāvyākaraṇam). Now these fourteen difficult questions had to be answered by not replying.

Moreover, when it is useful, the Buddha does answer. But questions asked by the heretics (tīrthika) do not lead to nirvāṇa (na nirvāṇa samvartante) and increase doubt (saṃśayān vardhayanti). Therefore the Buddha answers by not replying to them. If he knew that they have a definite usefulness, he would reply by distinguishing (vibhajya), but as they have no use, he stops and does not reply. This is why we know that the Buddha is omniscient (sarvajña).

Furthermore, the Buddha spoke of three kinds of things: i) conditioned things (samskṛtadharma), ii) unconditioned things (asaṃskṛtadharma) and iii) inexpressible things (avācyadharma): in doing this, he has spoken of all dharmas.

Furthermore, being based (āśritya) on the eternalist view (śāsvatadṛśti) or the nihilist view (ucchedadrśti), the heretics asked the questions of eternalism or nihilism, but since any real nature (satyalakṣaṇa) is absent in them, the Buddha did not reply. The eternal nature (nityalakṣaṇa) and the non-eternal nature (anityalakṣaṇa) seen by these heretics have no reality. Why? The heretics grasp (udgrhnanti) these natures and become attached to them (āsajyante), saying: “This is eternal, that is nothingness.” As for the Buddha, he too speaks of eternal nature and non-eternal nature, but merely by way of refutation (pratipakṣa).

Furthermore, people say: “Nothingness (nāstitva) exists; existence (astitva) does not exist.” They are making a mistake, and the Buddha does not make a mistake by not answering.

The sun (sūrya) lights up the earth, but it can neither lower the mountains nor elevate the valleys: it is limited to making them visible. In the same way, the Buddha has no action on dharmas. If they exist, he says that they exist; if they do not exist, he says that they do not exist. Thus he said:

“Old age and death have birth as condition (jātipratayam jārāmaraṇam), etc. [253c] on up to: the formations have ignorance as condition (yāvad avidyāpratayāḥ saṃskārah). Whether there is a Buddha or there is no Buddha, this causality (idampratayatā), this nature of things (dharmatā), is always present in the world. Buddhas appear in the world in order to teach this Dharma to beings.”

Furthermore, if the Buddha talked about eternalism (śāvata) or nihilism (uccheda), this would be a mistake. If you were asked what is the size or the physical appearance of the son of a barren woman and a eunuch (vandhyāṣaṇḍhaputra), this question would not deserve an answer. It is the same for the fourteen difficult questions: only in hypothesis do eternalism and nihilism have a basis to which response may be made, but since there is no eternity or nothingness, the Buddha does not respond.

---

843 For the fifth time, the Traité returns to this subject: see above, p. 154-158F, 421F, 423F, 529F.
844 See references above, p. 158F, note 2; 1378F
845 A free citation of a canonical passage: Tsa a han, T 99, no. 296, k. 12, p. 84b-c. See above, p. 157F, note 1 and references to be added from the Nidānasamānyukta, p. 147-149.
For all these reasons the Buddha does not make the mistake of answering the fourteen difficult questions.

**H. Simultaneous Teaching of the Self and the Non-self**

In some places the Buddha says that the ātman exists and in other places he says that it does not exist. –

People who understand the meaning (arthā) of the Buddhist doctrine and know the designation (prajñāpatti) say that the ātman exists. People who do not understand the meaning of the Buddhist doctrine and do not know the designation say that the ātman does not exist.

Furthermore, if a person is about to fall into the view of nihilism (ucchedāṛṣṭi), the Buddha says to him: “There is an ātman which, in future existences, undergoes [the retribution] of its wrongdoings (āpatti) and its merits (puṇya).” On the other hand, if a person is about to fall into the view of eternalism (sāśvatāṛṣṭi), the Buddha says to him: “There is neither an ātman, nor someone who acts (kāraka) nor a patient (?) (vedaka), and there is no autonomous dharma (svatantra) existing separate from what are called the five aggregates (pañcaskandha).”

Question. - If that is so, where is the truth?

Answer. – It is the ātman that is true, for the Seals of the Dharma (dharmamudrā) say: “All conditioned dharmas are impermanent; all dharmas are without self; nirvāṇa is peace” (sarvasaṃskāra anityāḥ, sarvadharmaḥ anātmānaḥ, saṃtamaḥ nirvāṇaḥ). Now the Dharma seal called nirvāṇa is the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. But if someone has not yet planted the roots of good (anavaropitakusaladharma), if his wisdom is not yet sharp (atikṣṇaprajñāḥ), the Buddha does not preach the profound doctrine of anātman (gambhīrānātmadharma) to him because, if he did, this person would fall into the view of nihilism (ucchedāṛṣṭi).

Question. – So be it. But in the Kiu-chō-wen (Kāśyapaparipccchā), the Buddha said: “The ātman is one extreme, the anātman is the other extreme: avoiding these two extremes is called the Middle Way” (ātmyaḥ ayam eka antah, anātmyaḥ ayam dviṭīya antah. ity etāv ubhāv antāv anupagamyā madhyamā pratipad ity ucyate). Therefore why do you say here that the anātman is true and that the ātman is just a manner of speaking [that constitutes] a skillful means (upāyapravacana)?

Answer. – 1) The partisans of anātman (anātmavādin) are of two kinds: i) those who grasp (udgṛṇanti) at the nature of anātman (anātmalakṣaṇa) and clinging (āśyante) to the anātman; ii) those who destroy the ātman

---

846 Monier-Williams: vedaka = proclaiming, making known
847 These two apparently contradictory sūtras have been cited above, p. 32F, notes 1 and 2.
848 A peremptory affirmation which ought to draw the attention of western literary circles trying desperately to introduce the notion of a soul into Buddhism.
849 See above, p. 1369F.
without, however, grasping at the anātman or clinging to it so that the anātman disappears by itself (svatah).

For the first, the anātman is an extreme (anata); for the second, the anātman is the Middle Way (madhyamā pratipad).

2) Furthermore, if the Buddha speaks of the ātman or the anātman, he has two reasons for doing so: i) if he is speaking from the conventional point of view (saṃvṛttih), there is an ātman; ii) if he is speaking from the absolute point of view (paramārthih), there is no ātman.

This is why he is not wrong in speaking sometimes of ātman and sometimes of anātman.

I. Simultaneous Teaching of Existence and Non-existence

In some places the Buddha speaks of the existence of dharmas and in other places he speaks of their non-existence.

Question. – You should not speak separately of existence (astitā) and non-existence (nāstitā): existence is ātman and non-existence is anātman. Why return [to a subject already dealt with]?

Answer. – 1) That is not correct (ayuktam etad). In the Buddhadharma there are two kinds of emptiness (śūnyatā): i) the emptiness of beings (sattvaśūnyatā); ii) the emptiness of things (dharmaśūnyatā).

Saying that there is no ātman is stating the emptiness of beings; saying that there are no dharmas is stating the emptiness of things. [254a]

Saying that there is an ātman and knowing the nature of pure designation (prajñapti-śūnyatā) is not clinging to the ātman; saying that there is an ātman within the five aggregates (pañcaskandha) is clinging to the ātman. In order to destroy this clinging to the ātman, it is said: “There is only the five aggregates. Impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self, peace and nirvāṇa, that is existence.”

2) Furthermore, there are two kinds of views of nothingness (ucchedadṛṣṭi):

a. “There is no future existence (aparajanman) where one undergoes suffering (duḥkha) or happiness (sukha) as a result of wrongdoings (āpatti) or merit (puṇya).” For those people, it is said: “There is an ātman that, from the present existence (iḥajanman) to the future existence (aparajanman), undergoes the retribution for wrongdoings and merits.

b. “All dharmas are empty (śūnya) and without attachment (nirāsaṅga).” This is a wrong view (mihiyāḍṛṣṭi) and, for these people, it is said: “There are [two kinds of] dharmas, namely conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas.

3) For beings of dull faculties (atīkṣṇendriya), it is said that there is no ātman; for beings of sharp faculties (tīkṣṇendriya) and deep wisdom (gambhiraprajñā), it is said that dharmas are empty from beginning to end. Why? Because anātman involves the rejection of dharmas. Thus it is said:

If he knows anātman well,
Every person who thinks in this way

Does not rejoice on hearing about existent dharmas,

Does not grieve on hearing about nonexistent dharmas.

Actually, to speak about ātman is to give support (āśraya) to things; to speak about anātman is to stop any support.

4) Moreover, the Buddhist doctrine has two ways of expressing itself: i) if it speaks clearly, it says that dharmas are empty; ii) if it expresses itself as skillful means (upāya), it says that there is no ātman. These two ways of teaching the Dharma end up in the same nature of Prajñāpāramitā. This is why the Buddha says in the sūtra: “The paths (mārga) that lead to nirvāṇa are absolutely identical: it is not that there are different paths.”

5) Moreover, the existent ātman, existent dharmas, parents, wrongdoings (āpatti) and merit (pūnyā), greater or lesser karmic retribution, are spoken of particularly to lay people (grhaṇa). Why? Because lay people generally do not seek nirvāṇa but cling to retribution of actions (phalavipāka) in future existences. On the other hand, the nonexistent ātman and non-existent dharmas are spoken of mainly to monastics (pravrajita). Why? Because generally monastics tend toward nirvāṇa, do not assume dharmas, nirvāṇa being the destruction of self.

6) Moreover, there are people whose spiritual faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhādindriya) are not yet ripe (paripakva) and who first seek perceptible [benefits] and later abandon them. For these people the Buddha advises [the accumulation] of good dharmas and the rejection of bad dharmas. By contrast, there are people whose spiritual faculties, faith, etc. (śraddhādindriya) are already ripe (paripakva) and who seek no perceptible [benefit] (upalabhā) in dharmas; they seek only to avoid the saṃsāric destinies. For these people the Buddha teaches emptiness (śūnyatā) and the non-existence (amupalabdhitā) of dharmas.

Both teachings are true (satya). Thus the ring finger (aṅguli) is both long (dīrgha) and short (hrasva); compared to the middle finger (madhyamā), it is short and compared to the little finger (kaniṣṭhā), it is long; its longness and its shortness are both true. It is the same for the doctrine of existence (astitvāvāda) and the doctrine of non-existence (nāstitvāvāda). To speak of existence is sometimes conventional (samvṛti) and sometimes absolute (paramārtha); to speak of non-existence is sometimes conventional and sometimes absolute. That the Buddha [254b] speaks of ātman or of anātman, both are true.

Question. – If both these things are true, why, as a general rule, does the Buddha praise emptiness (śūnyatā) and criticize existence (astitā)?

Answer. – Emptiness (śūnyatā), non-existence (amupalabdhitā) is the treasure of the Dharma (dharmanidhāna) of the Buddhas of the ten directions, noble amongst all. Thus it is said in the

851 For this idea, see Saddharmapuṇḍ., p. 40: Ekam evaḥam Śāriputra yānam ārabhya sattvānāṃ dharmaṃ deśayāmi yadidaṃ buddhayānam. na kiṃcic Śāriputra dvitiyāṃ vā triyāṃ samvidyate.
Prajñāpāramitā, in the *Tchou-lei-p’in* (Parīṇāma-parivarta): “The Prajñāpāramitā is the treasure of the Dharma of the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions.”

The Prajñāpāramitā is the emptiness of non-existence (*anupalambhaśūnyatā*). If the Buddha sometimes speaks of non-existent dharmas, it is in order to ripen beings (*sattvaparipācanārtham*) who, long afterwards, will all enter into the treasure of the Dharma of non-existence.

Question. – If that is so, why does the *Prajñāpāramitā* say: “Seeing the emptiness (*śūyatā*), the non-existence (*anupalabdhitā*) of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*) is not bodhi”?

Answer. - It is said in the *Prajñāpāramitā* that existence and non-existence do not exist.

[Dīghanakhasūtra.]853 – Similarly the *Tch’ang-tchao fan-tche king* (Dīghanakha-brahmacārisūtra) says:

There are three kinds of wrong view: *i*) everything exists; *ii*) nothing exists, *iii*) things are partly existent and partly non-existent.

The Buddha said to the brahmācārin Dīghanakha: The view that ‘everything exists’ is tied to desire, aversion and ignorance (*moha*). The view that ‘nothing exists’ is not tied to desire, or aversion, or ignorance. The view that ‘things partly exist and partly do not exist’ is partially tied and partially not tied to the aforementioned faults.

Faced with these three views, the noble disciple has the following thought: “If I adopt the view that ‘everything exists’, I will be in debate with two people: the one for whom nothing exists and the other for whom things partly exist and partly do not exist. If I adopt the view that ‘nothing exists’, I will also be in debate with two people: the one for whom nothing exists and the other for whom things partly exist and partly do not exist. If I adopt the view that ‘things partly exist and partly do not exist’, I will be in debate with two people: the one for whom everything exists and the other for whom nothing exists.”

From that arises conflict, from conflict arises disagreement, from disagreement arises violence. Foreseeing conflict, disagreement and violence for himself, the disciples gives up this view of non-existence and adopt no other view.857 Not taking up any view, he enters into the path.

---

852  Pañcavimsāti, T 223, k. 20, p. 363b4: Ānanda, these six pāramitās are the inexhaustible treasure of the Dharma of all the Buddhas. The Buddhas of the ten directions who presently preach the Dharma are all derived from the six pāramitās. The same in the past and the future.

853  An extract from the *Dīghanakhasutta* of the Majjhima, I, p. 497-501 (cf. Tsa a han, T 99, no. 969, k. 34, p. 249a-250a; Pie yi tsa a han, T 100, no. 203, k. 11, p. 449a-b), the original Sanskrit of which is reproduced partially in the *Avadānaśataka*, II, p. 187 seq.

854  Avadānaśataka, II, p. 188.

855  Ibid., p. 188-189.

856  Ibid., p. 189-190.

857  Ibid., p. 190
If one does not cling to the emptiness of dharmas, the mind does not arouse debate (vivāda) and merely drives out the fetters (saṃyojana): this is true knowledge. But if one grasps (udgrhnāti) the empty nature (śūnyanimitta) of dharmas, one provokes debate and one does not destroy the fetters; holding on to that wisdom is not true wisdom.

Everything that the Buddha says is aimed at saving beings; that is why there is not a single one of them that is not true. According to whether people cling (abhiniviśante) or do not cling to them to them, they are sometimes in the right and sometimes in the wrong. For all these reasons, the bodily, vocal or mental actions of the Buddha are ‘preceded by knowledge’ (jñānapūrvavaṃgama) and ‘accompany knowledge’ (jñānānuparivartin).

Question. – You said at the beginning that the Buddha has neither physical defect nor vocal defect nor mental defect (cf. āvenikadharmas no. 1-3), and here [254c] you say again that his bodily, vocal and mental actions accompany knowledge (cf. āvenikadharmas no. 13-15). What is the difference in meaning (arthaviśeṣa)?

Answer. – The first three attributes in terms of which the Buddha has no defect did not give a reason. These do give the reason: because his actions accompany knowledge (jñānānuparivartin). If the Buddha did not reflect before carrying out his bodily, vocal or mental actions, he would make mistakes, but since the Buddha first uses knowledge before carrying out his bodily, vocal or mental actions, he is faultless.

Furthermore, the Buddha is endowed with three kinds of pure action (pariśuddhakarman), three kinds of pacified actions (praśantakarma), three kinds of actions not requiring secrecy (ārakṣyakarman). Some people wonder why the Buddha has such actions and this is why the Buddha says: “All my bodily, vocal and mental acts (kāyavāgmanaskarman) are preceded by knowledge (jñānapūrvavaṃgama) and accompany knowledge (jñānānuparivartin).”

16-18. The Buddha penetrates the past, the future and the present

The Buddha knows the past (auṭa), the future (anāgata) and the present (pratyutpanna) by means of his knowledge, and his penetration is without obstacle (apratiḥata).

858 The physical, vocal and mental conduct of the Buddha being perfectly pure, he has no bodily, vocal or mental misdeeds to be hidden for fear that somebody should find it out: these are the three or four arakkheyya (ārakkheyya) in Pāli (Dīgha, III, p. 217; Anguttara, IV, p. 82-84), the arakṣya (arakṣana, arakṣaṇīya, arakṣya, arakṣana) in Sanskrit: Mahāvyut., no. 192-195; Bodh, bhūmi, p. 403; Sūtrālamkāra, XXI, v. 53; Samgraha, p. 287, 299; Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. 14, p. 761b14; Āloka, p. 915.
His threefold knowledge bears upon the three times and his penetration is without obstacles because his three actions accompany knowledge.859

A. Sarvāstivādin-Sautrāntika Debate on Time

859 The author of the Traité finds himself in a difficult position in regard to the problem of the three times, and he must use all his subtlety to get out of it with honor.

On the one hand, he has adopted the Mahāyāna list of the eighteen āvenīkadharmas. But in this list, numbers 16-18 say that the Buddha knows and penetrates unobstructedly the past, present and future. If he knows them, it is because they exist. Thus the author is forced to accept the existence of the three times.

On the other hand, the author is a Mādhyamikan for whom time does not exist either as an immutable entity or in dependence on causes. Thus the author is forced to deny the existence of the three times.

Here is how the author will proceed:

1) Well before his period, the problem of time had been discussed by the great Hīnayāna schools and a controversy had opposed the Sarvāstivādin-Vaihāskiṣas to the Sautrāntikas, a debate fully set forth in the Vībhāṣa, the Abhidharmakośa and the Nyāyānusāra, wisely translated and commented on by L. de La Vallée Poussin in his translation of the Kośa, V, p. 50-65 and in his article entitled Documents d’Abhidharma, MCB, V, 1936-37, p. 7-158.

The Sarvāstivādins affirmed the existence of the dharmas of the three times “because the Bhagavat said so, because the mental consciousness proceeds from the organ and the object, because it has an object and because the past bears a fruit.” The Sautrāntikas criticized it “because if past and future things really existed, the dharmas coming from causes (saṃskṛta) would always exist and would therefore be eternal. Now scripture and logic proclaim them to be impermanent.”

Brought at this point to intervene in the debate, the author of the Traité comes out on the side of the Sarvāstivādins and recognizes the existence of the three times. The result is that the list of the Mahāyāna āvenīkadharmas can legitimately claim that the Buddha knows the past, the future and the present.

2) By means of a second procedure and by referring particularly to the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, the Traité claims that all dharmas, no matter to which category they belong, “have but a single nature, namely, the absence of absence.” Therefore it is absurd to attribute temporal characteristics to them.

By denying now that which it previously asserted, the Traité is not contradicting itself in any way. When it recognizes temporal or other characteristics in dharmas, it is out of regard for the beings who are to be converted by certain considerations of temporal order. By refusing any characteristic to dharmas, it is referring simply to the universal and ungraspable emptiness (amupalambhaśūnyatā). In the first case and with the example of the Buddha, it is using skillful means (upāya); in the second case, it is restricted to wisdom (prajñā).
[The Sautrāntikān.] – Past dharmas, already destroyed, no longer exist; future dharmas, not yet come, are not formed; the present which lasts but an instant (ekakṣaṇīka) has no period of duration (sthitikāla). Then how can the Buddha know the three times with an unhindered penetration?

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – The Buddha affirms unobstructed penetration of the past, the future and the present. How can his word be wrong?

Moreover, if there were no past or future and if there was only an instant of the present, the Buddha would never realize his innumerable qualities (apramāṇa) such as the ten knowledges (daśajñāna) or the ten [powers (daśabala)]. There cannot be ten simultaneous knowledges in one single mind. If that were the case, the Buddha would never fulfill the ten powers. This is how we know that there is a past and a future.

[The Sautrāntikān]. – If the past, the future and the present existed, what could there not be? But the Buddha preached the four truths (catusatya) and, in the truth of suffering (duḥkhāyatā), he saw the aspects of impermanence, etc. (anityādyākkāra). Impermanence (anityatā) is death after birth, ruin (vīpariṇāma), vanishing (anupalabdhi). If past dharmas existed actually in truth, there would no longer be impermanence, ruin, vanishing.

Moreover, [to claim] that the past, future and present exist is to fall into eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭi). Why? If the dharma exists in the future, it necessarily exists in the present and from the present it goes into the past. If a man were to leave one house to enter another, we would not say that he has disappeared.

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – What is wrong in saying that he has not disappeared?

[The Sautrāntikān]. – If there were no impermanence (anityatā), there would be neither sin (āpatti) nor merit (puṇya), neither birth (jāti) nor death (maraṇa), neither bondage (bandhana) nor liberation (mokṣa).

Sins (āpatti) are the ten bad paths of action (daśākuśalakarmapātha), killing (prāṇātipāta), etc. If there were no impermanence [in other words, if the victim of the killing were eternal], there would be no sin of killing, etc., and, as is said in the Fen-pie-sie-kien (Mithyaḍṛṣṭivibhaṅga): “A knife driven into the body and impaling the seven places would do no harm.”

Merits (puṇya) are the ten good paths of action (daśakuśalakarmapātha), abstaining from killing (prāṇātipātavirati), etc.

Impermanence (anityatā) is the distinct births and deaths. If there were no impermanence, there would be neither birth nor death, there would be neither bondage (bandhana) nor deliverance (mokṣa). These are the innumerable errors (apramāṇadosa) [resulting from the eternalist system].

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – The dharmas of the three times each have their own characteristic (lakṣaṇa): the past dharma has the characteristic of the past, the future dharma has the characteristic of the future, the present dharma has the characteristic of the present. If the past and the future had the characteristic of the present, there would be the difficulties [that you have raised], but here past, future and present each have their own characteristic.

Furthermore, if there really was neither past nor future, the condition of being a monastic (pravrajitasamvara) would not exist either. Why? As soon as he would be in a bad state of mind
(duṣṭacitta) and would break his earlier commitments (śīla), this monk would no longer be a bhikṣu. And as soon as a saint (āryapudgala) would return in mind to worldly things (lokasamvrti), he would be just an ordinary person (prthagjana) since, [according to your hypothesis], there is neither past nor future nor present.

In the same way, sins (āpatti) also, beginning with the five ānantarya ‘sins of immediate retribution’, would not exist. Why? It is necessary for the five ānantaryas to be actions already past (atītakarman) and for their doer to be dead, for the latter to enter into hell (naraka). Now if these five ānantaryas are still to come (anāgata), there is no action (karman) and, as a result, no retribution (vipāka); and, in the present existence (pratypannātmabhāva), they are not ‘of immediate retribution’ [since the death of their perpetrator has not yet occurred]. Therefore, if the past did not exist, there would be no ānantarya sins and, still less, any other sins. The same reasoning holds for merits (puṇya).860 To deny the existence of sin and of merit is a bad view (mithyādṛṣṭi) and those who hold it are no different from birds and beasts.

Moreover, I do not say that past and future exist like the present. I say that the past, although vanished, is capable of producing a memory (smṛti) and of giving birth to a mind (citta) and mental events (caitasikadharma).

Thus, the fire that was extinguished yesterday can today give rise to a memory, but it is impossible that this fire be revived by virtue of this memory. If I see that someone is gathering kindling (indhana), I know that they will light the fire and I say to myself that today’s fire is like yesterday’s fire, but it is not possible for the fire to be re-kindled by virtue of this memory that I have of the fire. It is the same for that which is things of the future. Although the present mind (pratyutpannicitta) is instantaneous (kṣaṇika) and without duration (asthitika), it re-arises in series (saṃtāna) and is able to recognize dharmas. Inwardly (adhyātmam) using the actual mind (manas) as cause (hetu) and outwardly (using the dharmas as object (ālambana), a mental consciousness (manovijñāna) takes up its job.861 This mental consciousness, which is

860 Kośabhāṣya, p. 295, summarizes the debate thus:  

Yadi cātāmaṁ na syāt śubhāsubhasya karmanāḥ phalam āyatāṁ kathāṁ syāt. na hi phalotpattikāle vartamāno vipākahetur asṛti, tasmād asty evātītāṅgatam iti Vaibhāṣikāḥ. – “If the past does not exist, how would the retribution in the future of a good or bad action exist? Actually, at the moment when the fruit of retribution is produced, the cause of the retribution is no longer present. This is why the Vaibhāṣikas say that the past and the future exist.”

861 Kośabhāṣya, p. 295, presents the argument thus:  

Dvayaṁ pratītya viśītāṅgasātādy ātkāyam ity uktam. dvayaṁ katamāt. cakṣū rūpaṁ yāvan mano dharmā iti. asati vātītāṅmagate tadālambanam viśītāṅma dvayaṁ pratītya na syāt. - Paraphrased translation: It is said by the Buddha (Saṃyutta, II, p. 72) that it is because of two things, [organ and object], that consciousnesses arise. What are these two things? The eye and colors for the eye consciousness, and so on up to: the mind (manas) and things (dharma) for the mental consciousness (manovijñāna). If past and future things did not exist, the mental consciousness, which has them as object and which arises as a result of two things – as the Buddha has it – would not arise.
sovereign (adhipati), cognizes (vijānātā) past, future and present dharmas. There is only the mind and the actual mental (pratyutpanna) events that it does not cognize; it cognizes all the rest.

**B. The Non-existence of Time According to the Mahāyāṇa**

**Question.** – In the Prajñāpāramitā, in the Jou-siang p’ìn (Tathātālakṣaṇaparivarta), it is said: “The three times (tryadhvā) have but a single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), namely, the absence of nature (alakṣaṇa).”

Then why is it said here that the Buddha’s knowledge knows the three times with an unhindered penetration?

**Answer.** – The Buddhas have two ways of preaching the Dharma (dharmanirdesa): i) first, analysis of the dharmas (dharmanivibhanga); ii) then, the preaching of unlimited emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā).

When the Buddha claims that he penetrates dharmas of the three times without any obstacle, this is an analytical teaching (vibhajya nirdeśa). When he says that the three times have but a single nature, namely, the absence of nature, he is teaching unlimited emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā).

Moreover, those who are not omniscient (sarvajñā) come up against obstacles (pratigha) in the consciousness of the three times. Thus saints such as [255b] Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Maitreya, Śāriputra, etc., have all encountered obstacles in the consciousness of the three times.

Therefore when it is said that the Buddha cognizes the three times with an unhindered penetration, we are not referring to emptiness [but simply to the analysis of dharmas].

Finally, there are people who produce wrong views (mithyadrṣṭi) in regard to the three times and who say: “Past (atīta) dharmas and beings (sattva) have a beginning (pūrvanta), do not have a beginning, etc.”

If they have a beginning, then there are new beings, and the dharmas also arise without cause or condition (hetupratyaya).

---

862 For the Sarvāstivādin, the present mind does not cognize itself: it is the manas that is just past that is cognized by the immediately following manovijñāna; cf. Kośa, I, p. 31; IX, p. 231 and note.

863 In agreement with the other Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, the Pañcaviṃśati speaks of the adhvaśūnyatā ‘emptiness of time’, excluding any beginning (pūrvanta), any end (āparānta) and any present (p. 49, l. 5-19): it proclaims the tryadhvasamātā ‘the identity of the three times’ (p. 242, l. 6, 10, 19) and concludes from it that all dharmas are without characteristics: Sarva ete dharmā na samyuktā ni visamyuktā arūpiṇḍa ‘nidarśanā apratīghā ekalakṣaṇāḥ yadutālakṣaṇāḥ.

864 The ninth of the eighteen emptinesses. The Pañcavimśati, p. 196, l. 17-18, defines it thus: Tatra katamātyantaśūnyatā. yasya anto nopalabhyahe tad atyantam atyantena śūnyam akūṭasāṁvināśītām upādāya. tat kasya hetoḥ. prakṛṭir asya eṣa. Kumārajīva translates (T 223, k. 5, p. 250c2-4): What is atyantaśūnyatā? Atyanta means that the limit of dharmas is ungraspable because they are neither eternal (akūṭasthā) nor destroyed (avināśita). Why? Because that is their nature.
If they do not have a beginning (pūrvānta), neither do they have an end (aparānta), they have neither end nor middle (madhyānta). Or else not having a beginning means having a middle and having an end; not having an end means having a beginning and a middle; not having a middle means having a beginning and an end.

But if beings (sattva) and things (dharma) are without beginning, they are also without middle and without end and, since the three times (tryadhvan) do not exist, there is nothing (ākiṃcid).866

Furthermore, if there is no beginning, how can there be this Omniscient One (sarvajñā) who, in order to destroy all these wrong views, declares that "the dharmas of the three times (tryadvadharma) have but a single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), namely, the absence of nature (alakṣaṇa)" and who, in order not to destroy the threefold time, declares that "the Buddha knows it"?

Question. – But absence of nature (alakṣaṇa) is has limits (antavat)!

Answer. – No. Absence of nature is limitless (ananta), inexpressible (anabhilāpya) and unquestionable.

Why do you say it is limited? If one grasps characteristics in the absence of characteristics, this would no longer be an absence of characteristics (yady alakṣaṇe nimittāny udgrhiṇyād alakṣaṇam na syāt). By absence of nature we mean the ungraspable emptiness (anupalambhaśūnyatā). Here, absence of nature is ungraspable and emptiness itself is ungraspable. This is why absence of characteristics is called ungraspable emptiness.

Furthermore, the Buddha has two kinds of paths (pratipad):867

1. The path of merit (punyapratipad), if a person, hearing about the ten powers (bala) of the Buddha, his four fearlessnesses (vaśāradya), his four unhindered knowledges (pratisaṃvid) and his eighteen special attributes (āvenikadharma), produces minds of veneration (satkāra) and faith (prasāda).

2. The path of wisdom (prajñāpratipad), if a person hearing that dharmas coming from the complex of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagryutpanna) are without self-nature (niḥsvabhāva), abandons all these dharmas, but does not become attached in mind to emptiness.

Thus the moon (candra) moistens objects (vastu) and the sun (sūrya) ripens them, and thanks to this twofold action, everything prospers. The path of merit (punyapratipad) and the path of wisdom (prajñāpratipad) do the same: the path of merit gives rise to qualities (guṇa), and the path of wisdom, acting on the path of merit, expels attachment to wrong views (mithyādṛṣṭyabhiniveśa).

This is why, although he preaches the limitless emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā) of dharmas, the Buddha also speaks of his unhindered penetration of the three times; there is nothing wrong in this.

---

865 An absurd consequence, for the trnasmigration of beings has had no beginning (anamataggāyam bhikkave saṃsāro) and conditioned dharmas by definition are the result of causes and conditions (hetusampanna, hetuppabhāva, idappaccayatāpatticcasamuppanna).

866 Cf. Pañcaviṃśati, p. 240: Nāsya yānasya pūrvānta upalabhīyate nāparānta upalabhīyate na madhya upalabhīyate. tryadhvasaṃmāt tad yānaṃ. tasmād mahāyānaṃ mahāyānam ity ucyate.

867 For this twofold path, see below, k. 29, p. 274a10.
This is a brief explanation (samkṣepanirdeśa) of the meaning of the eighteen special attributes of the Buddhas.

Second Section  REFUTATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDIN THEORIES ON THE SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA

I. REFUTATION OF THE FIRST SARVĀSTIVĀDIN LIST

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – If that is so, why did Kātyāyanīputra give the name āvenikadharma to the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya), the great compassion (mahākārūṇā) and the three special equanimities (āvenikalāṃyupasthāna) of the Buddha? If the eighteen special attributes that you mentioned above, [namely, nāsti tathāgatasya sūkhālita, etc.] were really true, why did Kātyāyanīputra list others?

[The Mahāyānist]. – This is why he is called Kātyāyanīputra ‘son of Kātyāyanī’. If he was truly Śākyaputra ‘son or disciple of the Buddha’ [like [255c] us’, he would not say that. The Śākyaputraśas have defined the real special attributes. Moreover, the attributes of the Buddha are numberless and the 36 attributes [mentioned by us, namely, the 18 non-special attributes studied in chapters XXXIX and XL, plus the 18 special attributes studies in chapter XLI] are, amongst all the Buddha’s attributes, like a drop of water (bindu) in the great ocean (mahāsamudra). The attributes of the Buddha are not rare. Why enumerate eighteen [like Kātyāyanīputra]?

Moreover, the arhats, pratyekaduddhas and bodhisattvas [share to some degree in the ten balas that Kātyāyanīputra reserves as special attributes of the Buddha]; they too know what is possible and what is impossible (bala no. 1); they reveal the retribution of action in the three times (bala no. 2); they distinguish the dhyānas and the samāpattis (bala no. 3) and they reach āsravakṣayajñāna (bala no. 10). Under these conditions, how could [Kātyāyanīputra] say that these attributes are special to the Buddha?

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – Yes, but the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas do not have ‘an exhaustive knowledge, a universal knowledge’ (cf. above, p. 1526-7F) of these things. They have only the cognition (abhiṣṭa) and the knowing (vidyā) of them, but do not have the power of knowledge (jñānabala) like the Buddha. Only the Buddha knows all that ‘in an exhaustive manner, in a universal manner’, and this is why these knowledges are ‘special’ to him. Therefore refer back to what has been said about the ten powers (above, p. 1556-7F).

[The Mahāyānist]. – When the Buddha explained the meaning (artha) of these ten powers, he did not emphasize his ‘exhaustive and universal’ knowledge of them; he simply said that he knew what is possible

---

868 For this first list prepared by Kātyāyanīputra, see references above, p. 1626F.
and what is impossible (sthānāsthāna), etc. Those who have spoken of his ‘exhaustive and universal knowledge’ are the scholars (upadesācarārya).

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – I beg your pardon! As you yourself said above (p. 1557F) they are spoken of in the Mahāyāna and the Buddha, being still a bodhisattva, claimed to know all ‘in an exhaustive and universal way’.

[The Mahāyānist]. – Yes, we talk about them in the Mahāyāna, but what does that matter to you? You do not believe in the Mahāyāna, you refuse the evidence and you yourself say that the śrāvaka system is the [only] valid one.

Moreover, although the Buddha has this ‘exhaustive knowledge’, this ‘universal knowledge’ of the ten powers, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have a small portion of it. [Therefore Kātyāyanīputra is wrong in considering the ten powers (bala) as special attributes of the Buddha.] But śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have absolutely no part of the eighteen special attributes [which we propose in the Mahāyānist list: nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam, etc]. This is why we describe them as truly special attributes.

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – But the practitioners of the two Vehicles, [namely, the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas] also share in the eighteen special attributes [of the Mahāyānist list: nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam, etc.]. The Buddha alone never has bodily, vocal or mental faults (attributes no. 1 to 3 of the Mahāyānist list); but sometimes the practitioners of the two Vehicles do not have them either. Therefore they share in these attributes [and these do not belong exclusively to the Buddha].

[The Mahāyānist]. – Your objections do not hold (ayuktam etad). Why? What constitutes the special attribute is the fact of never having faults and not the fact of not having them [from time to time]. The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not share the perpetual harmlessness of the Buddha. [Thus this perpetual harmlessness is indeed a special attribute of the Buddha.]

Furthermore, the arhats are indeed said to possess the powers in question, but nowhere do they qualify them as special attributes (āvēnika). And you who do not believe in the Mahāyāna reject the eighteen truly special attributes [proposed in our Mahāyānist list: nāsti tathāgatasya skhalitam] and you count the ten powers (bala) [in the list of attributes drawn up by your Kātyāyanīputra]. This procedure is inadmissible!

Then look at these 80 secondary physical marks (aṣīty anuvyañjanāni) of the Buddha in which you believe but which are not mentioned in the Tripiṭaka. Why not reject them [since you reject the powers, etc., in your list of special attributes]?

II. REFUTATION OF THE SECOND SARVĀSTIVĀDIN LIST

[The Sarvāstivādin]. – However, we have drawn up [a list] of eighteen special attributes where we do not count [the ten powers]. What are these eighteen?

1. The Buddha knows the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas; thus he is omniscient (sarvajñā).
2. The nature of the qualities (guna) of the Buddha is difficult to probe (durvigaha): thus his qualities are immense.

3. Animated by a lofty aspiration (adyasha), he thinks of others lovingly: thus he is greatly compassionate (mahakarunika).

4. He has acquired incomparable knowledges (asamajana): thus he has mastery in knowledge (jananavaśita).

5. He penetrates well the nature of the mind (cittalaksana): thus he has mastery of concentration (samadhivaśita).

6. He has found the means (upāya) of saving beings: thus he has mastery in metamorphosis (nirmāṇavaśita).

7. He knows well the causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) of dharmas: thus his teaching (vyākaraṇa) is immense.

8. He preaches the true nature (bhūtalaksana) of dharmas: thus his teaching is not wrong.

9. He speaks by distinguishing (vibhajya) and evaluating (mitvā): thus he has no vocal fault (nāsti tathāgatasya ravītam).

10. He has attained the perfection of the ten powers (daśabarasampad): thus he has no loss of wisdom (prajñāparihāni).

11. In every conditioned dharma (samskṛtadharma) he sees only a mass of things (dharmasaṃcaya) and non-self (anatman): thus his actions are always generous.

12. Knowing the favorable occasion (kāla) and the unfavorable occasion (vikala), he has established the threefold Vehicle (yānatraya) for he always sees beings.

13. He is always mindful (sadāśmṛtimat): thus he has no lapses (muutsasmṛtī).

14. For innumerable incalculable periods (asaṃkhyeyakalpa) he has deepened the good minds (kūsalacitta): thus he is free of traces of the disturbing emotions (kleśavāsana).

15. He has attained perfectly pure knowledge (pariśuddhajñāna): thus there is nobody who can legitimately (saha dhamena) find any faults in him.

16. From lifetime to lifetime, he has venerated honorable individuals: thus the top of his head is invisible (anavalokitamūrdhatā).

---

869 This is the 2nd attribute in the Mahāyānist list.
870 This is the 10th attribute in the Mahāyānist list.
871 This is the 3rd attribute in the Mahāyānist list.
872 This is equivalent to introducing the four vaisāradyas into the list of special attributes.
873 This is the first of the 80 anuvyañjanaś according to the list drawn up by the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras: see above, p. 1346F.
17. He cultivates the mind of great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā): thus he brings down his feet quietly, the soles of his feet are soft and delicate (mṛdutaraṇapādatala) and beings who meet him find happiness.

18. He has acquired the supernatural powers (abhiñā) and the perfections (pāramitā): thus he transforms the minds of beings and leads them to rejoice and find salvation. When he enters a city, he manifests the power of his transformations (vikurvaṇabala).

[The Mahāyānist]. – These eighteen special attributes [proposed in your list] are not mentioned in the Tripitaka and even less so in other sutras. As some people are on the lookout for the attributes of the Buddha, the śrāvakas and the scholars (upadeśācārya) gather a few from everywhere to celebrate the qualities (guna) of the Buddha.

Thus the absence of vocal fault (nāsti tathāgatasya raviṭam), the non-loss of wisdom (nāsti prajñāpariṇāṇih) and the absence of memory lapses (nāsti muṣitaṃsmyritā) [mentioned in no. 9, 10 and 13 of your list] are borrowed from the eighteen special dharmas of Mahāyānist origin [no. 2, 10, and 3 of our list], and having chosen them, you comment on them.

The invisible top of the head (anavalokitamūrdhatā) and the soft and delicate soles of the feet (mṛdutaraṇapādatala) [mentioned in no. 16 and 17 of your list] are very frequent marks and cannot be counted among the eighteen special attributes of the Buddha.

The [real] special attributes have knowledge (jñāna) as essence and there can be no question there either of the physical strength (kāyabala) of the Buddha – a strength comparable to that of ten myriads of perfumed white elephants (śvetagandhasātin) – or of the strength of his supernatural powers (abhiñābala). This is why we must know that, in the eighteen special attributes, it is only a matter of the qualities of knowledge (jñāna) and not attributes consisting of the automatic fruits of retribution (vipākaphala).

Third Section CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE EIGHTEEN SPECIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BUDDHA RECORDED IN THE MAHĀYĀNIST LIST

874 This is the 6th of the 32 lakṣaṇas according to the list prepared by the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras above, p. 274F.
875 The 32 physical marks (lakṣaṇa) in their entirety or partially, were possessed by others than the Buddha: see above, p. 285-286F and notes.
876 See above, p. 1348F.
877 Normally the lakṣaṇas are the reward for ‘actions productive of the 32 marka’ (dvārimśallakṣaṇakarman) accomplished by the Bodhisattva during the hundred kalpas following the three asaṃkhyaeyakalpas of his career: see above, p. 246-255F.
1. According to the A-p’i-t’an-fen-pie (Abhidharmavibhaṅga), the eighteen special attributes [of the Mahāyāna list] are included (samgrhīta) in the five aggregates (skandha):

- The absence of physical fault (no. 1) and of vocal fault (no. 2), the physical action accompanying knowledge (no. 13) and the vocal action accompanying knowledge (no. 14) are included in the aggregate of form (rūpaskandha).

b. The absence of the concept of variety (no. 4) is included in the aggregate of concept (samjñāskandha).

c. The absence of non-concentrated mind (no. 5) is included in the aggregate of consciousness (vijñānaskandha).

d. The other attributes are included in the aggregate of volition (saṃskāraskandha).

2. All the attributes are in the fourth dhyāna for it is in the fourth dhyāna that the Buddha attained enlightenment (sambodhi) and attained nirvāṇa.

3. Some say that the four material special attributes (no. 1, 2, 13, 14) are included in the desire realm (kāmadhātu) and the form realm (rūpadhātu) and that the other attributes are included in the nine levels [rūpadhātu, 4 dhyānas, 4 samāpattis].

4. All the attributes are good (kuśala) and are pure dharmas (anāsravadharma).

5. The four material dharmas (no. 1, 2, 13, 14) are the result of two conditions (pratyaya): the causal condition (hetupratyaya) and the governing condition (adhipatipratyaya). – The other attributes are the result of four conditions [by adding to the previous two the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) and the object condition (ālambanapratyaya)].

6. Four attributes (no. 1, 2, 13, 14) are without object (anālabana); the other four have an object (sālambana).

7. Four attributes are accompaniments to mind (cittānuparivartin) but are non-associated with mind (na cittasamprayukta). – Thirteen attributes are associated with mind (cittasamprayukta) and accompany mind (cittānuparivartin). - [256b] One attribute is non-associated with mind (na cittasamprayukta) and does not accompany mind (na cittānuparivartin).

All of this is explained in the Abhidharmavibhaṅga. To understand this is to penetrate into the Perfection of Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) and the true nature (bhūtalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. All these dharmas have a single nature (ekalakṣaṇa), namely, the absence of nature (alakṣaṇa): in the mind of the Buddha, they have one characteristic, namely, pacification (śanta).
CHAPTER XLII THE GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND
THE GREAT COMPASSION OF THE BUDDHAS

PRELIMINARY NOTE

Loving-kindness and compassion are included in the four immeasurables (apramāṇa) also called brahmāvihāras which are abundantly commented on in the old canonical texts and have been treated in detail in Chapter XXXIII. The Prajñāpāramitā considers them to be complementary dharmas of the Buddhist path, usually practiced by the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and also advised for the bodhisattvas. It is recognized by all that the practice of the four immeasurables exclusively profits the practitioner who nourishes them in the state of meditation but is of no benefit to the beings who are their object. In other words, loving-kindness and compassion are purely platonic feelings the sole result of which is the purification of the mind of the one who experiences them.

The great loving-kindness (mahāmaitri) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā) of the Buddhas is quite different. These truly profit those who are taken as their object.

I. GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND GREAT COMPASSION ACCORDING TO THE ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA

1. There is practically no mention of them in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas which adhere to the law of karma in all its strictness. If a being has his own actions as his sole good, his sole heritage and sole recourse, it is hard to see how the loving-kindness and compassion of the Buddhas would be of any benefit whatsoever to him.

But as always, an exception must be made for the Ekottarikāgama, a late text loaded with Mahāyānist interpolations In a sūtra which has no correspondent in Pāli (T 125, k. 32, p. 725c7-9), it comments that “the Tathāgata, endowed with great loving-kindness and great compassion, thinks with pity about beings, contemplates them all and everywhere, seeks to save those who are not yet saved, never abandons them like a loving mother for her child.” Besides, in the Balasūtra (T 125, k. 31, p. 717b13-23), reviewing the characteristic strengths of beings, it states that the strength of a young boy are tears (runda), that of women is anger (krodha), that of śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas patience (ksanti), that of kings pride and inflexibility (mānastambha), that of arhats effort (vyāyāma), and finally, that of the Buddha Bhagavats mahāmaitrī and mahākaruṇā. – This latter comment does not appear in the correspondent Balasūtra of the Saṃyukṭāgama (T 99, k. 26, p. 188a2-7) and of the Anguttaranikāya (IV, p. 223).

The Paṭisambhidāmagga (I, p. 126-131), which is part of the fifth Nikāya, lists no less than 82 miseries of human society (lokasannivāsa), miseries provoking the great compassion of the Buddha with regard to beings, but it does not mention the practical effects of this great compassion.
2. The late Vinayas, such as that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, and the post-canonical literature show the evidence of a growing interest in regard to these two attributes of the Buddha. In three places in the Divyāvadāna (p. 95-96), 124-125, 264-265) and in fourteen places in the Avadānāṣataka (I, p. 16-17; 30-31; 72-73. etc), there is a stock phrase in honor of these great compassionate ones (mahākarunika) who are the Buddha Bhagavats, endowed with all the qualities and who, three times during the night and three times during the day, i.e., six times in a day and night, look at the world with their Buddha-eye (trīrātre trirdivasasya śatkytvo rätrimdivasena buddhacaksuṣā lokaṃ vyavalokayanti) and ask themselves: In whom should I plant seeds of good not yet planted (kasyānavaripitāni kuśalamūlāny avaropayāmi), in whom should I make the roots of good grow that are already planted (kasyāvaropitāni kuśalamūlāni vivardhayāmi), etc? This classic stock phrase is often followed by stanzas where it says that the Buddha never loses the opportunity of converting beings, watching over them and protecting them with the care of a loving mother for her only son, looks for them like a ‘cow of compassion’ seeking her calves that are in danger. See for example, Divyāvadāna, p. 96.

3. Faced with the almost complete silence of the Pāli Abhidhamma, it was the task of Kātyāyanīputra and his disciples to fix the position of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika school in regard to the great compassion of the Buddhas and to note the similarities and differences in the karaṇa practiced during the course of the four apramānas and the mahākarunā reserved for the Buddhas and great bodhisattvas. The explanation is practically identical in the Mahāvibhāṣa (T 1545, k. 31, p. 159b13-160b18; k. 83, p. 428a5-431b3), the Kośa (VII, p. 77-79) and the Kośabhāṣya (p. 414-415), the Nyāyānusāra (T 1562, k. 75, p. 749b7-29) and the Kārikāvibhāṣa (T 1563, k. 36, p. 957b13-c7).

a. Karunā and mahākarunā are by nature conventional knowledge (saṃvijñāna), therefore impure (sāṣrava), because they concern beings conventionally and not really existing.

b. Mahākarunā is ‘great’ for five reasons: i) by its accessories (saṃbhāra) for it is produced by a great accumulation of merit and knowledge (mahāpunyajñānasamāhārasamudāgamāt); ii) by its aspect (ākāra) for it considers things under the aspect of the three sufferings (tridūkhkhātākaravāt), namely, the suffering of suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhatā), the suffering of existence (saṃskāraduḥkhatā) and the suffering of change (pariṇāmaduḥkhatā); iii) by its object (ālambana) for it has as object the beings of the threefold world (traiḍātukālambanā); iv) by its equality (samatava) for it concerns all beings equally; v) by its superiority (adhimātratva) for no other compassion is superior to it.

c. Karunā and mahākarunā differ in their nature (svabhāva), their aspect (ākāra), their object (ālambana), the level (bhūmi) on which they are noticed, the mental series (saṃtāna) in which they dwell, their mode of acquisition (lābha), the protection (paritrāṇa) which they exert or do not exert, and finally, the extent to which their impartiality (tulyatva) is extended.

Karunā is the absence of hatred (advēṣa); mahākarunā is the absence of delusion (amoha).
Karunā takes the aspect of a single suffering, namely, the suffering of suffering (duḥkhaduhkhata); mahākarunā takes the aspect of the threefold suffering, i.e., suffering of suffering, suffering of existence (samskaraduhkhata), suffering of change (parināmaduhkhata).

Karunā has as object the beings of the world of desire (kāmadhātu); mahākarunā has as object the beings of the threefold world (traiḥdātuka).

Karunā is practiced in the anāgāmya, the dhyānāntara and the four dhyānas; mahākarunā is practiced in the fourth dhyāna alone.

Karunā dwells in the mental series of prṛṭhagjanas, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; mahākarunā arises only in the mental series of Buddhas.

Karunā is obtained by detachment from the desire realm (kāmadhātu); mahākarunā by detachment from the threefold world including the sphere of bhavāgra.

Karunā, the simple feeling of pity, does not protect beings; mahākarunā is an efficacious compassion and protects beings from the terror of saṃsāra.

Karunā is a partial pity that sympathizes only with suffering beings; mahākarunā extends impartially to all beings impartially.

d. Why does the Buddha speak only of great compassion whereas he does not mention great loving-kindness, great joy, great equanimity? These should also be described as great because all the qualities (guna) present in the Buddha are great since they come from the wish to assure the benefit and happiness of innumerable beings…Besides, there are sutras where great loving-kindness, etc., is spoken of.

II. GREAT LOVING-KINDNESS AND GREAT COMPASSION ACCORDING TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

Taken separately or together, the mahāmaitrī and mahākarunā of the Buddha literally invade the Mahāyāna sūtras where they appear on almost every page. It will suffice here to refer to the citations collected by Śāntideva in his Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 286-290.

In their way of dealing with the subject, the śāstras of the Greater Vehicle are evidently inspired by the Sarvāstivādin masters mentioned above: see, e.g., the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, T 1606, k. 14, -p. 761c1-4, the Bodh. bhūmi, p. 247-248, and above all, the Upanibandhana on the Saṃgraha, p. 301-302 as note. The Two Vehicles agree on an essential point: the lesser karunā practiced in the course of the apramānas is of no use to beings, whereas the mahākarunā of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas is an efficacious skillful means.

There are, however, important points on the subject of which the Hināyāna and Mahāyāna scholars disagree:
1) The Mahāyānists did not know or, in any case, did not retain the 82 miseries of human society given by the Paṭisambhidā (I, p. 126-131) as bringing forth the great compassion of the Buddhas. In their place, they have a list of 32 Tathāgatasya mahākaruṇāḥ drawn up by the Brahmaviśeṣacintīparīcchā (T 585, k. 1, p. 9b23-10a16; T 586, k. 2, p. 41c6-42a25; T 587, k. 2, p. 72b26-73b9) and reproduced in the Mahāvyut., no. 154-186.

2) In contrast to the Sarvāstivādins, they do not accept that the great compassion of the Buddhas is a conventional (saṃtyijñāna) and impure (sāsrava) knowledge on the pretext that it deals with non-existent beings. For the Mahāyānists, all the attributes of the Buddha are pure (anāsrava).

The Sūtraṃkāra, p. 127 says: Mātāpitprabhṛtīnāḥ hi trṣṇāmayah snehoṣāvadhyāḥ, laukikakaruṇāvihārīnāṁ niravato ‘pi laukikaḥ, bodhisattvānāṁ tu karuṇāmayāḥ sneho niravadyaś ca laukikākārtikṛntas ca. – “In the mother, the father, etc., affection, made of desire, is blameworthy; in those who dwell in worldly compassion, affection is beyond reproach, but nevertheless worldly. But among bodhisattvas, affection, made of (pure) compassion is both beyond reproach and supraworldly.

If the Sarvāstivādins take the great compassion and omniscience of the Buddhas to be conventional knowledges, worldly and impure, it is because they are concerned, more or less, with non-existent beings and things. But in the eyes of the Mahāyānists, the argument does not hold. Indeed, according to the Aksāyasamātisūtra (see above, p. 1245F, 1272F), apart from the mahākaruṇā having beings and things as object, there is a mahākaruṇā without object (anālambana). It is that of the Buddhas and also of the great bodhisattvas who, beginning at the eighth bhūmi, are no longer disturbed by objects and notions: this eighth level, Acalā, is rightly called anabhisanśkārābhogavihāra or anābhoganirmittavihāra (cf. Sūtraṃkāra, p. 178; Bodh. bhūmi, p. 367; Saṃgraha, p. 202). In simple words, the great compassion of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas acts spontaneously outside of any consideration relating to beings and things. This is why it is so effective.

3) Finally, the Mahāyānists, instead of locating mahāmaitrī and mahākaruṇā in the fourth dhyāna as the Sarvāstivādins do, place it in the great samādhis of the Buddhas, the Samadhīrājasamādhi and Siṃhavikṛdītasamādhi.

These are the ideas which the Traité is going to develop in the following pages.
Sûtra. – [The bodhisattva-mahātattva who wishes to cognize perfectly] great loving-kindness and great compassion must practice the Perfection of wisdom (bodhisattvena mahāstvena mahāmaitrīṃ mahākaruṇāṃ pariṇātukāmena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śikṣatavyam).

Sāstra. –

1. Great loving-kindness and great compassion

Great loving-kindness (mahāmaitrī) and great compassion (mahākaruṇā) have already been explained above (p. 1242F seq.) in the chapter entitled ‘The Four Immeasurables’ (caturapramāṇacitta). Here we will repeat it briefly (samskepeṇa).

Great loving-kindness assures the happiness (sukha) of all beings; great compassion uproots the suffering (duḥkha) of all beings. Great loving-kindness gives beings the causes and conditions for happiness; great compassion gives beings the causes and conditions that eliminate suffering.

Suppose there is a man whose sons are in prison (kāraṇa) about to undergo great torture. If their father, with loving-kindness and compassion, uses some skillful means (upāya) to prevent their suffering, that is great compassion; if, having freed them from suffering, he then gives his sons the five objects of enjoyment (pañca-kāmaguṇa), that is great loving-kindness. There are many differences of this kind.

2. Degrees of loving-kindness and compassion

Question. – Great loving kindness and great compassion being so, what is lesser loving-kindness and lesser compassion?

Answer. – The loving-kindness and compassion that are part of the four immeasurables (apramāṇacitta) are lesser; but here the loving-kindness and compassion that are concerned in the eighteen special attributes (āvenikadharma) are great.

Furthermore, the loving-kindness and compassion found in the Buddha’s mind are called great: those found in the minds of other people are called lesser.

---

878 This version departs from the revised Pañcaviṃśati (ed. Dutt, p. 21, l. 4-5) where it is said that mahāmaitrī, mahākaruṇā, mahāmuditā and mahopeksā should be cultivated by the bodhisattva.

879 Adopting the variant p’i in place of tsouei.

880 In this section, the Traité partially adopts the Sarvāstivādin views on lesser and great compassion: see above, p. 1717F.
Question. – If that is so, why is it said that the bodhisattva practices great loving-kindness and great compassion?

Answer. – The great loving-kindness of the bodhisattva is lesser compared with that of the Buddha, but compared with that of adepts of the two Vehicles [śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas], it is great. The magnitude is a question of words (prajñapti). The great loving-kindness and great compassion of the Buddha are truly very great.

Furthermore, lesser loving-kindness gives happiness to beings only in theory; actually, it has no happy effect. Lesser compassion considers the various physical and mental sufferings of beings and has pity on them, but is incapable of freeing them from suffering. On the other hand, the great loving-kindness not only wishes that beings find happiness, but also assures them of happy things; and great compassion not only has pity for the suffering of beings but also frees them from sufferings.

Furthermore, in worldly people (prthagjana), śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas, the loving-kindness and compassion are described as lesser, whereas in the Buddhas they attain the epithet of great.

Furthermore, great loving-kindness arises in the mind of great men (mahāpurusa), appears suddenly within the great dharmaśaras of the ten powers (bala), the four fearlessnesses (vaśāradya) the four unobstructed knowledges (pratisamvid) and the eighteen special attributes (āveṇikadharma): it is able to destroy the great sufferings of the three bad destinies (durgati) and can bring the three kinds of great happiness: i) happiness of the gods (divyasukha), ii) human happiness (manusyasukha), iii) the happiness of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasukha).

In addition, this great loving-kindness is extended to all the beings of the ten directions and three times, including insects (prāṇin). Loving-kindness penetrates the marrow of the bones (asthimajjan) and the mind never renounces it.

Suppose that the beings of the trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu had fallen into the three bad destinies (durgati) and in their place a single man underwent the sufferings of each of them; suppose that after having repaid these sufferings, this man took the happiness of the five objects of enjoyment (paṅcakāmagunasukha), the happiness of the trances and absorptions (dhyanasamāpattisukha), the supreme happiness of this world (laukikāgrasukha) and distributed them liberally to beings to make up for it. Well then! This man would not reach the ten-millionth past of the loving-kindness and compassion.

881 Since coarseness and subtlety, big and small, are relative notions (parasparāpeksika), as has been said above (p. 729F, 1687F).

882 See above, p. 1707F, 1709F.

883 The tisso dukkhatā, namely, dikkhadukkhatā, samkhyāradukkhgatā and viparītadukkhgatā: cf Dīgha, III, p. 216; Samyutta, IV, p. 259; V, p. 56.

884 Cf. Commentary of the Dhammapada, III, p. 51 which also distinguishes manusyasukham, dibbasukham and paramatthabhūtāṃ nibbānasukham.

885 In contrast to the lesser loving-kindness which bears upon only beings of Kāmadhātu.
of the Buddha. Why? Because the happiness of the world is deceptive, false and does not free from saṃsāra.

3. Epithet ‘great’ reserved for loving-kindness and compassion

Question. - All that resides in the mind of the Buddha is great; why do you say that only his loving-kindness and compassion are great?

Answer. – All the qualities (guṇa) belonging to the Buddha are necessarily great.

Question. – If that is so, why do you say only that his loving-kindness and compassion are great?

Answer. – The loving-kindness and compassion are the root (mūla) of the enlightenment (saṃbodhi) of the Buddhas. Why is that?

The bodhisattva sees beings tormented by all the sufferings (duḥkha): suffering of birth (jāti), old age (jarā), sickness (vyādhī) and death (maraṇa), bodily suffering (kāyika), and mental suffering (caitasika), suffering in this life and in the next life (ihaparata duḥkha). Feeling great loving-kindness and great compassion, he comes to save beings from these sufferings, and subsequently he forms the resolution (cittam utpādayati) of seeking anuttarā samyaksambodhi. By the power of his great loving-kindness and great compassion, in the course of saṃsāra in innumerable incalculable lifetimes, his courage never sinks (cittam asya nāvalīyate). By the power of his great loving-kindness and his great compassion and although he could have attained nirvāṇa long ago, he does not give the evidence of it (na sāksātkaroti). This is why, among all the attributes of the Buddha, loving-kindness and compassion are great. If he did not have this great loving-kindness and this great compassion, he would enter nirvāṇa too soon.

Next, when he attains enlightenment, he realizes innumerable very profound concentrations (samādhi): trances (dhyāna), absorptions (samāpatti) and liberations (vimokṣa). Experiencing this pure happiness (vīśuddhasukha), he abandons it and does not keep it. He goes into the villages (grāma) and the towns (nagara) and preaches the Dharma with all kinds of avadānas and nidānas. He changes his form and guides beings by an infinity of vocal sounds (ghoṣa); he endures curses, injuries, criticisms and slander on the part of beings and goes so far as to become a female musician: all that thanks to his great loving-kindness and great compassion.

Furthermore, the epithet ‘great’ attached to great loving-kindness and great compassion does not come from the Buddha: it is beings who describe them thus. In the same way, the lion (simha) that is very strong never boasts of the greatness of its strength, but all the beasts remember it. [257a]

---

886 This is what the Vijñānavādin later will call apratiṣṭhita nirvāṇa: cf. Sūtrālaṃkāra, p. 41, 47, 147, 171; Madhyāntavibhaṅga, p. 4, 108, 200.
Beings have heard speak of the many marvelous attributes of the Buddha and they know that the Buddha, in order to save beings, can accomplish austerities (duṣkaracaryā) for innumerable incalculable periods (asamkhyaṃkalyāṇa). Hearing and seeing such exploits, they have given the names of great loving-kindness and great compassion to these attributes.

A man who had two friends was thrown into prison (kārā) for some misdeed. One of his friends provided the necessities and the other died in his place. Everybody declared that the friend who died in his place was full of loving-kindness and compassion. It is the same for the Buddha who, from lifetime to lifetime has sacrificed his head (śiras), eyes (nayana) marrow (majja) and skull (mastaka) for beings. Beings hearing and seeing these things in one accord have called him the great loving-kindness one and the great compassionate one.

[Śibijātaka]⁸⁸⁸. — As king Che-p’i (Śibi), he wanted to save a pigeon (kapota) by replacing his own flesh as [an equivalent] and as the piece of his flesh did not reach the weight of the pigeon, he climbed onto the balance (tulā) and ransomed the pigeon at the cost of his body. Then the earth shook in six ways (prthivī saṇḍikāram akampata), the water of the sea rose in waves and the devas offered the king perfumed flowers. Beings cried out: “He is truly a great loving-kindness one and great compassionate one to be so concerned for a little bird at this point.”

The Buddha receives the epithet of great loving-kindness and great compassion from beings. There are many jātakas of the same type that could be told fully here.

4. Epithet ‘great’ refused for the wisdom of the Buddhas

Question. — There are yet other qualities (guna) in the Buddha, such as concentration (samadhi), etc., and people do not know them, do not describe them as great. But the Buddha’s wisdom (prajñā), his preaching of the Dharma (dharmanirdeśa), etc., make beings find the Path; why are they not called great?

Answer. — Nobody fully knows the power of the Buddha’s wisdom but, in his great loving-kindness and great compassion, the Buddha, from lifetime to lifetime, sacrifices his life and abandons the bliss of the concentrations in order to save beings and this everyone knows. The Buddha’s wisdom is cognizable by induction (anumaya), it cannot be cognized directly. But his loving-kindness and compassion are visible to the eye and audible to the ear; they are cognizable, for the Buddha has uttered his lion’s roar (siṃhanāda) several times.

Furthermore, the Buddha’s wisdom is subtle (sukṣma) and wonderful and if the bodhisattvas and Śāriputra do not know it, what can be said of other people? Loving-kindness and compassion are visible

---

⁸⁸⁷ For this detail, see above, p. 143-144F and n.
⁸⁸⁸ Jātaka told in full above, p. 255-260F.
and audible and people can believe them and accept them. The wisdom of the Buddha is so subtle that it cannot be probed (durvigāhya).

Furthermore, great loving-kindness and great compassion are loved by everyone: they are like a delicious medicine (oṣadhi) that people like to swallow. Wisdom is like an unpleasant medicine that many do not like at all. But because they like loving-kindness and compassion so much, they have described them as great.

Furthermore, there are hardly any beings already enlightened (abhisambuddha) who are able to believe and accept the Buddha’s wisdom. In contrast, great loving-kindness and great compassion are of such a different kind that everybody can believe them and accept them. As they have seen a picture of them or heard the voice, they can believe and accept them and, since they have derived much benefit (hita) from them, they call them great loving-kindness and great compassion.

Furthermore, great wisdom has as its nature the relinquishment (parityāga), the rejection (parivarjana) of dharmas; great loving-kindness and great compassion have as their nature pity for (anukampa) and service (upakāra) to beings. [257b] This pity and service are loved by all beings; that is why they call them great loving-kindness and great compassion of the Buddha.

In the Tch’e-sin king (Vīśeṣacintisūtra or Brahmvīśeṣacintiparipṛcchā) it is said that great loving-kindness and great compassion have thirty-two ways of acting on beings.889 On the extent (saṃgraha), nature (lakṣaṇa) and object (ālambana) of this great loving-kindness and great compassion, see above (p. 1269F) what has been said in regard to the four immeasurables.

5. Loving-kindness and compassion are pure among the Buddhas

Moreover, the great loving-kindness, great compassion and the other qualities (guṇa) of the Buddha should not be multiplied. The system of Kātyāyana tries to distinguish the natures (lakṣaṇa), and great scholars, basing themselves on Kātyāṇa’s system, comment on these distinctions:890 all of that should not be accepted. Why?

Kātyāyana says that great loving-kindness (mahāmaityrī), great compassion (mahākaruṇā), omniscience (sarvajñatā) are impure dharmas (sāsrayadharma), bonds (grantha), worldly dharmas (laukikadharma). But that is not correct. Why?

Great loving-kindness and great compassion are the root (mūla) of all the Buddha’s attributes; how can it be said that they are impure dharmas (sāsrayadharma), bonds (grantha), worldly dharmas (laukikadharma)?

889 See references above, p. 1269F, n. 1.
890 See the preliminary note to the present chapter.
Question. – Although great loving-kindness and great compassion are the root of the Buddha’s attributes, they are impure. Although the lotus (padma) grows in the mud (paṅka), we cannot, however, describe the mud as marvelous. It is the same for great loving-kindness and great compassion; even though they are the root of the attributes of the Buddha, they cannot be pure (anāsrava).

Answer. – As long as the bodhisattva has not become Buddha, his great loving-kindness and great compassion can be called impure (sāsrava) and still show faults (doṣa), but as as soon as he has attained, as Buddha, the knowledge of unhindered deliverance (apratihatavimuktijñāna), all his attributes are pure (śuddha); all the disturbing emotions (kleśa) and their traces (vāsanā) have disappeared. The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not possess the knowledge of unobstructed deliverance and do not eliminate the traces of the disturbing emotions (kleśavāsanā). Often even their doubts (saṃśaya) on this subject have not been destroyed and this is why their mind is impure. The Buddhas themselves have none of that. So why then do you say that their great loving-kindness and great compassion are impure?

Question. – I do not wish to be lacking in respect but, since the minds of loving-kindness and compassion in the Buddha concern beings, they are necessarily impure (sāsrava).891

Answer. – The power (prabhāva) of the Buddhas is inconceivable (acintya). The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas feel loving-kindness and compassion without being able to eliminate the notion of being (sattvasamjñā), whereas the Buddhas feel loving-kindness and compassion beyond any notion of being. Why is that?

In the arhats and pratyekabuddhas, the nature of ‘beings of the ten directions’ (daśadiksattvanimitta) does not exist (nopalabhyate) and yet, when they feel loving-kindness and compassion, they grasp the nature of being (sattvanimittam udgrhaṇanti). The Buddhas would have to look hard for a single being in the ten directions and they would not find him, and when they feel loving-kindness and compassion they do not grasp the nature of being (sattvanimittam nodgrhaṇanti).

This is what is said in the Wou-tsin-yi king (Akṣayamatisūtra): “There are three kinds of loving-kindness and compassion: i) those that have beings as object (sattvālambana); ii) those that have things as object (dharmālambana); iii) those that that have no object (anālambana).”892

Finally, Buddha is the only one among all beings to cultivate the non-deceptive Dharma exclusively (aśathyadharma). If the Buddha practiced loving-kindness and compassion among beings by way of grasping the nature of being, we could not say that he practices the non-deceptive Dharma. Why? Because beings are absolutely non-existent (atyāntanupalabdha).

It does not say that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas cultivate exclusively [257c] the non-deceptive Dharma and this is also so in regard to beings (sattva) and things (dhāraṇa), insofar as they sometimes grasp characteristics (nimittāny udgrhaṇanti) and sometimes they do not grasp them.

891 Impure in that they still involve belief in the individual (satkāyadrṣṭi).
892 A passage already referred to above, p. 1245F, 1272F.
It is impossible to make the objection to us that the Buddha does not cultivate the non-deceptive Dharma. His omniscience (sarvajñāna) destroys all the impurities; it can come from impure dharmas (sāsrava) and itself play the part of a pure cause (anāsrava). How could such an attribute be impure (sāsrava)?

Question. – The pure knowledges (anāsravajñāna) each have their object (ālambana); there is not one that can completely bear upon all dharmas. Only conventional knowledge (samvrtijñāna) bears upon all dharmas. This is why we say that omniscience is impure (sāsrava).

Answer. – That is what is said in your system, but it is not said in the system of the Buddha. If a man carrying his own bushel-measure (drona) went to the market and this bushel-measure did not correspond to the official bushel-measure, there would be nobody who would use it. It is the same for you. You are using a system that does not correspond to the system of the Buddha and so nobody wants to apply it.

Why would not pure wisdom (anāsravaprajñā) bear upon all dharmas? This impure knowledge [this conventional knowledge (samvrtijñāna) which, according to you, bears upon all dharmas] is conventional (saṃketika), deceptive (mṛśavādin) and weak: consequently it cannot bear upon all dharmas correctly and exactly. It is you who claim, in your system, that it bears upon all dharmas.

Furthermore, the system of the śrāvakas includes ten knowledges (jñāna), but in the Mahāyāna there is an eleventh called ‘knowledge conforming to reality (yathābhūtajñāna)’. The ten [traditional] knowledges end up in this knowledge conforming to reality in order that they form only a single knowledge, i.e., pure knowledge (anāsravajñāna). In the same way, the rivers (nadi) of the ten directions empty into the great sea (mahāsamudra) where they all take on one and the same taste, that of salt.

Great loving-kindness and great compassion are included (samgrhiṇa) in the Samādhirasamādhi and the Siṃhavikriḍitasamādhi of the Buddhas.

This briefly (samkṣepaṇa) explains the meaning of great loving-kindness and great compassion.

---

893 For the Sarvāstivādins, samvrtijñāna is impure and bears upon all dharmas. See above, p. 1474-1475F.
894 Adopting the variant jou che tche. This eleventh knowledge added by the Mahāyānists to the traditional ten knowledges has been defined above, p. 1483,F, 1486F.